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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the wartime experience of the League of Nations. It analyses the 
League’s ability to serve as a touchstone for international political, economic and 
social cooperation in a period of intense crisis for liberal internationalism. It 
demonstrates that the League’s political identity retained a relevance to a world at 
war, despite the failure of its diplomatic role. The thesis chronicles the efforts of 
League officials and of member states as they strove to maintain, in the League’s 
international civil service, a nucleus of liberal idealism in contradistinction to fascist 
expansionism. It determines the impact of geo-political factors on the integrity of the 
League apparatus and documents how the League’s ideological baggage determined 
its wartime social and economic work. The League did not remain a static entity in 
its final years and this work highlights the adaptation of League officials to an 
evolving political landscape with the League’s wartime experience providing a 
bridge between pre-war internationalism and its post-war variant. The successes and 
failures of the League’s political and technical organs were a reflection of the course 
of international affairs with its wartime history serving as a barometer of the 
diminished Eurocentrism and rising Atlanticism of international cooperation. This 
period was emblematic of the challenges of internationalism with the League’s 
international civil service splintering under the weight of internal and external 
pressures. The League’s wartime experience also underscored the reality that 
internationalism was a contested concept. The League’s brand of internationalism, 
with its aim of universalising the values of liberal democracy, was increasingly out-
of-step with a war-weary preoccupation with security. League officials fought to 
preserve technocratic unity between the old organisation and the U.N.O. within an 
international order increasingly dominated by the two emerging superpowers; neither 
of which enjoyed a straightforward relationship with the League of Nations.  
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
A product of the Paris Peace Conference (1919), the purpose of the League of 
Nations was to regulate international diplomacy and to serve as a forum where 
member states, through mutual and voluntary contract, agreed to abide by the terms 
of a Covenant. This Covenant, evoking the language of a sacred biblical promise, 
bound each state to respect and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity 
of its fellow member states. The League was intended as an alternative system to the 
closed-door and exclusive diplomacy practised during the antecedent Concert of 
Europe system; instead member states formally prescribed to ‘open, just and 
honourable relations between nations.’1 The League Council, permanently composed 
of the great powers as well as smaller states through a revolving system of temporary 
membership, was intended to mediate and arbitrate international disputes. The 
League Assembly, where every member state enjoyed a single vote, served as a 
forum for multilateral debate on various international issues. The League encouraged 
disarmament and sought to impose supervision on how its member states governed 
minority groups and residents of the former German and Turkish colonies through its 
Minorities and Mandates Commissions. The League also strove to promote social, 
economic and humanitarian progress through both the specialised branches of its 
Secretariat and separate affiliated technical commissions and organisations. These 
technical bodies included the semi-autonomous International Labour Organisation 
(I.L.O.); the Economic and Finance Organisation (E.F.O.); the Health Organisation 
(H.O.); the Permanent Central Opium Board (P.C.O.B.); the Drug Supervisory Body 
(D.S.B.); the Advisory Committee on Social Questions; the High Commissioner for 
Refugees and the Organisation of Intellectual Cooperation (O.I.C).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The Covenant of the League of Nations, available from Yale Law School, the Avalon Project 
(http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp) (20 April 2010).  
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Fig 1: Structure of the League of Nations and its specialised bodies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Informed by Martyn Housden, The League of Nations and the Organisation 
of Peace (Harlow, 2012), pp 1-19) 
 
The League of Nations, although imbued with globalist aspirations, 
represented a very specific kind of internationalism which by no means dominated 
the landscape of international affairs. While the League owed its immediate 
existence to the desire to avoid the replication of the horrors of the First World War, 
its establishment marked the apogee of an older socio-political movement; liberal 
internationalism. Historians agree that the League was the product of mid-nineteenth 
century liberalism with the rhetoric of the Covenant was closely bound to the 
traditions of liberal democracy.
2
 Liberal internationalism entailed a respect for 
democracy, sovereignty and free trade.
 3
 Liberal internationalists were motivated to 
strive for a peaceful international political and legal order while simultaneously (for 
the most part) respecting the rights of nation states.
4
 As such the League system was 
unable and often unwilling to accommodate the other variants of internationalism 
prevalent on the European continent, especially those shaped by the more radical 
ideologies of fascism and communism.
5
 However it was not only the rival 
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internationalism of the extreme left and right that strickened the League’s diplomatic 
machinery. Even among the liberal democratic countries at ease with the spirit of the 
Covenant the League was never the dominant means of conducting international 
diplomacy.
6
 The challenges faced by the League, as a vehicle for liberal idealism 
trying to compete with realpolitk, reached crisis point during the Second World War. 
Susan Pedersen, in her 2007 article ‘Back to the League of Nations’, argued that 
historical understanding of the League remained incomplete with many research 
possibilities left unexplored more than sixty years after its dissolution.
7
 Pedersen 
called on fellow historians to return to the chronically underused League archives in 
Geneva to ‘examine more intensely the personnel, mechanisms and culture of that 
Geneva-centred world.’ 8  This thesis contributes to the recent revival in League 
historiography by investigating the wartime preservation of the organisation during a 
crucial period for the evolution of internationalism.  
The thesis opens in 1939 against the backdrop of a volatile political 
landscape and ends in 1947 with the liquidation of the League of Nations. Chapter 
one documents the reaction of the political organs of the League, its Assembly and 
Council, to the outbreak of the Second World War. It contrasts the policy of the 
Assembly and Council towards the German and Soviet invasions of Poland with the 
course of action adopted by member states following the U.S.S.R.’s invasion of 
Finland. The manner in which the Secretariat and technical officials justified their 
continued existence, adapted their work to the reality of the situation and assumed 
the role of guarantors of the League’s Covenant on behalf of member states, is 
explored in chapter two. Secretary-General Joseph Avenol’s controversial and 
contested actions in the lead up to his resignation are also documented in the light of 
new primary evidence. The motivation behind the transfer of selected missions of the 
League of Nations to the United States and to Canada is also discussed. Chapter 
three chronicles the wartime activities of the League’s technical agencies. It 
identifies the various challenges to their work programmes and examines whether 
the League was able to preserve a semblance of institutional unity. Chapter four 
documents and discusses wartime relations between the League Secretariat and 
member states. It determines why certain states continued to ascribe importance to 
                                                          
6
 Zara Steiner, The lights that failed: European international history 1919-33 (Oxford, 2005), p. 299.  
7
 Susan Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’ in The American Historical Review, cxii (2007), pp 
1091-1117.  
8
 Ibid., p. 1112 
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League membership during the years of conflict and why others were anxious to 
relinquish it. Chapter four also documents how government attitudes to the League 
determined its contribution to the new international order that was slowly emerging. 
Chapter five outlines the processes involved in the dissolution and liquidation of the 
League. This chapter contributes to the scholarly debate on the construction of the 
United Nations Organisation and the influence of the League experience on this 
process.  
In 2011 Patricia Clavin questioned the approach of traditional international 
histories in their acceptance that internationalism (in its pre-war form) ended with 
the outbreak of the Second World War.
9
 The League’s political organs were not 
dissolved until 1946; during the following year its remaining international civil 
service oversaw the liquidation of its financial assets and the transfer of its functions 
to the new United Nations Organisation (U.N.O.). Despite this reality, the wartime 
experience of the League of Nations is one that is traditionally accorded meagre 
attention by general histories of the organisation.
10
 Where greater focus is accorded 
to this period it is usually confined to one or two dramatic episodes in the League’s 
final years such as the resignation of Joseph Avenol and the grandiloquent speeches 
of its final Assembly in April 1946.
11
 The most logical explanation for the historical 
neglect of the League’s last years would be that nothing of significance occurred 
during that period to warrant investigation. This was true for the League’s judicial 
organ, the Permanent Court of International Justice (located in The Hague), which 
assumed a nominal existence following the fatal disruption to its work by the 
German invasion of the Netherlands. However this project has found that the 
League’s wartime experience is rich in episodes, publications, accounts and 
correspondence which not only document a pivotal period for the organisation itself 
but which have profound implications for the development and evolution of 
internationalism. This thesis challenges the common historiographical tendency to 
                                                          
9
 Patricia Clavin, ‘Introduction: conceptualising internationalism between the world wars’ in Daniel 
Laqua (ed.), Transnationalism reconfigured: transnational ideas and movements between the world 
wars (London, 2011), p. 9.  
10
 See for example Clive Archer, International organisations (3rd ed., London, 2001); Ruth Henig, 
Makers of the modern world: the League of Nations (London, 2010); Martyn Housden, The League of 
Nations and the organisation of peace (Harlow, 2012); Northedge, The League of Nations; Paul Raffo, 
The League of Nations (London, 1974); George Scott, The rise and fall of the League of Nations 
(London, 1973); Frank Walters, A history of the League of Nations (London, 1952). 
11
 See for example Elmer Bendiner, A time for angels: the tragicomic history of the League of Nations 
(London, 1975); George Gill, The League of Nations from 1929 to 1946 (New York, 1996).  
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regard 1939 as the culmination of pre-war liberal internationalism. Instead it posits 
that the League’s wartime experience reflected the problems of pre-war 
internationalism and anticipated the challenges of its post-war variant.   
Biographies of the secretaries-general of the League have permitted a limited 
insight into the organisation’s wartime history. 12 James Barros in his biography of 
the second secretary-general of the League, Frenchman Joseph Avenol, and both 
Stephen Barcroft and Douglas Gageby in their respective biographies of his 
successor, Irishman Seán Lester, documented their subjects’ experience of this 
period as an episode in long and eventful international careers.
 Arthur Rovine’s 1970 
study The first fifty years: the secretary-general in world politics also provides an 
excellent insight into the potential and limitations of that office. These respective 
biographies are informative and commendable for their use (on Barros, Gageby and 
Barcoft’s part) of Lester’s personal papers and diary, otherwise neglected but 
astonishingly detailed sources on the League’s history from the late 1920s until 
dissolution. The focus of these biographical narratives on the personal histories of 
the secretaries-general did not permit, within their pages, scope for meaningful 
investigation and analysis of the wartime preservation of the League. They were also 
produced at a time when access to pertinent national archive files on the war period, 
especially those related to the Vichy regime, was restricted. Furthermore this thesis 
has found that the efforts entailed in preserving the organisation were not confined to 
the person of the secretary-general. Rather it was a collective effort on the part of 
numerous high officials within the League Secretariat and technical services whose 
endeavours were supported by influential national statesmen, civil servants and 
diplomats. The contribution of these figures to this seemingly quixotic endeavour 
needs to be documented to further our understanding of what the future of 
internationalism signified to those who continued to work within an international 
apparatus and to those who would be responsible for shaping the post-war 
international order.  
The neglect of the League’s wartime existence can be attributed to the 
traditional fixation of historians on the League’s poor record in the mediation of 
                                                          
12
 James Barros, Betrayal from within: Joseph Avenol and the League of Nations 1933-40 (New 
Haven, 1969); Stephen Barcroft, ‘The international civil servant: the League of Nations career of Seán 
Lester, 1929-47’ (PhD thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 1973); Raymond B. Fosdick, The League and 
the United Nations after fifty years: the six secretaries-general (Newtown, 1972); Douglas Gageby, 
The last secretary-general: Seán Lester and the League of Nations (Dublin, 1999); Arthur Rovine, 
The first fifty years: the secretary-general in world politics (Leyden, 1970).  
6 
 
international disputes. As earlier historians concluded that the League’s collective 
security potential was spent by the mid-1930s there was little interest in 
documenting its final years, especially as the League’s diplomatic organs, its 
Assembly and Council, were suspended in 1939 for the duration of the war. A.J.P. 
Taylor identified the culmination of the Abyssinian crisis in 1936 as the real end of 
the League while P. Raffo characterised the sanctions imposed by League member 
states on Mussolini’s Italy during that crisis as constituting, ‘nothing more than the 
death rattle of a dying organisation.’13 George Scott’s 1973 history of the League 
focused on the ‘fall’ of the organisation, characterising the dramatic episodes that 
marked the League’s existence as ‘sequences in a relentless theme of tragedy.’14 
Elmer Bendiner dubbed League headquarters a ‘mausoleum of hopes’ by the year 
1938, haunted by three ‘ghosts’ who experienced invasion or internal turmoil 
without any assistance from the organisation: China, Ethiopia and Spain.
15
 
Contemporaneous to the publication of these highly critical histories there existed 
another school of League scholarship that sought to depict the organisation not as a 
failure, but as an important bridgehead in international cooperation. One of the most 
notable examples of this historiographical tradition was Frank Walters’ A history of 
the League of Nations (1952) which was one of the first general histories of the 
organisation to appear in the aftermath of its dissolution. Walters argued that the 
League was worth studying as it constituted ‘the most effective move towards the 
organisation of a world-wide political and social order.’16 
In interacting with the existing corpus of League histories a thorough 
awareness is required that studies of the organisation have rarely been politically 
neutral. Even before the League’s dissolution a theoretical battleground was 
spawned that had its roots in competing ideologies. During its lifetime the League 
tended to elicit extreme responses; attracting both ardent support and vehement 
condemnation. This bi-polarity resonated in the subsequent scholarship with various 
historians and political scientists going to great lengths to present the League as 
either a success or a failure. Sympathetic studies of the League tended to be 
                                                          
13
 A.J.P. Taylor, The origins of the Second World War (London, 1963), p. 96; Raffo, The League of 
Nations, p.18.  
14
 Scott, The rise and fall of the League of Nations, p. 208.  
15
 Bendiner, A time for angels, p. 380.  
16
 Walters, A history of the League of Nations, p. 1.  
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described as ‘idealist’ with its more critical counterpoints classified as ‘realist.’17 
Notable exponents of the ‘idealist’ position include Walters, a former deputy 
secretary-general, and politicians such as Viscount Cecil, one of the principal 
architects of the Covenant. ‘Idealists’ could not refute the League’s failure to fulfil 
its role as the guarantor of the sovereignty of its member states. However they were 
quick to absolve the spirit and practices of the organisation from blame. They argued 
that the League was betrayed by the intransigence of the great powers which refused 
to deploy the machinery of the League to collectively condemn and punish 
unprovoked acts of aggression.
18
 Their position was perfectly encapsulated by 
Cecil’s famous observation: ‘The League of Nations has not been tried and found 
wanting; it has been found inconvenient and not tried.’19 The ‘idealist’ interpretation 
was rooted in the western liberal tradition and was often inspired by progressive 
politics. League supporters and apologists viewed the League as a civilising, 
enlightening and unstoppable force; proof of the onward march of human progress.
20
  
The ‘realist’ discourse in the study of international relations gained 
momentum as the League’s political mission stalled. Realist historians and theorists 
reject the position that international cooperation is the current of world history and 
that common interests morally bind member states to seek peaceful outcomes to 
disputes. Rather they accept that as states are confined ‘to a condition of 
international anarchy’, those states remain ‘self-interested, power-hungry and 
competitive actors’, thus limiting the scope of international cooperation in the 
political sphere.
21
 Gerhart Niemeyer did not accept the argument that the failure to 
fully realise the collective security potential of the League could be attributed to 
great power arrogance. Rather he argued that the League’s political and diplomatic 
machinery ought to have been designed to accommodate the dynamics of great 
power relations and the inevitable prioritisation of national interests over 
international cooperation.
22
 While the composition of the League Council reflected 
                                                          
17
 For a summary of the idealist/realist debate and the development of such categorisations see David 
Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd and John Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht: International 
organisation in the twentieth century (3rd ed., London, 1996).  
18
 See Walters, A history of the League of Nations, p. 778.  
19
 Raffo, The League of Nations, p. 8  
20
 See Brian G. Rathbun, Trust in international cooperation: international security institutions, 
domestic politics and American multilateralism (Cambridge, 2012), p. 58. 
21
 Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht, p. 12.  
22
 Gerhart Niemeyer ‘The balance sheet of the League experiment’ in International Organisation, vi 
(1952), p. 542.  
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Wilson’s belief that some states were more equal than others, the great powers did 
not possess the exclusive right to veto diplomatic action and administrative changes; 
rather unanimity among all members of the Assembly and Council was required to 
give effect to League resolutions.  
Clavin observed that historians have struggled to break free from the need to 
either exonerate or condemn the League for the breakdown in international 
diplomacy in the inter-war years.
23
 Such polarising scholarship has increasingly been 
eclipsed by the shift in League historiography away from the ‘popular caricature of 
its farcical disarmament programme’ towards a greater focus on the League as a 
facilitator of transnational encounters that achieved considerable success in the social 
and economic spheres.
24
 As Pedersen observed, these studies are less focused on 
what the League failed to do but on what it ‘did and meant over its twenty-five year 
existence.’25 This trend in League historiography corresponded to a sea-change in the 
study of international relations (I.R.), away from the binaries of the idealist and 
realist interpretation towards a ‘middle-way’ between the antagonisms of the two 
traditional theories. The ‘neo-liberal institutionalist’ theory of international relations 
accepts the realist argument that states are self-interested and jealous of their 
sovereignty but seeks to identify why states might, despite these limitations, continue 
to seek means of cooperation within international institutions such as the League.
26
 
International historians have made greater exertions to understand the League as a 
product of its time, the first comprehensive project in international cooperation, born 
in a period of intense and increasingly militant nationalism.
27
  
This thesis strongly identifies with this newer historiographical tradition and 
benefits from the recent opening up of League scholarship.  As the newer studies of 
the League’s technical agencies are not engrossed by the League’s political record 
they tend to be more alive to the organisation’s wartime history. Historians such Iris 
Borowy, Martin Dubin, Jill Jensen, William B. McCallister and Geert Van Goethen 
have discussed the wartime work programmes of the technical organisations.
28
 
                                                          
23
 Clavin, ‘Introduction: conceptualising internationalism between the world wars’, p. 4.  
24
 Ibid.  
25
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26
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27
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28
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Economists such as Anthony Endres and Grant Flemming have also examined the 
theoretical modules and business cycles employed during wartime by both the 
Economic and Finance Organisation and the International Labour Organisation.
29
 In 
her 2013 publication Securing the world economy: the reinvention of the League of 
Nations 1929-1946 Patricia Clavin made the most significant contribution towards 
the integration of the wartime history of the League into the wider narrative of the 
organisation. Chronicling the efforts of the Princeton mission of the League’s 
Economic and Finance Organisation, Clavin demonstrated how the E.F.O.’s lifelong 
commitment to supporting global capitalism was reflected in its wartime studies; 
studies which not only had an immediate influence on post-war relief and 
reconstruction measures but which also reverberated within new international 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and even the 
European Economic Community.
30
  
Pedersen pointed out that while studies of the League’s technical 
organisations have become increasingly popular, these agencies are largely dealt 
with separately and there has yet to be a ‘synthetic study’ of the League’s entire 
technical experience.
31
 It is not within the scope of this thesis to offer such a 
‘synthetic study’, however it does adopt a more holistic approach to the League’s 
wartime history. It documents the institutional experience of the League’s 
international civil service during the Second World War by focusing on how the 
disparate technical organisations related to one another and to the League’s high 
direction and Secretariat. It is particularly concerned with the question of leadership 
and the ability or inability of the secretary-general to act as the administrative and 
political figurehead of the League. The thesis chronicles the difficulties experienced 
or self-imposed by the various League agencies in the maintenance of a common 
                                                                                                                                                                    
UNOG] (ed.), The League of Nations in retrospect: proceedings of the symposium (Geneva, 1983), pp 
42-73; Jill Jensen, ‘From Geneva to the Americas: the International Labour Organisation and inter-
American social security standards, 1936-1948’ in International Labour and Working Class History, 
lxxx (2011), pp 215-240;William B. McAllister,  Drug diplomacy in the twentieth century: an 
international history (London, 2000); Geert, Van Goethem ‘Phelan’s war: the International Labour 
Organisation in limbo (1941-8)’ in Jasmien Van Daele, Magaly Rodriguez Garía, Geert Van Goethem 
and Marcel ven der Linden (eds), I.L.O. histories: essays on the International Labour Office and its 
impact on the world during the twentieth century (Bern, 2010), pp 313-41.  
29
 Anthony M. Endres and Grant A. Fleming, International organisation and the analysis of economic 
policy, 1919-50 (Cambridge, 2002), p. 12, pp 42-54.  
30
 Patricia Clavin, Securing the world economy: the reinvention of the League of Nations 1920-1946 
(Oxford, 2013).  
31
 Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’, p. 1108.  
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institutional identity and examines the relevance and impact of that identity within an 
evolving international order. 
Demonstrating how the League’s political identity defined its relationship 
with member states and shaped its contribution to wartime international affairs and 
post-war planning is also a central concern of this work. Pedersen argued that the 
League’s security record is the one aspect of its existence in which a revisionist 
argument is hardest to uphold.
32
 It is not the intention of the thesis to challenge the 
accepted consensus on the diplomatic failure of the League; such a position would be 
both empirically and theoretically unsustainable. However it contends that the 
vitality of its technical services can only partially explain the League’s wartime 
preservation. The League’s diplomatic role was suppressed by 1940 but the 
organisation retained a political relevance and presence. Member states as well as the 
governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the Third Reich continued to 
attach political weight to the wartime existence and endeavours of the League of 
Nations. This thesis does not treat the League’s diplomatic record as the ‘elephant in 
the room’ as so many of its supporters and technical officials were inclined to do 
during its final years. The League’s security record profoundly impacted upon its 
wartime experience and post-war opportunities. As such this project highlights the 
organic relationship between the League’s political identity and its technical role. 
League officials often made a firm distinction between what they described as the 
‘political’ and ‘technical’ work of the international civil service.33  The League’s 
‘political’ work included the Secretariat’s efforts to support the operation and 
objectives of the Assembly and Council in the fields of disarmament, minority rights 
and the welfare of the mandated territories. Its political identity was predicated on 
liberal internationalism. The League’s ‘technical’ work encompassed the efforts of 
the permanent Secretariat and of seconded experts and technocrats, e.g. economists 
and medical professionals, to promote social and economic progress. The 
establishment of the League’s specialised agencies under the umbrella of the parent 
organisation reflected what later became known as the functionalist movement, 
although it was not described in those terms at the time. Functionalists argue that the 
process of collaborating in narrow, technical or ‘functional’ areas will eventually 
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‘spill over’ into more sensitive political areas.34 The technical organisations have 
been presented in historiography as a more enlightened and sophisticated means of 
encouraging peace.
35
 They were regularly depicted as removed from the political 
controversies of the League’s diplomatic experience. 36  While certain League 
officials and apologists sought to impose an explicit distinction between the 
‘technical’ and ‘political’ branches of the international civil service there was little to 
separate the League’s social and economic work from the organisation’s political 
identity.
37
 As various historians have posited, League officials and technical experts 
were rarely ideologically neutral but rather sought to perpetuate democratic ideas, 
liberal economics and western learning through the medium of their various 
publications and international conferences.
38
 This thesis explores how, far from 
distancing themselves from the loaded rhetoric of the League Covenant, the technical 
officials refused to divorce the League’s political ethos from their wartime social and 
economic work. This underscores the formal position of the thesis-that the League’s 
liberal identity permeated every aspect of its existence.  
Pedersen described the Secretariat as the ‘beating heart’ of the League and 
lamented the fact that we know so little about how it influenced political 
developments because so much historiography has been written from the standpoint 
of national interests.
39
 This thesis documents the central role of the League’s 
wartime international civil servants in the preservation of the organisation as a 
nucleus for future international cooperation. The League’s permanent Secretariat 
provided continuity between meetings of the Assembly, Council and various 
specialised committees of the organisation. This, coupled with the liberal democratic 
culture of the international civil service, has resulted in the depiction of League 
officials as the permanent embodiment of the League of Nations itself.
40
 According 
to F.S. Northedge, League officials were overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, 
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liberal multilateralists opposed to extreme nationalism.
41
 The Secretariat of the 
League was envisaged as an impartial international civil service, removed from the 
quagmire of national politics and prejudices.
42
 However, as Barcroft and Rovine 
argued, this did not mean that the League’s international civil service and, in 
particular, its secretary-general, adopted an apolitical role.
43
 League officials sought 
to exert political influence to advance the cause of internationalism rather than the 
interests of individual governments. Not all League officials were committed liberal 
internationalists. As Pedersen pointed out it was impossible to completely exclude 
opportunistic time-servers from the international civil service.
44
 However as both 
Mark Mazower and Fred Halliday asserted, idealism is a crucial factor in the 
endurance of international organisations.
45
 In documenting the professional 
shortcomings of Secretary-General Joseph Avenol this thesis will demonstrate the 
pre-eminence of idealism for the ability to provide pioneering leadership to a 
trailblazing international organisation.   
While George Scott acknowledged that a few nations (forty-four by the end 
of the war) continued to ‘make their genuflections’ at Geneva, very little explanation 
has been offered as to why this was the case, without drawing on the success of the 
League’s technical programmes. As the League’s technical organisations were the 
wartime embodiment of the League’s liberal democratic ethos, it follows that the 
organisation’s political identity was a vital motivation behind its wartime 
preservation. This thesis contributes to bridging the gap between the recent 
historiography devoted to the League’s technical experience and the earlier fixation 
on the League’s diplomatic role. Drawing inspiration from those histories devoted to 
the technical organisations, this thesis determines what the League’s preservation 
‘meant’ to member states on a political level.46 The thesis asserts that continued 
membership of the League of Nations served an important purpose for all states who 
wished to affirm their allegiance to the liberal democratic values of the Covenant.  
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States that did not share those values defined themselves against, rather than 
by, the League’s political identity. As Mazower demonstrated, by the end of the 
nineteenth century ‘the international had become the terrain upon which widely 
differing political groups and ideologies mapped their hopes and fears.’47  While 
certain episodes within the wartime experience of the League of Nations were the 
direct result of the reality of war, many were emblematic of the organisation’s 
inability to cope with differing political and cultural traditions among its member 
states. In the idealist tradition, the League’s aspirations and endeavours were 
presented as universal, transcending all cultural and ideological differences. Walters 
argued that the League had served as the medium ‘in which the common interests of 
humanity could be seen and served across the barriers of national tradition, racial 
difference, or geographical separation.’48 Post-war interpretations of the League have 
been influenced by the rise in Marxist historiography and in that movement’s 
rejection of imperialism and ethnocentrism. This led historians to criticise the 
undeniably Eurocentric tradition of the League Covenant, which they perceived as an 
attempt by the great powers to perpetuate western traditions. As Martin Kitchen 
argued, the League ‘was created in the belief that the principles of liberal democracy 
would be accepted throughout the world and was powerless to deal with states which 
despised such ideas.’49 F.S. Northedge argued that the League’s expulsion of the 
U.S.S.R. served as a vindication of the old Soviet claim that the League was an 
alliance of ‘robber capitalist nations’ against the solitary socialist state.50 The thesis 
determines what the attitudes of member states to Soviet membership of the liberal 
League reveal as to the nature of pre-war and wartime internationalism. The 
League’s problematic wartime relationship with the world’s first communist state 
serves as a useful reflection on the League’s political identity and its place in the 
international landscape, foreshadowing the challenges of international cooperation in 
the Cold War era.  
Lucian Ashworth recently argued that the scholarly urge to characterise 
earlier observations on the League as either idealist or realist tend to erode the 
complexities and subtle differences of opinion between various internationalist 
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thinkers.
51
 A recurring theme within this thesis is that internationalism was a relative 
concept; depending on their political background and foreign policy goals, member 
states expected different things from the first major project in international 
cooperation. These expectations often shifted over time in correspondence with 
changes in the political landscape; the League was not a static or inflexible form of 
internationalism. The smaller European states first expected the League to provide 
them with the protection of the great powers; later when it became clear that the 
great powers had no intention of activating the League’s collective security potential, 
the League accommodated the gravitation of the small powers towards independent 
policies of neutrality. The presence of neutral powers in the League and their effect 
on the organisation’s political efficacy is an important factor which has long been 
overlooked by historians of both interwar and wartime internationalism.
52
 Neville 
Wylie, in alluding briefly to this topic, argued that the collective security ideals of 
the League had a ‘corrosive’ effect on neutrality.53 This thesis argues that this was 
not the case; the League accommodated neutrality in contradistinction to post-war 
internationalism, so much so that neutrality almost had a ‘corrosive’ effect on the 
League’s wartime potential and post-war prospects. The continued membership of 
neutral states sparked a debate within the international civil service on the 
organisation’s moral position and political affinity within a polarising atmosphere of 
war.  
Such difficulties reflected a wider problem; the League’s role and purpose 
had never been explicitly defined or delineated. The organisation was conceived as 
an organic work in progress.
54
 Throughout its history member states were reluctant 
to allow the League to develop into a giant, authoritative bureaucracy.
55
 At the same 
time they permitted the League’s international civil service to develop and expand 
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without imposing any significant design on them.
56
 As a result there was a 
significant disparity between the cautious internationalism of member states and the 
often ambitious internationalism of League officials. While various internationalist 
thinkers viewed the League as a stepping stone towards world government, among 
member states the League was valued as an affirmation of national sovereignty and 
legitimacy; as such national governments were not anxious to extend the influence of 
the League’s international civil service.57 Tension and jealousies between national 
interests and internationalist aspirations persisted during the war years when League 
officials sought to influence wartime relief measures and post-war planning. The 
Secretariat’s relations with member states were further complicated by a burgeoning 
internationalism less infused with the traditions of liberal democracy than it was 
attuned to the language of security.  
The lack of coherent aspirations for the future development and potential of 
the League enacted difficulties and divisions within the international civil service 
itself. Clavin demonstrated how the existence, within one organisation, of separate 
agencies devoted to various activities, was both a strength in that it permitted a 
collaborative approach to social and economic issues and a weakness in that it pulled 
the League in different directions.
58
 The wartime experience of the League of 
Nations encapsulated the difficult and often contentious operation of an umbrella 
organisation trying to balance its political, social and economic responsibilities. The 
I.L.O. was the only affiliated agency of the League specifically prescribed by the 
Treaty of Versailles. The League and its secretary-general were placed hierarchically 
above the I.L.O. and its director; the I.L.O.’s budget was ultimately approved by the 
secretary-general and the League’s Supervisory Commission on budgetary matters. 
However the secretary-general held no other authority over the I.L.O. whose director 
enjoyed considerably more autonomy than that of his League counterpart.
59
 The 
dynamic first director of the I.L.O., Frenchman Albert Thomas, set the precedent for 
an executive style of leadership. Unlike the secretary-general (whose position was 
conceived as less of a political leader and more of an administrator) the director of 
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the I.L.O. became an initiator of political action through the practise of placing 
various proposals before the delegations of the International Labour Conference.
60
 
The I.L.O. was based in Geneva and possessed its own constitution and Governing 
Body which elected the director, liaised with member stares on labour matters and 
supervised the work of the independent secretariat, the International Labour Office. 
Martin Dubin argued that the relationship between the I.L.O. and the Secretariat of 
its parent organisation was often marred by rivalry.
61
 The thesis demonstrates how 
the pressures of wartime and geographical separation exacerbated tensions between 
the disparate agencies and the Geneva-based Secretariat. It highlights the difficulty 
of maintaining institutional unity within an international organisation devoted to 
multiple international activities, where the difficulty lies not in the fact that their 
various tasks are utterly distinct, but were often extremely complementary as with 
the E.F.O. and the I.L.O. Internal divisions was as much a strain on the wartime 
survival of the League as external pressures.  
The transfer of selected branches of the League’s technical services to the 
United States and to Canada constituted an assault on the organisation’s traditional 
Eurocentrism. Eric Hobsbawm singled out the recalcitrance of the United States for 
the organisation’s ineptitude in mediating international disputes. According to 
Hobsbawm, in ‘a world no longer Euro-centred and Euro-determined, no settlement 
not underwritten by what was now a major world power could hold.’ 62  The 
American Senate’s rejection of League membership led to a neglect, on the part of 
historians, of the interesting relationship that later evolved between the League and 
the U.S State Department. The dominant American role in the creation of the U.N. 
also effaced any interest in tentative American participation in the League. A 
minority of historians have attempted to overturn the traditional perception of the 
United States as completely apathetic to international collaboration before and 
during the Second World War.
63
 Clavin’s most recent publication demonstrates the 
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influence of the E.F.O.’s liberal, free-trade principles on the policies of the U.S. 
State and Treasury Departments.
64
 This thesis also contends that the United States 
should not be presented as a spectator in the League drama but as a central player in 
its history. The establishment of technical missions in the United States 
demonstrated the declining geopolitical importance of Europe and the emerging 
hegemony of the United States in international affairs. Their transfer elicited 
interesting responses from the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, 
Latin American member states and the League’s international civil service. The 
complex attitude the Roosevelt administration entertained towards League also 
added another dimension to the internecine rivalries of the technical agencies. In 
previous scholarship the League is often depicted as ignoring the reality of the wider 
political landscape. E.H. Carr notably attacked the League’s idealist paradigm as 
being out of touch with the current of world affairs.
65
 This thesis demonstrates that 
the League’s international civil service regularly adapted to new political realities, 
engaging in wider processes such as the evolution of American internationalism.  
This thesis also contributes to the debate on the transition from the League to 
the United Nations Organisation (U.N.O.). We can perceive from the existing 
historiography that the recognition of the U.N.O. as the heir to the League is 
commonplace. There is a general consensus among historians that the U.N.O. ‘did 
not rise Aphrodite like from the Second World War.’66 The specialised agencies of 
the United Nations owed much to their forbears within the League of Nations 
umbrella.
67
 We must be careful however not to regard the transfer of the technical 
functions of the League to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the 
U.N.O. as the only possible outcome of negotiations between League and U.N. 
representatives. Mark Mazower conceded that the optimism associated with the 
endurance of international organisations tend to obscure the complexities inherent in 
the creation of such organisations.
68
 Raffo also criticised the tendency among 
historians to depict a ‘satisfying’ and neat sense of continuity between the old 
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international organisation and the new.
69
  Research into the dissolution of the League 
illustrates that any sense of continuity between the technocratic wing of the League 
and that of the U.N.O. (as opposed to the important political differences between the 
two organisations) was by no means a foregone conclusion. This thesis outlines the 
persistent tension that existed between the need to capitalise on the experience of the 
League Secretariat on the part of the United Nations powers and the tendency to 
assign officials associated with that failed enterprise a peripheral role. The 
difficulties, obstacles and downright hostility experienced by League officials during 
the transition period are quite telling. They serve as a useful indicator of the different 
political, cultural and ideological forces which were ignored or unforeseen by the 
League’s founders but which, after 1945, formed the guiding principles of the new 
system of international cooperation.  
Studies devoted to the transition from the League to the U.N.O. tend to 
regard the latter organisation as a maturation of internationalism and as an 
improvement upon the shortcomings of the League in the realm of security.
70
 
Ashworth deplored the tendency of historians and scholars of international relations 
to turn their works into ‘Whiggish’ histories of progress and such a pitfall is 
studiously avoided in this work.
71
 Research findings illustrate that the United 
Nations was not universally regarded as new and improved League of Nations. The 
contemporary debate in the aftermath of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the San 
Francisco Conference demonstrate that there remained a dearth of agreement on 
what one should expect of an international organisation. This thesis contends that the 
United Nations was neither an improved nor a diminished League of Nations. It was 
the product of a different political climate and the reactions, among government 
figures, national civil servants and League officials to the creation of the U.N. and to 
the dissolution of the League, further emphasised the contested nature of 
internationalism.  
This thesis is primarily a historical investigation into the final years of the 
League of Nations that benefits from the insights into the League experience offered 
by other scholarly traditions. It was from the disciplines of international relations 
(I.R.) and political science that concepts such as idealism, realism, functionalism and 
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supranationalism first emerged. Scholars such as Fred Halliday, U.V. Hirschhausen 
and K.K. Patel have all noted the traditional distrust with which diplomatic 
historians tend to regard such theoretical frameworks.
72
 The thesis engages with 
various theories of international relations and political science where appropriate but 
does so on a firmly empirical basis. This project has found such concepts to be 
constructive rather than detrimental to the development of a historical understanding 
of the League of Nations.  
This thesis offers an original and unique perspective on the wartime 
experience of the League through multi-archival and multi-lingual research, 
presenting findings from repositories in Dublin, London, Paris and Geneva. The 
League of Nations was a bureaucratic institution and the paper trail it left behind in 
its archives in Geneva is enormous. This thesis is replete with evidence from the 
League archives, drawing on the miscellaneous reports of the secretary-general, of 
the technical services and of the Supervisory Commission; on the extensive 
correspondence with national civil servants, politicians and representatives of 
various voluntary and philanthropic organisations; on reports of the liquidation 
committee of the League and on records of the negotiations between the League and 
the United Nations Organisation. The official documents of the International Labour 
Office are also consulted. Secretariat officials and technical experts adopted a 
transparent attitude to their work and were always eager to publicise the activities of 
the League. Figures such as Edward Phelan, the acting director of I.L.O., Alexander 
Loveday, the director of the E.F.O. and Arthur Sweetser the League’s director of 
publicity, were particularly prolific in attempting to maintain wartime publicity for 
the organisation through speeches, lectures and journal articles. It is through the 
writings and speeches of these figures that an overview of the wartime social and 
economic work of the international civil service can be obtained as well as an 
appreciation of the League’s impact on an evolving international landscape.  
The private papers and records, preserved for posterity, of League officials, 
help illuminate the more politically sensitive aspects of the League’s experience. The 
personal papers of Seán Lester (deputy secretary-general 1937-40, secretary-general 
1940-7), his diaries, reports and correspondence, available through the United 
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Nations Archives and the U.C.D. Archives (Dublin) offer an unrivalled insight into 
the League’s wartime history. His diary and papers, while underused sources, are a 
gift to the historian, as Lester was a meticulous record keeper. He preserved intact 
not only a painstaking account of the experience of League officials in Geneva, but 
also important correspondence with leading political figures such as Anthony Eden 
and Charles de Gaulle. These letters shed light on the implications of wider wartime 
developments for the organisation as well as the formation of a new international 
body that still retained some influence of the old League Covenant.  
With personal papers, over-reliance on a bare minimum of sources can distil 
or jeopardise the objectivity of a study and offer an incomplete and overly partial 
version of events. This thesis draws on the private papers of Joseph Avenol, 
deposited in the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to document the 
League’s immediate reaction and adaptation to the outbreak of war. Avenol’s later 
political writings, undertaken in an effort to rehabilitate himself with his former 
colleagues, are assessed to determine whether the Frenchmen was in fact an extreme 
right-wing ideologue or simply an opportunist responding to the political reality of a 
German-controlled Europe. The correspondence and papers of other senior members 
of the League Secretariat, figures such as Thanassis Aghnides, Alexander Loveday 
and Arthur Sweetser, located in the League’s archives, are consulted to ensure that 
this thesis is representative of the experience of the entire League apparatus, 
including that of the transferred technical agencies. The thesis also calls upon the 
personal papers of Robert Cecil, the League’s most steadfast apologist, to 
demonstrate the endurance of liberal internationalism in spite of the reality of war.  
The governmental and diplomatic records of the United Kingdom, the Irish 
Free State, France, the United States and Switzerland are drawn upon throughout the 
thesis. Pedersen identified one of the weaknesses of existing League historiography 
as being overly reliant upon national archives, rather than League records.
73
 This 
thesis consults both national and ‘international’ archives. Governmental records are 
essential as without them one could glean an overly optimistic account of the 
League’s wartime experience from its officials. It could not be within the scope of 
this thesis to consult the national records of the League’s entire wartime membership. 
The extensive diplomatic correspondence between the Office of the Secretary-
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General and member states is presented within the course of the thesis insofar as it 
proves significant to the League’s wartime experience. It also has to be 
acknowledged that the methodology of this thesis is Euro-focused, with a heavy 
reliance on European diplomatic and government records. However this conforms to 
the Eurocentric tradition of the League of Nations with European events and 
traditions enacting the most dramatic repercussions within the League’s political 
organs and international civil service. The records of the British War Cabinet are 
particularly pertinent for the question of the League’s wartime preservation and post-
war fate. The records and correspondence of the Foreign and Dominion Offices also 
permit an insight into the attitudes other member and non-member states entertained 
towards the League. The records of the French (Vichy) Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
are a useful source to determine the veracity of both Joseph Avenol and Seán 
Lester’s accounts of the internal crisis within the Secretariat in 1940. The Vichy 
records also provide an insight into the distant relations member states, falling within 
the German sphere of influence, were obliged to maintain with the League. The 
records of the Free French movements also serve as a useful indicator as to the 
political value of League membership for erstwhile governments-in-exile. The 
records of the Political Department of the Swiss federal government are extremely 
relevant for documenting the conditions in which the Geneva-based Secretariat 
operated during the war. Given the close trade relations between Bern and Berlin, the 
Swiss federal papers also serve as a useful medium through which we can glean the 
attitude of the Reich Chancellery of Foreign Affairs to the continued existence of the 
League. The Foreign Relations of the United States series has also been consulted to 
help chronicle the transition from the League to the United Nations Organisation and 
have proven a particularly useful method to trace the place of the League within the 
resurgence of American internationalism.  
The vast collection of newspaper reports and analyses available on the 
League during the war years illustrate that a significant disparity exists between the 
contemporary interest in League affairs and the subsequent lack of historical 
investigation into the final years of the League experience. Newspapers such as the 
Manchester Guardian (British) and the Journal de Genève (Swiss), which tend to be 
more supportive of the League, have been consulted. Articles from The Times 
(British) and New York Times (American), which were usually less effusive, are 
analysed.  Publications which were downright hostile to the League, such as the 
22 
 
Soviet organ Pravda, are also studied to achieve an appreciation of the varied 
perception of the League during this period.
 74
 The records of pressure groups such 
of the League of Nations Union serve as a valuable reflection of the endurance of 
liberal internationalism. Contemporary accounts from figures well acquainted with 
the world’s first experiment in international cooperation, such as the journalist 
Robert Dell and the committed liberal internationalist Gilbert Murray, demonstrate 
the contested nature of the League’s legacy. Contemporary articles, treatises, 
apologias and critiques from those removed from the League experience are also 
consulted to gain a wider perspective on both the League’s wartime experience and 
on the evolution of internationalism.  
Drawing on original research and building on the new wave of League 
historiography, the thesis avoids both the anachronistic fatalism and myopic 
optimism that characterised earlier accounts of the organisation and which led to a 
neglect of the League’s wartime history. It asserts that the League’s wartime 
experience is an important, though long overlooked, chapter in both the history of 
the organisation itself and in the wider narrative of internationalism.
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Chapter one: The League’s place in the international system upon the outbreak 
of war: its political identity and technical role. 
 
The news comes in that German troops have entered Polish territory at three  
points and that Polish towns are being bombed from the air. So it begins.
1
 
 
This was the diary entry of Deputy Secretary-General Séan Lester for 1 September 
1939 when the Wehrmacht crossed into Poland, exposing the severe disparity 
between the internationalist aspirations of the League system and the cold hard 
reality of international relations. The outbreak of war provided the fatal blow to the 
League’s ability to mediate and arbitrate international disputes. The lofty objective 
of the League Covenant ‘to achieve international peace and security’ was further 
reduced to a mere formula of words.
2
 It has been incontrovertibly proven by previous 
historians that the League never functioned as an effective agent of collective 
security.
3
 This chapter permits an investigation into why member states chose to 
preserve the League of Nations during the war years, despite the paralysis of its 
diplomatic machinery. It determines why member states continued to ‘make their 
genuflections at Geneva’ and argues that their motivations were not completely and 
exclusively anchored in the success of the League’s technical organisations.4 Though 
the prestige and vitality of the technical agencies ensured the organisation a 
continued potential in the social, economic and even humanitarian spheres, the 
League was a fundamentally political organisation that retained a relevance to a 
world at war. Following the example of recent works devoted to the League’s 
technical agencies, the chapter seeks to determine the League’s place in the 
international landscape in 1939 by concentrating on what the organisation actually 
‘did and meant.’5 It determines what member states expected from the first ‘great 
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experiment’ in international cooperation during the latter years of its existence.6 This 
chapter argues that by 1939 the League’s political identity mattered more to member 
states than its diplomatic role; thus the death of collective security was not the death 
of the League. The League’s liberal identity politicised every aspect of its work, 
including its technical activities. Thus a thorough understanding of the League’s 
wartime social and economic work cannot be achieved without an appreciation of its 
political significance to an evolving international landscape 
 
 
The League and the outbreak of war in Europe  
The League’s supporters and apologists originally celebrated the organisation as an 
alternative to the nineteenth century diplomatic system which had operated as the 
exclusive tool of the great powers.
7
 Unlike the pre-1919 ‘entangling’ defensive 
alliances ‘the community circle of the League’ was not intended to be closed but 
rather the League was meant to function as ‘inclusive and encompassing, a truly 
global organisation.’ 8  Woodrow Wilson hoped that the League Covenant would 
serve as a ‘Monroe doctrine for the world that would reduce opportunism in 
international affairs.’9 The stifling of the League’s collective security potential in the 
inter-war period, when the League failed to effectively intervene in crises such as the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, convinced later 
historians that the League system did not constitute a new form of diplomacy. P. 
Raff and Zara Steiner notably dismissed the idea that member states, especially the 
great powers, were willing to practise diplomacy through recourse to the League 
alone. Raffo argued that the League was ‘an additional piece of machinery, 
permanent and often useful, but never a replacement for the traditional methods.’10  
Steiner too concurred that ‘the Geneva system was never a substitute for great power 
politics’ but was rather ‘an adjunct to it.’11 In March 1939 as Hitler’s armies moved 
beyond the Sudetenland to occupy the rest of Czechoslovakia, Lester mused in his 
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diary on the absence of the League from the ill-fated diplomatic efforts to stem 
German expansionism, asking ‘are we to lie on the shelf?’12 Lester’s diary perfectly 
encapsulates the diplomatic sidelining of the League, illustrating that the 
organisation was a spectator to, rather than an actor in, the drama that ultimately led 
to war.  
Under the terms of the Covenant, the assumption of belligerent status on the part 
of one or more of its member states was deemed ‘a matter of concern to the whole 
League.’13 On 9 September, almost a week after the Anglo-French declaration of war, 
Sir Alexander Cadogan (permanent under-secretary at the British Foreign Office) 
wrote to Secretary-General Joseph Avenol informing him of the state of war that 
existed between the United Kingdom and Germany.
14
 He reminded the secretary-
general that every diplomatic solution to ‘bring the violation of Polish territory by 
German forces to an end’ had been employed to no avail.15 What is significant about 
this letter is that Cadogan stressed that everything the British government had tried 
to do for Poland was done ‘in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant.’16 Cadogan 
thus sought to depict the Anglo-French attempts to guarantee Polish security and 
their joint declaration of war once that security was breached, as collective security 
in action.  
Such a bold statement on Cadogan’s part validates Andrew Stedman’s previous 
arguments on the place of collective security in the British political system. Stedman 
demonstrated how the ‘high moral veneer’ of the language of the League Covenant 
was increasingly hijacked by British politicians and civil servants to conceal the 
pursuit of the opposite of this policy; the creation of defensive alliances.
17
 As Martyn 
Housden has outlined, the term collective security included the following elements: 
 
1. Public debate in the Council and the Assembly of actions carried out by 
statesmen. 
2. Arbitration of disputes organised by the Council of the League. 
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3. Economic sanctions applied against an aggressor state. 
4. The possible supply of military units by members to stop war.18 
 
Drawing on House’s definition, there was nothing ‘collective’ about the Anglo-
French guarantee to Poland. The course of events of the summer and autumn of 1939 
was not determined by multilateral discussions at Geneva. Nor did the Allied 
Supreme Council deploy an expeditionary force to Poland. Though Cadogan assured 
Avenol that the British employed every diplomatic means at their disposal to avert 
war, the League itself was removed from Anglo-German affairs since the latter’s 
withdrawal in 1933. To underpin his assertion that the League was dead by 1935, 
A.J.P. Taylor wrote that in September 1939 no one even bothered to inform the 
League that war had broken out.
19
 The correspondence between Cadogan and the 
Office of the Secretary-General demonstrates that this was not the case. However it 
cannot be overlooked that the Foreign Office did not reach out to the League until 9 
September, a full week after the outbreak of war. While the immediate pressures of 
mobilisation may be partly accountable, Cadogan’s less than prompt communication 
revealed the deep-seated British disaffection with the League’s diplomatic 
capabilities. Influential British politicians and Foreign Office officials did not appear, 
on closer inspection, to genuinely adhere to what Cadogan termed, the ‘spirit of the 
Covenant’. Gladwyn Jebb, of the economic relations section of the Foreign Office, 
stated in the late 1930s that he personally believed that ‘collective security was dead’ 
and could not ‘help feeling that it would be better to have no obligation at all.’20 
Cadogan’s own diaries reveal that not even the man who dispatched the above note 
to the secretary-general believed that the League’s version of collective security was 
viable. He conceded in 1938 that collective security was ‘if not dead’ then resigned 
‘to a state of suspended animation.’21  
Yet at the same time the Foreign Office was careful not to slight the League 
completely. Cadogan’s pains to associate the Anglo-French declarations of war with 
the liberal internationalism of the League Covenant were a strong indication that the 
organisation, while politically impotent, was not politically irrelevant. Steiner argued 
that while the League’s efforts in disarmament and other security matters foundered, 
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the League ‘was able to create a long-lasting international regime and to establish 
norms of state behaviour that, though frequently breached, became part of the 
international fabric.’22 The Covenant was an important touchstone for international 
law and order and the League, though lacking the supranational function to compel 
member states to abide by its terms, was able to influence codes of diplomatic 
conduct among its member states. Thus while the League was unable to embody a 
new form of diplomacy, its presence in the international landscape encouraged a 
greater self-consciousness, if not complete transparency, in how states conducted 
their respective foreign policies.  
 While the British were eager to associate League rhetoric with their own war 
aims, the invasion of Poland by both Germany and later, by the Soviet Union, drew 
forth no formal words of protest from the halls of the Assembly or Council rooms of 
League headquarters, the Palais des Nations. An article in the Swiss newspaper 
Gazette de Lausanne pointed out that the League had been created to prevent war 
and questioned why it did not, after the outbreak of such a war, raise a vengeful 
voice in condemnation of it.
23
 Such seeming indolence understandably inspired the 
realist position on the political irrelevance of the organisation by this point.
24
 
Certainly the dearth of activity within the League Assembly and Council in the run 
up to and immediate aftermath of the outbreak of war does little to explain the 
League’s wartime preservation. However while the League failed to respond to the 
Anglo-French declaration of war, that failure should not prompt historians to ignore 
what was going on both inside and outside the League apparatus. The League’s 
internal and external relations during this period reveal that while the League was 
denied a role in these developments, it was not untouched by them. The relations 
between the League and member state function as a prism through which the 
international historian can derive a deeper appreciation of national foreign polices as 
well as of the course of international affairs.  
 The League’s silence on the outbreak of war was largely determined by the 
postponement of the session of the League Council, due to convene on 11 September 
1939. It was agreed by member states that a special commission could meet instead 
                                                          
22
 Steiner, The triumph of the dark, p. 173.  
23
 Gazette de Lausanne, 4 Nov. 1939. 
24
 See for example Carr, Conditions of peace, p. 164.  
28 
 
and with the written approval of member states, devise the League budget for 1940.
25
 
This decision was influenced by the League’s neutral Swiss hosts who were worried 
that criticism of the conduct of the war would provoke the ire of the Reich Foreign 
Ministry.
26
 Just as the League influenced diplomatic behaviour it also altered the 
perception and practise of neutrality, an age-old concept within international affairs.  
John F.L. Ross illustrated the fundamental difference between neutral foreign policy 
and the collective security ideal expected, if not exactly forthcoming, from member 
states. Whereas neutrality ‘implies abstention from conflict and assumes free choice’, 
collective security operations require ‘the common participation of most or all states 
in concerted enforcement measures (sanctions) if called for by a recognised 
international authority.’27 Originally, the advent of the League led many political 
commentators to declare that neutrality was no longer a viable option in international 
disputes.
28
 Such assertions in the early days of the League would not reflect the later 
reality. The League was a more sophisticated organisation than its many detractors 
would allow, permitting a form of multilateralism not attempted for many years after 
its dissolution; this was because the League had a notable ability to adapt to, if not to 
influence, the reality of international affairs. Neutrality was facilitated by the League 
Council from very early on in the organisation’s existence. In 1920 special 
recognition was accorded to Swiss neutrality with Switzerland exempt from 
participating in any military sanctions that could be proposed by the Council.
29
 The 
rise of independent policies of neutrality among League member states was 
emblematic of the small state experience of the organisation. Article sixteen of the 
Covenant was the clearest articulation of the collective security aspirations of the 
League. Under article sixteen, member states were accorded the right to expel any 
state which engaged in an unprovoked and illegal act of aggression against another. 
Such aggression would be considered an act of war against all member states of the 
League. All diplomatic and economic relations with the aggressor would be duly 
severed and member states would be bound to provide whatever military and 
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humanitarian assistance they could muster to repel the invading force.
30
 Such 
principles held a great attraction for the vulnerable smaller states who could, 
theoretically, call upon the great powers in the League for assistance in repelling 
illegal acts of aggression. 
 But by the late 1930s the small powers, with the fate of Abyssinia serving as 
a depressing example, could no longer expect the great powers to protect the weak. 
As a result the League was compelled to accord further recognition of the place of 
neutrality within the international framework. An interpretative resolution, the 
Declaration of Copenhagen, was accepted by the Assembly in 1938 which accorded 
member states the right to judge what action, if any, they were obliged to take under 
article sixteen.
31
 This resolution was spearheaded by the Nordic countries and by the 
traditionally vulnerable low countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) 
as they sought to distance themselves from an increasingly likely war. Thus it was 
the political organs of the League themselves that sounded the death knell of 
collective security. In the summer of 1939 Halvdan Koth, the Norwegian minister of 
foreign affairs, in a speech to the parliament in Oslo declared that while the League 
was engaged in useful technical work, article sixteen was ‘sleeping so soundly there 
was no need to awaken it.’32  
Marcel Pilet-Golaz, President of the Swiss Confederation (1940), insisted in 
the early months of the war that although Switzerland had obvious duties of 
hospitality towards the League, its neutral territory should not be used as an arena in 
which belligerents could launch oratorical battles.
33
 As the war years wore on, the 
preoccupation of the Swiss Confederation with preserving its neutrality and 
sovereignty from hostile interference would easily claim precedence over its 
responsibility to the League. A crucial factor in the vulnerability of the League’s 
position was that it was predicated on a rather loose agreement with the Swiss 
government. Article seven of the League Covenant established the seat of the League 
in Geneva. This article described the organisation’s buildings and property as 
inviolable and stated that all officials and government representatives engaged in the 
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business of the League should enjoy full diplomatic privileges.
34
 However this 
article had no legal basis and representatives of the League were obliged, in 1921, to 
come to an agreement, or modus vivendi, with the Swiss authorities. This agreement 
was eventually codified in 1926 when the Swiss federal government agreed to 
recognise that the League of Nations possessed an international personality and legal 
capacity and could not, in principle, be sued before the Swiss courts without its 
express consent.
35
 No member of the Swiss public authorities was to enter 
headquarters without the express authority of the Secretariat. Property destined for 
League ownership was exempt from Swiss customs and fiscal immunity was granted 
to League assets, securities and salaries. League officials and government delegates 
were to enjoy varying degrees of immunity from civil and criminal prosecution in 
Switzerland unless those rights were waived by the secretary-general.
36
 The presence 
of League headquarters in Geneva ultimately proved very beneficial for Switzerland 
with the periodic sessions of the Assembly and Council boosting the already well 
established tourism industry of Geneva and its environs. A report conducted by the 
Secretariat in 1935 concluded that the presence of League headquarters was worth an 
annual thirty eight million Swiss francs (C.H.F.) to the local economy.
37
 The League 
was also an employer of a high number of Swiss nationals.
38
 Ultimately the modus 
vivendi between the League and the Swiss Federal Council was not protected by 
international law; as a result the League’s presence in Switzerland became 
increasingly precarious as German hegemony increased.  
 The fact that the neutral member states were not obliged to withdraw from 
the League indicates that collective security had assumed a secondary importance 
within an organisation designed to promote international peace.
39
 This raises the 
question as to why states remained their membership of the League when there was 
an implicit understanding, both among small powers such as Switzerland and  great 
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powers such as the United Kingdom, that the League’s collective security potential 
was spent. League membership had become less important for the impact it could 
make on the course of international affairs than for what it signified to the 
international community. The small states no longer clung to the League as a 
security safety net but rather as an affirmation of their cherished independence and 
sovereignty as well as an expression of a peaceful liberal democratic world view.
40
 
In the Assembly session of September 1934 Giuseppe Motta, a veteran Swiss 
politician and member of the Federal Council, outlined what his country hoped to 
achieve through participation in the League Assembly as well as its general approach 
to foreign policy: 
 
A small country like Switzerland, who is neither able nor willing to play a 
role in high international policy, must necessarily pursue its own conceptions. 
We must deny ourselves the luxury of opportunities, even of the highest and 
most legitimate order. We can emulate other countries only in the arduous 
pursuit of moral values.
41
 
 
The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs approved of Motta’s message to the 
Assembly and perceived Ireland’s role at Geneva to be similar to that of 
Switzerland.
42
League membership imparted a sense of respectability and also 
denoted recognition of sovereignty. As Michael Kennedy illustrated, participation in 
a forum such as the League Assembly and the procurement of a semi-permanent seat 
on the Council, allowed small states to pursue a multilateral foreign policy that 
would otherwise been beyond their national means.
43
 These were the perquisites of 
the League of Nations that member states were reluctant to discard. Before 1920 
neutrality usually deprived a country of its ability to influence the course of 
international affairs. The League’s acceptance of the various interpretative 
resolutions meant that the neutrals did not face the international isolation the Swiss 
Confederation experienced in the proceeding centuries, when it was described, by 
one observer, as a detached observer on ‘the balcony overlooking Europe.’ 44  A 
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columnist in the Irish Independent noted that a frank discussion of the rights and 
wrongs of the invasion of Poland in the Assembly would induce the neutrals to 
resign from the already attenuated organisation.
45
 The neutral powers were permitted 
to influence League policy in the autumn of 1939 which prevented the League 
Council being harnessed for the purpose for which it was intended: the 
denouncement of expansionism and the promotion of territorial integrity. The 
absence of any governmental desire on the part of the League’s then forty six 
member states to oppose this policy indicated that the League had evolved into 
something drastically different from a collective security organisation.  
This does not mean that the final years of the League’s existence should be 
ignored by historians. The scholarly debates on the nature and practise of 
international cooperation through the mechanisms of the League of Nations serve as 
an invaluable aid to researching the events of 1939-40 and to determining their 
significance. The question of ‘agency’, a dominant theme within current historical 
discourse has a particular relevance to the events of this chapter. Gerhart Niemeyer, 
a prominent voice in the realist tradition of League historiography, tended to treat the 
League as an agent, rather than a vehicle for international cooperation, refusing to 
absolve the organisation itself for the breakdown in international affairs by holding 
the great powers solely accountable.
46
 Clavin, coming from the more positive 
technocratic orientated historiographical tradition, asserted that the League was an 
important but much overlooked agent in international social and economic reform.
47
 
It is difficult to regard the League diplomatic organs, rather than its technical bodies, 
as decisive agents in international affairs as the League was not a world government 
and was deliberately lacking in any considerable supranational function. As Clavin 
argued, the League of Nations was designed to reinforce the authority of member 
states rather than to challenge it.
48
 From its early days, there was significant support 
among League officials and supporters for the strengthening of the League’s 
influence into some kind of supranational authority.
49
 Former League officials 
Salvador de Madariaga and Jean Monnet came to the conclusion that the League 
could not hope to be effective unless member states surrendered a degree of 
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independence and sovereignty.
50
 Other League apologists on the other hand, figures 
such as the renowned classicists Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern, both of whom 
enjoyed association with the League’s Organisation of Intellectual Cooperation 
(O.I.C.), argued that national sovereignty was the non-negotiable basis for 
international cooperation between states.
51
 The League could not mobilise an 
international police force to give effect to its resolutions. It relied on the willingness 
of member states to recognise its moral authority. Commitment to the Covenant 
could not be forced and cooperation with the League was predicated on volunteerism. 
Given the success of the League’s technical organisations Clavin’s position is easy to 
support while the reality of the League’s experience does not sustain Niemeyer’s 
criticism of its diplomatic machinery. As Jean Siotis wrote:  
 
Institutions facilitate the conduct of multilateral relations and they provide 
the necessary framework, for the elaboration and implementation of co-
operative programmes; but left to themselves, in an environment 
characterised by growing heterogeneity, hostility and polarisation, they are of 
little avail as effective instruments for the maintenance of peace.
52
  
 
The League was a vehicle rather than an actor in the diplomatic sphere. Its 
political impotence was a reflection less of its congenital weaknesses than of the 
conservative internationalism of its member states that were unwilling to threaten 
their sovereignty by according the League a direct role in the regulation of 
international affairs. As Arthur Sweetser, the League’s dynamic director of publicity 
observed in 1940, the League’s ‘record is valuable both as an index of the stage 
which international life has at present attained, and as an augury of the course we 
may expect it to take in the future.’53 Thus the League’s political record should not 
be summarily dismissed as an unmitigated failure but harnessed as a means of 
chronicling the evolution of international cooperation. At the same time, as can be 
perceived by the decisive role played by the neutrals in the postponement of the 
Assembly, the League served as a distorted reflection of the reality of international 
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affairs, failing to showcase the combined strength of the great powers but rather 
exposing the collective weakness of the small, vulnerable states.  
During this period the disparity between the League’s political impotence and 
its technical vitality was widening into a chasm. Responding to the failure of its 
diplomatic role a concerted and determined attempt was made to widen the League’s 
agency in matters of social and economic concern. In the idealist strain of League 
historiography, its international civil service has assumed an almost mythic quality, 
held up as the perfect example of impartial, disinterested civil servants working 
tirelessly for the greater good.
54
 In his memoirs, Salvador de Madariaga, a former 
Secretariat official and Spanish delegate to the League Assembly, presented those 
Secretariat officials and statesmen who championed the League, as ‘civic monks’, 
with internationalism their religion and the Covenant their ‘sacred text.’55 What is 
important to remember is that former officials of the Secretariat were effectively 
propagandists for the organisation, willing to propagate the image of a dynamic and 
talented civil service that embodied the very soul of internationalism, apostles of the 
‘spirit of Geneva.’ In the wake of an explosion in hard-boiled nationalism from the 
late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the institution of an 
international character into the Secretariat was a novel endeavour. Upon being 
seconded to the secretariat or technical services, a new League official was obliged 
to take the following oath: 
 
I solemnly undertake to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience, the 
functions that have been entrusted to me as an official of the Secretariat of 
the League of Nations, to discharge my functions and to regulate my conduct 
with the interests of the League alone in view, and not to seek or receive 
instructions from any government or other authority external to the 
Secretariat.
56
 
 
As Pedersen rightly acknowledged, for all its significance for the future development 
of international cooperation the League’s Secretariat largely remains an unknown 
historical quantity.
57
 To accept the depiction of the Secretariat as an impartial and 
even less convincingly, as an apolitical body, is to ignore the complexities of a once 
700 strong pioneering institution. While Secretariat officials had a limited political 
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role they were politically minded animals who could exert a certain influence. The 
Assembly and Council did not possess the necessary executive authority to compel 
member states to adhere to its resolutions and those of the Permanent Court. 
However the League derived a political agency through the actions and influence of 
its officials. League officials displayed a marked willingness to wade into political 
debates and sought to intervene in domestic social and economic policies.  
Presiding over the entire administrative and technical structure of the League 
was the most political of all the secretaries-general of the organisation, Frenchman 
Joseph Avenol. Initially the great powers had hoped, in 1919, to appoint a major 
statesman to the apex of the international civil service to ensure motivational 
leadership for the League’s diplomatic mission. In the absence of a suitable 
candidate such a political conception of the office of secretary-general was 
abandoned. Instead the secretary-general’s brief was limited to that of figurehead and 
chief administrator of the Secretariat.
 58
 The League Covenant prescribed a modest 
role for the secretary-general. According to article seven the secretary-general could 
appoint staff to the Secretariat (with the approval of the Council) and could 
represented the Secretariat at all meetings of the Assembly and Council.
59
 Avenol’s 
controversial shadow loomed large in the League historiography of the 1970s.
60
 Like 
the League’s first secretary-general, Sir Eric Drummond, Avenol was not a 
statesman but a national civil servant. His appointment reflected the conservative 
interpretation of an office that was more ‘secretary’ than ‘general’.61 Having served 
as inspector of finances at the Quai d’Orsay and as a financial delegate to the French 
embassy in London, Avenol was seconded to the Finance Committee of the League 
of Nations in 1920. In 1924 he was promoted to deputy secretary-general, replacing 
his compatriot, the future architect of European unity, Jean Monnet. Though later 
regretting his replacement by his former assistant, at the time Monnet was confident 
that Avenol had done ‘good work’ at the League.62 Avenol had played a prominent 
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role in the League’s project of post-war economic reconstruction. He led missions to 
Austria and Hungary and to other countries who requested the League’s advice on 
post-war financial rehabilitation.
63
 Under Monnet the position of deputy secretary-
general was one which came to be associated with overseeing the economic and 
social work of the League. Avenol continued this tradition, taking a special interest 
in the League’s Economic and Finance Organisation. Secretary-General  
Drummond’s desire, upon his retirement, to be succeeded by a small-state national 
was undermined by Lord Balfour’s (British foreign secretary in 1919) previous 
assurance to the French government that while the first secretary-general would be 
British, he would be succeeded by a Frenchman.
64
 Avenol’s candidacy was 
predicated on his seniority and by the fact that his colleagues regarded him as 
‘objective as any Frenchman can be.’65 
 Despite his unanimous election by the Assembly of December 1932, 
reservations lingered as to the suitability of Avenol to the post; reservations that 
were not, at this time, predicated on the Frenchman’s political convictions. James 
Barros, drawing on the testimony of Avenol’s former colleagues at the Quai d’Orsay 
and within the Secretariat, described the Frenchman as anti-communist in his 
politics.
66
 This political persuasion would not have alienated Avenol from the 
majority of his colleagues with both E.H. Carr and Martyn Housden noting the 
particular ‘conservatism’ of Geneva. 67  Avenol’s appointment did not incur 
disapproval because he was too political; rather reservations were expressed that he 
was not political enough. The New York Herald, while acknowledging that Avenol 
was an expert in international finance, claimed that the Frenchman was ‘conspicuous 
for his inactivity in League negotiations’ and that he was ‘as little known as any man 
in the League.’68 Salvador de Madariaga was convinced that the selection of an un-
charismatic technocrat, who was, in the Spaniard’s view, the ‘executor of other 
people’s decisions’, demonstrated the desire of the great powers to contain the 
political potential of the office of secretary-general.
69
 De Madariaga’s desire for a 
supranationalist League led him to state his preference for a more imaginative and 
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forceful character to assume leadership of the Secretariat; specifically someone such 
as Avenol’s compatriot, Albert Thomas, the first director of the I.L.O. Thomas died 
in 1932 but de Madariaga was adamant that someone of his ilk was required to halt 
the political decline of the League. According to de Madariaga, Thomas, unlike 
Avenol, would certainly have refused ‘to remain a chief Rubber Stamp or a Grand 
Inkpot such as the powers would have wished him to have been, for he thought that 
the secretary-general should become what he would probably have made him to 
grow-a true world chancellor.’70 The Geneva correspondent of the Echo de Paris 
regarded the selection of a former finance official for the post of secretary-general as 
confirmation that the League was turning away from its role as an arbitrator of 
disputes.
71
 Avenol’s election was interpreted as a sign that the great powers wanted 
the organisation to concentrate on less controversial and sensitive areas; the 
positioning of a technocrat at the head of the Secretariat would ensure that change in 
direction.
72
  
As events unfolded in the period 1939-40 Avenol would demonstrate his 
willingness to be a very political secretary-general, despite the constitutional 
limitations to his office. However as the League Secretariat found itself having to 
confront the reality of war, all signs pointed to the League’s technical organs 
superseding the work of the Assembly and Council. The establishment of technical 
sections within the Secretariat to study issues such as health, refugee affairs, drug 
trafficking, labour laws and economic matters was initially considered to be ancillary 
to the League’s prime goal of the prevention of war.73 Drummond was particularly 
reluctant to develop League initiatives along those technical lines, echoing the 
concerns of the British government which was fearful of the creation of giant 
bureaucracies that would swallow tax-payers money.
74
 Monnet, as Drummond’s 
deputy, strongly disagreed as did the extremely ambitious and capable personnel 
appointed to head the technical sections.
75
 Compared with the stale and often 
fruitless meetings of the Assembly and Council, peace appeared more achievable by 
striving for social and economic parity and progress. The League’s future director of 
the Economic and Finance Organisation, Britain’s Alexander Loveday (a former 
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War Office official), extrapolated upon the relationship between peace and 
prosperity in 1938 as storm clouds threatened the horizon:  
 
I have had the privilege, and it is a privilege, of living in Switzerland for 
seventeen years. I do not think there is any country in the world where the 
general standard of living of all, in good years and bad, is so high. Why is it? 
Because they have had no wars for over a hundred years, and because they 
are really concerned about the standard of living of everyone. Their standard 
is high because they have had no wars; but because their standard is high the 
last thing in the world they want is war.
76
 
 
As Victor-Yves Ghébali demonstrated, the League pioneered a functionalist 
approach before the word itself was coined.
77
 League officials did not describe their 
work as ‘functionalist’ but rather referred to their social and economic work as ‘non-
political’ or ‘technical cooperation.’78 David Mitrany was regarded as one of the 
founding theorists of functionalism, whose ideas reached maturity during the war 
years and its immediate aftermath. According to Mitrany:  
 
If one was to visualise a map of the world showing economic and social 
activities, it would appear as an intricate web of interests and relations 
crossing and re-crossing political divisions-not a fighting map of states and 
frontiers, but a map pulsating with the realities of everyday life. They are the 
natural basis for international organisation.
79
 
 
During the inter-war period the League’s technical organisations gave expression 
and encouragement to these transnational social and economic encounters among 
states and as the League’s political activities constricted, its functional work 
expanded. In February 1939 the Governing Body of the I.L.O. informed member 
states  that it would be ‘wrong in principle to assume that those services must 
necessarily cease’, even if a number of states who took a leading part in its activities 
became involved in hostilities.
80
 The officers of the Governing Body reminded 
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government members that during the First World War the International Institute of 
Agriculture at Rome did not cease its activities.
81
 Furthermore, while a war had the 
potential to assume global proportions, the Governing Body predicted that ‘the great 
majority of the members of the organisation would not, in all events in its early 
stages, be actively engaged in hostilities.’82 In January 1940, upon the occasion of 
the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the League of Nations, the 
Secretariat’s Information Section issued a communiqué on Avenol’s behalf. The 
secretary-general shared his understanding of the contribution the League had made 
to social and economic progress and outlined the reasons why the outbreak of war 
did not reduce the organisation to a defunct entity: 
 
[The League] has served as a centre of discussion and elaboration of a 
philosophy of international life and conduct which has had an effect on world 
relations immeasurably surpassing the modest material resources put at its 
disposal.  [………] it has created network of international agencies in nearly 
all fields of human interest which can hardly fail to be part of the foundations 
of the international life which must inevitably be created at the end of the 
present conflict, when mankind returns to the normal paths of peace.
83
  
 
According to the secretary-general the international community could still 
derive benefit from such an organisation as the League in wartime. The League’s 
Secretariat and technical officials, through the results of their own work and because 
of the vast holdings of the League’s Rockefeller Library, had a wealth of relevant 
economic, social and humanitarian data and statistics to place at the disposal of 
afflicted governments. Loveday subscribed to the belief that the organisation’s value 
lay in its role as a ‘clearing house of ideas’, able to offer advice to member states on 
technical matters, based not on theory, but on what other countries had already 
achieved.
84
 Clavin has argued in subsequent historiography that the League’s 
greatest contribution lay in the generation of sophisticated ‘epistemic communities’ 
that developed particular expertise and world views.
85
 The experience of Secretariat 
officials in assisting post-war reconstruction polices in the aftermath of the First 
World War provided another strong argument for the League’s wartime 
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preservation.
86
 It is also significant to note that League officials did not simply draw 
upon the League’s technical role as a justification for its wartime preservation. The 
central argument was that the League represented something bigger and better than 
the exclusive alliances which seemed to lead inexorably to war. As Avenol stated in 
January 1940: ‘The word cannot go on indefinitely in conflict; a settlement must 
come sooner or later; and, when it does come, it will be found that there are certain 
perennial truths in the League which mankind cannot and will not forego.’87 The 
League’s technical activities were wrapped in its ethos of liberal idealism and its 
officials cited both its technical expertise and its political identity as testament to its 
continued relevance to a world at war. 
As the political situation deteriorated a project was embarked upon from 
1938-40 to enhance the scope and reach of the technical organisations. It 
traditionally fell to the Assembly and Council to approve the League’s technical 
programme. The Office of the Secretary-General produced a report in June 1939 
advocating the removal of the League’s technocratic agenda from the remit of 
political organs as: 
 
All the manifold subjects within the League purview come up for 
consideration simultaneously. These subjects have to compete with each 
other, for the time and attention of delegations whose interest is in any case 
chiefly turned towards political issues. No technical question or group of 
questions can get quite all the attention it deserves.
88
  
 
The report argued that it was unfair to expect the Council to take anything other than 
a perfunctory interest in the work of the technical agencies as its members were 
‘politically minded persons.’89 In attempting to sever the technocratic agenda from 
that of the League’s political organs, League officials hoped to entice non-member 
states into greater collaboration with the technical organisations. This was partly 
inspired by the longstanding and fruitful collaboration the various technical agencies 
enjoyed with the great power that so dramatically rejected the League’s diplomatic 
mission: the United States of America. 
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President Wilson believed that the League’s role should be confined to 
serving as an instrument for high politics.
90
 Thus it was ironic that it was the success 
and vitality of the League’s technical work which enticed the United States into the 
League sphere. The United States government participated in the League’s economic 
work from 1927 onwards and cooperation increased with the election of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt in 1932.
91
 Before assuming the presidency, Roosevelt played a 
leading role in the creation of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation which sought to 
promote the foreign policy ideals of the former president.
92
 He was especially 
supportive of the technical work of the League. The inaugural conference of the 
I.L.O. took place in Washington DC in 1920. At that time Roosevelt held the office 
of assistant secretary to the navy and personally arranged for the provision of office 
space for the conference staff.
93
 Roosevelt stood as the Democratic vice-presidential 
nominee for the election of 1920 on a pro-League ticket. With the subsequent 
Republican landside and the growing realisation on Roosevelt’s part that a continued 
commitment to the League would consign him to the political wilderness, he became 
more muted in his support for the organisation. As a Presidential candidate in 1932 
Roosevelt declared that the League of Nations, as it was then, ‘was not the League 
conceived by Woodrow Wilson.’94  This was a rather prescient remark and even 
when in power, Roosevelt, the consummate practitioner of politics as the art of the 
possible, was never prepared to lend the League his equivocal support. This position 
impacted profoundly upon the League’s wartime experience.  
Roosevelt’s secretary of state was more open in his support for the League. 
Cordell Hull served in the House of Representatives during Wilson’s presidency and 
was a strong advocate for the League in its early days. According to his memoirs he 
regarded the congressional repudiation of the League Covenant as an act that would 
ultimately end in disaster.
95
 As secretary of state Hull made it a point when receiving 
diplomatic representatives, especially from the smaller European countries, to 
encourage them to give as much support as they could to the League, in an attempt to 
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stress the importance he attached to the continuation of the League in a very difficult 
time in its history.
96
 A clear sign of the international intent of the Roosevelt 
administration was given when the United States formally joined the I.L.O. The 
I.L.O. always maintained a branch office in Washington and from the beginning of 
Roosevelt’s presidency American diplomats were sent as observers to I.L.O. 
conferences. On 20 August 1934 Roosevelt, exercising powers conferred on him by 
Congress, formally accepted an invitation from the International Labour Office and 
the United States became a fully a participating member of the I.L.O. By 1939 the 
directorship of the I.L.O. was occupied by an American, John Winant, a former 
governor of the state of New Hampshire.  
 Conscious that any association with the United States, limited as it may have 
been to the technical activities, augured well for the League as a whole, there was an 
initiative within the Secretariat of the League to secure formal recognition of the 
collaboration of non member states. In addition to the United States, other states 
such as Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela, having withdrawn from the League, 
continued to cooperate with the technical agencies in a limited fashion. In the 
Assembly of September 1938 a resolution was passed by member states in which 
they declared their desire to welcome any further collaboration with non member 
states, authorising the secretary-general to communicate this resolution to those 
states in question.
97
 On 23 May 1939 Avenol addressed a sitting of the Council and 
proposed a committee to investigate ways and means of organising formal technical 
collaboration with non member states.
 98
 Four days later the Council approved 
Avenol’s suggestion. Stanley M. Bruce, the former Australian prime minister and 
committed internationalist, was appointed to lead this committee which also 
considered proposals for according the technical organisations a greater role in 
sanctioning their own work programmes. The Bruce Report (published in August 
1939) proposed a new Central Committee that would determine and coordinate the 
work of the technical services independent of the Assembly. It would consist of 
twenty-four states elected by the Assembly on the recommendation of its own bureau. 
The Central Committee, meeting once a year, would also have the power to elect 
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more members including non League member states.
99
 The proposals of the Bruce 
Committee effectively promised the technical organisations the same level of 
autonomy enjoyed by the I.L.O., the agenda of which was determined by its own 
Governing Body, while its budget was approved by the secretary-general and the 
Supervisory Commission. With the postponement of the September Assembly it was 
unclear when member states would be given the opportunity to consider such matters.  
 Thomas Weiss and Jean Siotis argued that the Bruce Report ‘was trying to 
make a virtue out of a necessity’ in strengthening the functionalist potential of the 
League just as its political mission lay in tatters.
100
 However such an argument 
overlooks the subsequent mobilisation of the League’s political organs in December 
1939 to expel a member state for the first and only time in League history. While this 
action was not inspired by altruism, the motivations behind and implications of such 
a course of action were politically significant for a Europe that was falling apart. 
Despite the attempts to re-orientate the League towards greater concentration on 
technical matters, this episode demonstrates that the League could not be de-
politicised. The experience, motivations and reactions of member states to the 
Assembly and Council sessions of December 1939 provide a clear insight into what 
they hoped to achieve by continued membership of the League of Nations.  
 It was not the transgressions of Hitler’s Germany that pulled the League out 
of its lethargy and which inspired member states to act with uncharacteristic vigour 
and fervour. It was the actions of another member state, another bête noire of a 
polarised Europe: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As Martin McCauley 
argued, the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 was the first decisive rejection of 
President Wilson’s assertion that the principles of liberal democracy and free market 
trade would become a universal reality.
101
 The young Soviet state was not invited to 
attend the Peace Conference in 1919 and viewed the League with suspicion. Georgy 
Chicherin, commissar for foreign affairs (1918-30), was convinced that the 
‘imperialistic’ League could never assume the role of impartial arbiter in Soviet 
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affairs. 
102
 Such prejudice and antagonism was not one-sided. The League’s then 
secretary-general, Eric Drummond, perceived the League as a liberal democratic 
institution that was incompatible with communist ideology.
103
 The colourful 
memoirs of de Madariaga, recording the Soviet experience of the 1932 disarmament 
conference, demonstrate the anti-communist culture of Geneva: 
 
Contrary to what had by then become a tradition, the secretary-general did 
not receive [the Soviet delegates] either in his house or in his office; nor did 
he offer them any hospitality anywhere. The Bolshies were then still those 
awful people; less because of their already rough treatment of their 
adversaries than because of their proletarian ways. Their bosses (one could 
hardly call them leaders) went about as cloth-capped commissars, and had 
not yet become Homborg hatted ministers. So that when Litvinov [Soviet 
delegate and future commissar for foreign affairs] and Lunacharsky [another 
soviet delegate] turned up [............] no one in the Secretariat would move to 
offer them a hand to shake.’104 
 
It was the collective security potential and most assuredly not the political 
identity of the League that enticed the Soviet Union, under the leadership of 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov (1930-9), to seek and acquire 
membership of the League in 1934. Litvinov was instrumental in convincing Soviet 
leadership that the U.S.S.R. could not isolate herself from the capitalist bloc and that 
the League would provide the means, (though not the only means), to protect Soviet 
borders and its sphere of influence from German and Japanese expansionism.
105
 The 
great powers supported the Soviet entry out of similar pragmatism. It reinforced 
Franco-Soviet cooperation in containing German ambitions in Eastern Europe and 
the British government ultimately considered it wiser to include the Soviet Union  in 
a framework for peaceful mediation of disputes.
106
 The admittance of the Soviet 
Union to the League, its acquisition of a permanent seat on the Council and the 
prospect of the appointment of its citizens to Secretariat posts, caused considerable 
apprehension among the smaller European states at Geneva. Suspicion of the spread 
of communism and the Soviet Union’s history of suppressing religious freedom 
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prompted countries like Argentina, Portugal, Switzerland and the Netherlands to 
express their opposition to overtures being made to the U.S.S.R.
107
 In the autumn 
session of the 1934 Assembly, Éamon de Valera president of the Executive Council 
of the Irish Free State and minister for external affairs, expressed the hope that the 
Soviet Union, in light of the ‘good faith’ member states had shown in accepting its 
membership, would undertake to uphold the ‘liberty of conscience’, i.e., religious 
freedoms, of its citizenry.
108
 This statement encapsulates the original Wilsonian 
conception of the League as the embodiment of liberal progressivism. As J.A. 
Thompson argued: ‘in a world where such values as democracy, self-determination 
and human rights are not always and everywhere respected by governments, there is 
bound to be a tension between a commitment to promote them and participation in a 
comprehensive system of collective security.’109 These tensions were only likely to 
increase as the security credentials of the League were diminished, with small states 
clinging to membership to reaffirm their liberal democratic, and even Christian 
values.  
Reservations among both the Soviets and the western states over the former’s 
participation in the League’s technical activities demonstrate how intrinsic the 
political forces that moulded the Covenant were to every aspect of its existence, even 
to work traditionally described as ‘non political.’ 110  Ghébali echoed Mitrany’s 
assertions on the benefits of a functionalist approach to international cooperation by 
arguing that the technical organisations were better at achieving their goals than their 
political counterparts because of common interests.
111
 This position fails to recognise 
that internationalism itself is a relative concept with the Soviet aspirations for the 
League proving drastically different to that of their Western European counterparts. 
Furthermore, while transnational social and economic projects crossed national 
borders they often struggled to transcend political divisions. The Irish delegation to 
Geneva was in regular correspondence with the Holy See, reporting on developments 
and paying close attention to the role of the Soviet officials who were seconded to 
the Secretariat. When in 1935 the Soviet citizen Marcel Rosenberg was appointed 
under secretary-general, Éamon de Valera sought assurances from Joseph Avenol 
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that Rosenberg would not be given any role in the Social, Minorities, Mandates or 
Intellectual Cooperation sections.
112
 De Valera believed that those areas would have 
a direct bearing on the rights and activities of religious groups within member states 
and would also provide the opportunity for the dissemination of pro-Soviet 
propaganda.
113
 Avenol was sympathetic to the Catholic bloc and assured anxious 
delegates that Rosenberg would not be given any such contentious role in the 
Secretariat.
114
 This information was duly passed on by the Irish envoy to the Holy 
See to the Cardinal Secretary of State Giovanni Pacelli (the future Pius XII). While 
the news from Geneva was a source of relief, Pacelli remained extremely pessimistic 
that the Soviet Union was in a position to have its ‘agents’ within the League.115  
The concerns of the Holy See and the Irish Department of External Affairs 
proved ill-founded as the U.S.S.R did not join the League to avail of its social and 
economic work. A study undertaken by the League Secretariat in 1944 noted that the 
Soviet Union had always exhibited ‘a marked indifference’ to the technical activities 
of the League.
116
 Its contribution to the statistics of the League’s Health Organisation 
and drug bodies was sporadic. Clavin wrote that whereas the League reflected 
middle-class concerns about the right to self government, the International Labour 
Organisation was designed to reflect proletarian interests and was intended to 
combat the pull of international communism.
117
 The I.L.O. was a vehicle for social 
democracy rather than the more extreme form of proletarianism embodied by the 
Soviet Union.
118
 The U.S.S.R. was understandably reluctant to be associated with the 
I.L.O. upon its assumption of League membership only to be informed that it was 
prerequisite to entry into the umbrella organisation. The International Labour 
Conference enjoyed a tripartite structure; national delegations were composed of 
government representatives, workers and employers on a ratio of 2:1:1. The same 
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organisational structure was replicated in the Governing Body of the I.L.O. which 
was composed of representatives from the eight countries of chief industrial 
importance as well as other non-permanent representatives, elected by the 
International Labour Conference. The Soviet government dispatched an ‘observer’ to 
the 1935 International Labour Conference and then the following year upgraded that 
status to government ‘delegate.’ In 1937 a full Soviet delegation attended the 
conference in Geneva. However from 1937 onwards the U.S.S.R. ceased to be 
represented at the conference.
119
 The U.S.S.R. was antagonistic to the tripartite 
formula of the Labour Conference due to its insistence of the primacy of workers’ 
rights over the venture capitalism of employers and entrepreneurs.
120
 The U.S.S.R 
was not represented in the discussions of the Bruce Committee.
121
 Northedge 
observed that the social and economic agencies of the League sought to create a 
world dreamed of by Victorian captains of industry; where legislation to temper the 
excesses of capitalism would gradually lead to a coincidence of interest between 
entrepreneurs and workers to ensure fair conditions of life for all.
122
 Technical 
organisations that sought to enhance rather than eradicate capitalism could never 
receive the long-term commitment of a state that eagerly anticipated the worldwide 
destruction of that system.  
Instead the Soviet Union displayed a greater eagerness to realise the League’s 
collective security potential than any other great power at Geneva. The American 
ambassador to the Soviet Union reported that Litvinov confided to him his 
conviction that the League could have ‘no meaning at all unless it [stood] for 
collective security.’ 123  Thus, contrary to the arguments of a minority of League 
officials and of subsequent historians and theorists, the League’s diplomatic mission 
was arguably less divisive than its technical role; the latter being predicated on the 
acceptance of liberal norms and values, the former on maintaining international 
peace and security whatever the cost.
124
 The Soviet Union tried to use the League 
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Assembly to mobilise public opinion when the fate of Czechoslovakia hung in the 
balance during the Sudetan Crisis of 1938.
125
 A later memorandum by the British 
Foreign Office concluded that, given previous Soviet suspicions of the League, its 
entry into the organisation constituted nothing more than a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ and that it would be ‘naive to conclude that she had been converted to 
the true principles enshrined in the Covenant.’126 There is a certain level of hypocrisy 
in this statement as neither Britain nor France were prepared to utilise the League 
during the mid-1930s to deal with the worsening European diplomatic situation. 
While the Soviet Union could not adhere to the liberal spirit of the Covenant it was 
prepared, more than any other great power, to fulfil the League’s primary goal. In 
1941 the journalist Robert Dell, the Manchester Guardian’s former Geneva 
correspondent, published The Geneva Racket. The book was a scathing attack on 
British and French League policy in which the author condemned the complete lack 
of international spirit on the League Council.
127
 The Manchester Guardian argued 
that its journalist was ‘one of the disappointed enthusiasts who is entitled to “let off 
steam” because he himself gave so much to the cause that was betrayed.’128 Dell 
argued that from 1934-9 the Soviet delegation was one of the most faithful to the 
principles of the Covenant and ‘had the policy of Litvinov been accepted by England 
and France’ the world would not then be at war.129 
The U.S.S.R.’s experience at Geneva would prove, in the words of one 
historian of Soviet foreign policy, ‘an unmerciful boomerang’ with the Soviet Union 
finding itself the eventual antagonist of the very system it sought to rally.
130
 The 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939), in which the U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany 
agreed to carve up the territory of Eastern Europe, was the direct result of the still-
birth of collective security and the refusal of Britain and France to include the Soviet 
Union in their ill-fated appeasement efforts. Never mistaking Hitler for a gentleman 
diplomat, Joseph Stalin sought to create a greater buffer area between Germany and 
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the U.S.S.R. by invading Poland and pressurising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into 
granting the Red Army use of bases in their territories.
 131
   
Soviet leaders then turned their attention to another state with which it shared 
historic links, it once constituting a grand duchy of Imperial Russia: the young 
republic of Finland. Lenin had granted Finland’s independence in 1917 in the hope 
that bourgeois self-determination would intensify class struggle and result in a 
socialist revolution. However by 1939 this small state of three and a half million 
people was being governed by a coalition of social democratic and agrarian 
parties.
132
 A pact of non-aggression was signed between Finland and the U.S.S.R. in 
1932 but the dispute between the Soviet Union and Finland in June 1939 over the 
latter’s refortification of the Åland islands was a portentous sign of what was to 
come the following winter.
133
 In a communication to Secretary-General Joseph 
Avenol, the Finnish government emphasised that its entire foreign policy was 
directed towards remaining outside of the conflicting power blocs in Europe and that 
Finland could not constitute a threat to any power, especially the Soviet Union.
134
 
These assurances would not assuage Soviet security fears of the vulnerability of 
Leningrad, only thirty two kilometres from the Finnish frontier, to attack through the 
Gulf of Finland. An additional strategic advantage to the annexation of Finland was 
very apparent. Acquisition of Finland’s port of Liinahamari on the northern shore of 
the Arctic Ocean, which remained ice-free in the winter months due to the gulf-
stream, would have constituted an obvious boon for the Soviet navy. 
The Finnish government dispatched a diplomatic delegation to Moscow in 
October 1939. By November talks had broken down due to excessive demands for 
territory on the part of the U.S.S.R. Events came to ahead on 26 November 1939 
when the Soviet Union manufactured a border incident and attempted to present, to a 
sceptical world, a Red Army training exercise as an attack on Soviet forces by 
Finnish troops. The U.S.S.R. tore up its pact of non-aggression with Finland and the 
Red Army launched an invasion force on 30 November. The first town to be 
captured was the small coastal settlement of Terijoki and it was here that the Soviets 
established a puppet Finnish government under O.V. Kuusinen. Soviet forces, 
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suffering from the legacy of Stalin’s purges on the officer classes of the Red Army, 
confusion and poor planning met with surprisingly fierce resistance on the part of a 
largely volunteer force accustomed to the harsh terrain.
135
 
 
 
The League’s response to the invasion of Finland 
Following the swift German-Soviet conquest of Europe, no one expected further 
fighting in Europe until the spring of 1940. Thus the Red Army’s attack on Finland 
secured a rapt worldwide audience and quickly earned almost universal 
condemnation. According to the Irish Times, ‘the conscience of the whole world has 
condemned Soviet Russia for its invasion of its tiny and peaceful neighbour.’136 
States such as Switzerland, which had long objected to the presence of a communist 
power in the League, felt a strong sense of vindication. According to the Journal de 
Genève, the U.S.S.R. had done nothing more than to reveal its ‘true colours.’137 A 
session of the Assembly and Council of the League would provide member states 
with the appropriate arena in which to articulate their vehement condemnation of 
Soviet policy. The League could do nothing however until an appeal was made by 
one of the parties in the dispute. On 3 December Secretary-General Joseph Avenol 
received a telegram from the Finnish delegate to the Assembly, Rudolf Holsti. In this 
communication Holsti declared that Finland had ‘continually made every effort to 
live in peace’ with the Soviet Union and invoked his country’s right to appeal to the 
League for mediation under articles eleven and fifteen of the Covenant.
138
 The 
Council and Assembly were accordingly convoked for 9 and 11 December 
respectively.  
Records reveal that Finland did not approach the secretary-general of its own 
accord. Despite de Madariaga’s concerns that Avenol would prove shy of political 
matters the League’s experience of the Winter War demonstrated that the secretary-
general was only too willing to wade into the realm of international disputes. Avenol 
confided to the American consul-general at Geneva, Harold Tittman, that the Finnish 
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appeal would not have been forthcoming without his encouragement.
139
 According 
to Tittman, Avenol was not motivated by an earnest desire to mediate between 
Finland and the U.S.S.R., or even by a genuine desire to secure assistance for the 
Finns. Avenol simply wanted to secure Soviet expulsion from the League as he felt 
that ‘such action would serve to increase immeasurably the prestige of the 
League.’140 In contrast to the powers later conferred on the secretary-general of the 
United Nations Organisation, Avenol could not call matters to the attention of the 
League Council. He could only operate as an indirect agent and influence. Avenol’s 
course of action did not tally with his earlier response to an appeal for League 
assistance on the part of another invaded member state. In April 1939 Avenol 
refused to recognise the Albanian complaint against Italian aggression as a plea to 
the League because the Albanian government failed to communicate with the 
Secretariat either directly or through its accredited representative in Geneva; rather 
the letter was sent from the Albanian chargé d’affaires in Paris who informed the 
secretary-general that he was acting on the instructions of his government.
141
 
Avenol’s anti-communist outlook likely influenced his approach to the Finnish 
government: he was, according to the American consul-general, ‘most anxious’, for 
Soviet expulsion to take place.’142 While member states traditionally demurred from 
enhancing the political role of the secretary-general, Avenol was not likely to 
antagonise them at this point because his politics did not conflict with the anti-
communist culture of Geneva.  
Avenol dispatched a telegram to Moscow urging the Soviet Government to 
accept the mediation of the League in its war with Finland. Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov responded on behalf of his government, refusing the 
request. According to Molotov there was no justification for convocation of the 
Assembly and Council since the Soviet Union was not in ‘a state of war with 
Finland.’143 Citing the newly installed Kuusinen government, Molotov insisted that 
government in the name of whom the Finnish delegate Holsti appealed to the League 
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was not ‘the real representative of the people.’144 The refusal of the Soviet Union to 
acknowledge the aggression or to dispatch delegates to Geneva would help realise 
Avenol’s desire for Soviet expulsion. Member states could not resolve a dispute in 
the absence of one party and so their task then became one of passing judgment on 
the illegality of the Soviet invasion of Finland.   
Avenol’s assertion that a League response to the invasion of Finland would 
elicit a positive response was partly vindicated by the reaction of the international 
press. In France the Petit Parisien and Le Temps both commended the Finnish 
decision to appeal to the League and they demanded a general condemnation of 
Soviet policy.
145
 Newspapers such as the Journal de Genève lauded this 
revitalisation of the League and urged the organisation to reclaim some of its honour 
and prestige on the world stage.
146
 The press response provides a valuable insight 
into what contemporaries conceived of the League’s role. The emphasis was not on 
what the League could do for Finland but on what it meant for member states; the 
Assembly provided the opportunity for an expression of shared values. According to 
the Columbian newspaper El Tiempo the League of Nations was: 
 
more the soul of internationalism than an organ...... an idealistic concept of 
what friendship between nations should be, and is saving, in these times, 
admittedly romantically, the rights of humanity that have been besmirched by 
the cowardly violence of the strong upon the weak.
147
 
 
The El Tiempo article perfectly articulated the League’s continued public appeal. 
The League’s founders fervently believed that the mobilisation of international 
public opinion was vital to the survival of the organisation, although as Mark 
Mazower pointed out, this often transformed the Assembly and Council into an arena 
for theatrics rather than a platform for serious policy-making.
148
  The was valued less 
for what it could do but for what it signified as a touchstone for peaceful cooperation 
between states and as an expression, however imperfect, of liberal internationalism.  
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While the press response to the convocation of the Assembly and Council 
was largely positive, the sudden mobilisation of the League’s political organs elicited 
a more equivocal and varied response from governments. This demonstrated the 
disparity between the rhetoric of the Covenant and the practise of realpolitik. A 
columnist in the Irish Times noted the varied motivations and constrains among the 
government delegations due to convene in Geneva: 
 
There are small countries, whose position is so remote that they have no 
incentive of self-interest; there are others, who are so close that the first blast 
of retaliatory fury would burst upon their heads; there are others, again, who 
have grievances against those with whom they would be expected to be 
comrades in arms.
149
 
 
The Latin American member states of the League, the countries most remote from 
the European war zone, spearheaded the motion for Soviet expulsion. It was the 
presence of Latin American countries at Geneva that largely accorded the 
organisation an intercontinental dimension. At the same time the Latin American 
experience of the League of Nations exposed the organisation’s inherent 
Eurocentrism. According to Erik Jensen, the League was unable to function as an 
effective organisation because ‘its assumptions remained based on European value 
systems and notions of European dominance inherited from the world of before 
1914.’150 While the League aspired to universality it refused to dilute the Eurocentric 
focus of the organisation much to the disenchantment of the Latin American states, 
all of whom were members of the League though never at the same time. The vast 
majority of disputes brought to the attention of the League Council were European 
disputes and even when the organisation displayed some interest in resolving inter-
American disputes, such as the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, it 
deferred to the actions of the United States, a non League member state. This eroded 
the League’s value to the Latin American states as a counterpoint to the growing 
hegemony of the United States in the western hemisphere.
151
 From 1925 to 1938 
Costa-Rica, Brazil, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Chile, Venezuela 
and Peru all formally withdrew from the League. Brazil’s withdrawal was motivated 
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by the failure to establish a permanent seat for a Latin American state on the Council 
at a time when semi-permanent seats were created for two more European powers; 
Spain and Poland. 
While the remaining Latin American member states appeared to mitigate the 
Eurocentrism of the League’s composition it did not dilute the Eurocentrism of its 
political culture. Sharing a great deal of cultural heritage with Western Europe, the 
Latin American independence movement owed much to the traditions of liberal 
democracy.
152
 The Chilean politician and diplomat, Don Agustín Edwards, argued in 
1929 that the ideals of the League appealed to traditional Latin American sentiments, 
perhaps more so than to their European counterparts:  
 
The Latin American nations sprang into existence in a common movement 
for independence. The very reason of their existence as independent nations 
is the solidarity which reigned amongst them when they resolved to obtain 
their freedom. International co-operation-the very essence of the League of 
Nations-is innate to them.
153
  
 
Argentina was one of the main protagonists in the expulsion of the Soviet Union. In 
June 1939 Argentina’s foreign minister José Maria Cantilo gave an interview to La 
Razón newspaper explaining why Argentina remained in the League. According to 
Cantilo, Argentina did not attempt to distance itself from Geneva as it was still 
‘faithful’ to the Covenant. 154  Cantilo stressed that Argentina would maintain 
solidarity with Europe, because of its shared cultural traditions with that continent 
whose emigrants continued to shape the country.
155
 Argentina was certainly quick to 
respond to a European crisis. On 4 December 1939 Cantilo telephoned Avenol 
personally. Cantilo argued that the unprovoked act of aggression on the Soviet 
Union’s part justified its immediate expulsion from the League. 156  In this 
conversation traditional distrust of communism featured prominently. At that 
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moment in time Argentina was governed by a right-wing coalition of the military, 
anti-radicals and conservative landowning elites known as the Concordancia. The 
bold establishment of a puppet communist government in Finland rankled and served 
as a reminder that Soviet internationalism in the 1920s had been predicated on 
encouraging proletarian agitation within the sovereign territory of other states in 
order to ferment a worldwide socialist revolution.
157
 According to Cantilo ‘the 
creation of organisations within other countries to facilitate expansion of 
communism constitutes a danger to which peoples cannot be indifferent who hold a 
reverence and respect for human life, conscience and liberty.’158 It was clear that the 
Soviet Union was not being judged as if it was simply another expansionist state; 
indeed the fascist powers never experienced the same level of condemnation at 
Geneva. Rather the League Assembly was used as an opportunity to place the entire 
communist system on trial. Cantilo’s statement sought to underpin the contradiction 
between the spirit of the Covenant and communist ideology. This contradiction 
proved fatal to Soviet membership at a time when the League’s political identity was 
valued more than its security potential.  
Latin American participation in the League was marked by the tendency 
among those states to exercise their traditional solidarity and form a solid voting 
bloc.
159
 In the wake of the Argentinean communication the Panamanian government 
also wrote to the secretary-general calling for an immediate cessation of 
hostilities.
160
 Uruguay also assured Avenol that it would be obliged to withdraw 
from the League unless the Council provided a strong response to Soviet 
aggression.
161
 The willingness of Latin American states to pronounce upon an 
entirely European crisis, through the medium of the League, stood in sharp contrast 
to their most recent diplomatic efforts to neutralise the western hemisphere.
162
 The 
Chilean ambassador expressed concern about a proposal, forwarded by other Latin 
American states, that the Union of American Republics (Pan-American Union) 
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should issue a resolution in support of Finland. He reminded the U.S. State 
Department that the prime object of the recent Panama Conference (September 
1939), attended by American nations, was to ‘secure the neutrality of those nations 
in the European war and that the situation produced between Finland and the Soviet 
Union [was] a clear consequence of said war.’163 The Latin American support for 
Soviet expulsion demonstrated that neutrality, during the Second World War, was 
less an ideological commitment than a pragmatic policy to remove small states from 
the firing line. The Soviet expulsion allowed Latin American member states to 
express their commitment to international law without incurring significant 
diplomatic repercussions. One of the criticisms contemporaries levelled against the 
League’s collective security aspirations was that they had the potential to make every 
war universal instead of keeping it localised.
164
 In permitting the Latin American 
countries a determining voice in the expulsion of the Soviet Union, the League 
ignored the reality of geo-politics. While the expulsion of the Soviet Union would be 
easy to secure, assistance for Finland could only be achieved with the cooperation of 
its small and mostly neutral neighbours.  
Those small states had to be especially wary of antagonising the Third Reich.  
The League Assembly could conceivably serve as a platform for denunciation of 
Germany. German newspapers claimed that the convocation of the League’s political 
organs would have ‘disagreeable repercussions’ for the neutral countries as 
proceedings were bound to be strongly influenced by the two belligerent powers 
(Britain and France).
165
 The Swiss also expressed concern that the speeches and 
actions taken at Geneva would compromise the neutrality of the Helvetic 
Confederation.
166
 Swiss diplomatic documents reveal that officials in the 
Wilhelmstrasse were watching events unfold in Geneva. The Swiss minister in 
Berlin, Hans Frölicher, wrote a letter to the head of the Political Department 
Giuseppe Motta, in Bern, communicating the attitude of Ernst von Weisäcker, the 
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state secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry.
167
 Weisäcker was concerned that the 
Assembly would condemn German actions and questioned the wisdom of permitting 
the discussion of disputes, in which Switzerland was not directly involved, on Swiss 
territory.
168
 Motta assured Weisäcker that he did not foresee any such difficulty with 
the December Assembly.
169
 Weisäcker warned Motta that if the Swiss permitted the 
Assembly and Council sessions to function as a forum for Allied propaganda against 
the Third Reich, Germany would be within its rights to demand the Confederation to 
put its neutrality in order, a position that Motta did not dispute.
170
 The Swiss 
economy was heavily dependent on trade with Germany and thus the government in 
Bern was extremely conscious of the dangers implicit in allowing any condemnation 
of German foreign policy on Swiss soil.
171
 In fact the Swiss did not need to be 
prompted by Weisäcker to adopt a cautious approach, having already secured a 
guarantee from Avenol that there was to be no allusion to what was termed the wider 
‘European war’ within the halls of the Palais des Nations.172 The correspondence 
between the Swiss Political Department and the Reich Foreign Ministry 
demonstrated that while there was little confidence in the League’s diplomatic 
influence that did not mean that the organisation was politically insignificant.  
Switzerland was not the only neutral state anxious to stifle any condemnation 
of Nazi Germany. Avenol also received a communication from the delegations of 
Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden to the effect that they 
considered the Assembly to have been convened for a specific political object, the 
Finnish appeal, and that they would abstain from discussing any other political 
issues.
173
 According to Neville Wylie, one of the most striking aspects of European 
neutrality was the neutrals failure to capitalise on their numerical strength.
174
 Yet in 
this instance, neutrals were consciously using their collective influence to direct the 
course of League proceedings to accommodate their own cautious foreign policy. 
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The atmosphere of the League Assembly was more redolent of the sum of the fears 
of the small states than of the combined strength of the great powers.  
Indeed, Britain and France failed to provide decisive leadership in the 
December Assembly. The British Foreign Office was quite supportive of the 
neutral’s aim to limit the Assembly and Council sessions to a discussion of the 
Finnish question in order to contain any sensitive political issues that might cause 
embarrassment.
175
 Foreign Office officials were aware that the Polish government-
in-exile, then based in Paris, was likely to send delegates to the forthcoming 
Assembly session. The government decided that Britain would recognise those 
delegates since the basis of the Anglo-French declaration of war rested with the 
German violation of that country’s sovereignty. 176  However, it was extremely 
anxious lest Czechoslovakia, the victim of both German aggression and 
Chamberlain’s failed policy of appeasement, dispatched a delegation. At that point 
London did not recognise any Czechoslovak government. The British delegation to 
Geneva might have been compelled into the difficult position of refusing to 
recognise a Czechoslovak delegation to the Assembly.
177
 The Foreign Office was 
convinced that the only line of safety lay in insisting, like the neutrals, that the 
Assembly should only consider the matter for which it was called and then stand 
adjourned for a more convenient session.
178
 Thus a situation was created where the 
Soviet Union could be condemned for its invasion of Finland while its previous 
invasion of Poland, would be overlooked.  
Elements within the British government and Foreign Office regarded the 
motion for Soviet expulsion a futile and damaging exercise. Both Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax were sceptical of the 
League’s ability to produce a useful result for Finland. 179  Alexander Cadogan 
dubbed the decision to convoke the Assembly as ‘inevitable but insane.’180  The 
prospect of the imposition of economic sanctions on the offending Soviet Union was 
a controversial topic. The Foreign Office did not wish to burn their bridges with the 
greatest power in the Baltic through the severing of complete diplomatic and 
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commercial relations with the U.S.S.R.
181
The War Cabinet resolved to withhold 
support for any such sanctions within the Assembly.
182
 While the British government 
did not instigate the motion for expulsion it was aware that failure to support it 
would damage its international standing.  At this stage Italy had not yet entered the 
war and Britain was determined to limit the number of belligerents its war effort 
would have to contend with. According to the British ambassador to Rome, the 
Italians were taking the line that if Britain was serious about fighting aggression its 
delegation was obliged to take a serious line against the Soviet Union. If the British 
government failed to denounce the Soviet Union, Italy would be led to question its 
‘bona fides.’183 Britain could not claim, as Chamberlain had vowed in his radio 
address to the nation on 3 September, that it was fighting against ‘brute force, bad 
faith, injustice, oppression and persecution’ unless it was prepared to condemn a 
similar act of ‘brute force’ on the Soviet Union’s part.184 Richard Austen Butler, the 
British delegate to the Assembly, stressed that Britain needed to keep its ‘moral 
position intact’ and that for this reason support for Soviet expulsion was preferable 
to abstention from voting.
185
 If obliged to support a motion for Soviet expulsion, the 
British perceived in the Assembly session an opportunity to equate the Allied war 
effort with the collective security ideals of the Covenant. Winston Churchill, in his 
capacity of first lord of the admiralty, informed his cabinet colleagues that Britain 
stood to: 
 
reap some advantage from them meeting of the League since the discussion 
there would tend to focus the conviction that in the war we stood for the 
principles of humanity against barbaric aggression. There is also strong 
support in this country for international co-operation and some organisation 
for this purpose would be needed after the war.
186
  
 
This evidence endorses Steiner’s argument as to the League’s role in 
establishing norms of state behaviour, with which states, publicly at least, sought to 
identify.
187
 The determination of the French to support an expulsion motion was also 
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a deciding factor in the British decision to endorse the resolution. The French were 
wary of provoking the Soviet Union but they were conscious that either rejection of 
the motion or abstention would alienate domestic opinion.
188
 Influenced by the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the French Communist Party’s opposition to the war 
with Germany, the autumn and winter of 1939-40 was characterised as ‘an orgy of 
anti-communist hysteria’ when the Daladier government began the process of 
interning communists.
189
 Charles Corbin, the French ambassador to London, 
informed his British allies that the French government’s position was strongly 
influenced by the strength of public sympathy for Finland and antipathy for the 
Soviet Union. Corbin stated that the least his government could do was to support a 
motion for Soviet expulsion.
190
 The French government dispatched a strong 
delegation to Geneva, including the former prime minister and minister of foreign 
affairs, the seasoned senator Joseph Paul Boncour. Small power pressure (of the 
positive or the negative kind) was an important feature of the League’s diplomatic 
experience but it did not determine the organisation’s potential; delegates from the 
smaller nations could only influence League policy insofar as the great powers were 
prepared to listen to them.
191
 While the motion to expel the Soviet Union was not 
initiated by the great powers, had the British and French, as permanent members of 
the League Council, refused to give their consent, the motion would have foundered. 
The reaction to the convocation of the League Assembly thus permits an overview of 
the domestic concerns and foreign policies of the great and small powers alike.  
Meanwhile Finland shared almost the same trepidations about the Assembly 
as did the neutral countries. Finland was fighting a war which it was ultimately 
unlikely to win however valiant a resistance its troops could proffer against the Red 
Army in the short term. The Finnish historian Oli Vehviläinen went so far to claim 
that Finland did not support the League resolution for expulsion so as not to further 
antagonise an already formidable adversary.
 192
 The reality of the Finnish position 
was more complex. Finland was then a member of the League Council. However as 
Finland was a party to the dispute, under article fifteen of the Covenant its vote was 
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not required to secure the necessary unanimity for a Council resolution. Rudolf 
Holsti, the Finnish delegate to the League, reminded Under Secretary-General 
Thanassis Aghnides that his government might eventually be compelled to seek the 
most favourable conditions from the Soviet Union for the re-establishment of peace. 
Holsti confided to Aghnides that Finland would therefore not insist upon the 
exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League.
 193
 However Holsti gave an 
assurance that Finland would not in any way wish to obstruct the will of member 
states.’194  
Unfortunately for Finland, Chamberlain and Halifax were correct to predict 
that the result of the Assembly would have little or no impact on the course of the 
war. The emphasis in the press and among governments was more on condemnation 
than assistance. In his study of Europe between the wars, Mark Mazower argued that 
as the years progressed the League’s influence shrunk until it was reduced to nothing 
more than a mere ‘coalition of like-minded states’, rather than the embodiment of a 
new international order.
195
 The evidence clearly supports this view with that ‘like-
mindedness’ predicated on a collective antipathy for communism. The British 
Foreign Office predicted that the Assembly would be a successful exercise in ‘anti-
Russian propaganda.’ 196 However the transformation of the League’s political 
function was not the accidental result of the failure of the League’s diplomatic 
machinery. Rather it was a deliberate and self-conscious process as demonstrated by 
the earlier opposition to Soviet membership and participation in the League’s 
technical activities. The League’s political identity was also regarded, by the press 
and by government officials, as a positive feature of the League’s experience. The 
Irish Times argued that the moral authority of League member states, uniting to 
condemn an act of aggression, would be an extremely uplifting exercise, boding well 
for the future development of international affairs.
197
 On 3 December 1939 Sir Orme 
Sargant (deputy under secretary of state for foreign affairs) pressed on Lord Halifax 
the need to use the League as an expression of shared values and respect for 
international law. He argued that it would be unwise to stifle the League in its 
function as a ‘forum of world opinion’, despite the serious political consequences 
                                                          
193
 Thanassis Aghnides to Joseph Avenol, 9 Dec. 1939 (A.F.M.F.A., 6PAAP/32, f. 190).  
194
 Ibid.  
195
 Mark Mazower, Dark continent: Europe’s twentieth century (London, 1998), p. 68).  
196
 Memorandum by A.W.G. Randall, 4 Dec. 1939 (T.N.A., FO 371/23694, p. 196).  
197
 Irish Times, 4 Dec. 1939.  
62 
 
liable to be enacted from an expulsion motion.
198
 The Foreign Office also concluded 
that if the League did not allow an expression of protest against the Soviet Union it 
would have ‘shocked’ world opinion.199 If the League was going to function for the 
rest of its days as an exclusive club in which its members expressed a common 
identity, there was no longer any room for a state so at odds with the dominant 
political culture of Geneva. 
The eyes of the world turned on Geneva when the twentieth session of the 
League Assembly opened on 11 December 1939. As one columnist noted, there was 
a ‘touch of drama’ about this sudden resurgence of the League.200 The organisation 
of League proceedings for this special session was rather abnormal. It was well 
within the Council’s mandate to tackle the Finnish appeal on its own; however 
Avenol had pushed for the simultaneous convocation of the Assembly. The 
secretary-general believed that a decision by the Assembly, in which every member 
state was entitled to exercise their vote, would carry greater moral authority and 
universality than if action was limited to a Council resolution.
201
 This provided the 
means for the League to present itself as Sargant’s ‘forum of world opinion.’ Had 
matters been confined to the Council, the great powers would not have felt the same 
pressure to support Soviet expulsion. It was agreed that a special committee, 
composed of thirteen member states, would consider the Finnish appeal and make a 
recommendation to the Assembly. The committee was composed of delegates from 
Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, India, the Irish Free State, Norway, Sweden, 
Thailand, Uruguay, Bolivia and Venezuela with Portugal’s José Caeiro da Mata 
elected as chairman. On 11 December the special committee of the Assembly sent a 
telegram to Moscow urging the Soviet government to bring an immediate halt to 
hostilities and to open negotiations. The telegram stated that Finland had already 
indicated its willingness to accept such a request and it gave the Soviet government 
twenty-four hours to respond to the appeal.
202
 The following day the Soviet Union 
responded with a terse refusal to the request.
203
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On 13 December a plenary session of the Assembly was held. As expected it 
was the Argentinean delegate Rudolfo Freye who spoke first and it was Freye who 
forwarded a motion for the expulsion of the Soviet Union. In a justification of the 
motion, Freye argued that as the League no longer possessed: 
 
the strength it required for the application of economic and military sanctions, 
the passing of judgement, from the point of view of moral effect, was 
conceivable only if the intention was to influence non-member states. The 
League had no doubt lost all coercive force, but it could not refuse to make a 
gesture-the exclusion of Russia-unless it was prepared to resign its functions 
in a spirit of suicidal defeat.
204
 
 
Freye’s words reflect the League’s role as the appointed standard-bearer of civilised 
international relations. They imply that the loss of coercive force was not the fault of 
member states but the result of the harsh reality of international affairs. However, 
theoretically, there was no impediment to member states if they wished to impose 
economic sanctions on the Soviet Union and provide Finland with military relief. 
Member states had already resigned the collective security potential of the League to 
‘suicidal defeat.’ At the opening session of the Assembly, the Finnish delegate Eino 
Hosti stated that his government hoped the League would ‘find means to transform 
the world sympathy into practical help.’ 205  Holsti and his compatriots would be 
sorely disappointed. It was true that the plight of Finland elicited genuine sympathy 
from League member states. As the British delegate stated:  
 
It was no wonder that there had been such a demonstration of public support 
for Finland. Though a small country, its whole record since it achieved 
independence had proclaimed a devotion to the cause of peace and to those 
ideals of social progress for which the League has always stood.
206
  
 
Unfortunately for Finland the December Assembly functioned as forum for 
collective denunciation rather than as a launch pad for collective action. Prioritising 
the League’s political identity over its diplomatic role permitted member states to 
project an image of peace without having to enforce it.  
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Freye argued before the assembled delegates of member states that the 
U.S.S.R. had placed itself outside of the Covenant by an illegal application of force 
against its peaceful neighbour; Soviet actions constituted an insult to all member 
states and therefore the exclusion of the U.S.S.R. from the League of Nations was 
the only course of action that could be contemplated by the Council.
207
 Freye stated 
that Argentina would withdraw from the League if the Soviet Union remained a 
member. Latin American solidarity remained intact at the Assembly and the Mexican 
delegate used the opportunity to emphasise the ‘great importance which it attached to 
the valuable collaboration of the states of the New World within the League of 
Nations.’208  Once the Argentinean motion was forwarded the die was cast. The 
motion was adopted by majority vote among the members of the special committee 
and the report was presented to the Assembly on the morning of 14 December 1939. 
For the resolution to be accepted, no single state, great or small, could reject it. 
Abstention could not derail a League resolution. The Assembly passed by 
acclamation the resolution of the special committee with nine states out of the forty 
two assembled abstaining from voting. The countries who abstained from voting 
were: China, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and 
Switzerland.  
It was clear from the initial reaction to the convocation of the Assembly and 
Council that a unanimous resolution was out of the question. The impossibility of 
securing such unanimity serves as a clear reflection of the state of international 
relations at this time. The countries that declined to participate in the resolution were 
motivated by the constraints of their own national concerns. The Baltic countries 
were then falling rapidly under Soviet political and military influence. The Chinese 
ambassador to London, Dr. Quo Tai-Chi, informed the British that China’s delegates 
would abstain from voting due to their difficult diplomatic position.
 209
  In previous 
Assembly sessions China spoke out against Japanese incursions into Manchuria. It 
had been the Soviet government who had given the Chinese the most assistance in 
their struggle against the invading forces.
210
 During the Assembly proceedings other 
states that declined to participate in the resolution used the opportunity to articulate 
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and emphasise their neutrality. The Swedish delegate, speaking on behalf of his own 
country as well as Norway and Denmark, informed the Assembly that they were 
compelled to abstain from assuming a position in regard to the resolution ‘insofar as 
it relates to a measure coming within the framework of the system of sanctions.’211 
The Swiss delegate outlined the same justification for abstention.  He assured the 
assembled states that the Swiss government would not regard the League’s 
organisation of humanitarian assistance for Finland, on Swiss soil, as a violation of 
its neutrality.
212
 According to the records of the Swiss Federal Council, the 
government was prepared to allow its delegation to express admiration for the 
bravery of the Finns while instructing it to abstain from the expulsion motion on the 
grounds of the Confederation’s perpetual neutrality.213 The fact vulnerable member 
states such as Switzerland and Sweden felt secure enough, despite their precarious 
neutrality and the hostile attitude of the German press, to even attend the League 
session was quite telling. It was a clear indication that the December Assembly was 
never intended to serve as a genuine exercise in collective security. According to 
Neville Wylie, the League’s brand of internationalism had a ‘corrosive effect on 
neutrality.’214 The proceedings of the December Assembly indicate that the League 
actually permitted the forceful and deliberate expression of neutrality. As 
demonstrated above, it allowed vulnerable neutral countries such as Sweden and 
Switzerland, to invoke their rights under international law before an international 
audience. The fact that they were not admonished by other member states for failing 
to participate in the expulsion motion indicates that neutrality was an accepted 
feature of League membership.  
On the evening of the 14 December members of the Council considered the 
motion for Soviet expulsion.
215
 A resolution was circulated to all member states in 
which the Council found ‘that by its act the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has 
placed itself outside the League of Nations’ and so it followed that the Soviet Union 
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was ‘no longer a member of the League.’216 As with the Assembly resolution, the 
decision only achieved the necessary unanimity through the abstention of three states: 
China, Greece and Yugoslavia. Finland did not vote on a resolution in which it as 
directly concerned and the Soviet Union abstained from the meeting, as did Peru and 
Iran.  
The Soviet government adopted a disdainful attitude to the League resolution, 
continuing to maintain that the U.S.S.R. was not at war with the legitimate Finnish 
government. Speaking through TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) the 
government claimed that the decision of member states was so absurd that it could 
only make a ‘laughing stock of its ill-starred authors.’217 The Soviet government 
wrongly identified Britain and France as the architects of the expulsion motion and 
attacked the hypocrisy of two imperialist countries in denouncing an act of 
aggression when they themselves were in control of vast empires.
218
 In issuing such 
a statement the Soviet Union was reverting to its original perception of the League as 
a tool for the imperialist powers. Indeed the young Soviet state had initially viewed 
the League as a ‘coalition of capitalist interests to be directed against the Soviet 
Union.’219 This perception was not baseless; both Wilson and Lloyd George were 
prepared to consider the removal of the Baltic States, the Ukraine and the Caucuses 
from the U.S.S.R. so that they could become mandated territories under the 
supervision of the League.
220
 In 1940 no great power was prepared to even 
contemplate harnessing the League’s collective security potential to organise direct 
military action against the Soviet Union. However the League was being used as an 
instrument of anti-Soviet policy. The aversion expressed in the corridors of the 
Palais des Nations against the entire Soviet system demonstrate that the brief period 
of Soviet commitment to collective security (under Maxime Litvinov) had been 
nothing more than an artificial and premature détente within the anti-communist 
culture of Geneva. The Soviet Union’s inglorious expulsion from the League 
heralded the end of the first major experiment in international cooperation between 
the liberal democracies and the solitary socialist state.  
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Indeed, reactions to the Assembly and Council resolutions demonstrate that 
anti-communist prejudice was a determining factor in the expulsion of the Soviet 
Union. The chairman of the Assembly’s special committee, José Caeiro da Mata, 
articulated the sense of vindication among those states that had opposed Soviet 
membership from the outset. He claimed that the actions of the U.S.S.R. represented 
‘no surprise and no disappointment.’221 Da Mata argued that the expulsion of the 
U.S.S.R. expressed ‘the feelings of millions who still believed in the triumph of 
spiritual values.’222 The Vatican newspaper Osservatore Romano described Soviet 
attitudes and actions during this period as indicative of the ‘contempt’ in which it 
held ‘natural rights.’223 The same organ charged the Soviets as being an ‘anti-God 
party’ who sought by its invasions of Poland and Finland to ‘carry the banner of 
atheism towards the west and the centre of Europe’, threatening ‘all religions 
especially Catholicism.’224 Robert Dell was convinced that the Latin American states 
which demanded Soviet expulsion were ‘more influenced by hatred of communism 
than by concern for the fate of Finland.’225 Dell regarded the expulsion of the Soviet 
Union as ‘justified’, arguing that the fact that Germany, Italy and Japan escaped such 
a fate was ‘no argument against it’, it never being ‘too late’ for the League ‘to make 
amends.’226 However according to Dell, it was illogical to expel the Soviet Union 
without the application of sanctions; the only result was that the League lost the 
Soviet financial contribution to the budget.’227 The Soviet Union violated the League 
Covenant. However the inconsistency inherent in the expulsion of the Soviet Union 
for a crime that had previously been committed with impunity by other League 
member states (then withdrawn) undermined the much celebrated ‘moral effect’ of 
the Assembly and Council resolutions.
228
 This episode in the League’s history 
illustrated that the problems of antagonism and prejudice between conflicting 
                                                          
221
 Report of the delegates of the United Kingdom on the twentieth Assembly of the League of 
Nations to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, 8 Jan. 1940 (T.N.A., FO 371/2443, p. 8).  
222
 Ibid.  
223
 Osservatore Romano, 6 Dec. 1939 translation provided in (T.N.A., FO 371/23696). 
224
 Osservatore Romano, 20 Dec. 1939 translated in a letter from D.G. Osbourne, British legation to 
the Holy See, to Halifax, 20 Dec. 1939 (T.N.A., FO 371/23696).  
225
 Dell, The Geneva Racket, p. 303.  
226
 Ibid.  
227
 Ibid.  
228
 For the ‘moral effect’ of the Council resolution see Rudolfo Freye’s speech: Report of the 
delegates of the United Kingdom on the twentieth Assembly of the League of Nations to the secretary 
of state for foreign affairs, 8 Jan. 1940 (T.N.A., FO 371/2443, pp 6-7).  
68 
 
systems of government would have to be tackled to create a more cohesive security 
organisation in the future.  
While the Soviet press identified Britain and France as the protagonists in the 
December sessions of the League’s political organs, this episode was actually 
indicative of their failure to provide strong leadership at Geneva. What prompted the 
Anglo-French bloc to support the motion for expulsion was their need to be 
associated with the condemnation of any form of expansionism. When Richard 
Austen Butler, the British delegate, rose to speak in the Council session he declared 
that the ‘strength of the general feeling in the world’ on the Finnish invasion, derived 
from the ‘realisation that another blow is being struck at the foundations on which 
the existence of all of us as independent nations is founded.’229 Butler remained 
deliberately vague in his statements on the invasion, barely invoking the name of the 
Soviet Union. Butler rather strove to impress upon his audience the idea that the 
United Kingdom stood in the vanguard of the defence of the Covenant. Butler stated 
that ‘wild movements have been loosed which seem to threaten the life of free 
peoples.’230 The December Assembly allowed the British government and the neutral 
countries to justify their respective positions while permitting identification with a 
peaceful, egalitarian system of international relations.  
The French government also used the Assembly to justify its own policies, 
drawing an analogy between the Allied war effort and the League resolution on 
Finland. During the Council session, Joseph Paul-Boncour told a nervous Geneva 
that he could not pass judgement on Stalin without denouncing ‘the first and chief 
author of the present European upheaval.’ 231  This was one of the few incidents 
during proceedings that raised the spectre of German retaliation against the neutral 
powers. Another was the speech by the representative of Polish government-in-exile 
(then resident in Paris) Sigismond Gralinski. Gralinski addressed the elephant in the 
room; the aggression that had already snuffed out Polish independence. Gralinski 
paid tribute to the Finns, claiming his compatriots would feel a natural sympathy for 
their plight as Poland had been the first country to oppose the ‘march of terror and 
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destruction.’232 Gralinski did not condemn the League’s failure to come to Poland’s 
aid against both Germany and the Soviet Union but did speak of the ‘terrible 
sufferings of the Polish people under the regime of occupation.’ 233  Gralinski’s 
presence underscored the League’s role as a badge of sovereignty for those states 
who could no longer take such sovereignty for granted. It also exposed the 
contradictions and inconsistencies in the expulsion of the Soviet Union for its 
invasion of Finland while the League Assembly drew a shroud over the fate of 
Poland and Czechoslovakia.  
Raffo dubbed the decision to expel the Soviet Union as a ‘petty act’ that ‘did 
no credit to the organisation.’234 While Soviet expulsion was undoubtedly motivated 
more by prejudice than altruism, the consensus among Secretariat officials, 
politicians and the press in late 1939, early 1940, was that it reflected well on both 
member states and the League. Avenol was particularly ebullient about the outcome 
of the session of the League’s political organs. He argued that the expulsion of the 
Soviet Union had given the League ‘a fresh and unexpected lease of life.’235 Officials 
in the Quai d’Orsay were also pleased that the League Assembly was used to the 
advantage of the Allied war effort.
236
 The press reaction was overwhelmingly 
positive. The Journal de Genève praised the League for its ‘clear and courageous 
attitude’.237 The Portuguese organ Diário da Manhã recognised the ‘meaningful’ 
collective action on the part of member states and the significance of their adherence 
to the Covenant.
238
 As the Irish Times noted: ‘the League was the one really 
constructive result of the last war. When the present war is over, the civilised world 
or what is left of it, may be very glad to have Geneva’s organisation still in 
existence.’239 The president of the Assembly optimistically closed proceedings with 
the following remarks: 
 
The Assembly had tried to act upon the principles of law and equity, with 
natural hesitation but without ambiguity. A member State had applied to the 
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League for assistance and had not applied in vain. The flame had been kept 
alive in the storm of terrible events.
240
  
 
It has often been the practise of post-war realist historians to dismiss such misplaced 
optimism on the part of League supporters and apologists when, in their eyes, the 
organisation had lost all political importance.
241
 While a study of the December 
Assembly cannot sustain a revisionist reading of the League’s security record, it does 
provide an insight into why member states chose to preserve the organisation 
through the war years. The Covenant’s (albeit inconsistent and incomplete) ability to 
serve as benchmark in diplomatic conduct and as a counterpoint to both extreme 
ideologies and expansionism imbued the League with symbolic relevancy and a 
poignancy to a world at war.  
 
 
 
The aftermath of the Assembly 
The twentieth session of the Assembly was not closed but adjourned indefinitely 
until such a time as member states could meet again. In his closing address, the 
President of the Assembly expressed his hope that when the Assembly met again, 
there would be proof that the modest efforts which had been made would not have 
been entirely in vain.’242 Member states were not placed under any obligation to help 
Finland. Rather they were exhorted to provide Finland with such material and 
humanitarian assistance as was in their power to give and to refrain from any action 
which might ‘weaken Finland’s power of resistance.’243 As Mazower pointed out, 
the Secretariat of the League never carried any considerable executive power in its 
own right, but rather saw itself as interlocutor, helping individual governments fulfil 
their obligations under the Covenant.
244
 This tradition was upheld during the Winter 
War. Avenol encouraged staff to devote their energies to relief efforts in the spirit of 
solidarity with and admiration for Finnish resistance efforts.
245
 League official Bertil 
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Renborg (who was Swedish) was dispatched to Stockholm to establish a temporary 
branch office. Renborg made several trips to Helsinki where he received first-hand 
information on what Finland most urgently needed and the resulting lists were then 
wired to Geneva to be circulated among member states. 
246
 Information and statistics 
were supplied from the League’s E.F.O. identifying which member states could 
reasonably supply the goods requested.
247
 Medicine, food and warm winter clothes 
flowed into to Finland and its government expressed its gratitude to the League for 
the latter’s assistance.248 
League officials were also aware of Finland’s urgent need for military 
assistance: Renborg reported to Avenol that by January 1940 fifty per-cent of the 
productive population were engaged in the defence of the country amidst a growing 
realisation that time was running out.
249
 Avenol sought to operate as an informal 
political agent when he assisted the Finnish legation in Paris in its petition for armed 
intervention from the French government and armed forces.
250
 The lack of urgency 
in Allied military response caused anxiety among the small states of Europe. As a 
member of the neutral Greek Government enquired of his compatriot, Under 
Secretary-General Thanassis Aghnides: 
 
Are those who are in a position to help doing enough to save Finland because, 
if that country succumbs there will be a great temptation, in fact an 
insuperable one, for the small neutral countries to argue that they need not be 
foolhardy in their attitude towards Germany and draw that country’s 
thunders?
251
 
 
Aware that the eyes of the world were upon them, the British government 
knew that if Finland fell, it would become ‘another Abyssinia’ in its diplomatic 
history.
252
 One of the reasons for the failure of the League’s political mission in the 
inter-war years was the tendency of Britain and France to pursue their own ends 
outside the framework of the Assembly and Council; this tendency was epitomised 
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by the inauspicious Munich Conference of 1938.
253
 Though both Britain and France 
participated in the League resolutions they demurred from using League machinery 
to organise military intervention in Finland. In February a plan was devised in which 
an Allied Expeditionary Force would land in Finland, not by air, but by land, having 
passed circuitously through neutral Norway and Sweden. Allied motivation lay less 
in relieving beleaguered Finland than in procuring the use of Scandinavian ports as 
well as the control of the coveted Swedish iron ore fields, to the detriment of the 
Germany war industry.
254
 The Allied Supreme War Council concluded that the 
recent League resolution could be publicly invoked to justify the establishment of 
military bases in Norway and Sweden.
255
 In reality Britain and France continued 
their policy of sidelining the League from their main diplomatic and military 
undertakings. When Avenol proposed making a personal call to the Foreign Office in 
order to ensure that all possible means of assistance for Finland were under 
consideration, he was rebuffed by Alexander Cadogan.
256
 Britain and France used 
the League for rhetoric, not for realpolitik.  
The Allied powers appealed to Norway and Sweden for permission to move 
an expeditionary force through their respective territories. They assured the Swedish 
and Norwegian government that if such an action provoked a German invasion, 
Britain and France would provide the necessary military assistance.
257
 Sweden was a 
particularly vulnerable power of economic interest to both the Allied and the Axis 
bloc.
258
 On 3 February the German Minister in Stockholm called upon the Swedish 
foreign minister and informed him that Germany would not remain inactive if 
Sweden sent regular troops into Finland.
259
 Sweden could not afford to be indiscreet 
in providing assistance to Finland. Through the British embassy in Stockholm, the 
Swedish government informed Whitehall that they wished to avoid lending any 
credence to the idea that they were ‘participating in a common international action 
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against Soviet Russia under the auspices of the League of Nations.’260 Despite this 
pressure, Sweden provided considerable clandestine assistance to Finland. A Finnish 
League official, P. Hjelt, informed Avenol that by the end of January 1940, up to 
8,000 Swedish volunteers had already crossed into Finland and gifts amounting to 
more than eighty million Swedish crowns had been donated. 
261
 The prospect of 
becoming the battleground for the first major showdown between the great powers in 
Europe was consequently none too inviting for Sweden and Norway and they duly 
refused to grant permission for the passage of the expeditionary force. In all events, 
the significant delay on the part of the British and French in committing troops had 
already proved fatal for Finland. The Finns were aware that the Allied plan was too 
vague and unlikely to survive Swedish and Norwegian protestations. The British 
Cabinet eventually agreed on 2 March that it was not fair to offer Finland assistance 
it could not realistically provide.
262
 On 12 March 1940 the Finnish government 
signed the Peace of Moscow with the Soviet Union. Finland consequently lost ten 
per cent of its territory with over 400,000 civilians living in the ceded territory being 
forced to move en masse bringing whatever possessions they could carry.  
In the aftermath of the Peace of Moscow Halvdan Koht, the Norwegian 
foreign minister, was moved to respond to the accusations, especially from the 
French press, that Norway and Sweden had betrayed their Nordic neighbour.
263
 Koht 
argued that ‘there would be no honour or moral gain in throwing a country into a 
fight which could lead to nothing but disaster, loss, and destruction.’ 264  Koht 
squarely accused the British and the French of usurping the League resolution for 
their own ends: 
 
As their enemy-Germany-had a pact of friendship with Soviet Russia, it was 
natural that the two western powers should gradually come to regard the war 
waged by Finland as a help rendered to themselves.  I am sure that many 
people in those countries wished to go to the aid of Finland from idealistic 
motives. But I am as certain that it was a result of considerations connected 
with their own war that there developed among them a growing 
determination to reinforce the resistance of Finland. 
265
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Koht’s radio address highlighted the truth at the heart of an Assembly resolution that 
was invested with more symbolic meaning than decisive action. This symbolic 
meaning was predicated on the League’s exclusive brand of liberal internationalism; 
the League’s international civil service aspired to operate as the embodiment of that 
internationalism during the war years.  Secretariat and technical services hoped to 
serve as a ‘nucleus, however small, on which international life might be reorganised 
once the war [was] over.’ 266  The Assembly inaugurated a special committee to 
consider the Bruce proposals and agreed to regard the reforms as experimental with 
their implementation postponed until the end of the war.
267
 In reality a separate 
mechanism was introduced to oversee the work of the technical organs. The 
League’s Supervisory Commission traditionally assisted the secretary-general in 
devising the budget for the Secretariat and the technical organisations (including the 
I.L.O.) for the approval of the Assembly and Council. The Supervisory Commission 
was composed of distinguished individuals, appointed by the Assembly, who served 
the League in an independent capacity and not as government representatives 
(though some such as Carl Hambro and Sir Cecil Kisch were national politicians and 
civil servants). The Supervisory Commission’s power was enhanced during the war 
years when League member states agreed to accord it, in tandem with the secretary-
general, full authority to approve the budgets and work programmes of the technical 
organisations in the aftermath of the indefinite adjournment of the twentieth session 
of the Assembly.
268
 The Supervisory Commission acted for member states until the 
Assembly and Council could convene once more in Geneva.   
 The idea that the League could be confined to its technical role certainly did 
not meet with universal approbation. In the aftermath of the postponement of the 
Bruce proposals, Dell argued that the success of the technical organisations did not: 
 
justify the existence of the League which is, and was intended to be, 
primarily a political organisation. The League was founded to preserve the 
peace of the world and to establish an international order and the rule of law 
in international affairs, not to deal with public health or prostitution or the 
opium traffic, although there is no reason why it should not deal with them 
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[..........] if the activities of the League of Nations were restricted to such 
matters as these, as some people seem to desire, it would evidently have to be 
remodelled on quite different lines and be given a new title.
269
  
 
While Dell was correct to assert that the League was primarily a diplomatic 
organisation he failed to identify the organic relationship between the League’s 
political identity and its technical role. Certain technical officials such as Arthur 
Sweetser and Frank Walters sought to distinguish between the League’s political and 
technical organs, sharing the same views as Mitrany and Ghébali in arguing that 
social and economic cooperation could transcend the political divisions of the 
Assembly and Council.
270
 However, as Clavin correctly asserted, this view was not 
universal to the League’s international civil service; most League officials did not 
believe politics could or should be taken out of their technical work, but rather saw 
the value of their work in encouraging intergovernmental cooperation to effect real 
change.
271
 Functionalism was not an alternative to political cooperation; rather it was 
a different means to achieve the same end. Martin Hill, a prominent member of the 
E.F.O., who wrote the first history of that agency in 1946, highlighted the fact that 
the work of the E.F.O. was inherently political-its ultimate objective being ‘to 
contribute towards the consolidation of peace and the removal of causes of 
international conflict.’272 John Winant, the director of the I.L.O., identified one of the 
primary roles of the organisation as working to ‘strengthen the fabric of 
democracy.’ 273  Reservations were even expressed within the League Secretariat 
against allowing non-League member states to participate in the organisation’s 
technical activities if they would not formally accede to ideals of the Covenant. As 
one secretariat official argued in early 1939: 
 
At the present time, when the retention of membership of the League has to 
be justified in so many countries by insistence on the value of the League’s 
technical work, it would surely be inadvisable to undertake a reform, the very 
object of which is to enable a non-member to acquire all the powers and 
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advantages of League membership for the purpose of technical 
collaboration.
274
 
 
The political League was never destined to eclipse the technical League as 
they were both intrinsic to one another. Its technical role was indistinct from its 
political identity as both were designed to reflect and promote the liberal capitalist 
ethos of their founders. This was reflected in the response of the I.L.O. to Soviet 
expulsion from the League. In February 1940 the Governing Body of the I.L.O. 
decided that the Soviet Union was no longer a member of the I.L.O.
275
 According to 
a formal statement by the chairman of the Governing Body, the American Carter 
Goodrich (professor of economics at Colombia University), ‘just as the U.S.S.R. had 
become automatically a member of the I.L.O. when it entered the League in 
September, 1934, so by its expulsion from the League in December, it ceased to be a 
member of the I.L.O.’276 As discussed, by this stage the Soviet Union had largely 
ceased to participate in the work of the I.L.O.
277
 In expelling the I.L.O. the 
Governing Body was in unchartered territory; while member states which had 
withdrawn from the League were permitted to retain their membership of the I.L.O., 
Soviet expulsion was unprecedented. The Governing Body’s decision to follow the 
League’s example reflected the historic role of the I.L.O. as a social democratic 
counterpoint to international communism.  
The reaction of the United States government to the proposals of the Bruce 
Committee reflected the impossibility of divorcing the League’s political mission 
from its technocratic agenda. The American consul in Geneva informed a Secretariat 
official that, at that present moment in time, with the result of the League’s political 
failure unfolding in Europe, it would be next to impossible to secure official 
congressional approval for the proposals of the Bruce Report.
278
 As Clavin 
demonstrated, attempts to encourage American nascent internationalism during this 
period could easily backfire with Roosevelt’s ‘opaque’ foreign policy proving a 
frustration for all those who wished to encourage greater American participation in 
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the League.
279
 The fact that the Roosevelt administration refused to drop its cautious 
approach to any formal association with the League, despite the suspension of the 
Assembly and Council, further demonstrated that governments could never be 
induced to view the League‘s activities through anything other than a political prism.  
In conclusion the League’s place in the international landscape in 1939 was 
predicated on its political identity. It served as an expression, if not as an 
enforcement, of liberal internationalism in a world where such ideals were being 
placed under intense pressure. Indeed, as the painful consequences of Soviet 
marginalisation attest, the League’s political identity undermined its diplomatic role 
as an objective arbiter of international disputes. The League was a product of its time 
and a reflection of member state aspirations. This was the conservative 
internationalism of Geneva; an internationalism where greater emphasis was placed 
on the creation of a collective identity than the striving for collective security. If an 
effective security organisation was to be created in the future there needed to be a 
reversal in priorities. This could only be achieved if the great powers were prepared 
to lead and the small powers willing to follow. The mobilisation of member states to 
denounce Soviet aggression, while remaining passive in the face of fascist 
expansionism, can be explained by the strength of anti-communist feeling and the 
influence of geo-political factors: Continental European neutrals such as Switzerland 
had more to fear from the Wehrmacht than from the Red Army. The inconsistent 
approach of League member states to the two biggest threats to liberal democracy, 
fascism and communism, would enact important repercussions for both the League’s 
wartime experience and its post-war prospects. The League’s liberal democratic 
ethos would later prove a liability within a changed political landscape and a new 
balance of power dynamic. However in 1939 this ethos, married to the League’s 
technical goals, provided a strong justification for its wartime preservation. As the 
war became a war of extremes, total in its reach and impact, an internal crisis within 
the League’s international civil service threatened to shake the League from 
its liberal democratic foundations.
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Chapter two: The impact of war on the Secretariat and technical organisations 
of the League, 1939-1940 
 Although the League’s international civil service was no longer obliged to act 
as a support to the Assembly and Council, it played a central role in the preservation 
of the liberal democratic ethos of the Covenant within an evolving political 
landscape. The activities and motivations of the Secretariat and technical officials 
permit a valuable insight into the impact of war on liberal internationalism and to the 
value of the League as diametrically opposed to the violent expansionism of the 
totalitarian powers. It has already been established that the League’s agency was 
predicated on the ability of its international civil service to influence national 
policies.
1
 This chapter discusses what League officials, in a time of intense crisis, 
were prepared to do with such influence. It fell to the League’s Secretariat and 
technical agencies to preserve the organisation in the name of its member states. 
However, League officials did not always constrain themselves to the cautious 
internationalism of those states. This chapter also reveals the disparities and 
divisions within the Secretariat itself: with the ambitious internationalism of the 
lower ranks being frustrated by the conservatism of the secretary-general. Joseph 
Avenol’s attempts to attune the international civil service to what he perceived as the 
realities of international relations are documented in the light of new historical 
evidence, unavailable to his previous biographers. The League was an organisation 
prone to identity crises; its place in the international landscape was never clearly 
defined. This chapter documents the tension that existed within the League apparatus 
between the inclination to align with the Allied war effort and the obligation to 
transcend the exclusivity of wartime alliances.  
 
 
An exclusive alliance or a universal society of nations? 
While the floor of the Assembly in December 1939 did not feature a candid debate 
on the course of the wider ‘European war’, the League’s international civil service 
reflected on its own position vis-à-vis the conflict. Previous historians have alluded 
to the fact that the League itself was misnamed: its French title la Société des 
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Nations was more appropriate for an organisation that sought to encourage 
multilateralism in a break with the militarist alliances and nationalist leagues of the 
past.
2
 As discussed in chapter one, member states preferred to treat the organisation 
more as a ‘coalition of like-minded states’ rather than as a basis for a military 
alliance. For this reason the neutrals still had a place within the framework of 
membership. Alexander Loveday, the director of the E.F.O., stressed that if war 
broke out the League should remain at the disposal of all member states, neutral and 
belligerent alike.
3
 In a letter to Avenol, Loveday emphasised the importance of 
maintaining ‘the tradition of objectivity and scientific honest y’ which had always 
been ‘the essential condition’ for the success of the E.F.O.’s work.4 The Governing 
Body of the I.L.O. was of a similar mindset.
5
  
 This was not a universal position among League officials and supporters. 
Afterall the future of peaceful internationalism depended on the ultimate defeat of 
fascist expansionism. In October 1939 F.L. McDougall (a British born Australian 
businessman and economic diplomat, closely associated with the policies of Stanley 
Bruce and the work of the E.F.O.) wrote to Loveday arguing that the expertise of the 
League’s technical officials should be placed at the disposal of the Allied war effort.6 
He claimed that the continuation and reform of the economic and social side of the 
League’s work should be supported as it would ‘carry to neutral and American 
opinion a sense of Allied confidence’ and would also underline the ‘international 
soundness of the Allied peace aims.’7 Certain members of the international civil 
service were also anxious for the League and its technical agencies to operate as a 
moral compass and to align with those powers taking a stand against the Axis bloc. 
John Winant explicitly linked the I.L.O.’s quest to procure social justice with the 
struggle against totalitarianism.
8
 Deputy Secretary-General Seán Lester, though an 
Irish national, did not believe in neutrality, regarding it as both impossible and 
immoral for individual states and for the League to feign impartiality.
9
A few months 
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before the outbreak of war Lester recorded in his diary that he prepared a note for 
Frank Walters (British deputy secretary-general) and for the British Foreign Office 
‘suggesting the use of Geneva as a rallying point-in spite of its smash-alongside the 
alliance system they seem to be working on. But Avenol says “no” the League’s time 
is not yet.’10 The transformation of the League into an Allied agency was not feasible 
during the Phoney War period as most member states remained outside of the fray.  
This divergence of opinion illustrates that even after twenty years of practise within 
the League of Nations there remained a lack of consensus on the appropriate role of 
an international organisation.  
 The different viewpoints abounding as to the League’s political role point not 
only to the disparity between the national interests of member states and the 
aspirations of the international civil service but also highlight the divisions within 
the Secretariat itself. Avenol’s reaction to Lester’s proposal to use Geneva as a 
rallying point signified that ambitious internationalism was very much a ‘bottom-up’ 
movement in the League’s international civil service. Traditionally the secretary-
general proved an inhibiting influence on those League officials who oversaw the 
League’s emergence as a powerful technocracy. Robert Dell wrote that Eric 
Drummond was in ‘no sense a driving force but rather a brake. He did not stimulate 
the staff of the Secretariat, but rather restrained them if they showed signs of what 
appeared to him excessive zeal.’11  Avenol trained as an economic diplomat and 
might have been expected to be more sympathetic to those who wanted to enhance 
the League’s technical role; his name being closely connected to the Bruce Report. 
Martin Dubin and Victor-Yves Ghébali, in their respective studies of the Bruce 
Report, identified Avenol as a driving force in the attempt to emancipate the work 
programmes of the technical agencies from the authority of the League’s political 
organs.
12
 Raymond Fosdick, the former American deputy secretary-general of the 
League and director of the Rockefeller Foundation, conceded that the utility of the 
Bruce Report must be placed in the balance of any evaluation of Avenol’s career.13 
However Clavin recently argued that the movement for reform owed more to the 
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E.F.O.’s director, Alexander Loveday, who had been pushing for the re-organisation 
of the technical organisations since the early 1930s.
14
 
Drawing on the testimony of those who knew and worked with Avenol, 
Clavin’s position is much more convincing. The British author, Hilary St. George 
Saunders, a former Secretariat official who had on occasion operated as Avenol’s 
secretary, claimed to have known the secretary-general ‘as intimately as it is possible 
for an Englishman to know an enigmatic Frenchman.’15 According to British Foreign 
Office files, Saunders allowed that Avenol possessed a ‘brilliant’ mind for 
economics and finance but dubbed him a ‘lazy man, accustomed to work in fits and 
starts.’ 16  Avenol, though personally ambitious, was clearly not a devout 
internationalist. According to Saunders, when Avenol’s name was first mooted as 
Drummond’s likely successor he informed the French government, canvassing on his 
behalf, of his preference for a senior position in the Bank of France.
17
 Salvador de 
Madariaga asserted that Avenol was not an ardent internationalist but a ‘realpolitiker 
with hardly any dose of world spirit.’18  It is difficult to accept de Madariaga’s 
depiction of Avenol as a realpolitiker given the poor political judgement he would 
later display, but his lack of ‘world spirit’ is corroborated by other well placed 
sources in Geneva. Dell, one of the most prominent journalists on the League’s press 
corps, observed in 1941 that if ‘Lord Perth [formerly Sir Eric Drummond] had little 
faith in the principles and aims of the League of Nations, M. Avenol has still less.’19 
Avenol’s lack of internationalist fervour enacted important repercussions for his 
stewardship of the Secretariat during the greatest crisis of its existence.  
While Avenol may not have been the most dynamic and inspiring head of the 
Secretariat, his eagerness to test the political limitations of his office was evidenced 
by his involvement in the expulsion of the Soviet Union. In his 1979 study of Seán 
Lester’s international career, Stephen Barcroft wrote that by 1939 the ‘old-non 
political’ Secretariat was breaking down into left and right-wing factions.20 Drawing 
on de Madariaga’s memoirs and on the evidence of the 1939 Assembly it is easier to 
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endorse James Barros and Arthur Rovine’s assertion that the Secretariat was always 
a political entity.
21
 Yet Barcoft’s argument about left and right wing divisions raise 
an interesting point about the factors that render internationalism a relative concept. 
Political divisions tend to colour what governments, officials and apologists 
expected of the League and set different parameters as to the potential of the 
organisation. Those on the right of the political centre tended to value the League for 
its support of national sovereignty while those on the left tended to incline more 
towards the expansion of the League’s influence on national governments. Robert 
Cecil (Viscount Cecil of Chelwood) was the most prominent supporter of the League 
in the United Kingdom. Cecil devoted his public life to the League of Nations from 
the organisation’s inception. He served as the British representative to the Paris 
Peace Conference and contributed to the drafting of the Covenant. He represented 
both Britain and South Africa at the League Assembly and from 1923 to 1945, as 
chairman and president of the British League of Nations Union, rallied public 
opinion in support of the League. As Thompson demonstrated Cecil projected ‘a 
moral fervour and sincerity essential for a leader of a public crusade.’22 A life-long 
Conservative, Cecil was devoted to preserving national sovereignty as the basis of 
international cooperation.
23
 He was also regretfully aware that his commitment to the 
League rendered him regularly out of step with Conservative foreign policy. He 
acknowledged in 1949 that attempts to ‘carry out any obligations under the Covenant 
in their plain meaning’ incurred considerable reluctance from his own party.24 Cecil 
owned that greater support for the League came from the Liberal and Labour Parties, 
a position supported by Lucian Ashworth in his recent study of Labour foreign 
policy.
25
 Reflecting on the historically determining role the French state played in 
the formation and development of the League, Seán Lester acknowledged that 
‘France’s share in the League’s work was never as full and sincere as when the 
Socialists were in power.’26 Support for the League in the United States tended to be 
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elicited from Democrats and philanthropic organisations who advocated greater state 
intervention in matters of social and economic concern.
27
  
Within the international civil service itself the most ambitious technical 
officials tended to lean to the left; including Frenchman Albert Thomas, the former 
Socialist minister for munitions in the French wartime government (1915-17) and the 
first director of the I.L.O., and the Pole, Dr Ludwik Rajchman, under whose 
directorship the work and influence of the League’s Health Organisation expanded 
dramatically.
28
 Avenol, on the other hand, leaned to the right. Drawing on the 
testimony of former colleagues, James Barros characterised Avenol, before 1940 at 
least, as extremely conservative, offering fragmentary evidence to suggest that the 
second secretary-general may have been a monarchist with little affection for the 
Third Republic.
29
 The question of the extremity of Avenol’s right-wing views has 
engrossed his biographers. Rovine went so far as to accuse Avenol of showing 
sympathy ‘for the dictators of the right’ throughout his entire career as secretary-
general.
30
 Avenol certainly appeared anxious, in the mid 1930s, to prevent 
Mussolini’s Italy from renouncing its membership of the League, despite its 
transgression of the Covenant. In the midst of the Abyssinian Crisis in 1936 he paid 
a visit to Rome to try and convince Mussolini and his foreign minister, Count Ciano, 
to resume relations with the League. The Italians were bitter about the Assembly’s 
imposition of economic sanctions (however ineffectual) and the failure of the League 
to recognise the new Italian Empire.
31
 In the aftermath of the discussions Avenol 
informed the press that clarification had been sought and received concerning Italian 
grievances with the organisation and that he was confident Italy would resume its 
participation in due course.
32
 However Avenol failed to foresee the reluctance of the 
Credentials Committee of the League Assembly to disqualify the Abyssinian 
delegation; this constituted a refusal, on the League’s part, to fully recognise the new 
Italian Empire. Consequently on 11 December 1937 Italy gave notice of its intention 
to withdraw from the League of Nations. As the 1930s came to an end there were 
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rumblings of discontent over Avenol’s apparent reluctance to antagonise Italy and 
Germany. The Times charged Avenol with wanting ‘to leave the door open for the 
totalitarian powers to return to the League.’33 
While Avenol’s right-wing sympathies may have inspired a conciliatory 
approach to fascist Italy and a vindictive attitude to the Soviet Union there is no 
overwhelming evidence to suggest that he was a right-wing extremist. Afterall most 
European governments feared the spread of communism more than the excesses of 
fascism with Lester observing in September 1939 that League member states had 
‘failed to see what the Nazi really was.’34  Rather Avenol was simply aping the 
Anglo-French policy of appeasement. De Madariaga observed that Avenol did not 
question the lukewarm commitment of Britain and France to the enforcement of the 
Covenant because he relished mixing with ‘the governments and bureaucracies of 
the great.’ 35  Avenol’s actions reflected the cautious diplomacy of the two most 
powerful members of the Council and paymasters of the League, both of whom 
continued to make overtures to Mussolini’s Italy, even after the outbreak of war. 
Everything suggested that in the months leading up to the European conflict and 
during the period of Phoney War Avenol was instead trying to reconcile the political 
atmosphere of the Palais des Nations with the guarded landscape of international 
diplomacy. This entailed purging the Secretariat of those officials who criticised the 
foreign policies of Britain and France. In late 1938 Marcel Hoden, Avenol’s long-
term chef de cabinet, left the Secretariat. Hoden was a popular figure with the press 
and with the rest of Secretariat and was known for his outspoken opposition to the 
Munich agreement.
36
 Hoden’s departure was engineered by Avenol who was obliged 
to abolish the latter’s position to effect his departure. The Manchester Guardian 
noted that there was a ‘profound political divergence’ between Hoden and Avenol, 
as the latter was an ‘avowed partisan’ of appeasement.37 Avenol also refused, as the 
war approached, to extend the contract of Dr. Ludwik Rajchman. Rajchman 
denounced Mussolini and despite the reticence of the League Council on the Spanish 
Civil War, expressed his admiration for Republican forces.
38
 L’Humanité charged 
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Avenol with sacrificing Hoden and Rajchman in the ‘spirit of Munich’.39  Due to 
figures such as Hoden and Rajchmann, and to a lesser extent Lester and Winant, the 
League’s international civil service, unlike its political organs, challenged rather than 
reflected the reality of international affairs. Avenol sought to eradicate this anomaly 
and to perpetuate the prevailing conservatism of member states within the League 
Secretariat by checking its more radical elements.  
In the Assembly of December 1939 member states invested Avenol with the 
authority to ensure the continued functioning of the League’s administrative and 
technical organs. Swiss governmental records illustrate that Avenol did not entertain 
ambitious plans for a wartime international civil service. In March 1939 Avenol 
confided to Edouard de Haller (a former League official who would go on to 
represent the Swiss government in aid and humanitarian matters during the war) that 
he decided, in the event of war, to preserve only a small number of Secretariat 
officials and to evacuate all non-Swiss staff.
40
 Avenol clearly did not keep his 
colleagues abreast of his future vision of the Secretariat or else was entirely 
inconsistent in his view. In a letter to the Foreign Office in April 1939 Frank Walters 
wrote that ‘the secretary-general considers that it will be his duty, if war should arise, 
to do his utmost to keep in being, so far as possible, the essential parts of the 
Secretariat machinery.’41 Avenol’s previous plan to evacuate all non-Swiss staff did 
not materialise but he did embark on a policy of partial liquidation. The need to 
adapt the League Secretariat to suit the reality of budgetary constraints, while 
ensuring that it remained an effective instrument for technical cooperation, was 
arguably a thankless task. The League had been in a process of downsizing since 
early 1939 due to dwindling member state contributions; with every member state 
withdrawal the numbers employed in the Palais des Nations fell correspondingly. In 
the space of a year, from 1939-40, over three hundred staff left the League’s 
headquarters in Geneva, reducing the numbers working in the international civil 
service by fifty per cent.
 42
 Between 1939 and 1943 the number of League staff fell 
from 654 to 99 individuals.
43
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Walters kept Roger Makins of the League of Nations Section in the British 
Foreign Office informed of Avenol’s polices. According to Walters, Avenol was 
shaken by some criticisms being made in Paris against him. Avenol claimed that his 
compatriots were accusing him of extravagance in maintaining a large proportion of 
the Secretariat at a time when the Assembly and Council were no longer expected to 
meet.
44
 At the prompting of Walters, the Foreign Office arranged a telegram of 
support from Foreign Secretary Halifax to the harried Avenol. Lord Halifax told the 
secretary-general that he was mindful of the ‘special difficulty’ Avenol was 
experiencing but was confident that the secretary-general was doing ‘his best to 
preserve the Secretariat as a working organisation so far as circumstances permit.’45 
Walters, however, did not have confidence in the secretary-general’s policy. Avenol 
tended to adopt a less than sophisticated approach to the problem of the termination 
of League contracts, leaving staff free to decide whether or not they wished to offer 
their services to their home governments.
46
 Walters argued that this was an unwise 
course of action, risking the loss of the Secretariat’s most able staff as well as 
impairing its representative character.
47
 In trying to suppress the ambition of his 
colleagues in order to create the most minimal and unobtrusive international civil 
service, Avenol threatened to confer upon the League an irrelevancy it had so far 
avoided.  
 
 
The threat to headquarters 
Apart from Avenol’s policy of partial liquidation, the biggest threat to the League’s 
wartime technical potential was the precarious location of League headquarters. By 
1939 Switzerland was becoming increasingly encircled by the Axis powers, with the 
Großdeutschland of Germany and Austria to the north and east and Mussolini’s Italy 
(which would not become a belligerent power until June 1940) to the south. The 
Swiss Federal Council, composed of a conservative coalition of centrist and centre-
right parties such as the Christian People’s Party, the Free Democracy Party and the 
Swiss People’s Party, was determined to preserve the neutrality and security of 
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Switzerland above all other existing obligations.
48
 There was a general consensus in 
the Palais des Nations that not only should the neutrality of Switzerland be respected 
but that in the event of an imminent invasion the international civil service would 
have to evacuate from Geneva.
49
 Walters informed the Foreign Office that the last 
thing the Secretariat wanted to do was to give the Germans a pretext for a Swiss 
invasion.
50
 By the spring of 1940 an evacuation plan was devised by the Office of 
the Secretary-General. The plan was not comprehensive; rather it was designed as a 
short term solution. If Switzerland was invaded by Germany the Secretariat and 
technical services were to relocate from Geneva to a temporary halting ground in 
southern France.
51
 The inconsequential spa town chosen to be the temporary refuge 
of a fugitive Secretariat would not, as it transpired, acquire renown through any 
association with the League of Nations. Rather it secured a greater historical infamy 
as the site of the expiration of the French Third Republic and the birthplace of the 
authoritarian regime to which it would give its name.  
The suitability of Vichy as a temporary haven for a refugee Secretariat was 
predicated on the same advantages that later recommended it to Marshal Pétain’s 
government. As a popular and fashionable holiday destination it could boast enough 
accommodation for League officials and rooms in which a skeletal Secretariat could 
operate. In April 1939 Avenol dispatched a Secretariat official to identify suitable 
accommodation in Vichy with the proviso that the League could not afford any of 
the more luxurious hotels the town had to offer.
52
 The French authorities proved 
most supportive and accommodating during the course of the Secretariat’s 
investigation into the viability of Vichy. The officials of the Quai d’Orsay wrote to 
Avenol expressing solidarity with his efforts to take all precautionary steps to 
preserve the international civil service.
53
 In the spring of 1940 copies of important 
League documents were forwarded to Vichy for safekeeping. Just as the I.L.O.’s 
wartime experience would provide an interesting comparison with that of the League, 
so too would its leadership. The I.L.O.’s director, John Winant, acted with greater 
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alacrity than Avenol to ensure a refuge for his office in the event of an invasion of 
Switzerland. Soon after the declaration of war Winant secured a lease on the 
Pavilion de Sévigné at Vichy and duplicates of I.L.O. files were sent there for 
safekeeping.
54
 
These nascent evacuation plans were abruptly abandoned from May-June 
1940 when the stupor of the Phoney War was shattered with the launch of Hitler’s 
campaign in Western Europe. When France began to crumble Seán Lester took steps 
to ensure the rapid return of all important League documents from Vichy.
55
 During 
the German invasion of France the Pavillon de Sévigné served, for a time, as a 
German military headquarters. German staff officers dined in the same rooms in 
which confidential and important I.L.O. files were stored. In the wake of the 
Armistice, as the German Army withdrew to the north, the I.L.O. was able to retrieve 
its transferred files which survived the general upheaval intact.
56
 The chaos of May-
June 1940 engendered a crisis deep within the Secretariat. Geneva looked 
increasingly threatened, given its strategic position near the French border. Lester’s 
diary provides a valuable insight into the palpable fear of invasion that existed in 
wartime Switzerland. He wrote in June 1940 that reports were flooding Geneva of 
fresh German reserves moving into the Black Forest as if poised for a Swiss 
invasion.
57
 The Swiss populace endured numerous invasion scares during the war. In 
May 1940 there was a temporary mass exodus from the northern cities of Basel and 
Zurich. As early as September 1939 Lester confided to his diary that ‘there can be 
little confidence in talking to people not exactly sure in Geneva these days. 
Espionage is widespread.’58 Winant gave the Swiss army permission to occupy I.L.O. 
buildings in the event of a German landing on the lake via hydroplane.
59
 While a 
German invasion of Switzerland did not materialise, Secretariat officials could never 
be sure that the Alpine nation would remain outside of Hitler’s expanding European 
empire.
60
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The German conquest of Northern and Western Europe pulled a significant 
number of League member states into the war, including many small states who 
forcibly expressed their neutrality in the Assembly of 1939. As a result calls to align 
the League with the Allied war effort became more pronounced. Following the rapid 
advance of the German army, Walters, in a letter to Makins, suggested the immediate 
evacuation of League headquarters to London. Although transfer to Portugal, another 
of the European neutrals, was briefly mooted, Walters believed that neutrality had 
already proven to be a stifling and inhibiting influence on the League’s wartime 
endeavours.
61
 He argued that the neutrals were too vulnerable to fend off invasion 
against superior forces and foresaw that as the war wore on the number of neutrals 
would diminish further.
62
 A grand total of twenty two European countries declared 
their neutrality at the outbreak of war. As the war progressed however only five 
remained out of the conflict, the League’s hosts being one of them.63 Walters wrote 
that the ‘protest of the American Republics’, or Pan-American Union, against the 
German invasion of the neutral low countries made ‘at least another dozen or so 
members of the League who have declared their moral solidarity with the Allies.’64 
Walters reasoned that the obvious corollary between Allied rhetoric and the language 
of the Covenant rendered the League’s failure to publicly identify with the Allies 
redundant:  
 
What therefore could be more natural than [that] the countries which are 
fighting for the same principle as those of the Covenant should, in virtue of 
that fact, frankly invite the remnants of the League machinery to function on 
their soil? I believe that there would be some political and moral advantage 
for the Allies if this should happen, though the main beneficiary would, for 
the moment, undoubtedly be the Secretariat.
65
 
 
In a letter to Walters weeks earlier, Makins had outlined the British position on 
League headquarters. The Foreign Office expressed reservations as to the possible 
transfer of the League to France (before the German conquest) as it believed such a 
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move would alienate neutral member states.
66
 Alliances and Allied agencies would 
become ubiquitous as the war wore on: the League remained unique as the only 
vehicle for multilateralism between neutral and belligerent alike. If Walters’ 
proposal was adopted the League would no longer be a Society of Nations but would, 
in fact, be living up to the militarism of its Anglophone name. The transformation of 
the League into an Allied agency would be a regressive step, rolling back the years 
to the ‘entangling alliances’ of 1914.  
Nevertheless the League’s international civil service incurred a huge risk in 
remaining in Geneva. If League officials needed any indication of what would 
happen to their organisation in the event of a German invasion, the demise of the 
Paris based International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (I.I.I.C.) provided such 
a cautionary tale. The Institute was the executive organ of the League’s Organisation 
of Intellectual Cooperation (O.I.C.), established in 1922. It owed its origin to the 
failure of the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation (I.C.I.C.), the 
advisory organ to the Secretariat on matters of educational, intellectual and cultural 
importance, to obtain the adequate funding to maintain a significant office in the 
Palais des Nations. With substantial financial assistance from the French 
government the I.I.I.C. was subsequently established in Paris and the Institute could 
boast the membership of several high profile luminaries of the scientific, artistic and 
literary world including Marie Curie, Albert Einstein and Henri Bergson.
67
 Its 
experts believed that their mission lay in promoting greater intellectual cooperation 
between universities and institutes, in coordinating international scientific research, 
in documenting the cultural life of various countries and even in the creation of a 
new international language.
68
 The O.I.C. also oversaw the work of national 
committees of intellectual cooperation established by the League’s member states.  
The collapse of France brought the work of the Institute to a halt. Its director, 
Henri Bonnet, did not take any steps to organise an evacuation plan. With the French 
army and the British Expeditionary Force stalling against the superior tactics of the 
Wehrmacht, Bonnet abruptly paid all his staff, gave them three months leave and 
managed to board an airplane bound for the United States before the Germans 
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reached Bordeaux.
69
 This development imperilled the overall future of the O.I.C. 
The likelihood that all members of the Committee for Intellectual Cooperation could 
meet to devise work programmes in the absence of the Institute and its director was 
decidedly slim. In addition, the work of the Institute could no longer be facilitated by 
the Secretariat’s Intellectual Cooperation Section which no longer existed in the 
wake of Avenol’s partial liquidation of the Secretariat. Instead a solitary Secretariat 
official dealt with member state queries on intellectual cooperation as they arose; this 
official was also charged with satisfying requests for information on the past work of 
the Mandates Commission.
70
 Thus the League’s wartime work on intellectual 
cooperation was so limited to be almost non-existent.  
Gilbert Murray, the vice president of the O.I.C., refused to accept these 
developments as the end of the League’s experiment in intellectual cooperation. 
Traditionally those involved in the work of the O.I.C. perceived its role as providing 
moral encouragement to the League’s diplomatic mission. 71  The work of the 
Committee and the Paris based Institute was expected to provide the intellectual 
backbone to the League’s disarmament programme.72 The O.I.C., more than any 
other technical agency, demonstrated the organic relationship between the League 
and the forces of liberal democracy, providing an articulate, if sometimes esoteric, 
expression of the League’s political identity. An esteemed Oxford classicist, Gilbert 
Murray appeared to embody the very principles of Western liberalism upon which 
the Covenant was founded.
 73
 Australian-born but British educated, Murray was a 
committed supporter of the British Liberal Party. Shortly after the League’s 
foundation he was invited by Prime Minister Jan Christiaan Smuts to serve as South 
Africa’s delegate to the League Assembly (1921-2), and was subsequently chairman 
of the League of Nations Union (1923-38). Murray wanted to preserve the role of 
I.C.I.C. members as the supposed apologists and intelligentsia of the League’s 
political identity. Murray, like Lester, Walters and Winant, believed that that identity 
shared an elemental core with Allied peace aims. He urged the British government to 
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place more emphasis on the work of the national committees of intellectual 
cooperation. Murray argued that there was ‘certain advantage in showing that the 
League is alive and that Great Britain feels confident.’74 He perceived a use for the 
I.C.I.C. as a mouthpiece for Allied propaganda and as a propaganda weapon against 
Nazi ideology. He wrote that: 
 
The war is really a war of ideas and faiths, and the free movement of thought 
between groups and nations is essentially the thing in which we believe and 
which the Nazis and fascists deny. I would go so far as to say that without 
constant Intellectual Cooperation the free nations cannot hold together.
75
 
 
Murray advocated the transfer of the Institute to a city in the United States, such as 
Boston or New York.
76
 The Second World War was depicted as a struggle between 
the forces of democracy and totalitarianism. Consequently figures such as Murray, 
McDougall, Lester and Winant were tempted to invest the League with a wider 
political significance by fusing the stoic liberal internationalism of the Covenant 
with the bravura of the Allied war effort.  
Ultimately the O.I.C. was not destined to transform into an Allied agency. 
The British government was indisposed to feel any considerable obligation towards 
an agency that was infused with more of a French, rather than British, spirit.
77
 
Furthermore the O.I.C. did not enjoy the same prestige as, for example, the E.F.O. 
and the I.L.O. Arthur Sweetser, getting completely carried away in hyperbole, 
attributed to the League of Nations the greatest responsibility for all the ‘profound 
changes’ in the organisation of intellectual life in the inter-war years.78 In reality 
there was very little coordination of the work of the Committee and the Institute and 
its officials and experts never established an overall programme to determine what 
the activities of the O.I.C. should actually encompass. The reputation of the Institute 
suffered from its perception as a rarefied institution marred by high profile 
intellectual divisions between its members, most notably between Henri Bergson and 
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Albert Einstein.
79
 A British post-war inquiry into its activities concluded that the 
O.I.C.’s attempt to embrace every conceivable form of artistic and intellectual 
activity and to reduce it to some form of ‘documentation’ was a waste of the time, 
finance and the considerable ability at the disposal of the Committee and the 
Institute.
80
 Murray’s proposal was not likely to win favour at the Foreign Office 
which was of the firm position that linking the organs of the League ‘so plainly with 
His Majesty’s government would hardly be a satisfactory solution’ to diffusing the 
tensions between the League and Switzerland.
81
 Makins enlightened Murray as to the 
outcome of a conversation he had shared with the exiled Bonnet. The Frenchmen 
informed Makins that he did not contemplate the transfer of the Institute to the 
United States.
82
 Bonnet did not go the United States with League business in mind; 
rather he collaborated with other French exiles such as the one-time deputy 
secretary-general of the League, Jean Monnet, who sought to create a Free French 
alternative to the Vichy government.
83
 Other officials of the Institute also returned to 
service in their national governments.  
As the pressure on Swiss neutrality increased the Federal Council sought to 
exert a corresponding pressure on the Secretariat to remain discreet and unobtrusive. 
In July 1940 Avenol, ever accommodating to member states, bowed to Swiss 
pressure and decided that the remaining Secretariat officials should retreat to the 
Rockefeller Library and thus render themselves more ‘insignificant’ looking to the 
Germans.
84
 The claustrophobic atmosphere of Geneva risked stifling the potential of 
the technical agencies. Communication in and out of Switzerland was proving 
increasingly difficult with frequent postal delays and increased censorship of letters 
and telegrams.
85
 The success of the technical services depended on their ability to 
disseminate the results of their research and on their availability to advise 
governments on social and economic policy. As the future of international civil 
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service became increasingly jeopardised it was North America that emerged as a 
likely place of wartime refuge.  
Despite the refusal of the Roosevelt administration to formally endorse the 
proposals of the Bruce Report, the League continued to raise its profile in the United 
States during the Phoney War period. The League Secretariat had at its disposal a 
vast network of former League officials and supporters placed in positions of 
influence who were only too willing to exert that influence for the benefit of the 
organisation. As one columnist in the Tribune de Genève noted, the League was a 
‘veritifiable diplomatic, technical and social school’ for a good number of its former 
officials.
86
 This network was especially important for the League’s relationship with 
the United States. The League Secretariat possessed several important contacts 
within influential research foundations, philanthropic organisations and academic 
institutions which lobbied for greater American participation in League affairs. 
These included the American League of Nations Association, the Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. These non-governmental organisations became important 
sources of funding for the organisation as League membership began to fall away 
and even exerted influence on the research and political agenda of the organisation.
87
 
According to Katharina Rietzler, the American philanthropic elite were so closely 
intertwined with the American internationalist movement that it was almost 
impossible to distinguish one group from the other.
88
 Ivy League universities 
regularly hosted mock League of Nations Assemblies, especially during the early 
years, to stimulate interest among its students in the activities of the organisation.
89
  
Frank Boudreau, an alumnus of the League’s Health Organisation, worked 
for the high-profile Millbank Memorial Fund, a New York based foundation engaged 
in research, analysis and communication issues of health policy and social medicine. 
When the Secretariat decided to erect a pavilion at the New York World Fair in 1939 
Boudreau worked feverishly to facilitate a personal trip by Joseph Avenol to the 
United States and to Canada to coincide with the exhibition. He managed to solicit 
invitations for Avenol to pay a visit to the Rockefeller family (generous benefactors 
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of the League) at their country home in Virginia, to give an address at Yale 
University and to pay a visit to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull in 
Washington.
90
 Boudreau was left crestfallen when Avenol decided that he would not 
be in a position to make such an overseas trip in a time of grave political crisis and 
resolved to postpone it to a more opportune juncture. Avenol received a personal 
telegram from President Roosevelt expressing his regret that such a visit could not 
take place.
91
   
The postponement of Avenol’s American tour did not completely dispel the 
opportunity for greater American exposure to the aims, activities and operation of 
the League. The New York World Fair of 1939-40 served as an exercise in League 
self-publicity and as a reflection of the undaunted optimism of League officials and 
supporters in wartime. Deputy Secretary-General Seán Lester gave a radio address to 
the assembled crowd in October 1939, on the occasion of League of Nations Day at 
the fair. Lester sought to justify the preservation of a ‘functional’ League during 
wartime, arguing that the League still possessed ‘a great deal of usefulness’. 92 
During the course of his address Lester posited that the vast technical and 
humanitarian experience acquired by League officials and experts over the previous 
two decades was of immense value to governments as they devised their wartime 
social and economic policies and steeled themselves for the difficult process of post-
war reconstruction. Lester also shared his understanding of the wider political 
significance of the League’s wartime preservation, with the organisation representing  
 
a better way of settling disputes than slaughter and butchery or the ruthless 
use of military force; unless something like it is given the necessary support, 
the world will never rise above a state of recurrent war and strife.
93
  
 
The League’s presence at the New York World Fair was overshadowed by 
the Fair Corporation’s obstinate refusal to renounce its own role as a peacemaker, 
ensuring that the League pavilion was confined to a peripheral location.
94
 Despite 
these local intrigues, the Roosevelt administration was willing to lend its support and 
good wishes to the League pavilion. Arthur Sweetser, a former war correspondent, 
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was the League’s director of publicity and was the longest serving American 
member of the Secretariat, having been appointed in 1919. Dispatched to New York 
to oversee the work of the pavilion Sweetser was invited to lunch with the president 
while paying a flying visit to Washington, during which Roosevelt expressed his 
general approval of the League exhibit.
95
 While Roosevelt was not in a position to 
pay a personal visit, he dispatched three members of his cabinet, who could relate to 
the technical activities of the League; the secretary for agriculture, the assistant 
secretary of labour and the surgeon-general. In April 1940 Dr. Mary Woolley, 
president of Mount Holyoke College and a former American delegate to the 
League’s Disarmament Conference, formed a committee in the United States to 
support the ‘non-political and humanitarian’ activities of the organisation. Roosevelt 
wrote to her in support, stressing that the League’s technical agencies were ‘not only 
worthy, but definitely essential’ in this time of crisis.96 Though Roosevelt did not 
favour formal association with the League, his administration retained an important 
working relationship with its technical agencies.  
The friendly relations cultivated between League officials and their 
supporters in the United States came to immediate fruition in the aftermath of the fall 
of France, when the future of the League appeared decidedly bleak. On 11 July 1940 
Harold W. Dodds, president of Princeton University, on behalf of his own institution 
and of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and the Institute for Advanced 
Study (both located on the Princeton Campus), extended an invitation to the 
technical services to relocate from Geneva to the university in New Jersey. 
According to Dodds, the governing authorities of those three educational and 
scientific institutions were moved to extend such an offer to the League because of 
the ‘great importance’ they attached to the technical agencies.97 The terms of the 
offer were extremely generous with the technical services offered access to suitable 
offices and other work stations rent-free. The authorities at Princeton kept the State 
Department informed of the invitation from the outset and it was made clear to 
President Dodds that the secretary of state would place no obstacles in his way.
98
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Much to the astonishment and consternation of his colleagues Avenol 
rejected Dodd’s invitation outright, claiming that for legal reasons he could not 
contemplate transfer of any agencies of the League away from headquarters unless 
the entire organisation was obliged to evacuate from Geneva.
99
 Such a refusal 
confounded his colleagues at a time when the League’s technical potential was 
threatened by the wider political situation.
100
 Avenol’s dismissal of Dodd’s generous 
invitation was actually just one episode of a wider crisis within the Secretariat.  In 
the summer of 1940 the secretary-general faced unprecedented charges of trying to 
sabotage the League’s liberal democratic identity by offering to place the staff and 
the services of the organisation at the disposal of the Axis bloc. 
 
 
The battle between idealism and opportunism 
The sensationalism of Joseph Avenol’s resignation attracted the attention of 
historians in the three decades following the League’s dissolution.101 Avenol was 
charged with espousing pro-Vichy, Anglophobic sentiments, betraying pro-German 
sympathies and threatening to commandeer the League’s technical potential for the 
Axis reconstruction of Europe.
102
 Stephen Schwebel, in his 1952 publication The 
secretary-general of the United Nations: his political powers and practices, devoted 
a brief appendix to the murky questions surrounding Avenol’s resignation. Schwebel 
was able to interview Avenol in August 1951 about a year before the latter’s death. 
Schwebel referred to the above accusations levelled at Avenol and permitted the 
former secretary-general to robustly deny their validity.
103
 Schwebel did not include 
the testimony of Avenol’s former colleagues who were privy to the events of 1940 
and whose relations with the secretary-general had, by that point, descended into 
acrimony. Later works by James Barros, Arthur Rovine and Stephen Barcroft drew 
heavily on the diary and papers of Seán Lester and on the personal recollections of 
Thanassis Aghnides. While anecdotal testimony is colourful and valuable in its own 
right, Aghnides’ personal papers reveal his reservations as to the accuracy of his 
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recollections. In a 1965 letter to Louis H. Starr, director of the oral history 
department of Colombia University, Aghnides qualified these reservations on the 
basis that he kept no diary at the time and that consequently he felt a ‘gnawing 
uneasiness’ as to reliability of ‘impressions, particularly in respect of dates, but not 
solely of dates.’104 Aghnides confided to Starr that Avenol tried to use him as ‘a cat’s 
paw’ in his schemes but acknowledged that he had become hazy about what 
happened in ‘1941’ despite the fact that these events took place in 1940. 105 
Aghnides’ personal papers and his correspondence with the British Foreign Office, 
dated from the wartime period, provide a more direct and reliable account of the 
events of 1940.  
The biographical efforts of Barros and Rovine have proven an excellent 
foundation for later historians upon which to develop an understanding of Avenol’s 
personal politics and controversial actions. However these historians were obliged to 
work amidst a paucity of archival material.  Rovine, in his 1970 study of the office of 
the secretary-general, conceded that greater knowledge of the incumbents of that 
post would only be achieved with the release of more pertinent files from the various 
national archives.
106
 Apart from Douglas Gageby’s biography of Lester (published in 
1999) there has been no significant attempt to chronicle Avenol’s actions since the 
1970s.
107
 Even then Gageby’s work was preoccupied with Lester’s experience of 
events and drew almost exclusively from the latter’s diary and personal papers to 
document the story of Avenol’s resignation. A more comprehensive understanding 
of Avenol’s resignation can only be achieved through multi-archival research. The 
greater availability and accessibility of British, American and particularly French 
governmental records and diplomatic correspondence since the 1970s warrants a 
contemporary effort to re-examine the motivations behind, and significance of, 
Avenol’s actions. This primary material combined with a greater historical 
appreciation of the period permits a new perspective on this crisis within the 
Secretariat with its implications for the office of secretary-general within the overall 
narrative of international organisations.  
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Lester’s diaries, upon which previous histories have been heavily reliant, 
appear as a damning indictment of the secretary-general. Lester depicted Avenol as 
calm and collected in the wake of the French defeat and the imminent disintegration 
of the Third Republic; he noted that the secretary-general believed that ‘decent terms 
could be got’ with the Germans. 108  According to Lester, Avenol ‘spoke with 
complacency of a new state when the glory of the old one was being mangled under 
the tanks of the invader.’109 Lester’s colleagues also confided to him the details of 
their conversations with Avenol. Benoit Marius Viple, a Frenchman and senior 
official with the I.L.O., informed Lester that he had been called to Avenol’s office on 
5 July 1940. According to Lester’s diary Avenol spoke to Viple on the subject of a 
‘new France, which was to be given a new soul in collaboration with Germany and 
Italy [to] keep the British out of Europe’.110 Avenol asked Viple to go and see Pierre 
Laval (who was Viple’s former foster-brother) on his behalf. Viple, like most of his 
colleagues, refused to cooperate with his superior and berated Avenol, opining that 
‘anyone who had anything to do with French affairs would be well advised to keep 
out of France for a considerable time’ and that Avenol should not ‘soil the honour 
both of France and himself in view of his position.’111 In the past Avenol had been 
derided by his compatriots for being ‘la domestique des Anglais.’112 Lester’s diaries 
depict Avenol’s apparent dramatic transformation into a hardened Anglophobe in the 
aftermath of the British sinking of the French Mediterranean fleet at Mers-el-Kébir 
on 3 July 1940. According to Lester, Avenol was overheard telling anyone who 
would listen that Britain’s international prestige would fade, that it should be ‘kept 
out of Europe and driven out of the Mediterranean.’113 The secretary-general was 
also accused of trying to engineer the complete dismissal of all British League 
officials. The most serious of all charges levelled against Avenol was that he tried to 
place League machinery at the disposal of the ‘New Order’ in Europe. On 6 June 
1940 Lester wrote in his diary that Avenol: 
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made a note on the possibility of league machinery in Europe being used in 
an unnatural way in the interest of certain powers, envisaging also a possible 
league of European states using our name and acting under the dictation of 
certain non-members for the future conduct of the war.
114
 
 
According to Lester Avenol tried unsuccessfully to convince staff to 
approach the German consul in Geneva, Dr. Wolfgang Krauel, in order to share the 
secretary-general’s novel, if vague, proposals for the future use of the international 
civil service with the German diplomatic corps.
115
 During the midst of this supposed 
intrigue Avenol suddenly announced his resignation to member states on 27 July 
1940.
116
 However in the proceeding weeks Avenol showed no sign of quitting 
Geneva and, according to Lester, continued to extrapolate on his vision for the 
League as a tool of the Axis bloc. Under the terms of the previous Assembly 
resolution Avenol was expected, at a time when member states were unable to 
convene, to exercise his authority in tandem with the Supervisory Commission. 
Despite Lester’s pleas the secretary-general refused to call a meeting of that body to 
either consider his resignation or to approve a budget for the forthcoming year.
117
 
If Lester’s depiction of the events of 1940 was correct it meant that Avenol 
politicised his office to an unprecedented degree and attempted to perpetuate a 
political culture within the Secretariat that was wholly at odds with both the liberal 
democratic ethos of the Covenant and the cautious internationalism of member states. 
However it would not be wise to employ Lester’s diary as the sole means of 
chronicling the events leading up to Avenol’s resignation. Relations between the 
latter and the secretary-general broke down irrevocably during this period with 
Avenol refusing to meet with his deputy and with Lester consequently obliged to 
rely on second-hand information from his colleagues, particularly from Aghnides.
118
 
That is not to say that Lester’s testimony should be discounted; however it should be 
tested against the evidence provided by other League officials, British diplomats and 
by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vichy). It is only through the medium of 
multi-archival research that a clear and balanced interpretation of Avenol’s actions 
and character can emerge. According to the papers of Thanassis Aghnides the fall of 
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France led to an escalation of Avenol’s ongoing efforts to pare down the Secretariat. 
On 15 June 1940 Avenol circulated a memorandum calling on all officials who were 
contemplating leaving Geneva at some time in the future to offer their resignations 
before 30 June ‘in the interests of everyone’.119 British Foreign Office records reveal 
the apprehension of Whitehall and of British diplomats at what appeared to be 
Avenol’s attempt to liquidate the Secretariat, discriminate against British staff and 
refuse the Princeton offer. Alexander Loveday expressed his concerns to Sir David 
Kelly, the British minister in Bern, that Avenol showed signs of trying to dismiss the  
remaining British technical experts without the authority of the Supervisory 
Commission.
120
 Kelly used Loveday as the medium through which to inform Avenol 
of the views of the British government. Loveday informed Avenol that the London 
government was alarmed at his apparent dismissal of the Princeton offer and relayed 
its concern that the secretary-general appeared to be ‘virtually dissolving technical 
organs of the League of Nations on his own responsibility.’121  
On 27 June Kelly, accompanied by Harry Livingstone (the United 
Kingdom’s consul in Geneva), called on Avenol in the Palais des Nations. At this 
meeting Avenol argued, as he had done in the spring of 1940, that the diminished 
status and mandate of the League no longer warranted a large international civil 
service. He claimed that he had ‘200 employees doing nothing’ and that he planned 
to slash that number by half as he could not agree that they ‘should be paid for doing 
nothing’.122 Avenol defended his policy to Schwebel in 1951. Avenol told Schwebel 
that he did not want to maintain, as the symbol of the League, ‘civil servants 
discredited by their idleness and uselesslness.’123  However Avenol exceeded his 
authority in trying to organise the summary dissolution of the international civil 
service and ignored the previous directive from member states to preserve the 
Secretariat and the technical services as a wartime nucleus of international 
cooperation. Furthermore his policy of liquidation could not be justified on financial 
grounds considering steps had already been taken to cope with the financial shortfall 
from the previous years.
124
 Schwebel sympathised with Avenol’s actions, posing the 
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question: ‘What may be expected of the secretary-general when his organisation is in 
fact-politically dead-when it gives no hope of meeting the crisis successfully?’125 
That is rather a weak argument considering the League had never really faced any 
major political crisis successfully and that was not the point of the League’s wartime 
preservation. While member states did not regard the League as a useful diplomatic 
tool they continued to value its political identity and technical potential.
126
 It was not 
for Joseph Avenol to suddenly decide its irrelevancy to a world at war. His actions 
were contrary to the spirit of the Bruce Report which sought to enhance, rather than 
diminish, the League’s technical potential. 
The British Foreign Office was particularly disturbed at the idea that the 
League’s British staff were facing undue discrimination. According to Foreign 
Office records there was no compelling evidence to support that accusation. David 
Kelly asked the League’s treasurer, Seymour Jacklin, about the veracity of such 
accusations. Jacklin denied that Avenol was discriminating against British League 
officials, informing Kelly that most of the British staff leaving Geneva ‘were very 
anxious to go.’127 Kelly regarded this as an unwelcome development as he did not 
have any positions to offer departing British staff within his own legation and was 
mindful that the entire British foreign service was in danger of oversubscription.
128
 
However Vichy records demonstrate that Avenol was indeed given to Anglophobic 
remarks during this period. On 25 July Avenol wrote to Paul Baudouin, the Vichy 
minster of foreign affairs, blaming the decline of the League on British influence and 
complaining that former League officials who had left Geneva were organising a 
campaign against him in London, accusing him of trying to destroy the Secretariat.
129
 
Indeed in October 1940 former, unnamed, League officials gave an interview to the 
Christian Science Monitor denouncing Avenol’s involvement with Vichy and his 
anti-British campaign within the Secretariat.
130
 In his letter to Baudouin, Avenol also 
wrote disrespectfully of British determination to preserve the League when that 
power, according to Avenol, incurred a large share of responsibility for the League’s 
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diplomatic shortcomings.
131
 In their interview with the secretary-general on 27 June, 
Kelly and Livingstone passed on their concerns to Avenol that the process of 
reducing the Secretariat, at that precise moment, raised the prospect of a difficult and 
dangerous journey home across the European warzone for many former officials. 
Their dismissal from the international civil service would also entail an immediate 
loss of special diplomatic immunities at the moment in which they were most 
needed.
132
 Avenol conceded that this was unfortunate and made a vague assurance 
that he would try to organise some kind of ‘evacuation train.’ 133  The secretary-
general was clearly unconcerned about maintaining a working international civil 
service, thereby vindicating Walters’ previous lack of confidence.134  
 Kelly and Livingstone also confronted Avenol on his rejection of the 
Princeton invitation. Lester had attributed Avenol’s attitude to what he perceived as 
the secretary-general’s growing antipathy for all things Anglo-Saxon.135 However 
when Kelly and Livingstone urged Avenol to reconsider, the secretary-general was 
able to offer a more sophisticated and reasonable explanation for his refusal. Kelly 
informed Avenol that Britain would sponsor the transfer of selected missions of the 
technical agencies to the United States.
136
 Avenol responded that this altered his 
position somewhat but emphasised his reservations concerning the League’s 
technical officials going to New Jersey without being accorded official recognition 
by the U.S. State Department. According to Avenol, only official recognition would 
enable them to call on foreign governments for collaboration.
137
 Dodds’ invitation 
was, after all, offered in a private capacity on behalf of three independent academic 
institutions, rather than from the Roosevelt administration or the State Department. 
Avenol informed Kelly and Livingstone that if the technical experts wanted to go to 
the United States in the capacity of private individuals he would accord them leave. 
A few months later, in September 1940, Avenol told Carl Hambro, the chairman of 
the Supervisory Commission and president of the League Council, that he could not 
countenance the transfer of technical organisations to New Jersey purely as a means 
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of securing refuge for a few distinguished League officials.
138
 Avenol asked Harold 
Tittman, an American diplomat then based in Geneva, if the State Department could 
issue an official invitation to the technical agencies. Tittman consulted Secretary of 
State Hull who replied that his department did not think it was possible, at that 
present moment, to assume an obligation towards an intergovernmental organisation 
of which the United States was not a member.
139
 According to Hull there was: 
 
a number of political questions associated with the League of Nations and the 
activities of the United States government in connection therewith. These 
questions are of such a nature that, in spite of the great interest of this 
government in the technical and non-political work of the League, serious 
doubt is held in the Department that the transfer of the technical sections to 
this country would be entirely understood and approved by members of the 
Congress and by large sections of the people of the United States.
140
 
 
This correspondence further demonstrated that the League, despite the 
suspension of the Assembly and Council, was still perceived as a fundamentally 
political organisation. Gary Ostrower wrote that in the 1930s the Roosevelt 
administration was obliged to keep the League enthusiasts in the State Department 
on a tight rein ‘lest they upset the cart.’141 Tittman’s response demonstrates how the 
League remained, in 1940, a delicate issue in American foreign and domestic policy.  
Avenol’s reservations about establishing informal technical missions in the United 
States were entirely valid. The League Secretariat was experiencing enough 
difficulties with the Swiss Federal Council, despite the existence of a modus vivendi. 
As Dodds issued his invitation in a private capacity he could not offer any 
diplomatic safeguards to the League’s technical agencies.  However Avenol could 
not hold out against the mounting tide of opposition to his refusal of the Princeton 
offer. On 28 June he informed Tittman that he would accept Dodds’ invitation.142  
 The accusation that Avenol entertained pro-Vichy sympathies is easier to 
uphold. The reverberations felt within the Palais des Nations by the fall of France, 
demonstrated how intrinsic Europe was to the League. The fate of France was bound 
to have an impact upon the Secretariat of the League of Nations with France 
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traditionally regarding itself as a central player in the organisation’s history. 143 
According to Avenol’s personal papers, the secretary-general’s initial reaction to the 
German invasion was a conventional one. On 27 May 1940 he wrote a letter of 
support to General Maxime Weygand, who had recently replaced Maurice Gamelin 
as the supreme commander of the armed forces, sending him his best wishes in this 
undertaking.
144
 Although Weygand would become one of the more vocal advocates 
for an armistice, the significance of this letter should not be overstated, given that the 
general was then engaged in organising the defence of France. France was the most 
powerful state to succumb to the armies of the Third Reich. It would also be the only 
one which would seek an end to hostilities by asking for an armistice. It was a 
popular move at a time when 125,000 French citizens lost their lives in the weeks 
from May to June and 1.6 million taken as prisoners of war.
145
 While defeatist in 
military matters, Pétain’s regime remained optimistic in the face of uncompromising 
armistice terms. The Vichy government would adopt the motif of renewal as it 
sought to return to ‘traditional values’ in the wake of the dissolution of the 
‘decadent’ Third Republic.146 Such aspirations were in line with Avenol’s social and 
political conservatism.
147
 Prominent members of Pétain’s cabinet also came to 
believe that France could become an associated power and play a prominent role in 
the coming New Order.
148
 The question is whether such a controversial view 
percolated within the League’s international civil service. 
It is the records of the Vichy government that provide the greatest insight into 
Avenol’s motivations and aspirations in the summer of 1940. Though previous 
historians were aware that Avenol was in touch with Vichy, they did not enjoy the 
same access to the most pertinent records.
149
 Bendiner supposed that the Vichy 
government decided Avenol’s future for him, instructing the secretary-general to 
tender his resignation as a means of placating the German conquerors.
150
 However 
the records attest that Avenol was not a mere pawn of Vichy and in fact instigated 
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the process that led to his resignation. Avenol sent a letter as early as 4 July 1940 
(only twelve days after the signing of the Franco-German Armistice) to Paul 
Baudouin, Pierre Laval’s predecessor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Avenol 
asked Baudouin to inform Marshal Pétain of his full support.
151
 Avenol also 
expounded on the need to encourage order and sacrifice among the populace in order 
to rejuvenate the social and political organisation of France; this policy, Avenol felt, 
would help articulate France’s place in the world, forming the most effective 
foundation for the future conduct of its foreign policy.
152
 Avenol also expressed his 
desire, in this letter, to serve his country and offered to resign if the new government 
thought it fit for him to do so. Avenol assured Baudouin that he would offer his 
resignation ‘without hesitation’ and without waiting for a ‘treaty of peace’ to decide 
the fate of the League if that was what the new government desired.
153
 In his 
interview with Schwebel Avenol acknowledged that he had chosen ‘to adhere to the 
Pétain faction at Vichy.’ 154  As demonstrated by the December 1939 Assembly, 
Avenol was anxious to exert some influence on the governments of member states 
and he displayed the same directness with his own. He was obliged to wait almost 
two weeks for Baudouin’s reply and would not announce his resignation to member 
states until the 27 July 1940.  
Avenol’s support for the Vichy regime inspired antipathy among his 
colleagues in the Secretariat and attracted the criticism of later historians. According 
to Kelly’s reports to the Foreign Office, Thanassis Aghnides was disturbed that 
Avenol’s sympathies, during this period, were ‘100% French.’155 It is difficult to 
know where else Aghnides expected Avenol’s sympathies to lie at a time of intense 
national crisis. Subsequent historians have often used strong language to attack 
Avenol’s supposed sympathies. Zara Steiner described Avenol as ‘devious’ and both 
Rovine and Barros’ studies seek to condemn Avenol, with Barros dedicating his 
work to Seán Lester, in recognition of the ‘steadfastness and courage’ he displayed 
in opposing his superior.
156
  Bertram Gordon observed that it is common, when 
engaging in a retrospective analysis of Vichy, for ‘accusatory passion’ to replace 
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historical analysis.
157
 Schwebel wrote that Avenol’s previous support of 
appeasement was compounded by his later sympathies with Vichy which unjustly 
turned Avenol into ‘a whipping boy for the sins of the pre-war period, though his 
role in them was actually subsidiary.’158 Avenol was eager to stress in 1951 that his 
support lay firmly with the ‘anti-Laval faction.’159 Pierre Laval, Pétain’s minister of 
state, has been depicted in French historiography as ‘the quintessential embodiment 
of manipulative politics and intrigue’, the personification of the excesses of the 
Vichy regime and the arch collaborator.
160
 Avenol, while not denying his support for 
Vichy, was anxious to dissociate himself with the political controversies which led to 
Laval’s execution for treason in October 1945. Just as the fatalism of League 
historiography anachronistically expects League officials to predict the organisations 
post-war dissolution, historians have likewise attacked Avenol for failing to 
anticipate the reality of Vichy. The crisis within the Secretariat in the summer of 
1940 occurred against the backdrop of early days in Vichy before the regime’s 
complicity in the Final Solution introduced the elements of persecution and 
criminality into the new French state. As Jean Paul Sartre wrote of the public 
reaction to reaction to armistice and occupation; ‘We never quite new whether we 
were doing right or doing wrong; a subtle poison corrupted even our best actions.’161 
In the post-war period Charles de Gaulle encouraged the myth that France was a 
nation of wartime résistants and that the Vichy regime was an illegal aberration.
162
 
This was not the case. Vichy was the legal government voted into existence by the 
French Chamber of Deputies and its leaders were recognised, by the international 
community as the legitimate representatives of France.
163
 
In 1942 Seymour Jacklin felt it incumbent to mitigate the stigma of the 
secretary-general’s pro-Vichy sentiments. Jacklin was aware that Avenol wrote to 
Vichy offering his services, indicating his intention to resign if it was the wish of the 
French government. Jacklin states that it was quite correct for Avenol to have done 
so.
164
 The independent character of the Secretariat was a much celebrated feature of 
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the League’s experience; but like every aspect of the League’s existence it had its 
limitations. For all the ‘world-spirit’ figures such as de Madariaga recognised within 
that institution, it cannot be overlooked that the first impulse of many Secretariat 
officials, including its most senior figures, was to return to national service in a time 
of crisis. Both Seán Lester and Frank Walters placed themselves at the disposal of 
the Irish Department of External Affairs, and the British Foreign Office respectively, 
with Walter leaving Geneva at the end of the summer. In his 1946 article on the 
international civil service of the future, Egon F. Ranshoffen-Wertheimer (a former 
Secretariat official) made the following observation; ‘nationalism is a potent 
irrational impulse. If it is pitted against international loyalty even an essentially 
decent international official may falter.’165 For Frenchmen, facing a grave national 
trauma, the only available government in the summer of 1940 (before the 
establishment of any credible ‘Free French’ movement) was the one headed by the 
eighty-four year old hero of Verdun. 
The gravest accusation laid against Avenol was that he tried to transform the 
League into a vehicle for Axis collaboration. No evidence can be found in Avenol’s 
personal papers or in the Vichy files to suggest that the secretary-general made any 
approach to the agents of the Third Reich. In 1951 Avenol vehemently denied the 
charge that he was pro-German. He described the rumour of his approaching the 
German consul as ‘absolutely false! Not a word of truth! Never had I a relation with 
Hitler! [.......] and never anything with Mussolini after 1936.’166 His colleagues and 
certain national civil servants thought otherwise. On 30 June, Livingstone learned 
(through Lester) that Avenol, believing Aghnides to be on his side, gave the 
impression to his Greek under secretary-general that he wanted to see himself as 
secretary-general of a new League based on a new order.’167 Lester reported to Kelly 
that Aghnides was fearful that Avenol was ‘trying to make him do something 
dishonourable’.168 A British official, attached to the embassy in Washington, was 
informed by Carter Goodrich, the American chairman of the I.L.O.’s Governing 
Body, that Avenol had been in contact with the German consul in Geneva.
169
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According to Jacklin’s 1942 evidence to the Foreign Office Avenol denied that he 
was an Axis stooge and informed the League treasurer that while he expected 
Germany to win the war, he ‘could not possibly, even if he were so inclined, do a 
deal with the Germans since the Germans were not interested in him.’170  
It is unclear how Avenol came to that conclusion. However simultaneous 
developments for the League’s Organisation of Intellectual Cooperation demonstrate 
that the Germans were not committed to commandeering League machinery for their 
own ends. The diplomatic records of Vichy prove a useful source from which from 
which to glean information on the German attitude to the League at this time. In 
autumn 1940 Professor Friedrich Berber, an official of the Reich Foreign Ministry 
and an authority on international law, was appointed Reich commissar for 
intellectual cooperation. A rumour surfaced that the German authorities entertained 
designs on the Paris based Institute of Intellectual Cooperation.
171
 In a visit to 
Geneva shortly after his appointment, Berber met with Professor Maurice Bourquin, 
a Belgian professor of jurisprudence at the University of Geneva, who was closely 
connected with the work of the League. Bourquin confided the finer details of his 
audience with Berber to Aghnides. Berber informed Bourquin that the German 
government was interested in maintaining the structure of intellectual cooperation. 
Berber claimed that his government was ‘anxious to keep on the Paris institute’, 
which ‘must sever all connections to the League of Nations which was too much 
under British influence.’172 According to Bourquin, Berber inferred that Germany 
wanted to use the Institute for propaganda purposes in South America. By December, 
when no such plans materialised, Murray, in a letter to Makins, mused on their 
viability. Murray knew Berber and dubbed him ‘a Ribbentrop man and fairly 
intelligent. He will obviously be able to get members [to form a committee] from all 
or practically all the European nations, though perhaps not men of much intellectual 
eminence.’173 The prospect of German interest in the I.I.I.C. became a subject of 
great interest to the French Foreign Ministry, the French government having been a 
major source of funding for the Institute.
174
 It sought to ascertain the German 
position at the Wiesbaden Armistice Commission in late 1940. A delegation from the 
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Reich Foreign Ministry denied entertaining any designs on the League’s Paris-based 
Institute.
175
 An organisation that sought to provide the intellectual stimulus to liberal 
internationalism could have no place in Hitler’s new Europe which was, according to 
Mark Mazower, ideologically predicated on ‘a violent fantasy of racial mastery, a 
demonstration of a martial elite breed to lord over hundreds of millions of 
subjects.’176As it transpired, while Berber took possession of the I.I.I.C., his actions 
were limited to the theft and removal to Germany of the Institute’s files covering the 
inter-war International Studies Conferences.
177
  
It is unlikely that Avenol approached the Germans with vague proposals for 
an Axis-controlled League (and vague they had to remain considering no one, not 
even the Germans themselves, had devised clear plans for a new European order 
based on German hegemony).
178
 However there is overwhelming evidence to 
suggest that Avenol did entertain such views and shared them with the Vichy 
government.
179
 René Charron, a Frenchman and member of the economic and 
finance research section of the League Secretariat, had many contacts in Vichy and 
was a close confidante of Avenol during the summer of 1940. While Avenol was 
waiting for the reply to his 4 July letter to Baudouin he sent Charron to Vichy. 
According to a communication dated 5 July, Avenol trusted Charron with a note 
advising the French government on their League policy. Avenol questioned whether 
it was wise for France to remain in a British dominated League of Nations in the 
aftermath of the British attack on the French Mediterranean fleet.
180
 He informed 
Baudouin that the French government could announce its intention to withdraw from 
an organisation that could no longer serve as an ‘Anglo-French association’ and that 
in the two years it would take for such an action to take legal effect the French 
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government could still hope to influence League activities.
181
  British Foreign Office 
records attest that Charron had also been tasked with sharing the secretary-general’s 
views on a new League with the Vichy government. Charron informed Kelly that 
Avenol was shocked when he was told that the new government was not interested in 
the idea of placing League services at the disposal of the ‘New Order’ in Europe.’182 
Thus while Avenol may not have taken any decisive action in relation to such 
controversial proposals, the evidence suggests that he had indeed entertained ideas of 
an Axis-controlled League.  
On 13 July Avenol received a reply to his letter to Baudouin. He was 
informed that the Vichy government would welcome his resignation.
183
 The 
government thought it wise for France to relinquish its leading role at Geneva; as 
such the resignation of a French secretary-general was regarded as the appropriate 
course of action.
184
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expected Avenol to leave office 
in three weeks, once he had settled the question of his succession.
185
 In the 1970s it 
was suspected, but not known by historians, that the Vichy regime intimated its 
desire to Avenol that the League should come to an end thus prompting the 
secretary-general to embark on what appeared to be a programme of sabotage.
186
 
Carter Goodrich, the chairman of the I.L.O.’s Governing Body, was also convinced 
that Pétain would pressure Avenol into either placing the League under the control of 
Germany and Italy or to liquidating the organisation entirely.
187
  The Vichy records 
illustrate that this was not the case. While the French government was not eager to 
preserve its dominant role at Geneva, its intention, at this time, was to maintain the 
League as a potential common meeting ground with the United Kingdom; the 
government was also anxious to avoid the appearance of German dictation.
188
 In the 
immediate aftermath of the armistice, the new French state was trying to determine 
to what degree it could practise an independent foreign and domestic policy and 
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protect its population from the excesses of Nazi occupation.
189
  League membership 
remained a potentially valuable diplomatic link with the world outside of Hitler’s 
new ‘Fortress Europe’ and reflected the unlikely aspirations of the Vichy 
government for the re-establishment of French sovereignty.  
On 27 July 1940, in the aftermath of his communication with the Vichy 
government, Avenol informed member states that he was relinquishing the post of 
secretary-general.
 190
 Baudouin’s letter made no allusion to the prospect of Avenol 
entering the service of the Vichy government. However the secretary-general did not 
lose hope of obtaining a position and went to Vichy on 21 August 1940 to that end. 
While he was received by Pétain, Pierre Laval twice refused to see him, perhaps 
arousing Avenol’s sympathies with those who opposed his growing influence in the 
process.
191
 A Vichy memorandum noted that Avenol has been ‘surprised, 
disappointed and saddened’ by the readiness of his own government and those of 
other member states to accept his resignation and by the failure of those governments 
to mark the occasion with the traditional exchange of letters of congratulations and 
thanks for services rendered.
192
 Avenol found himself not only bereft of his position 
of secretary-general but also deprived of his professional integrity, with no gain 
being derived from his avowal of support for this New Europe which had no place 
for him. Lester on the other hand recognised that the League’s brand of 
internationalism could only be assured of a post-war renaissance in the event of a 
German defeat: ‘The Nazis must be beaten if there is to be any decency in such life 
and civilisation as may survive.’193 Avenol was not a liberal idealist but nor was he 
the realpolitiker de Madariaga described. For all his welcoming of the Armistice, 
Avenol did not recognise that it was this event which devalued his entire career. He 
failed to see that the League, so intimately associated with the traditions of liberal 
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democracy, could never be reconciled with the realities of totalitarianism. Its value 
lay in serving as counterpoint to such a system.
194
 
In the absence of any other career prospects he showed no inclination to 
leave Geneva, much to the anxiety of his colleagues. As he could no longer formally 
assume the position of secretary-general he sought to retain informal authority over 
the Secretariat. As early as 12 July 1940 Roger Makins wrote that evidence was 
accumulating that Avenol was trying to double-cross member states in order to gain 
control of the League’s liquid assets.195 Avenol’s former private secretary, the Briton, 
Hilary Saint George Saunders, was tasked by the Foreign Office to prepare a report 
on Avenol’s character and capabilities for the perusal of Sir Robert Vansittart, the 
chief diplomatic adviser to the British government. According to Saunders, Avenol 
was not to be trusted. Saunders pointed out the possibility that Avenol could be 
pressured by the Vichy regime to dispose of League funds for the benefit of the 
‘enemy’ and Saunders thought him more likely to approach Italy than Germany.196 
Indeed, according to Lester, Avenol had admitted to his colleagues that he was not 
sure that Hitler would want the League but was convinced that Mussolini would as 
‘a counter-balance to German military power.’197 Saunders believed that this would 
simply entail the transfer of League money from where a portion of it was held by 
Chase Bank in New York to another bank in the United States with German or 
Italian connections. To do this however Avenol would have to secure the signature 
of the League’s treasurer, Seymour Jacklin. Saunders claimed that Jacklin (a South 
African of British parentage) was ‘absolutely trustworthy and above suspicion’ and 
proposed sending him a note to advise him to be on his guard.
198
  
This was done through the medium of the British consulate in Geneva with 
the Foreign Office informing Jacklin that they relied on him to ‘preserve financial 
orthodoxy.’199 Jacklin’s reply was dispatched on the 27 July with the South African 
offering assurances that he had thus far witnessed nothing but ‘clean and orthodox 
financial administration’ although he informed the Treasury that he might ‘seek 
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support or safeguards later.’ 200  Two days later, following Avenol’s notice of 
resignation, the previously unruffled Jacklin began to register concern for the 
integrity of the League’s liquid assets. According to Jacklin, Avenol proposed 
retaining control of financial administration by inaugurating a ‘committee of three’ 
with himself as chairman, to administer League funds.
201
 Avenol insisted that his 
input would still be required despite his official resignation. According to Avenol the 
political situation meant that there was no need to appoint a new secretary-general 
and even if a successor was installed he might not know anything about finance. 
Jacklin confided to the Foreign Office his view that Avenol’s arguments were not 
‘logical, nor convincing, nor in accordance with precedent.’202 Jacklin stated that he 
was not opposed to Avenol’s idea for the reorganisation of the Secretariat, ‘in 
principle’, despite being aware that the voice of the treasurer in such a triumvirate 
would most likely be in a minority. However he indicated that he would only be 
willing to go along with such a plan if he could trust Avenol’s successor or 
whomever was appointed to administer the Secretariat.
203
 Avenol told Schwebel that 
he offered to ‘put himself informally at the disposal of the League, without salary or 
responsibility.’204 This was untrue. Jacklin reported to Kelly that Avenol proposed 
drawing a salary of 2,000 C.H.F. per month for his services as a kind of secretary-
general emeritus.
205
 News of such proposals filtered out from the Palais des Nations 
with The Times reporting that Avenol was going to be replaced by a triumvirate of 
high officials.
206
  
Jacklin became suspicious when Avenol gave orders for the transfer of 
League funds, deposited in American and English banks, to Switzerland for an 
unspecified reason. Jacklin informed Avenol that he would do so ‘over his dead 
body’ and saw to it that the money is divided into certain earmarked funds to limit 
the possibility of Avenol tampering with them.
 207
 In response to Avenol’s suspect 
financial dealings British Treasury Officials compiled a report as to the best course 
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of action to mitigate the risk of misappropriation. According to the report, in 1939 
the League’s liquid assets amounted to about 3 million pounds, 700,000 of which 
was held in Lloyd’s and National Provincial Bank in London in the form of gold, in 
addition to certain investments.
208
 While the rest of the League’s assets were held in 
Paris and New York, the London account could be made available in Geneva by the 
branch of Lloyds and National there. The Treasury thus advocated the complete 
removal of the League’s financial administration from Switzerland. The continued 
operation of the Secretariat could be financed by local petty cash accounts in Geneva 
which could be supplemented by occasional transfers from the new financial 
headquarters of the League.
209
 
It is not clear what Avenol hoped to do with League funds. Three million 
pounds of the League’s liquid assets was unlikely to entice any German interest in 
Avenol’s schemes at a time when the Third Reich had much greater financial 
interests in Switzerland. As has been well-documented, Switzerland allowed the 
Nazis to launder gold and other capital of questionable origin in its banks, 
purchasing nearly half of Berlin’s gold reserve in the process, three quarters of which 
had been acquired by the Nazis illegitimately.
210
  What is more likely is that Avenol, 
bereft of any opportunities from Vichy and obliged to resign, sought to retain control 
over the League’s financial affairs in order to maintain some kind of position and 
prestige. Though not known for an imaginative style of leadership, Avenol was 
renowned for his authoritarian style. When he rose to the top of the Secretariat 
Avenol replaced Drummond’s British ‘bottom-up’ method of administration with the 
French ‘top-down’ model. As a result the technical activities came more under the 
responsibility of the secretary-general with the technical directors losing a 
considerable amount of executive authority.
211
 A Vichy government memorandum 
reported that Avenol hoped to exert indirect control over the Secretariat indirectly 
through his influence with members of the League’s Supervisory Commission.212 By 
August 1940 Avenol was still refusing to name a date for his departure from office 
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and proposed the complete winding up of the Secretariat on 31 December 1940.
213
 
According to Lester Avenol’s autocratic tendencies appeared to develop into 
megalomania in the summer of 1940, with Avenol reportedly declaring ‘I am the 
League of Nations.’214 While Avenol may have been the most senior international 
civil servant in Geneva, his cavalier attitude to the League’s liberal democratic ethos 
made him the least likely personification of the League 
By August 1940 Avenol’s position was untenable. His colleagues refused to 
cooperate with him and had been deferring to the authority of his deputy, Seán 
Lester, since the announcement of his resignation on 27 July.
215
 He had lost all 
credibility as an administrator and political figurehead; the British government and 
even the French government were anxious for him to leave office.
216
 Avenol left the 
Secretariat on 2 September, having relinquished his authority on 31 August. He 
settled in France in a small village in Haute Savoie, not far from the Swiss border. 
Avenol’s motivations during the summer of 1940 remain complex and thought-
provoking. Lester took Avenol’s optimistic reaction to the armistice as proof of his 
extremism.
217
 Later historians agreed with Lester’s conclusion. Barros argued that 
Avenol’s conservatism eventually developed into sympathy for the extreme 
reactionary elements.
218
 The sudden transformation of this cautious, conservative 
figure into a political extremist is not convincing. In her recent publication, Clavin 
acknowledged that it is difficult to identify any ideological consistency in Avenol’s 
decisions if he decided to ‘throw in his panicky lot with the dictators’ considering his 
anti-communist tendencies should have been affronted by the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact.
219
 Aghnides, who remained in close proximity to Avenol during the summer of 
1940, did not believe the Frenchman to be a right-wing extremist. Rather he 
attributed Avenol’s proposals to political opportunism. He confided to Livingstone 
his conviction that ‘if the League survived [Avenol] would wish to keep in with His 
Majesty’s Government but that [Avenol] really believed the League would be dead 
in three months.’220 Time Magazine made the caustic observation in July 1940 that 
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‘as long as Joseph Avenol can keep himself employed, the League is not stone 
dead.’221 Avenol’s personal papers also reveal his lack of ideological commitment. 
On 27 July 1940, two days after Avenol had disparaged the British government to 
Baudouin, he took it upon himself to personally inform Lord Halifax of his decision 
to resign from office, sending the following telegram; 
 
Having decided offer my resignation consider my duty to inform you 
personally this decision [remembering] with emotion long years of mutual 
confidence. I wish to thank you personally and ministers and public officials 
and friends who have given me their support.
222
 
 
Avenol was not a fascist ideologue: he was an opportunist. As Schwebel argued 
‘intelligent idealism’ was essential to an international civil service.223 It was the 
much ridiculed idealism of League officials and supporters that sustained them in 
their endeavour to keep the League alive in an increasingly hostile political 
environment. When Carl Hambro originally learned of Avenol’s intention to resign, 
unaware of his intrigue within the Secretariat, he wrote to urge him to reconsider. 
Hambro expressed his unshakable conviction, despite the then bleak prospects of the 
Allied war effort, that the continuation of the League was of vital importance to the 
future peace settlement.
224
 South Africa’s premier, General Jan Christiaan Smuts, 
one of the original architects of the Covenant, also expressed regret at Avenol’s 
decision. He shared Hambro’s certainty that all the ‘great work has not been in vain 
and that the League will still prove the best foundation on which to rebuild the 
international order.’225 Avenol did not share that conviction. In a letter to Frank 
Boudreau he confided his conviction that the League was over, that it had lost its 
‘soul and its functions’.226 When Avenol wrote to Carl Hambro in September 1940 
he informed the latter that the rumours surrounding his actions the previous summer 
were nothing more than ‘the toxins of a dying bureaucracy.’ 227  Avenol’s first 
response to the looming threat of war, was not that the Secretariat should be 
preserved as a nucleus for international collaboration, but that it should be pared 
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down to its most basic level.
228
 While Lester pondered the possibility of ‘dissolution 
with dignity’ he regarded such a policy as a final measure to prevent the League 
falling into the hands of the Axis powers.
229
 Avenol was not an unfit secretary-
general because of his pro-Vichy sympathies or because he desired to serve the 
government of his homeland; after all Drummond had been appointed British 
ambassador to Rome upon his resignation as secretary-general. Avenol was an unfit 
secretary-general because he lacked all discretion, circumspection and a commitment 
to the international civil service over which he presided. A common charge levelled 
against League officials and apologists was that their idealism led them to misread 
the current of international affairs.
230
 However Avenol spend his entire career as 
secretary-general trying to reconcile ambitious internationalism of the League 
Secretariat with the prevailing political landscape, with disastrous results. In 1940 he 
contemplated the transformation of the League’s political identity in an ill-conceived 
attempt to bring the organisation into conformity with what he recognised as the 
reality of a new European order. That Avenol’s career did not survive his espousal of 
such controversial views is indicative of the pre-eminence of the League’s liberal 
democratic identity to its wartime preservation. Avenol’s resignation also 
demonstrated the need for the secretary-general to embody both sound political-
judgement and an idealistic commitment to the peaceful internationalism. As Fred 
Halliday has shown, such traits were not mutually exclusive.
231
 Pedersen described 
the ‘spirit of Geneva’ as a unique ‘blend of pragmatism and hope.’232 Avenol did not 
possess this necessary mix of pragmatism and idealism to lead an international civil 
service through the war years.  
 
 
The transfer of technical missions of the League to North America 
As we shall see in chapter three, Avenol’s actions left an indelible mark on the 
Secretariat and enacted repercussions for its future operation. However his attitude to 
the Princeton offer did not prove fatal for the transfer of the technical organisations. 
                                                          
228
 Memorandum by Pierre Bonna, 31 Mar. 1939 (S.F.A., SDD 60/006/305, pp 137-8). 
229
 N.M. Butler to Makins, 7 Aug. 1940 (T 160/1353).  
230
 See for example Niemeyer ‘The balance sheet of the League experiment’, pp 537-558 and Carr, 
Conditions of peace, p. 164.  
231
 Halliday, Rethinking international relations, p. 10.  
232
 Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nation’, p. 1113.  
119 
 
It was decided that it would be Alexander Loveday’s Economic and Finance 
Organisation that would transfer a select group of personnel to Princeton. The 
gradual process of transferring officials began when Loveday and seven of his 
principal collaborators, together with their families, left Geneva on 6 August 1940.  
John Winant’s leadership of the I.L.O. in the summer of 1940 continued to 
contrast sharply to that provided by Avenol. Following the fall of France Winant 
took action to secure a transfer of the Labour Office away from Geneva. Winant did 
not wait to be invited by an American academic institution but approached the State 
Department directly. In June 1940, through the American Consul in Geneva, he 
wrote to Cordell Hull requesting a transfer of I.L.O. officials to the United States.
233
 
Winant received the briefest of replies from Hull informing him that the United 
States government was not in a position to extend such an invitation.
234
 Undaunted, 
Winant persisted in his request, trying to appeal to the shared democratic tradition of 
both the I.L.O. and the United States:  
 
I ask for your help and the help of the United States in continuing the 
organisation and [in] conserving the specialised personnel who have been 
devotedly loyal to the principles and practises of democracy and who are 
authorities in national and international social legislation and procedure.
235
 
 
Winant, refused to depoliticise the work of his agency and sought to reinforce 
the idea that the I.L.O.’s pursuit of social justice was sustained by the liberal, 
democratic principles on which the League was founded. However Hull was 
unmoved and once again refused the request, becoming more explicit as to why. Hull 
did not feel he could secure the necessary congressional approval to safeguard the 
international status and autonomy of the I.L.O. if it operated on American soil but 
hoped that his refusal would not be taken as any reflection upon the I.L.O. or the 
director’s administration of it. 236 Refusing to be deterred, Winant actually departed 
Geneva for the United States, hoping that his physical presence would help convince 
the Roosevelt administration of the I.L.O.’s dire need for assistance.  
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Winant only got as far as London before he altered his plans entirely. He 
established contact not with Roosevelt, but with William Lyon Mackenzie King, 
Prime Minister of Canada. Due to its expanding economy, Canada had a 
sophisticated labour movement and was receptive to the I.L.O.’s campaign for more 
equitable labour laws.
237
 King intimated to Winant that there would be many 
Canadian universities eager to assist the I.L.O. and left the director free to make his 
choice.
238
 Winant settled on McGill University, Montreal, on the basis that Montreal, 
with its mixed English and French speaking populations, was well equipped for 
printing documents in the two official languages of the organisation. Unlike the 
scruples of the U.S. State Department, the Canadian government proved ‘ready to 
take all the measures necessary to ensure that the [Labour] Office should be given its 
full status and independence as an international institution.’239 Around forty staff 
members of the International Labour Office joined Winant in Montreal in the initial 
transfer period. Others remained in Geneva, while some returned to their own 
countries as the I.L.O.’s national correspondents or were attached to the 
organisation’s various branch offices in order to supply, from there, material on 
social questions of interest to the Office.
240
 This was a significant reduction in staff.  
At its height in the 1930s the Labour Office was composed of some 450 officials, 
encompassing thirty seven nationalities, who had the ability to read and write in 
almost fifty languages.
241
  
Though he ensured the immediate survival of the I.L.O., Winant was not 
destined to lead it through the war years as shortly after the arrangements with 
McGill were made he was appointed American ambassador to the United Kingdom. 
Whereas Avenol’s attempt to serve the government of his homeland was regarded as 
controversial, perhaps unfairly so, by his colleagues, Winant’s resignation was not 
shrouded in subterfuge and recrimination. Winant was called into the service of what 
was then an officially neutral state, whose sympathies, like the majority of League 
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member states, lay with the Allied cause. It is also difficult to attribute to Winant the 
same self-interested opportunism practiced by Joseph Avenol. Unlike the former 
secretary-general, Winant was an idealist on both a national and international level. 
Winant regarded the war as an almost apocalyptic battle between the forces of 
democracy and totalitarianism.  In his director’s report of 1941 he informed member 
states that he was called into service by the President of the United States to serve as 
an ambassador ‘where the age-old fight for democracy has reached its climax.’242 
His deputy, Edward Phelan, observed that in accepting the diplomatic post his chief 
wanted to be ‘where the bombs were falling, to give the encouragement of his 
presence, if he could give no more to those whose sacrifice and courage all at the 
moment depended.’243 Winant’s leadership of the I.L.O. enhanced his reputation as a 
social democrat and directly lead to his appointment to the crucial diplomatic post at 
a time when the United States was beginning to extend economic assistance to the 
British war effort. Winant was not the obvious choice for ambassador but Roosevelt 
wanted to plant in London someone who was in step with his own New Deal social 
policies and perceived that Winant’s appointment would be received favourably by 
the British Labour Party, a party whose influence Roosevelt correctly deemed to be 
on the rise.
244
 Winant’s appointment underscored both the affinity between the 
League Covenant and Allied war effort as well as the inherently political nature of its 
social and economic work.  
While the sincerity of Winant’s internationalism was not in doubt his 
resignation undermined an appeal by Phelan, in June 1940, for governments to 
respect the vital international work carried out by officials seconded to the technical 
services and not recall them for national service.
245
 In its report of February 1939, 
the Governing Body of the I.L.O. emphasised that the office ‘was not a kind of 
refuge for persons who were avoiding their military duties in a moment of grave 
national danger.’246 However Phelan sought to remind the government members of 
the I.L.O. that civil servants were often exempt from military conscription as they 
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were considered ‘already rendering national service’ and requested that the same 
principle be applied, on an international level, to the Labour Office.
247
 At the same 
time, due to the downsizing of the secretariats of the League and of the I.L.O, 
arrangements could be made to negotiate with national governments over certain 
international officials.
248
 The resignation of the I.L.O.’s director further vindicated 
Ranshoffen-Wertheimer’s argument: even the most committed international official 
could not resist the lure of national service in a time of war.
249
 The League’s brand 
of internationalism was predicated on the inviolable sovereignty of member states 
and so national loyalties could not be precluded from its international civil service. 
In the aftermath of Winant’s departure for London, with inherent difficulties incurred 
in summoning an emergency meeting of the I.L.O.’s Governing Body, Winant’s 
deputy, Edward J. Phelan, assumed the acting directorship. 
While the State Department was firmly opposed to the transfer of the I.L.O. 
to the United States it was receptive to the transfer of a mission from the Permanent 
Central Opium Board (P.C.O.B.). The Board was composed of eight experts, who 
operated independently of their governments. Its role it was to monitor the 
movement of drugs, through its Drug Supervisory Body (D.S.B). Should evidence 
suggest that any country was accumulating excessive quantities of a particular drug, 
the Board, through the secretary-general of the League of Nations, would request an 
explanation for this development from the country in question.
250
 Herbert May, a 
serving member of the P.C.O.B., made it known to the U.S. State Department in 
1940 that the League’s drug bodies felt they could operate more effectively in the 
United States, free from the restrictions on their mail and the difficulties in 
communication hampering their work in Geneva.
251
 Whereas the I.L.O., with its 
concentration on sensitive labour and economic issues, was a large and potentially 
disruptive organisation, the P.C.O.B. proposed sending a much smaller delegation 
which concentrated on health related problems. Indeed the mounting problem of 
drug abuse and traffic of narcotics was a longstanding concern of various American 
philanthropic and scientific institutions and the United States was also a party to the 
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many international agreements brokered by the Board.
252
 According to the State 
Department, it was actually less difficult to offer assistance to a League agency, as a 
body seeking asylum, rather than to an organisation like the I.L.O. to which it was 
formally attached.
253
 The League’s drug officials would simply operate out of a 
branch office in Washington; such an arrangement would not need congressional 
approval. Accordingly, a mission of the P.C.O.B., the D.S.B. and the Opium 
Advisory Committee (which served as the link between governments and the League 
Secretariat on matters of drug control) established a branch office in Washington in 
early 1941. The League’s Health Organisation remained in Geneva for the time 
being but it too was eventually destined to open a small branch office in the United 
States. 
Following Avenol’s dramatic departure it was not possible to hold a session 
of the Assembly and Council to elect a new secretary-general and so on 2 September 
1940, Lester, with the written consent of the Supervisory Commission, was sworn in 
as acting secretary-general of the League of Nations. Lester’s first task was to 
arrange a meeting of the Supervisory Commission so that a budget for 1941 could be 
organised, ensuring the immediate future of the League. The difficulties Lester faced 
were indicative of the fact that a functional League of Nations could still ignite 
political controversies. A meeting of the Supervisory Commission could attract press 
attention and raise the old fears of the League functioning as an anti-Axis forum. 
Marcel Pilet-Golaz, president of the Swiss Confederation, formally requested in 
August 1940 that the meeting of the Supervisory Commission not take place in 
League headquarters.
254
 Permission was sought from and granted by the Portuguese 
government to hold the meeting in Lisbon. Portugal, on the Atlantic periphery of 
Europe, sharing ancient political and military ties with the United Kingdom, could 
adopt a bolder stance than the increasingly encircled Swiss.
255
  
The selection of a new meeting ground did not dispel political anxieties. The 
British ambassador to Helsinki, Gordon Vereker, learned that the Finnish member of 
the Supervisory Commission, Harri Holma, was forbidden by his government to 
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attend the session of the Supervisory Commission.
256
Vereker enlightened the 
Foreign Office as to the reasons for the Finnish démarche as related to him by the 
minister for foreign affairs in Helsinki. Minister Witting relayed his fears to Vereker 
that if Holma attended the meeting of the Supervisory Commission, Finland would 
become the target for a press campaign in Germany and Italy for being too 
subservient to Britain and the Allies.
257
 In addition, the Finns did not want to render 
Holma’s position as their diplomatic representative to the Vichy government more 
difficult than it already was. Although Vichy’s position towards the League was 
more ambiguous than the Finns could have known, the French representative Yves 
Bréart de Boisanger (the governor of the Bank of France) could not attend as he had 
since been appointed a French representative to the Wiesbaden Armistice 
Commission.
258
 Witting reminded Vereker that Finland was a small vulnerable 
country that could not risk drawing the thunders of Germany or any other of its 
unscrupulous neighbours (i.e. the U.S.S.R.) at a time when the German government 
was bringing strong indirect pressure to bear on Finland to withdraw from the 
League of Nations.
259
 The Foreign Office strongly objected to such a development. It 
instructed Vereker to remind the Finnish government that members of the 
Supervisory Commission were not representatives of their governments but served in 
an individual capacity and to state that there was ‘no reason why Finland should take 
up an attitude of this kind towards an organ of the League which did at least 
something to help it last year.’260 The Finns eventually relented, allowing Holma to 
attend the meeting in Lisbon after an assurance was sought from the Foreign Office 
that as little publicity be accorded to his presence as was possible.
261
 The League 
was no longer, if it ever really was, a threat to German expansionism but the Third 
Reich, like League’s member states, refused to regard the organisation as a mere 
vehicle for social and economic cooperation. 
A Secretariat delegation, led by Lester, was due to travel by bus to Lisbon, 
accompanied by the president of the Permanent Court of Justice, the El Salvadorian, 
José Gustavo Guerrero. How the League delegation was ultimately treated at the 
French-Spanish frontier must surely have brought home to Lester the dangers 
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implicit in the League’s strong association with the Allies. A Spanish official 
informed the League delegation that he had received instructions on 13 August that 
forbade the passage of any League official into Spain.
262
 Fortunately, for the sake of 
the meeting, the slighted League officials were able to entrust budgetary documents 
bound for Lisbon to Norwegian diplomats crossing from France into Spain.
263
 Lester 
later learned from Julio Lopez Olivan, a Spanish registrar of the Permanent Court, 
why the League delegation had been denied entry into Spain. Spain was, despite 
some overtures from Hitler, an officially neutral country during the war and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially approved their entry. However the pro-German 
Minister of the Interior Serrano Súñer issued an order forbidding the passage of 
League officials through Spain.
264
 The experience of League officials at the Spanish 
frontier would prove indicative of the entire wartime experience of the organisation. 
The growing Axis hegemony would impel many countries to slight an organisation 
which served as an embarrassing reminder of the Treaty that sought to contain the 
resurgence of German militarism. 
After beating a hasty retreat to Geneva Lester managed to establish telephone 
communication with the rest of the Supervisory Commission. This was crucial as, 
given the wartime authority invested by League member states in the person of the 
secretary-general, the budget could not be considered legitimate unless it secured 
Lester’s approval. The members of the Supervisory Commission present in Lisbon 
agreed that it was their responsibility to preserve the League as long as member 
states continued to support it; such was the reality of the political situation that the 
organisation was obliged to concentrate its activities to the social, economic and 
humanitarian spheres. 
265
 The resulting budget for 1941 was a stark indicator of the 
difficult times in which the League found itself. League officials would have to 
strive to meet the expectations of member states while working within the confines 
of an ever-diminishing budget. The Secretariat’s budget for 1941 consisted of a 
paltry 3,729,302 Swiss francs (C.H.F.), a startling reduction since 1939 when just 
over twelve million was placed at its disposal.
266
 This sum also had to accommodate 
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the work of the technical agencies (apart from that of the high commissioner for 
refugees and the P.C.O.B.). The I.L.O., enjoying separate budgetary arrangements, 
(subject to the approval of the secretary-general and the Supervisory Commission) 
was accorded just over three million C.H.F., a sixty per cent reduction since 1939.
267
 
As Housden demonstrated the League was always run on a shoestring budget.
268
 
However the war would bring its own unique financial hurdles; the League’s 
technical directors were obliged to contend with these wartime difficulties in the 
hope of making a post-war impact.  
Despite the ever worsening financial and political situation the League of 
Nations remained in existence. Due to the determination of officials such as Seán 
Lester, Thanassis Aghnides, Alexander Loveday, Seymour Jacklin and John Winant 
the League did not lose, as Avenol predicted, its soul or all of its functions. The 
League’s experience of 1940; the collapse of its leadership; its treatment by the 
Swiss, Spanish and Finnish governments and the reluctance of the United States to 
accord the transferred technical missions official recognition demonstrated that a 
‘functionalist’ League was still a very political League. Political considerations 
would determine its wartime experience as tensions between the League’s Allied 
affinity and its obligation to the neutrals continued to mount. The Secretariat’s 
position in Geneva and the transfer of various technical missions to North America 
would also serve as a reflection of the course of international affairs and provide an  
insight into the wartime evolution of internationalism
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Chapter three: Wartime challenges for a nascent international civil service: the 
League as a barometer of declining Eurocentrism and rising Atlanticism, 1940-
3 
This chapter documents the impact of geo-political factors on the League’s 
wartime technical activities and highlights the various challenges which beset the 
international civil service during the period 1940-3. The chapter contrasts the 
experience of the League’s Geneva based Secretariat with that of the transferred 
missions in order to provide further insights into the character of the international 
civil service and that of its leadership. While the energies of the international civil 
service were primarily expended on what was traditionally described as its ‘non-
political’ work, the vacuum created by the suspension of the League Assembly and 
Council lead to the increased politicisation of the technical organisations. Cut adrift 
from the inhibiting influence of the European neutrals, the transferred technical 
officials became increasingly bolder in adopting a pro-Allied stance; this undermined 
the place of the neutrals within the League apparatus while further demonstrating the 
importance of the League’s political identity to a world at war. The Second World 
War is often identified by historians as a crucial period for the climax of European 
hegemony in international affairs when the great power void created by the crippling 
military and economic liabilities of Britain and France was filled by the United 
States as it prepared to create its Pax Americana.
1
 The political implications of 
transferring selected missions of the League’s technical agencies to North America is 
an aspect of the League’s history that warrants further investigation for its 
significance to the evolution of both European and American internationalism. This 
was a period of crisis for the League’s inherent and ingrained Eurocentrism when the 
outcome of the North American transfer risked undermining the League’s historical 
affinity with the continent whose affairs so engrossed and determined the League 
experience. The growing ‘trans-Atlantic’ tendencies of the League’s technical 
officials and their geographical separation from their colleagues in Geneva also 
permit an investigation into the ability to preserve institutional unity and an esprit de 
corps in the League apparatus.   
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Lester and Phelan: two Irishmen as wartime leaders of rival secretariats 
Just as Joseph Avenol and John Winant provided contrasting leadership for their 
respective secretariats so too did compatriots Seán Lester and Edward J. Phelan. 
Their wartime relationship, often strained, was indicative of the historically fraught 
relationship between the I.L.O. and its parent organisation.
2
 A native of Co. 
Waterford, Edward J. Phelan received his education and professional training in the 
United Kingdom, serving in the Board of Trade before his appointment as one of the 
principal secretaries of the British delegation to the International Committee on 
Labour Legislation at the Peace Conference in 1919. Intimately involved in drafting 
the I.L.O.’s constitution, Phelan was one of the innovators of the tripartite formula of 
I.L.O. representation.
3
 One of Albert Thomas very first acts as director of the newly 
established I.L.O. was to appoint Phelan chief of the Diplomatic Division of the 
International Labour Office. The ascent of Phelan and Lester to the highest ranks of 
the international civil service was a historical moment for the development of 
international organisations. Calls from within the Assembly to appoint small state 
nationals to the most senior positions in the Secretariat and the technical services had 
been growing since the 1920s.
4
 In 1940 this was achieved by accident. Lester and 
Phelan’s respective wartime leaderships of the League and the I.L.O. would serve as 
a testing ground for the ability of small-state nationals to steer international 
organisations through a stormy political climate.  
The presence of two citizens of a small, neutral state in the highest echelons 
of the international civil service was not universally regarded as a positive 
development.
 5
 When discussing Phelan’s leadership potential, the historian Geert 
Van Goethem argued that the I.L.O. required someone with a higher profile who 
could act as a ‘leading light’; a quality he judged to be lacking in Phelan who did not 
enjoy a strong public profile.
6
 However while Phelan’s name may not have entered 
into mainstream consciousness, his colleagues regarded his encyclopaedic 
knowledge of labour matters and twenty year career in the top ranks of the I.L.O. as 
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essential advantages to his wartime leadership. C. Wilfred Jenks (director-general of 
the I.L.O. 1970-3) who served under Phelan during these years of crisis, described 
the Irishman’s defining influence on the I.L.O. over the course of its twenty five year 
existence: ‘the magnetism of his influence was known and felt throughout the office 
and there were few important files in which the initials E.J.P. did not constantly 
recur.’7 Events will show that Phelan’s occasional difficulty in acting as a ‘leading 
light’ was determined less by his nationality or ability than by an uncertain political 
climate.  
Seán Lester’s colleagues did not doubt his ability to steer the Secretariat 
through this tense period. In a letter to Robert Cecil in August 1940 Frank Walters 
wrote that Lester was ‘capable of doing the work if he was prepared to accept it’, 
that while the Irishman was ‘not quick in decisions’, his heart was in the right place.8 
Lester was a former journalist turned diplomat having moved from the Irish 
Department of External Affairs to Geneva where he served as the Irish Free State’s 
permanent representative to the League (1929-3) before he was seconded to the 
League Secretariat as the League’s high commissioner for the free city of Danzig 
(1933-7). Lester’s career as secretary-general was unique among all the incumbents 
of that post. He was simultaneously more of an isolated figure and less an 
independent leader than either Drummond or Avenol. At first glance his authority 
appeared to be enhanced by the verifiable power vacuum in the Secretariat, with the 
organisation bereft of the majority of its professional elite due to the heavy 
reductions in personnel. The duties and responsibilities of the office of secretary-
general were traditionally supported by the deputy and under secretaries-general. Of 
the two deputy secretaries-general, Lester received a sudden promotion and Frank 
Walters, owing to his rapidly deteriorating sense of hearing, quit Geneva for 
London.
9
 Under Secretary-General Thanassis Aghnides remained the highest ranking 
official to remain in his post after 1940.
10
 However Lester was aware that the Greek 
government-in-exile hoped to recall Aghnides to national service.
11
 The immediate 
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realisation of this goal was impeded because of a delay in securing the necessary visa 
from the Spanish embassy to facilitate Aghnides’ passage to London, via Lisbon. In 
1942 Aghnides was finally appointed permanent under secretary of state for foreign 
affairs in the cabinet of the Greek government-in-exile before assuming the position 
of ambassador to the United Kingdom at the end of that year. Aghnides served as 
Lester’s trusted ally in his opposition to Avenol in the summer of 1940. Following 
the suspension of Aghnides’ secondment to the League he wrote to Lester in 1942, 
articulating the ardent internationalism that Avenol clearly lacked:  
 
You and I were meant to work together and to fight for the same ideals. It 
gives me immense satisfaction to be able to place on record that we did work 
together for a common cause and that we did fight together against the same 
odds…. and foes.12 
 
That left the League’s treasurer, the South African Seymour Jacklin. As 
discussed, the British Foreign and Treasury Offices were anxious to remove Jacklin 
from the Secretariat’s nucleus in Geneva in order to establish a temporary financial 
headquarters for the League in London.
13
 It was judged that Jacklin’s presence in the 
British capital would enable him to keep a proper check on League finances across 
the globe, as he could better communicate with the transferred missions by paying 
occasional visits to Princeton and Montreal.
 14
 Jacklin would also be in a position to 
exert influence on representatives of the Dominion countries and on the 
governments-in-exile established in London to ensure payment of the sorely needed 
member state contributions to the League budget. Jacklin left Geneva for London in 
1941.  
Lester thus became the sole member of the League’s high direction to remain 
in the Palais des Nations for the duration of the war. The acting secretary-general 
was depicted in the Spectator as ‘the keeper now of the tiny flickering light, all that 
remains of the flaming torch of the great hopes and ideals.’15 Arthur Rovine, drawing 
on the later testimony of Arthur Sweetser, painted a brief picture of Lester’s wartime 
leadership as being marked ‘with a curious uncertainty which showed itself 
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especially during and after his virtual imprisonment in Geneva.’16 There was very 
little to inspire confidence in Lester. He was the ‘acting’ rather than the ‘elected’ 
secretary-general; his mandate to oversee the entire League apparatus came not from 
member states but from the consent of the Supervisory Commission. Nor did he 
share the autocratic tendencies of Joseph Avenol. As the Supervisory Commission 
had actually been appointed by the League Assembly, Lester felt it his duty to defer 
to the judgement of its influential chairman Carl Hambro.
17
 Increasingly isolated in 
Geneva, he lacked the traditional support system upon which the head of the 
Secretariat usually relied.  
 
 
The work of the Geneva Secretariat 1940-3.  
Historical commentary on the experience of the Geneva nucleus of the international 
civil service has been meagre and tends to be overshadowed by the more publicised 
work of the transferred missions.
18
 The League’s wartime presence in Geneva has 
been dismissed in later scholarship as ‘residual’ with some historians even 
incorrectly asserting that the Palais des Nations was ‘locked down’, leaving the 
transferred missions of the E.F.O. and of the I.L.O. as the only functioning 
components of the League apparatus during the final years of its existence. 
19
 
Though Lester’s isolation in Geneva was very real, it would be a gross injustice to 
posit, as Rovine did, that the acting secretary-general ‘headed a moribund League 
during the war and had little to do.’20 The evidence from the League’s archives and 
from various national repositories reveal that this was not the case. The local press 
observed that while there were few sights more melancholy in Geneva than that of an 
almost empty Palais des Nations, League headquarters remained an important hive 
of technical work; work which was at once less spectacular but more fruitful than the 
Secretariat’s suspended efforts to facilitate the League’s political and diplomatic 
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activities.
21
 Avenol’s policy of partial liquidation limited the breadth and scope of 
the work undertaken by the Geneva Secretariat. The work of the Political, Minorities 
and Disarmament Sections almost entirely disappeared. This work was 
fundamentally intergovernmental in character and depended on regular meetings of 
the Assembly and Council so that pressure could be exerted on any government 
guilty of reneging on its obligations to the Covenant and the peace treaties. However 
the Secretariat maintained correspondence with governments on these issues. 
Reports on the mandated territories continued to be sent to Geneva and the 
Secretariat duly prepared the appropriate memoranda on the contents of those 
reports.
22
 While the League’s work on the protection of minorities was also 
suspended, the Geneva Secretariat continued to update the relevant documentary 
material.
23
 
 No longer expected to provide the administrative support for the League’s 
political work the Geneva Secretariat was every bit as technical in character and 
spirit as the transferred missions of the specialised agencies. The Social Section of 
the League Secretariat continued to operate in Geneva, on a reduced level. The 
League’s social work comprised meetings of various advisory committees which 
investigated and made proposals on matters of common international concern, 
mostly relating to the welfare of woman and children.
24
 During the war the advisory 
committees could not meet but the Social Section of the Secretariat drew up studies 
on subjects such the traffic of women and children, child welfare, suppression of 
brothels, age of consent, legitimacy and on the effects of the Depression on a child’s 
life.
25
 Of the three first class officers concerned with this work before the war only 
one remained who could supervise the collection of reports and statistics in this 
field.
26
 While staff may have been depleted, a determined effort was made to 
document all the measures adopted in certain states to safeguard the welfare of 
children. The Secretariat forwarded the most important administrative and legislative 
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texts on child welfare to governments and national charities; this entailed significant 
translation work.
27
 The Secretariat was also able to satisfy individual queries on 
social issues from governments, charities and organisations by drawing on the vast 
statistical and analytical collections of the League’s Rockefeller Library.28  
 The Health Organisation retained a crucial presence in Geneva. The League 
of Nations Health Organisation was created by the fourth session of the Assembly in 
1923. It consisted of a General Advisory Health Council, composed of twenty 
government representatives, whose role it was to draft and secure international 
agreements on health questions. The organisation’s Health Committee, composed of 
international experts (specialists in the field of medical and public health questions), 
devised the programmes which directed the League’s health work. Unlike the 
members of the Advisory Health Council, the experts of the Health Committee did 
not serve as the representatives of their various countries; rather they were seconded 
for their knowledge and abilities in the manner of the P.C.O.B. The Health Section 
of the organisation was composed of Secretariat officials who supported the work of 
the Advisory Health Council and the Health Committee while embarking on various 
specialised studies.
29
 In March 1940 the Health Organisation called an emergency 
sub-committee to Geneva to discuss health problems arising from the evacuation of 
populations from the war zone. At this session the Health Section confirmed that it 
had already held preliminary discussions with public health departments of 
governments most likely to be affected and encouraged those governments to make 
use of the information the Secretariat could place at their disposal.
30
 This 
information included health and demographical statistics as well as crucial 
epidemiological data. From 1 November 1939 to 31 January 1941 the Health Section 
in Geneva received eighty-four separate information requests from governments on 
health matters.
31
 These included queries on healthcare, maternal mortality, infant 
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mortality, diphtheria, dysentery, yellow fever, typhoid, typhus, tuberculosis, cancer 
and syphilis. The Health Organisation also had an important role in encouraging the 
international standardisation of various medicines and sera. About midway through 
the war, the Health Organisation’s Permanent Commission on Biological 
Standardisation managed to broker an agreement on the international standardisation 
of penicillin.
32
  
 In a communication from the acting secretary-general of the League in 
September 1940 member states were assured that the Secretariat was anxious to 
remedy, as far as possible, the more or less complete isolation that had befallen many 
countries as a result of the escalation of hostilities.
33
 To this end the Health 
Organisation aspired to keep up its role in broadcasting, to the international 
community, vital information on outbreaks of contagious and communicable 
diseases. This included providing news of its spread of disease as well as monitoring 
local and transnational efforts to contain outbreaks. In June 1940, as a result of the 
reduction in staff, the Health Organisation suspended the publication of its monthly 
and annual epidemiological reports.
34
 However it fought to retain its position as a 
vital intelligence source on the state of global health by continuing to publish its 
weekly bulletin of epidemiological information. Traditionally the Health 
Organisation broadcast its weekly health bulletin from Geneva and from its Far-East 
Office in Singapore. Political factors had an adverse effect on the operation of the 
Eastern Bureau. By 1941 French and British colonial authorities were wary about the 
possibility of the League’s health publications exposing their vulnerability to the 
enemy and increasingly refused to provide certain statistics to the Singapore 
station.
35
  
With the escalation of the war in Asia the Health Organisation, was obliged 
to close its Singapore Office a week before the launch of the Japanese invasion in 
February 1942. It was suggested that the director of the Singapore Office, Charles 
Park, should set up base in India as that country was arguably the most important 
territory in the entire epidemiological survey of Asia. However the Indian authorities 
took a very severe view of the potential importance of epidemiological statistics to 
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the countries with which they were at war.
36
 Lester accepted Park’s proposal that he 
should go instead to Australia and shortly after his arrival the Australian government 
sent him an invitation to establish a temporary bureau. This afforded Park the 
opportunity to operate within the South Pacific zone, an important area for gathering 
intelligence on tropical diseases.
37
 Not long after the establishment of his Australian 
zone Park informed Lester that the results he had managed to obtain were 
disappointing and expected that it was not enough to justify the extension of his 
contract with the League.
38
 In November 1942 the activities of the Australian bureau 
were suspended.
39
  
The Health Organisation was thus obliged to adopt a Eurocentric approach to 
the problems of public health. The Geneva nucleus of the Health Organisation felt a 
special obligation to provide advice and information to the national and international 
medical services attempting to bring medical relief to the war-torn continent and to 
that end produced an extensive polyglot glossary of communicable diseases.
40
 The 
steady stream of information the Health organisation was able to supply on surgical 
and other medical matters was deemed especially useful to mobilised countries.
41
 
Since its foundation, the League’s Health Organisation had been unable to establish 
its own laboratories for medical research; however it developed a working 
relationship with designated international laboratories at the National Institute of 
Medical Research in London and at the State Serum Institute in Copenhagen.
42
 
During the war it was able to retain its links with the London laboratory and the 
League’s Health Section continued to publish its specialised studies on topics such 
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as gangrene, malaria, typhus, tetanus, famine disease, neo-natal health and 
nutrition.
43
 
The work of the League’s high commissioner for refugees, Sir Herbert 
Emerson, was severely impeded by the very war which rendered his services all the 
more vital. The League established the High Commission for Refugees in 1921 
under the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen. The High Commission provided both material 
assistance as well as legal protection for refugees. In the early years of its existence it 
provided assistance to Russian and Armenian refugees in particular. Following 
Nansen’s death in 1930 the High Commission was abolished and replaced with the 
Nansen International Office for Refugees which was staffed directly from the 
Secretariat. As the number of German refugees fleeing Nazi persecution rose, the 
League established the High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany in 
1933. The two refugee authorities were dissolved at the end of 1938 and the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Refugees under the Protection of the League was 
established with its headquarters moved to London.  During the early years of the 
war the Axis occupation of most of continental Europe meant Emerson’s office was 
restricted in the assistance it could render newly afflicted refugees. 
The frustrating wartime experience of the London-based high commissioner 
was not necessarily unique in the history of the League. Due to his paltry budget and 
the independent lines often taken by national governments in relation to refugee 
policy, the high commissioner traditionally experienced considerable difficulty in 
responding to various crises on an ad hoc basis.
44
 When the opportunities to offer 
direct assistance to refugees were limited the commissioner adopted a more advisory 
role, with Emerson placing information at the disposal of more proactive bodies such 
as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
45
 Nor was it in Emerson’s mandate 
to concern himself with the refugee problem generally. As per previous agreements 
the League’s high commissioner incurred a special responsibility for a select group 
of refugees known as the Nansen refugees. The Nansen refugees included Russian, 
Armenian and Saar refugees; groups which had experienced displacement in the 
general upheavals during and after the First World War. During the Second World 
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War these groups experienced further displacement and the high commissioner was 
unable to maintain appropriate communication with them or to obtain the necessary 
intelligence on their situation and condition.
46
  
Outside of Europe, the high commissioner was able to operate his pre-war 
mandate for the settlement of former Iraqi based Assyrians in Syria.
47
 Emerson was 
better able to keep abreast of general developments in government policies towards 
refugees in his capacity as director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees 
(I.C.R.), attending the meetings of that body in a consultative capacity. This agency 
was established in 1939 on the initiative of Franklin D. Roosevelt to coordinate 
intergovernmental efforts to resettle refugees from Nazi Germany and to prepare for 
the resettlement of future German emigrants.
48
 Emerson’s ability to adopt a more 
proactive role in European refugee affairs would not improve until the liberation of 
occupied Europe began in 1944.  
The jewel in Geneva’s functionalist crown and its greatest claim to utility 
was its Rockefeller Library. The League Library was the result of a 1927 endowment 
by the American philanthropist and Standard Oil heir John D. Rockefeller jnr.  
Rather than the overly esoteric and rarefied O.I.C., the Rockefeller Library was 
arguably the League’s real instrument of intellectual cooperation. It provided 
pertinent information support and services to the Secretariat and technical agencies. 
By 1940 the Library held approximately 340,000 bibliographical units and volumes 
of periodicals, in addition to general works of reference on history, geography, 
economics, finance, transport, law, politics, medicine, public health, and colonial 
administration.
49
 Apart from being of general academic use, all League publications 
were archived in the Library and could be made available to requesting governments. 
The League Library was open to public access and had formed a special working 
relationship with the Graduate Institute of International Studies located in Geneva, 
placing new microfilm reading technology at the disposal of its readers. League 
librarian Arthur de Brechya-Vuathier and his six staff members continued to receive 
an enormous amount of national publications from governments and received 
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corresponding requests from many of those governments for League publications or 
for older general publications archived by the Library.
50
  
Bendiner wrote that few readers availed of the Library’s services during the 
war.
51
 In fact the evidence from the League archives attest that its considerable 
collection continued to be placed at the disposal of various legations and consulates 
in Bern and Geneva, government departments and organisations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Institute of Transport in London.
52
 
During the war it did everything in its power to provide the U.S. Library of Congress 
with important European publications, some of which the United States government 
were only able to procure through the League’s agency.53 Over the two decades of its 
existence the Rockefeller Library established valuable contacts with government 
ministries and national libraries in order to obtain desired publications through a gift 
or exchange system. This system continued for a time during the war with the 
Library even able to source the publications of governments hostile to the Covenant. 
It received as gifts, or though an inter-library loan system, statistical volumes from 
Japan, Hungary, Romania, Spain, and the U.S.S.R.
54
  The Library was able to obtain 
a certain amount of Italian statistics by purchasing government publications from 
Rome. It also purchased German publications from the occupied territories of Poland, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. Through the German consulate in Geneva it 
even continued to receive the official publications of the Third Reich.
55
  
The ability of the Rockefeller Library to procure and preserve such a wide 
range of government publications was crucial to the League’s wartime technical 
programmes. League publications traditionally printed information on not only the 
economic and social conditions of member states but also on as many other countries 
and colonies as was possible to record. As many as eight-five countries could be 
represented in the League’s publications. Two of the League’s most important 
statistical publications were its Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and Statistical 
Yearbook. These publications carried information on employment and 
unemployment, agricultural, mineral and industrial production, international trade, 
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currency and banking, interest rates, prices and public finance as well as on 
numerous other social issues such as housing, nutrition, drug production and other 
health related matters. Traditionally member states sent their official government 
publications to the League Library in Geneva where Secretariat officials were able to 
collate and arrange figures for comprehensive statistical tables. The technical 
organisations also received more detailed information for their publications by 
sending out specific questionnaires to government departments of member states and 
to other countries that traditionally cooperated with them, such as the United States. 
However as the war progressed mobilised countries became increasingly reluctant to 
forward sensitive statistical data, especially of the economic kind, via this method.
56
 
As a result the Rockefeller Library’s vast and ever growing collection of government 
publications was increasingly drawn upon to create more internationally 
comprehensive statistical surveys. Despite the difficulties in procuring certain 
information, Martin Hill, an official of the E.F.O., pointed out that the League’s 
wartime statistical work, especially its Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and Statistical 
Yearbook, were ‘unique as a history in figures of the demographic, the economic and 
the financial developments of the world during the war.’57 The Rockefeller Library 
played an important role in allowing the League to operate, even during wartime, as 
the ‘clearing house of ideas’ of Loveday’s description.58  
 
 
 
The work of the League’s technical missions in North America 1940-3 
Wartime conditions enacted grave difficulties for the work of the Permanent Central 
Opium Board. The problem of the creation of new centres of drug production, a 
common wartime crisis, was compounded by a practical breakdown in 
communications with certain parts of the world.
59
 However the Drug Trafficking 
Section of the Drug Supervisory Body clung to survival in Washington D.C. as 
countries that remained parties to the various international drug conventions 
continued to provide it with information and the Allied countries in particular 
continued to monitor drug production as much as was practically possible. These 
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countries then forwarded information concerning the production of drugs as well as 
the traffic and seizure of illegal narcotics in various international ports; however the 
P.C.O.B. was not in a position to challenge governments when the various opium 
conventions were breached.
60
 Due to difficulties in communication and the 
reluctance of governments to share sensitive data such as shipping routes, the war 
meant that there was a decided limit to the intergovernmental functions of the 
League’s drug control bodies. Instead their efforts were channelled into devising 
recommendations for the post-war re-introduction of drug control in countries where 
it had lapsed.
61
 This suppression of the production, consumption and trafficking of 
opium consumed the League’s drug control bodies from the moment of their births; a 
mission that had been riddled with setbacks due to the reluctance of states to stifle a 
lucrative industry.
62
 While various measures were introduced to limit production, 
with varied results, consumption remained another matter entirely. During the war 
the secretariat of the D.S.B. and the P.C.O.B. advocated tighter restrictions on the 
production and consumption of opiates among the Allied powers. In 1943 the British 
and Dutch governments announced the adoption of a complete prohibition on opium 
smoking in all their territories in the Far-East, then under Japanese occupation. 
According to these respective declarations, once colonial authority over these areas 
was re-established there would be no attempt to re-introduce the traditional opium 
monopolies operating therein.
63
  
The two most successful and high profile of the League’s technical agencies 
were the semi-autonomous I.L.O. and the E.F.O. F.S. Northedge asserted that the 
war ‘rang down the curtain’ of the I.L.O.’s work.64 This was manifestly not the case; 
the war years were a crucial period for the evolution of the I.L.O. Following the 
meeting of the Supervisory Commission in Lisbon in September 1940, Acting 
Director Phelan joined the forty or so I.L.O. officials who had already taken up 
residence at McGill University, Montreal. Under Phelan’s leadership the I.L.O. 
continued to document labour conditions and sought to push itself forward as the 
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principal advisory organ on the social and economic problems that were destined to 
result from a sudden cessation of fighting and the subsequent rapid demobilisation of 
the armed forces. To this end studies were carried out and regularly disseminated, 
largely through official bulletins and through the International Labour Review, 
which documented the effects of war on wage levels, on working hours, on social 
insurance, on the payment of pensions and on sick pay; with special reports devoted 
to analysing relations between industry and governments in wartime. In the inter-war 
years various I.L.O. conventions were ratified by member states as part of the 
organisation’s advocacy for every worker to enjoy decent labour conditions and 
access to social welfare. The war posed the greatest challenge to this social 
progression. As one I.L.O. official noted: 
 
In countries nearer to the scene of conflict, the immediate effect of war was 
largely to reverse the trend of social advance and to suspend many measures 
intended to protect workers from exploitation and to guarantee them certain 
minimum standards.
65
  
 
This was at a time when individuals were expected to place their own rights 
and needs behind those of the motherland, to accept, at the very best; conscription 
into the armed forces, longer labour hours in munitions and other factories, a lower 
standard of living, and at the very worst; slave labour, incarceration, persecution and 
annihilation. The I.L.O. never had the executive authority, or even the ability, to 
ensure that the labour conventions produced by its various tripartite conferences 
were upheld. For instance in the inter-war period the British government refused to 
ratify the I.L.O. convention to limit the working day to eight hours.
66
 In September 
1941 Phelan noted that in many countries previous labour measures, often inspired 
or encouraged by the I.L.O., were relaxed with workers regularly performing twelve 
hour shifts or longer.
67
 The I.L.O. could not prevent governments circumventing 
labour norms in a time of war. What the Labour Office hoped to achieve was a role 
in ensuring the re-introduction of appropriate labour conditions in the post-war 
period; the Office would provide the wartime inspiration for a re-invigorated 
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international campaign against social injustice. Winant wrote in 1941 that the 
International Labour Office would strive to assemble as complete documentation as 
possible for the various authorities upon whom the responsibility for rebuilding the 
social order after the war would fall.
68
 Phelan was also adamant that the greatest 
threat to the future of the I.L.O. was the prospect of member states ceasing to make 
use of its advisory role.
 69
 The I.L.O. mission in Montreal continued to regularly 
receive requests from governments for technical assistance in the formulation and 
development of social policy and legislation.
70
 
In a reflection of its success, the E.F.O. was the largest non-autonomous 
technical organisation of the League. The E.F.O. enjoyed a staff of sixty-five in 
Geneva in 1938, a number equal to the combined staff of the Health, Communication 
and Transit (merged with the E.F.O. in 1939), Drug Control and Social Questions 
agencies of the League.
71
 Avenol’s policy of liquidation severely depleted the 
numbers employed by the E.FO, but as the number of projects taken on by 
Loveday’s Princeton mission increased so too did staff numbers. By the summer of 
1945 the total personnel of the Princeton mission numbered just less than forty 
individuals.
72
 The Princeton mission of the E.F.O. marketed itself as the ideal 
knowledge bank on which to base post-war economic reconstruction. As Lester had 
argued in his 1939 speech to the New York World Fair, the League’s production of 
regular economic and financial statistics assumed an even greater importance in 
wartime, with the need, on the part of the international community, to ‘know how 
trade is running and to have data upon the broad currents of world economy, 
particularly on the crises which always accompany and follow war.’73 When the 
League was first founded its interest in the world of economics and finance was 
limited. However as Clavin demonstrated, the League was forced to respond to the 
political and social crises caused by the post-war slump and later by the Great 
Depression when its E.F.O. began to grow into its role as a ‘pathfinder’, using its 
                                                          
68
 John G. Winant, ‘The I.L.O. looks ahead: A note from the director’ in International Labour Review, 
xlii (1941), p. 173.  
69
 Edward J. Phelan, ‘The I.L.O. turns a corner’ in Studies, xlv (1956), p. 162. 
70
 Report to the governments, employers and workers of member states of the International Labour 
Organisation, 14 Feb. 1941 (I.L.O.A., I.L.O.C.P, official documents, p. 11).  
71
 Hill, The Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations, p. 4. For further reading 
on the early development of the E.F.O. see Yann Decorzant ‘Internationalism in the Economic and 
Finance Organisation of the League of Nations’ in David Laqua (ed.), Transnationalism: 
transnational ideas and movements between the world wars (London, 2011), pp 115-34.  
72
 Hill, The Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations, p. 123.  
73
 Seán Lester’s speech to the New York World Fair, Oct. 1939 (A.F.M.F.A., 6PAAP/9, f. 132).  
143 
 
expertise driven research to monitor the performance of the world economy, 
encourage a return to liberal capitalism and to document the lessons of the past for 
national governments and other policy-makers.
74
 The Princeton mission was 
committed to illustrating the link between economic hardship and war. Loveday was 
adamant that the failure of the Allied powers to prepare an appropriate response to 
the various economic challenges that followed the end of the First World War 
resulted in the Great Depression.
75
 In turn the Depression created the appropriate 
conditions for the rise of the totalitarianism that spawned the Second World War. As 
Loveday wrote in 1943: 
 
There will always be men ready to seize power for their own aggrandisement. 
But if we can prevent another major depression after this war, we can prevent 
at least such an opportunity for power politics from arising.
76
 
 
A 50,000 dollar grant from the Rockefeller Foundation was utilised to fund extensive 
studies on inter-war economic and financial polices and on the Depression so that 
lessons could be learned from past mistakes.
77
 As Endres and Fleming demonstrated, 
the wartime work of E.F.O. was preoccupied with the impact of a sudden 
international shock, i.e. the immediate cessation of hostilities, on macroeconomic 
issues such as price levels and employment.
78
 Loveday wrote that almost ‘all the ills 
which beset the world in years 1919 and 1939 were due to the first two years after 
the Armistice’; arguing that peace would be lost unless the Allies devised the 
appropriate economic policies.
79
 He believed the E.F.O. had an important 
responsibility to serve as an advisory organ to the economic planners of the various 
national administrations.
80
  
The ability of the E.F.O. and the I.L.O. to influence post-war planning 
depended on the extent to which the relevant governments were prepared to listen to 
them. Loveday used the press to attract publicity for the work of the Princeton 
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mission on post-war reconstruction.
81
 When League officials first arrived in 
Princeton the State Department made it known that they desired the E.F.O. to be 
‘very discreet.’ 82  However Loveday knew that discretion was detrimental to the 
success of his mission, writing that he expected ‘the support we receive, moral and 
financial, will depend largely on the extent to which we show ourselves active and 
creative.’83  The work of the publicity maestro of the League, Arthur Sweetser, was 
rendered difficult by Avenol’s almost total destruction of the League’s press service. 
As director of publicity Sweetser complained to Lester ‘you cannot have publicity 
without either news or staff.’ 84  The Axis encirclement of Geneva meant that 
Sweetser was better able to maintain contact with the international press and to 
orchestrate a publicity blitz on the behalf of the organisation by operating in the 
United States.  
Sweetser launched his American press campaign by criss-crossing the 
country, attending the meetings, symposiums and conferences of various 
philanthropic organisations and academic institutions, managing to create a 
considerable amount of publicity in the process.
85
 In a letter to Lester he reflected 
that while many politicians and even former international civil servants such as 
Avenol’s former chef de cabinet Marcel Hoden, dismissed the League as ‘dead’, the 
organisation seemed to be forever ‘breaking into the news.’86 Not all of these news 
spots were positive however and some sought to reinforce the perception of the 
League as a pathetically moribund organisation. In the wake of the Princeton transfer 
an article in traditionally League-sceptic Time Magazine claimed that ‘the dying 
League of Nations sank to a single spark of life.’87 Sweetser was moved to write to 
the editor of the New York Times in November 1941 protesting against the growing 
impression that ‘the League of Nations and its many activities have passed from the 
scene and are now entirely out of the picture.’ 88  According to Sweetser, that 
impression was not only ‘wholly wrong’ but could be  
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challenged by many who cannot accept the totalitarians’ constant claim that 
all mankind’s gains in the last war have been swept into the discard. Despite 
all discouragement, difficulty, even apparent abandonment, a nucleus of 
eighty officials is on duty in the magnificent building which is the sole 
common possession of the nations. It is surely worthy of note that this 
outpost of decency has been maintained in the heart of stricken Europe. The 
world is less poor than it thinks. Amid all the present destruction there 
remains the seeds from which a new world-life can spring.
89
 
 
Sweetser’s defence of the League further articulated the political significance League 
apologists, officials and member states ascribed to the wartime survival of the 
technical agencies. However the League required an international audience to 
demonstrate that liberal internationalism was not a spent force. Meetings and 
conferences were employed by the League’s transferred missions to showcase the 
organisation’s potential for the post-war period. This was one of advantages of the 
North American transfer that could not be shared by those working in the Palais des 
Nations. The United States and Canada afforded the technical organisations a safe 
environment to develop and exchange ideas on the future of internationalism. In 
September 1941 League officials such as Arthur Sweetser and Bertil Renborg, 
figures connected with the operation of the organisation such as Carl Hambro and 
Henri Bonnet, as well as former officials such as Frank Boudreau, participated in a 
conference inaugurated by the Institute on World Organisation at the American 
University, Washington D.C. This conference discussed the contribution of the 
League with a view to learning what was needed for the post-war period.
90
  The 
E.F.O. attempted to make its presence in the United States felt with the participation 
of its various officials in public debates, lectures and seminars. Though unable to 
hold conferences on the scale the E.F.O. had been accustomed to, Loveday’s section 
improvised by making contact with the New Jersey and Pennsylvania branches of the 
League of Nations Association who agreed to convene on the Princeton Campus.
91
 
Representatives from the Drug Supervisory Body, as well as from the I.L.O. were 
dispatched to the Institute of Advanced Study to participate in these meetings and to 
discuss the work of their various sections. Not one to miss the opportunity, Loveday 
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also used the meetings as a platform to outline the recommendations drawn up by his 
staff for post-war reconstruction.
92
  
The war prevented regular meetings of the League’s specialised technical 
committees and sub-committees such as the Economic and Finance Committee and 
the Health Committee. In the League Assembly of December 1939 it was decided to 
prolong the appointment of experts to all technical committees until the political 
organs could meet once more. Only three of the six sub-committees of the Economic 
and Finance Committee were able to convene during the war period, while none of 
the Communications and Transit committees sat.
 93
 In 1942 a joint session of the 
Economic and Finance Committee of the League met in one of the most important 
meetings of the war period. The session was broken up to include meetings in 
London in April and in Princeton the following August to ensure the participation of 
as many of the members of the two committees as was possible. During the course of 
the various meetings the participants sought to emphasise that a great deal of the 
instability of the inter-war period arose from the inadequate relief measures hastily 
constructed after 1918.
94
 The committees aligned themselves with Roosevelt’s ‘Four 
Freedom’s’ speech of January 1941 and with the presidents avowed aspiration to 
bring about the fullest international collaboration to secure improved labour 
standards, economic advancement and social security.
95
 The committees of the E.F.O. 
declared their conviction that if such conditions were realised twenty years before 
‘the economic dislocation and tension of the inter-war period might well have been 
sensibly alleviated.’96 The publication of the proceedings of the various meetings of 
the E.F.O. provided the opportunity for Loveday’s mission to throw down the 
gauntlet to the international community in order to encourage wider engagement 
with the issue of post-war reconstruction. In the early years of the war, when the 
                                                          
92
 Daily Princetonian, 1 Dec. 1941.  
93
 Report of the committee on the liquidation of the League of Nations, 19 Feb. 1945 (T.N.A., FO 
371/57007, p. 8). The League’s Communication and Transit Organisation was merged with the E.F.O. 
in 1939.  
94
 League of Nations Economic and Finance Committee: report to the Council on the work of the joint 
session, London 27 April-1 May 1942, Princeton 7-8 August 1942 (Geneva, 1942), pp 5-6, 31 Aug. 
1942 available from (L.N.A., O.S.G., S 558/4/8).  
95
 Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ were articulated in an address on 6 January 1941. The four freedoms 
identified by the president as fundamental rights included freedom of speech, freedom of worship, 
freedom from want and freedom from fear; League of Nations Economic and Finance Committee: 
report to the Council on the work of the joint session, London 27 April-1 May 1942, Princeton 7-8 
August 1942 (Geneva, 1942), p. 9, 31 Aug. 1942 available from (L.N.A., O.S.G., S 558/4/8). 
96
 League of Nations Economic and Finance Committee: report to the Council on the work of the joint 
session, London 27 April-1 May 1942, Princeton 7-8 August 1942 (Geneva, 1942), p. 9, 31 Aug. 1942 
available from (L.N.A., O.S.G., S 558/4/8). 
147 
 
Allied powers were more engrossed by military goals, the League’s technical 
officials were operating within an intergovernmental vacuum. The ability of E.F.O. 
to operate as an effective advisory organ for post-war economic planning would not 
be tested until the great powers were prepared for greater public engagement with 
this issue.  
 
 
 
The League’s technical organisations as vehicles for Allied propaganda 1940-3 
As discussed in chapter two it was through the League’s officials, rather than its 
Assembly or Council, that the organisation derived its political agency. While 
Avenol used this influence to threaten the League’s liberal democratic ethos, the 
remaining technical officials sought to strengthen it. They also sought to align the 
League’s political identity with Allied peace aims. It was also significant that the 
League’s technical organisations promoted their wartime work programmes and 
propagated their ideas for post-war reconstruction from a North American base. 
While the Roosevelt administration refused to accord the League’s transferred 
missions official status on political grounds, it was during this period that the 
League’s technical work was politicised to an unprecedented level. The work of 
previous historians to dispel the pervasive perception of American (U.S.) 
indifference to the League serves as a valuable foundation from which to re-assess 
the place of the League in American internationalism.
97
 The United States did not 
feature among the League’s official cast of characters; however as a result of its 
growing political, military and economic importance, the Roosevelt administration 
was effectively the stage manager of League affairs during the Second World War.  
 It was a source of great pride to the I.L.O. that it succeeded where its parent 
organisation had failed in securing American membership.
98
 Engaged in self-
preservation it wanted to advertise the fact that the I.L.O. was then the largest 
international organisation to which the United States was attached. Shortly after the 
transfer to Montreal, Phelan approached Prime Minister King to determine if his 
government was willing to host an I.L.O. conference in Montreal in 1941. King was 
amenable but advised Phelan that it would be far more beneficial for the I.L.O.’s 
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prestige and publicity if the United States agreed to host the conference.
99
 Canada’s 
experience of the Second World War was marked by its growing confidence in its 
status as a ‘middle power’, conscious of both its prominent and increasingly 
independent status within the British Commonwealth and enjoying its improved 
relations with its once threatening southern neighbour.
100
 By virtue of the Ottawa 
government’s unique ability to see both the British and American point of view, 
King often served as a valuable intermediary between Churchill and Roosevelt.
101
 
King, bearing the considerable influence and esteem he had acquired in Washington, 
suggested to Roosevelt that the United States should host the New York Conference 
and the president accepted the proposal.
102
 The conference opened on 27 October 
1941 on the campus of Columbia University in New York. 
This meeting could not constitute a formal session of the International 
Labour Conference. A number of its member states were unable to attend and thus 
the conference did not have the power to adopt conventions provided for under the 
terms of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation. Rather it could 
hope to make informal recommendations to sympathetic governments and to inspire 
future labour legislation.
103
 While the conference was not universally representative, 
102 delegates and ninety three advisors hailing from thirty-four countries, mostly 
from North and South America, the Commonwealth and from exiled governments in 
London, made the journey to New York. Twenty-two of those states managed to 
retain the traditional tripartite composition of their delegations, with representatives 
of governments, employers and workers able to participate in proceedings.
104
 The 
conference was granted a certain amount of authority and legitimacy by the presence 
of various high profile cabinet ministers, such as Clement Atlee (United Kingdom), 
Frances Perkins (United States) and Jan Masaryk (Czechoslovak government-in-
exile). The officials of the International Labour Office feverishly prepared for the 
conference, arranging their studies on the impact of war on labour and social issues. 
The International Labour Organisation was considered the heir to the pre-war 
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movement for international labour legislation; the ‘social conscious of mankind’, a 
forum for the ordinary man in world affairs and the means to achieve social justice 
through non violent methods.
105
 This tradition was upheld in New York. One of the 
most important developments at this meeting was the workers’ delegates claiming 
the right of representation at any future peace conference.
106
 
The political climate of the United States had a crucial bearing on the I.L.O. 
Conference. The New York Conference unfolded against a backdrop of 
congressional debate on the repeal of the Neutrality Act.
107
 By this time the tone of 
Roosevelt’s speeches and public statements was one of ‘unrestrained 
belligerency.’108 It was clear that the United States would soon, by one means or 
another, enter the war. The United States used the I.L.O. Conference, just as Britain 
and France used the League Assembly in December 1939, as a means of projecting a 
commitment to liberal democracy as well as the soundness of its post-war aspirations. 
Frances Perkins, Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labour, was elected by the conference to 
preside over the proceedings. It was the American delegates who instigated an 
I.L.O.’s resolution of support for the specific provisions of the Atlantic Charter 
(1941) which called for improved labour standards, economic advancement and the 
extension of social security.
109
 The Atlantic Charter was drafted by Britain and the 
United States (before the latter had even entered the war) outlining their commitment 
to a just peace at the cessation of hostilities. The Charter also made a fleeing 
reference to ‘the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general 
security.’110 Roosevelt invited the conference to hold its closing session in the White 
House on 6 November 1941. The post-war survival of the I.L.O. appeared secure 
when Roosevelt made the following declaration in a speech to the assembled 
delegates: 
 
We must plan now for the better world we are to build. In the planning of 
such international action, the International Labour Organisation, with its 
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representations of labour and management, its technical knowledge and 
experience, will be an invaluable instrument for peace.
111
  
 
Reflecting on Roosevelt’s speech, Roger Makins of the British Foreign 
Office wrote that it showed very clearly ‘the importance which the United States 
government attach to the Labour Office’, observing that ‘the leadership of the United 
States in a conference of this kind is a development of extreme importance for the 
future.’112 Eric Hobsbawm identified the refusal of the United States to ratify the 
Treaty of Versailles as the primary reason for the League’s inability to regulate 
international relations.
113
  Without the support of the United States the international 
framework that would emerge from the ashes of the Second World War would be as 
artificial as that which was constructed in 1919. Makins judged that the conference’s 
resolutions were inspired by the fact that Americans were reluctantly making up their 
minds that their entry into the war was inevitable and one of their main 
preoccupations of the Roosevelt administration was to prevent their efforts leading 
once again to a ‘a lost peace.’114 Makins attributed the U.S. government’s strong 
attachment to the I.L.O. to its distinction as the only large international organisation 
through which it could engage in international cooperation, ‘it being politically 
impossible for them join the League or attempt at this stage to fashion some new 
institution.’115 According to Ostrower, the United States government always went to 
great lengths to distinguish the I.L.O. from the political work of the League.
116
 
However through the mechanisms of the I.L.O. the Roosevelt administration was 
able to participate in back-door multilateralism, using a technical front to achieve a 
very political end in laying the groundwork for a post-war order. This further 
demonstrates that the distinction imposed on ‘political’ and ‘technical’ international 
cooperation by the U.S. government was artificial but expedient.  
As member states were unable to convene during the war years the League of 
Nations was bereft of its intergovernmental character and thus possessed no direct 
link with the course of international affairs. The I.L.O. did not share this fate. As a 
result of the New York Conference the I.L.O. became intimately connected with 
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wider political developments. Subsequent to the New York Conference the 
Emergency Committee of the I.L.O.’s Governing Body convened in London in April 
1942 to coincide with the joint sessions of the Economic and Finance Committees. 
The Governing Body decided to establish a committee composed of individuals of 
‘wide experience in the light of whose advice the Governing Body could feel that its 
own decisions were formulated with security and autonomy.’117 This committee was 
tasked with devising the relevant proposals for the realisation of the social objectives 
of the Atlantic Charter. A contemporary observer to the New York Conference, the 
American civil servant and future diplomat R. Smith Simpson, noted that the debate 
on the director’s report to the New York Conference provided the first opportunity, 
since the outbreak of the European conflict, for a general and popular discussion of 
war aims and reconstruction.
118
 The I.L.O. was operating in the vacuum created by 
the suspension of the League’s political organs and by the wider dearth of diplomatic 
conferences. Despite the protestations of the United States that the I.L.O. was 
distinct from the political League, it was the I.L.O. and not its parent organisation 
that functioned as a vehicle for intergovernmental cooperation during the war.  
In 1939 attempts to transform the League into an Allied satellite agency was 
resisted on the grounds that too few member states were directly involved in the war. 
By early 1942 more than half of League member states were drawn into the conflict 
and the territory of twenty-four of them was under occupation.
119
 Within the 
polarising atmosphere of mobilised Canada and confronted by the growing 
interventionism of the United States, the technical missions increasingly orientated 
their work towards Allied war aims. While not forsaking the scientific and statistical 
nature of their methods, the public speeches, forums, reports and studies of the 
technical organisations became increasingly pro-Allied in tone. The League was 
never a static entity and underwent several transformations in its lifetime such as the 
erosion of its security role and the expansion of its technical activities. To remain 
politically relevant to the countries in which they were based, the transferred 
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technical missions needed to align themselves with the nascent Allied peace aims of 
the Atlantic Charter.  
The meetings held in the Institute of Advanced study, attended by League 
officials and the League of Nations Association, featured frank discussions on 
American policy and concluded that the United States ‘must take its full share of 
leadership’ in post-war international cooperation.120 According to Frank Boudreau, 
the League of Nations Association was devoting practically all its resources to 
rallying the Roosevelt administration as well as the American public into ‘giving the 
greatest possible assistance to Britain.’121 Sweetser too was explicit as to why his 
sympathies as a League official should lie with the United Kingdom. According to 
Sweetser, the ‘Germans have not the political wisdom to govern a far flung empire 
similar to the British Commonwealth. They think all men can be reduced to the same 
level of civilisation, and yet at the same time cannot deal with others on equal 
terms.’ 122  Sweetser’s observation corresponds with the conclusions of various 
historians that Wilsonian self-determination as well as the League’s championship of 
sovereignty was never designed to be universally applied.
123
 Mark Mazower noted 
that what was shocking about Nazi expansionism was that it was the first time 
Europeans found themselves the victims rather than the protagonists of colonial and 
racial policies.
124
 The League facilitated the survival of imperialism through its 
Mandates Commission but Hitler’s growing European empire was shocking to a 
Eurocentric organisation predicated on the inviolable sovereignty of its member 
states.  
Like his predecessor Winant, Phelan was enthusiastic about lending support 
to the Allied and later United Nations powers. The New York Conference was 
certainly an exercise in Allied propaganda. In his speech to the assembled delegates, 
Phelan declared that the democracy of the I.L.O. stood in ‘contradistinction to the 
kind of world we should have if these principles were destroyed and not only 
individuals but countries were compelled to shape their lives and institutions to an 
imposed pattern.’125 The Argentinean worker’s delegate (considerably more partisan 
than Argentina’s government delegate) was equally explicit on the ideological 
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affinity of the I.L.O. Constitution with the Allied war aims: ‘Here we have two 
systems confronting each other; on one side the regime of the dictators, headed by 
Nazism and Fascism, and, on the other side, liberal and democratic opinion in the 
world.’126 Wilfred Jenks, serving as an I.L.O. official during this period, claimed that 
the one of the distinctive characteristics of the organisation was the manner in which 
it transcended ideological conflicts, differences of party and divergences of 
economic interest.
127
 However, the New York Conference constituted a form of 
ideological and propaganda warfare. A workers’ resolution was adopted 
unanimously in which the I.L.O. urged ‘all free peoples to contribute to the uttermost 
limit of their power for the victory of China, Great Britain, Russia, and their Allies 
by supplying all the arms which their country can produce.’128 Whereas the League 
Assembly functioned as a coalition, the I.L.O. was taking on the aspects of an 
alliance.  
The increased partisanship of the transferred technical missions undermined 
the League’s ability to provide an inclusive form of wartime internationalism, for 
neutral and belligerent alike. Its wartime experience served as a useful bridge 
between pre-war and post-war internationalism when neutrality became a less 
accepted feature of international organisations.  The Argentinean government 
delegation to the New York Conference was obliged to abstain from the I.L.O.’s 
resolution of support for the Allies ‘in view of its political character’.129 Makins, 
contemplating the political significance of the conference, told Lester that the 
resolution rousing all member states to the Allied banner constituted a 
‘demonstration, not only by the belligerent powers; it gave an excellent platform to 
the representatives of the smaller European countries.’ 130  The smaller European 
powers present were representatives of the governments-in-exile of the countries 
under occupation. The fate of those states hinged on an Allied liberation of Europe 
and thus their attendance could arouse little political controversy. The only European 
neutral to send a delegation was the Irish Free State.
131
 The continental European 
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neutrals were not represented as they, according to an I.L.O. spokesman, ‘feared to 
arouse Nazi disfavour.’132  
The unabashed partiality displayed by the North American missions of the 
technical organisations did not earn a rebuke from the acting secretary-general. This 
was significant considering that these pro-Allied sympathies afforded the Swiss 
government the pretext to renege on its duties of hospitality to the League; a policy 
that was intensified in the aftermath of the North American transfer of the I.L.O., the 
E.F.O. and the drug bodies.  Adolfo Costa du Rels, president of the League Council 
and Bolivian minister plenipotentiary to Switzerland and the Vatican, met with 
Pierre Bonna of the Swiss Political Department on 15 August 1940. The latter 
expressed surprise at the decision to transfer selected missions of the League away 
from Switzerland.
 
Bonna added significantly that if League services left Geneva 
there could be no question of accusing Switzerland of deserting the organisation.
133
 
Bonna confirmed that there would be no provision in the forthcoming federal budget 
for the financial contribution owed by Switzerland to the League Treasury for 
1941.
134
 He could not guarantee that League officials and delegates would retain 
their diplomatic immunity and stated that no fresh appointment of government 
delegates would be recognised. Bonna stated that he saw no reason why the League 
should not remain in Geneva, provided it worked ‘inconspicuously’ and did not 
‘engage in activities of a political nature.’135 He categorically denied that Germany 
was placing any pressure on Switzerland to renounce the League. According to 
Bonna, as per latest correspondence with the Wilhelmstrasse, at that moment in time 
the German attitude to the League was one of ‘indifference.’136 Evidence from the 
Swiss archives demonstrates that Bonna was not being truthful with Costa du Rels. 
Correspondence between Bonna himself and the Swiss minister in Berlin, Hans 
Frölicher, dated ten days prior to his conversation with Costa du Rels, appear to 
contradict his assertions of German ‘indifference.’ Prompted by Frölicher, Bonna 
used the minister as an intermediary to assure the Germans that the League was 
defunct as a political entity.
 137
 He tried to convince the Germans that the Secretariat 
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was in a state of liquidation following the departure of Avenol. Bonna claimed that 
with the resignation of Edouard de Haller and Carl Burckhardt (the last League high 
commissioner for Danzig) there was no longer any senior Swiss official seconded to 
the Secretariat or the I.L.O. Finally he sought to assure the Germans that the Federal 
Council had no intention of contributing to the League’s 1941 budget.138 This was in 
keeping with the overall Swiss policy to ensure that the Geneva Secretariat did not 
attract significant publicity. Much to Lester’s exasperation, a newsreel was shown in 
Swiss cinemas in October 1940, supposedly showing ‘the last of the [League of 
Nations] officials leaving Geneva.’139 
This correspondence between Bonna and Frölicher implies that the Germans 
continued to deeply distrust the League and identified it as a pro-Allied institution. 
According to a 1942 report by the Swiss Political Department, the Confederation 
reneged on its financial responsibilities to the League because the bulk of the 
League’s funding came from the Allied countries of Britain and its 
Commonwealth.
140
 However the Political Department believed that Avenol and 
Lester had done commendably well in preventing the activities of the Geneva 
Secretariat from enacting any serious complications for Swiss neutrality.
141
 In reality 
Lester was not as eager as Avenol to allow the Swiss Federal Council to turn the 
League into ‘a prisoner of war.’142 Frank Walters informed Robert Cecil in August 
1940 that while Ireland was neutral, Lester’s opinions were not.143 When Sir Clifford 
Norton was appointed British minister to Bern in 1942 he paid Lester a courtesy call 
in Geneva. Norton wrote that he found the political views of the acting secretary-
general on the progress of the war to be ‘as sound as anyone [i.e. London] could 
wish’ and that if he expressed the same opinions to others Norton could very well 
regard the former member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood ‘as a first class 
British diplomatic agent and propagandist.’144 However Lester could not hope to be 
as political a figurehead as Phelan in expressing support for the Allied cause in his 
reports to the governments of member states; the Geneva nucleus of the Secretariat 
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was in too delicate a position with the Swiss Confederation. In a letter to Sweetser in 
1941 he wrote:  
 
It is simply impossible for me at this present time, especially while holding 
headquarters here in Europe, to write it on the basis of broad lines and free 
spirit which you can conceive to be desirable; it could not be aimed at stirring 
the imagination or at moving popular interest…….. If it gives the impression 
that the organisation is alive, is working and holds all its potentialities, we 
have reached something.
145
 
 
The growing dissatisfaction with projecting an objective attitude in respect of 
the war, while understandable, risked hampering the League’s role as an 
indiscriminate gatherer and disseminator of social and economic intelligence. The 
increased gravitation of the transferred missions to the Allied sphere was not and 
could not be universal to the entire international civil service. The work of the Health 
Organisation and of the P.C.O.B. and D.S.B. sparked controversy due to their 
willingness to correspond not with the governments-in-exile of occupied member 
states, but with the local administrations installed by the Axis powers.
146
 This was 
the most effective means of procuring the relevant statistics. The Swiss Political 
Department noted, with interest, that both Germany and Italy provided the League’s 
statistical publications with information on drug control, epidemics and public 
hygiene.
147
In return for providing German authorities with its weekly 
epidemiological report the Health Organisation received the German weekly health 
bulletin.
148
  
Within this impartial tradition the League Librarian, Arthur de Brechya-
Vauthier, emphasised the need to keep the Rockefeller Library open to consultation 
for all groups and individuals. The Library was of particular value in the centre of 
war-torn Europe and its inter-library loan system allowed its often rare collections to 
be shared with requesting governments, academic institutions and humanitarian 
organisations.
149
 As the Rockefeller Library held certain volumes not to be found 
elsewhere in Switzerland, or even in Europe, de Brechya-Vauthier stressed the 
negative impression that would be created if the League became precious about 
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whom it permitted to consult its vast collections of texts that were of social, 
economic and humanitarian value.
150
 He perceived the continued operation of the 
Rockefeller Library as a counter-argument against critics who (correctly) charged the 
League with approaching technical questions from a political angle.
151
 In a letter to 
Roger Makins in 1942 Lester defended the Rockefeller Library’s contact with the 
Axis powers, arguing that it provided the Secretariat and technical services with 
crucial statistical data.
152
 He owned that the League librarian himself was a German 
with an Austrian passport, waiting for the process of Swiss naturalisation to be 
completed. Lester emphasised that de Brechya-Vuathier was utterly reliable and that 
the Library could not exist without him.
153
 The Rockefeller Library’s connections 
with the Axis bloc did not mean the League was formally recognising their authority 
in the occupied territories; rather it was an essential measure in the Library’s role as 
a vital repository for the most up-to-date government publications, even if that 
government authority was installed by an illegal act of occupation. In this instance 
League officials could not allow the organisation’s liberal democratic identity to 
undermine its technical role of providing the highest quality information services to 
member states.    
The pro-Allied elements of the League’s international civil service took a 
dim view of this record of information sharing with the traditional enemies of the 
Covenant. After 1942, following the complete Axis encirclement of Switzerland, two 
versions of the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics were published; one in Princeton and 
the other in Geneva, for distribution in different areas.
154
 The remnants of the 
Economic and Finance Section of the League Secretariat that remained in Geneva 
were mostly focused on gathering the necessary European statistical data for the 
publication of the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics as well as for the Statistical 
Yearbook while the Princeton mission tended to produce more descriptive and 
analytical studies.
155
 The very prospect of League publications falling into the hands 
of the Axis bloc impelled Alexander Loveday to argue for the cessation of all 
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publications of League statistics in Europe
.
.
156
 Loveday argued that it would prove 
more economical and would make things easier on his own branch if it was no 
longer expected to collaborate with the League’s Geneva Secretariat on the statistical 
publications.
157
 Lester was reluctant to relinquish Geneva’s role as a publishing hub. 
The small nucleus of staff working on the European section of the Monthly Bulletin 
of Statistics and Statistical Yearbook continued to have access to ‘well maintained 
and even improved’ sources of information in the countries of neutral and occupied 
Europe.
158
 Lester asserted that the restriction of the publication of League documents 
to North America and the production of exclusively English language versions 
would hardly prevent the Axis powers getting their hands on League statistics if they 
were determined to do so.
159
 Loveday’s arguments can be perceived as a wider 
process, begun with the transfer of the technical services to the North America, to 
adopt a less Eurocentric and more Atlanticist approach to League endeavours.  
 
 
The struggle between the old world and the new: the clash of Eurocentism and 
Atlanticism 1940-3 
During this period there was a growing school of opinion, particularly in the United 
States, which asserted that Europe, by becoming embroiled once more in war, had 
forfeited its leading role in international affairs.
160
 The transfer of the technical 
missions to North America led to the effacement of the traditional Eurocentrism of 
the League by a growing preoccupation with American affairs. Alexander Loveday 
did not see any wisdom in maintaining a League presence in continental Europe. 
Writing to Makins in early 1941 Loveday dubbed Geneva a ‘rat trap’ and, mindful of 
the ever growing difficulties in communication, insisted that it would be ‘pure 
madness’ to remain in Switzerland when it was still possible to get out.161 Loveday 
expressed doubt as to the benefits of leaving League officials to carry on working on 
the shores of Lake Geneva, fearing that ‘after all they had been through their will 
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power may be weakening through sheer weariness.’162 Makins was not prepared to 
allow Loveday’s remarks to change the policy of the Foreign Office towards the 
location of League headquarters. He informed the director that it was the British 
view that the Secretariat’s permanent base should remain in Geneva ‘as long as 
possible.’ 163  Makins was quick to point out to Loveday that Lester’s sometime 
isolation from Princeton did not mean that the secretary-general was bereft of the 
support and confidence of Whitehall, with the Irishmen, in turn, keeping the Foreign 
Office well abreast of his decisions.
164
 This episode demonstrated the difficulty 
experienced by the isolated Lester in maintaining his authority, from Geneva, over 
the entire League apparatus.  
While Loveday’s concerns did not elicit the response he hoped for from 
Whitehall, the director of the E.F.O. was correct to assert that the Secretariat’s work 
in Geneva incurred considerable hardship. Since the summer of 1940 Lester was 
deprived of official communication with the Swiss government in Bern. The Federal 
Council shunned Lester upon his assumption of the mantle of acting secretary-
general. Lester offered to make a courtesy acte de presence at Bern either by visit, or 
to spare embarrassment, by letters. Both these suggestions were ignored by the 
Federal Council.
165
 In April 1941 Thanassis Aghnides received confirmation from 
official channels at Bern that the Swiss government had adopted a policy of non-
collaboration with the League.
166
 In June 1941 a Swiss official was dispatched to the 
Palais des Nations to inform Lester that the government was not in a position to 
reply officially to his correspondence and that it had no intention whatsoever of 
paying the Swiss contribution to the League budget of 1942.
167
 The official informed 
Lester that the Swiss Political Department was obliged to contend with German and 
Italian objections to the League’s presence within the Confederation and reminded 
the acting secretary-general that the organisation was supported by Britain and its 
allies.
168
 The Federal Council was anxious to avoid any over identification with the 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries of the British Empire.169 On the subject of contributions 
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Lester noted that while the federal government may have decided to withhold its 
payment of what was owed, Swiss officials and ex-officials were receiving in 
salaries and pensions nearly three times the amount of the annual Swiss contribution 
to the budget.
170
 These payments to Swiss nationals were then financed by other 
member states, many of whom, such as the governments-in-exile, were facing 
greater financial hardship than the affluent Swiss.
171
 Lester also claimed that the 
League itself was not involved in a war and that it occupied a ‘neutral position.’172 
This argument was not particularly convincing given the reality of League 
membership and in light of the public pronouncements of its transferred technical 
officials. 
Ultimately Lester could do little to change the policy of the Federal Council, 
not being given permission to discreetly and unofficially call upon Pilet-Golaz at the 
Political Department until late 1942.
173
 Avenol was eager to accommodate the Swiss 
at the expense of the League’s prestige, moving the depleted Secretariat into the 
library wing of the Palais des Nations so that the institution would appear less of the 
active presence that it was. The Swiss Confederation could not ask Lester to 
evacuate his staff from League headquarters without damaging its reputation; 
however the actions of the Federal Council suggested that a League withdrawal from 
Geneva would not have been unwelcome. The British Foreign Office had no 
intention of resolving the matter for the Swiss government. Whitehall: 
 
......saw no particular reason to make things easy for the Swiss government 
by taking any initiative in regard to the League. There is a good deal to be 
said for preserving at Geneva the headquarters of the League in conformity 
with the Covenant and to leave it to the Swiss government to incur the odium 
of asking the secretary-general to go.
174
 
 
Lester came to view the Swiss attitude towards the League in a very unforgiving 
light, even going so far in 1943 as to accuse the Federal Council of ‘failing the 
League.’175 Like the British Foreign Office and unlike Avenol, he was unwilling to 
assist the Swiss federal authorities as they reneged on their responsibilities to the 
League. The official residence of the secretary-general, La Pelouse, remained 
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unoccupied in the aftermath of Avenol’s departure in September 1940, mostly for 
reasons of economy. In response to ‘the continuance in local circles of a deplorable 
campaign’ against the League, Lester decided to move into La Pelouse in March 
1941 as a ‘quasi-political, quasi-moral’ response to the hostile attitude of the Federal 
Council.
176
 His message to the Swiss was clear: he was not going to abandon 
headquarters unless he was utterly compelled to do so. 
Despite Lester’s show of defiance the communication difficulties incurred by 
the preservation of headquarters in Geneva provided adequate ammunition to those 
who questioned his policy. Lester was informed that the Swiss government was 
obliged to abolish stamps bearing pictures of League buildings about which 
Germany had complained but was assured that the Secretariat and the International 
Labour Office would be permitted to use ordinary stamps and to continue to make 
use of the Swiss postal system.
177
 This assurance could do nothing to lessen the 
delays in postal communication as a result of the war conditions and the strict 
censorship imposed in continental Europe. In 1942 average postal time between 
Switzerland and the United States was twenty to thirty days. Prior to American entry 
into the war it was between nine and fourteen days.
178
 The postal time for the 
dispatch of League documents from Geneva to the United Kingdom varied widely 
from twenty to ninety days during the year 1941.
179
 In 1943 post to and from North 
and South America to Switzerland was held up as much as six months.
180
 Lester’s 
Secretariat also had to be wary of sensitive League material passing through hostile 
territory; when letters eventually arrived in Geneva they were often stained with the 
orange and blue smears from the German chemical test for sympathetic ink.
181
   
In trying to counter the delays in postal communication from Switzerland to 
countries outside of continental Europe, the Secretariat often forwarded its material 
to a branch office of the I.L.O. in Lisbon. Care was taken to avoid undue attention 
from the censors of various European states by using blank paper without the League 
of Nations heading.
182
 The French censors granted a global visa for all League 
studies and reports that were in regular publication since before the end of August 
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1941. All other publications were submitted to the chief censor at Annemasse who 
granted a special visa for each edition.
183
 The American legation in Geneva also 
permitted Lester to forward certain statistical information for the Princeton mission 
through its diplomatic post bags to the State Department.
184
 Whenever the Geneva 
Secretariat could not make use of the American consulate’s diplomatic post-bag, the 
material usually travelled through France and Spain to Lisbon and was then carried 
on American ships to the United States. This process became more complicated 
when the American entry into the war led to a decrease of American ships calling at 
Lisbon. To mitigate this shortfall, Swiss federal authorities upheld their promise to 
place their postal system at the complete disposal of League, allowing the 
organisation to use the Swiss bi-monthly shipping service between Lisbon and North 
America.
185
 This mail travelled between Geneva and Lisbon in Swiss lorries.  
The North American-based technical officials were thus obliged to rely on 
the painstakingly slow postal system in order to obtain European statistics for the 
Princeton publication of the Statistical Yearbook. The E.F.O. suspended the 
publication of its Yearbook for two years (from 1942-1944) until communication 
between Switzerland and the rest of the world improved dramatically and it could 
once again compile the most comprehensive study through the collaboration of both 
its Geneva and Princeton based officials. The evident disparity between the stifling 
atmosphere of Geneva and the liberation of the technical organisations in North 
America convinced Loveday of the folly of preserving headquarters where it was 
clearly not wanted. Writing to Janet Smith, who ran the tiny London branch office of 
the League, Loveday asserted:  
 
Here one feels in command of one’s work, able to find cooperation in 
carrying it out. In Geneva all this was impossible and the people I have met 
who came out recently all look as though they emerged from the bottom of a 
pit.
186
  
 
Trapped in Switzerland, League headquarters could no longer act as a 
conductor for the more ambitious projects in international cooperation embarked 
upon by the E.F.O. and the I.L.O. Pedersen argued that the technical organisations 
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had long succeeded in mitigating the organisation’s inherent Eurocentrism by 
enticing new countries into League membership to collaborate in social and 
economic fields of common interest.
187
 The transfer of missions of the technical 
organisations to North America was regarded by some as another timely assault on 
this Eurocentrism. As discussed in chapter one, Latin American member states often 
experienced frustration at the League’s Council’s tendency to overlook political 
developments in the western hemisphere. When the prospect of transfer was first 
mooted the president of the League Council, Adolfo Costa du Rels, informed an 
American diplomat attached to the consulate in Geneva that the Latin American 
countries would look favourably on any possibility of League services operating in 
North America.
188
 The diminished Eurocentrism of the League’s technical work did 
not mean that the liberal idealism of League officials became less pronounced in 
favour of other cultural norms and values as a result of their presence in North 
America. The optimism of the League’s technical officials shared a considerable 
affinity with the culture of American progressive politics, particularly with the 
conviction of President Wilson that liberal democracy drove social and economic 
advancement.
189
 Working in the United States, the Economic and Finance 
Organisation, located on the grounds of the university over which Wilson himself 
once presided, was not in any way breaking new ground, but was, in a fashion, 
coming home. 
Neither can it be claimed that the transfer of the technical missions to North 
America greatly enhanced the League’s universal and intercontinental capacities-
rather it constituted the potential swapping of one regionalist tendency for another. 
In a letter to Roger Makins in April 1941 Lester confided his suspicion that ‘interest 
in transferred Labour and League Organisations is being partly developed at the 
expense of interest in European headquarters.’190 The E.F.O.’s mission in Princeton 
established relations with various inter-American organisations such as the Inter-
American Statistical Development Commission and the Inter-American Statistical 
Institute; from 1943 a member of the Princeton staff represented the E.F.O. at 
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various technical meetings of the Statistical Institute.
191
 In May 1944 a representative 
of the Princeton mission served as an observer at the first Conference of National 
Commissions of Inter-American Development. The E.F.O. was also represented at 
other important continental and regional conferences including the Inter-American 
Demographic Congress (Mexico City, 1943) and the Conference of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations (1943 and 1945). The E.F.O. was increasingly called upon to 
advise many U.S. government agencies such as the Foreign Economic 
Administration, the Office of Strategic Services and the U.S. Treasury and was 
consulted by White House aides.
192
 
The Second World War was a crucial period for pan-American cooperation 
with the United States, early on in the conflict, directing the neutrality of the western 
hemisphere, to the exclusion of Canada and British colonial possessions in the 
Caribbean. In the wake of Pearl Harbor, the United States attempted to galvanise 
pan-American support for the Allied cause.
 193
 With the notable exception of 
Argentina, from 1942 onwards the Latin American states severed diplomatic 
relations with the Axis powers with many assuming formally belligerency. The Axis 
occupation of most of Europe greatly diminished the League’s ability to cultivate its 
Eurocentric practices but provided the opportunity for League organs to function as 
agents in the development of pan American regionalism. As Jensen demonstrated, 
the Roosevelt administration had long identified the I.L.O. as a useful vehicle for pan 
American cooperation.
194
 Growing inter-American cooperation led to the 
development of regional conferences of the I.L.O. The second I.L.O. regional 
conference of American countries met in Havana, Cuba, at the end of November 
1939. The resulting Declaration of Havana recommended a role for the I.L.O. as a 
social liaison agency between American countries and democratic European 
nations.
195
 The Havana Conference permitted an expression of pan American 
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solidarity for ‘the continuance with unimpaired vigour of the efforts of the 
International Labour Organisation.’196  The American nations dominated the New 
York Conference. The emergence of the Americas from the shadow of the old world 
was reflected in the push for the recognition of Spanish as an official language of the 
I.L.O. at the New York Conference, only for the resolution to be ultimately 
defeated.
197
 
During the war period American states cooperated and interacted with 
League officials in a way most European countries could not. The I.L.O. was better 
able to act as an agent in inter-American, rather than intercontinental cooperation. 
I.L.O. officials devoted a considerable portion of their work programmes to the study 
of North and South American economies, societies and labour conditions during the 
Second World War. The I.L.O. allowed its officials to serve as consultants within the 
United States, at the request of the State Department. One of its economists also sat 
on the Joint Bolivian-United States Labour Commission which was undertaking a 
study of labour conditions in Bolivia, particularly in relation to mining, on the 
invitation of the Bolivian government.
198
 The first session of the Inter-American 
Conference on Social Security was held in September 1942 in Santiago de Chile at 
the invitation of the Chilean government and under the auspices of the International 
Labour Office.
199
 The conference adopted a ‘Statute of Permanent Agency’ of inter-
American cooperation to act in concert with the Labour Office in the promotion of 
social security in the Americas.
200
 At the request of the Canadian and U.S. 
governments, the Labour Office organised several meetings between representatives 
of the governments, employers and workers of those two countries to discuss various 
labour and manpower questions arising out of the organisation of the war 
economy.
201
 Though by 1943 British and Dominion powers sat in on the meetings 
they remained primarily inter-American in focus. The Labour Office provided 
technical assistance and sent various missions to American nations (including 
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Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Costa-Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico and Venezuela) 
assuming a position of direct influence on American social and labour policy.
202
   
The I.L.O. also strengthened its branch office in London during this period. 
This initiative did not, however, enhance the organisation’s contact with continental 
Europe. The branch office became the organisation’s normal channel of 
communication with all the governments-in-exile established in Britain, with the 
British and Allied trade union movements and with the British, Belgian and Dutch 
colonial authorities.
203
 As Keith Robbins argued, historically Britain tended to be ‘a 
witness of European angst rather than fully sharing in it.’204 The Second World War 
confirmed Churchill’s view that Britain was ‘with Europe, but not of it.’205 Lester’s 
Geneva Secretariat provided the last remaining direct link to continental Europe. The 
unique position of the Geneva Secretariat was strengthened after the German 
occupation of the Netherlands caused an abrupt cessation to the work of the 
Permanent Court of Justice in The Hague.
206
 The fall of France appeared to signify 
the end of the League’s work in intellectual cooperation on the European continent. 
However, despite Makins’ previous assertion that Bonnet had no wish, in late 1940, 
to continue the work of intellectual cooperation, a very limited work programme was 
embarked upon in the western hemisphere. The Second Conference of American 
National Committees of Intellectual Cooperation was held in Havana in November 
1941.
207
 The conference was attended by members of the League’s Committee of 
Intellectual Cooperation but the acting secretary-general was not kept informed of 
the outcome of this conference or Bonnet’s role in it.208 The Secretariat did not even 
have a forwarding address for Bonnet and did not share any communication with 
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him.
209
 This development demonstrated how the separation of the League’s agencies 
and the difficulties in wartime communications led to the erosion of a cohesive 
League apparatus.  
The apparent dislocation between the Geneva Secretariat and the I.C.I.C. 
encouraged an approach to intellectual cooperation that was independent of the 
League. In the wake of the Havana Conference it was suggested that the I.C.I.C. 
would provide an appropriate vehicle for inter-American collaboration. Julián 
Nogueira, the Uruguayan delegate to the League Assembly, former Secretariat 
official and participant in the work of the I.C.I.C., expressed his opposition to this 
continentalisation of the work of intellectual cooperation. Noguiera was opposed to 
the creation of an exclusively American organisation for intellectual cooperation 
arguing that such work was essentially an international and universal issue, rather 
than a purely regional, concern.
210
 Regional organisations, such as the Pan American 
Union already existed. This desire to preserve the universalist features of League 
organs was mirrored in the refusal of the British Foreign Office to co-opt those 
organs as Allied agencies. Though never universal in composition or in practise, the 
League provided the greatest potential, however flawed, for large-scale international 
cooperation between states. Ultimately the full Americanisation of the I.C.I.C. never 
occurred as soon after the Havana conference its work lost is impetus.
211
 The I.C.I.C. 
subsequently ceased all activity until 1945. 
Lester did not approve of what the Foreign Office described as the ‘trans-
Atlantic tendencies’ of the transferred technical missions.212 Nor was he prepared to 
countenance a formal transfer of headquarters from Geneva. Under article seven of 
the League Covenant, the headquarters of the League could not be established 
elsewhere without the consent of the Council.
213
 Lester was highly conscious of the 
important role the English speaking countries of the United States and the British 
Commonwealth were destined to play in the post-war settlement.
214
 However for 
Lester and for the British Foreign Office, the League’s Eurocentrism actually 
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assumed a greater symbolic purpose during wartime. The maintenance of 
headquarters in Geneva served as a mark of solidarity with the embattled continent. 
Writing to Frank Boudreau, Lester claimed that in ‘the end [it] may well be that the 
moral (or if you like political) question of standing by at headquarters will later show 
out as even more important than the actual maintenance of elements of the technical 
services.’ 215 In a letter to Makins Lester wrote that he was not prepared to remove 
headquarters from Geneva as he could not contemplate any further weakening of the 
League’s relationship with Europe. 216 That would entail demeaning the importance 
of many states that had supported the League over its twenty year existence.   
Makins agreed with Lester’s reasoning. He argued that the removal of 
headquarters from Geneva would constitute a ‘breach of the Covenant and would 
detract from the moral and symbolic importance of keeping headquarters in its 
rightful place in Europe.’217  For Makins and for Lester the Eurocentrism of the 
League was nothing to be ashamed of but was rather the reality of the League’s 
history. The organisation’s fate was tied to that of the continent which nursed it 
through its early years. Now was not the time for the League to completely abandon 
Europe in favour of the country that had rejected it in infancy. The removal of 
League headquarters from Geneva would entail a tacit acknowledgment of the 
permanence of German hegemony and constitute a propaganda victory for the 
totalitarian powers. As Anthony Eden put it succinctly in a letter to Lester in 1942: 
 
The fact that you are still keeping the flag flying in Geneva has, quite apart 
from the technical work which the Secretariat can still usefully do, a moral 
and political significance which could perhaps only be accurately measured if 
you were ever obliged to haul it down. It is an outward sign of the 
hollowness and transience of the German “New Order” and I therefore hope 
that you will find conditions not too intolerable to enable you to carry on 
your rather thankless task for as long as you can.
218
 
 
There was some opposition to this policy in the British civil service. In 
August 1942 Sir Kingsley Wood (a Treasury official) wrote to Eden advocating the 
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transfer of headquarters to London. Wood argued that there was ‘something very 
unreal’ about keeping staff in Geneva and that a London based Secretariat would 
have greater access to Allied governments who were the main contributors to the 
League’s budget.219 Eden was not prepared to budge on the issue, reiterating to 
Wood his position that a transfer away from Geneva would prejudice the moral 
position of the League.
220
 While the liberal idealist paradigm never pervaded the 
often frustrating meetings of the Assembly and Council, it attained a new importance 
during the war as the antithesis of the Axis war machine. Due to the political 
constraints imposed by the neutrality of the Swiss Confederation, Lester’s Secretariat 
could not attack German or Italian policy; however the League’s continued presence 
in Geneva constituted an act of protest in itself.  
 
 
 
A divided international civil service 
Apart from the political importance of maintaining League headquarters in Europe, 
there was no reason to expect that the Roosevelt administration would be amenable 
to the transfer of Lester’s Secretariat to the United States. It had, after all, refused to 
grant the technical missions official status, which had an adverse impact on the esprit 
de corps of the international civil service. In 1940 Sweetser sought to remind the 
world of one of the advantages of the League; it permitted those working in the field 
of one activity to ‘cross professional lines and obtain assistance from those engaged 
in cognate fields’, resulting in a more complementary approach to technical 
cooperation.
221
 The I.L.O. and the Health Organisation developed a particularly 
strong tradition, in the inter-war years, of cooperation in studies of mutual interest 
which explored the relationship between economic conditions and public health.
222
 
When the League’s P.C.O.B. and D.S.B. were transferred to the United States, Lester 
hoped that they could be established in Princeton so that they could they could 
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function as an administrative unit with Loveday’s group. 223  The U.S. State 
Department, on the other hand, wanted to avoid the implication that the organs of the 
League of Nations were functioning on American soil with the formal consent of the 
government; rather it insisted that the various agencies should be split up so that they 
could operate through branch offices as independent bodies.
224
 This stood in stark 
contrast to Canada where Prime Minister King afforded the International Labour 
Office full status and independence as an international institution.
225
  The Foreign 
Office recognised that the U.S. attitude to the transferred missions tended ‘to give 
the League the status in the United States of any semi-private body, rather than of 
one aspiring to universality and invested with authority by governments.’226 Lester 
was informed that the policy of the State Department was to ‘obviate any question of 
the administrative functioning in the United States of America of international 
organs operating under conventions to which the United States was not a party.’227 
When in 1941 Seymour Jacklin travelled from London to visit the transferred 
missions in Canada and the U.S.A. he was requested by the State Department to 
refrain from engaging in any administrative work on behalf of the League.
228
 The 
U.S. government clearly viewed the League, like Lester and Makins, a product of 
European political culture and history with which it was reluctant to associate. These 
developments actually vindicated Joseph Avenol’s particular reservations as to the 
effect of the American transfer on the international status of the technical 
organisations.  
As can be perceived from the debate about League headquarters, the physical 
dislocation between the technical organisations and the Secretariat resulted in often 
fraught relations between the various groups. The Geneva and the North American 
branches of the international civil service had very different experiences of the war 
years. Economic matters inevitably played the most important role in driving a 
wedge between the disparate sections at a time when the salaries and expenses of 
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League officials were reduced. Loveday pressed for his Princeton mission to be 
granted a cost of living allowances and for the twenty per cent pay cut imposed on 
all staff at the outbreak of the war to be refunded.
229
 He argued that Princeton was an 
incredibly expensive town, being in fact the second most expensive town in the 
United States, opining that it would be in the interest of the League’s reputation to 
improve the salaries of its transferred officials.
230
 The tax rate was considerably 
higher in Princeton than in Geneva with Loveday’s missions experiencing heavy 
duties on necessary expenses such as gasoline.
231
 Jacklin had previously informed 
the transferred missions that they could only claim refunds from the League Treasury 
for income tax paid to federal and state authorities.
232
 By February 1942 Lester had 
formally decided, with Hambro’s concurrence, that while the League could refund 
income tax paid, it was not in a position to refund tax on officials’ personal income 
and properties, which constituted the majority of tax paid.
233
 Loveday tried to paint a 
pathetic picture of E.F.O. officials attempting to live within their means. He 
bemoaned the fact that he was obliged, because of the high rents in Princeton, to 
dwell in a four roomed flat and wondered to Lester whether ‘this modesty’ would 
‘prove rather damaging to the League.’234  
Lester was unmoved by Loveday’s pleas. The acting secretary-general 
viewed it as his duty to ‘try to look after staff who have been standing by us here, 
and especially those who are isolated, either from an invaded country or 
otherwise.’235 The transferred staff, removed from the claustrophobic atmosphere of 
Geneva, enjoyed excellent working conditions. Loveday’s group received a royal 
welcome from the Princeton authorities. The headquarters of the mission was 
situated in the brand new building of the Institute for Advanced Study and the E.F.O. 
enjoyed state of the art facilities. The building housed a comfortable assembly room 
and nearly twenty offices with separate rooms for typists. The Institute provided the 
transferred mission of the E.F.O. with additional administrative officers, bought 
them books and provided heat, light and telephone operators at no additional charge 
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to the League.
236
 Loveday also established a small library for his mission at 
Princeton which was financed by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.
237
 The 
International Labour Office was equally fortunate in its Canadian host. McGill 
University undertook to carry out renovations of two houses on the campus to the 
sum of 25,000 Canadian dollars while only charging the I.L.O. 5,000 dollars per 
annum for their use.
238
  
Meanwhile, in Geneva, Valentin Stencek (the director of personnel and 
internal administration of the League Secretariat) experienced great hardship in 
securing the necessary heating and maintenance for the sprawling Palais des Nations 
to prevent that stately pile falling into disrepair.
239
 League officials were also more 
isolated from the more high profile work of their transferred colleagues and from the 
supervision of the technical directors. Lester was not impressed by Loveday’s 
tendency to refer to those officials of the E.F.O. remaining in Geneva as the ‘rump’ 
of his department.
240
 Mazower reproduced this language when he posited that a 
‘rump Secretariat remained under wraps in Geneva.’241 As discussed, this was not 
the case with the Geneva headquarters playing an important role in documenting the 
European wartime experience. Lester appointed himself as a buffer between 
Loveday and his Geneva staff when the director of the E.F.O. sent messages to them, 
which, in the words of the acting secretary-general, ‘scorched the wires.’242 He urged 
Loveday to give his staff greater signs of his appreciation for their work on the 
Yearbook and the Monthly Bulletin.
243
 The Geneva staff also had to come to terms 
with the fact that the Germans were ‘within ten minutes easy walk’ of the Palais des 
Nations.
244
 This was a source of great anxiety for some League officials, particularly 
for its Treasurer Seymour Jacklin who left Geneva for London in 1941. Following 
Jacklin’s departure, an English bank manager in Geneva confided to Lester that 
while he remained in the Swiss city, Jacklin had experienced ‘the jitters with stories 
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about the Gestapo following him.’245 Though it is unlikely that these stories had any 
basis in reality, Jacklin’s experience was indicative of the tense and uncertain 
psychological climate of Switzerland at the time. 
Victor-Yves Ghébali wrote that the secretary-general was the ‘real master’ of 
the technical organisations during the inter-war period, who retained ultimate 
authority over activities and personnel, even if he did not share the same interests 
and drive of the technical directors.
246
 This was not the case during the war years. 
The transfer of the technical missions to North America fatally undermined Lester’s 
authority as secretary-general. On the other hand it enhanced the autonomy of the 
technical organisations who adopted an increasingly independent line from their 
parent organisation. As Van Goethen argued, the war presented an ideal opportunity 
for the I.L.O. to escape the guardianship of the League.
247
 Though it could determine 
its own work programmes, the I.L.O.’s funding was collected by the League 
Treasury; the secretary-general and the Supervisory Commission also needed to 
approve the I.L.O.’s budget. As Lester observed in January 1941; ‘after all the years 
of effort for complete autonomy, the only link remaining is the financial one.’248 The 
League budget was dramatically reduced during the war years. Expressed as 
percentages of the 1939 budget, the budgets for 1940 and subsequent years showed 
the following variations: 
   1939:   100 per cent 
1940:   66.55 per cent 
1941:   33.07 per cent 
1942:   29.93 per cent 
                                                   1943:   35.4 per cent 
         1944    31.25 per cent.
249
 
 
As League funds steadily dwindled, the various elements of the international 
civil service were obliged to vie for the biggest proportion of the budget. Phelan was 
able to exploit Lester’s isolation in Geneva to get what he wanted from the 
Supervisory Commission which met on the I.L.O. turf in Montreal from the years 
1941-4. In June 1941 Sir Alexander Cadogan, stating the position of the British 
Foreign Office, wrote to Lester advising him not to travel to the forthcoming meeting 
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of the Supervisory Commission, to remain in Geneva and to delegate his authority to 
some other League official who was in a position to travel.
250
 There was a very real 
danger that while Lester could get out of Europe, he might not be able to get back in. 
In a letter to Hambro in September 1940 Lester expressed his reluctance to leave 
Geneva but at the same time he did not want his post to become ‘useless.’ 251 
Ultimately Lester was not able to leave Geneva until 1944. He was thus not in a 
position to challenge the Supervisory Commission when it agreed to impose greater 
economies on the Secretariat than on the I.LO. In 1942 the Secretariat’s share of the 
budget (including Loveday’s section, but excluding the refugee and drug bodies) was 
just over 3.4 million C.H.F., while the I.L.O. was accorded 3.1. million.
252
 From 
1943-5 the I.L.O.’s share of the budget was, at least, half a million greater than that 
of the Secretariat.
253
  
Lester concluded that his confinement to Geneva and the greater degree of 
personal contact between the Supervisory Commission and the technical organs 
meant that certain members of the Commission had derived the impression that 
‘nothing mattered that was not on the American continent.’254 As he complained to 
Sweetser: 
 
two entirely different standards have been applied to the I.L.O. and the 
Secretariat; they are comparatively comfortable and well off, the Secretariat 
is chivvied; and the more reductions made the more are demanded; then a 
moment will come when I shall be calmly asked to provide staff and studies 
which may be impossible. I think a tremendous difficulty has arisen from the 
separation between the Supervisory Commission and myself.
255
 
 
By 1941-2 the contrasts between Lester and Phelan’s leadership was stark. 
Lester was isolated; Phelan was able to mix with foreign ministers and presidents, 
operating as a leading light in international cooperation. The future of Lester’s 
Secretariat was constantly imperilled by its location in war zone; the future of 
Phelan’s Labour Office appeared secure. Lester became highly resentful of Phelan: 
Roger Makins observed that nothing could ‘eradicate [Lester’s] suspicion off his 
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fellow Irishman.’ 256  Lester accused Phelan in particular of adopting a cavalier 
attitude towards the budget, of acting on the principle that his work was so vital that 
‘funds would be found for him.’257 Demonstrating the same initiative as Winant, 
Phelan was more than willing to adopt a proactive approach to securing the 
necessary funding for the work of the Labour Office. The independent streak, long 
prevalent in the I.L.O., manifested itself clearly when Phelan requested that member 
states be permitted to make separate contributions to the League and the technical 
services. According to Phelan, greater financial autonomy from the League was not 
sought until the war years as until then the financial arrangement was convenient for 
member states when making their contributions.
258
 Phelan later came to the 
conclusion that there were several Latin American nations as well as Canada, the 
I.L.O.’s host country, which desired to support the technical activities alone, to the 
exclusion of the contribution owed to the League Secretariat.
259
 This proposal 
contravened traditional protocol, undermining the cohesion of the League apparatus 
as well as the ultimate financial authority of the League over the I.L.O. Though 
Phelan’s proposal was not accepted it was indicative the I.L.O.’s historic struggle for 
emancipation from its parent organisation.  
Tensions came to a head at the meeting of the Supervisory Commission in 
Montreal in August 1942 where Phelan was placed under an intense amount of 
pressure from the League’s treasurer, Seymour Jacklin, to make economies. 
However Phelan responded, quite reasonably, that the I.L.O. was receiving more and 
more requests for work; in fact, according to Phelan, as the I.L.O. was obliged to 
work with a reduced staff on an expanding programme of post-war reconstruction 
studies, the Labour Office was arguably busier than ever.
 260
  Instead Phelan 
proposed that the instalment of funds to the I.L.O. be spread out more so that it 
would not fall within the budget of 1943. This was accepted by a weary Supervisory 
Commission despite the objections from Jacklin that this constituted no sacrifice on 
Phelan’s part.261 René Charron observed of the confident wartime approach of the 
International Labour Office; ‘these people know what they want and they go at it 
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boldly.’ 262  These developments exposed the limitations to Lester’s wartime 
administration of the League apparatus and demonstrated that he was losing the 
battle to keep the entire structure intact. Lester’s leadership was not so encumbered 
because of his nationality or because of any shortcoming in his personal qualities. 
Rather his already difficult task was compounded by the fact that the League 
apparatus was already splintering by the time he assumed office due to physical 
separation and mounting rivalry.  
Phelan on the other hand was able to expand his authority over the I.L.O.’s 
budget precisely because of the growing dissonance between the Secretariat and the 
technical services. The confidence of the I.L.O. was also enhanced by the certainty 
derived from the New York Conference that it enjoyed strong political support. 
Makins conceded to Lester that the acting secretary-general could be forgiven for 
regarding the effect of the New York Conference as upsetting ‘the balance between 
the institutions of the League’ and enhancing ‘the position of the Labour Office out 
of all proportion to that of the [League] Secretariat.’ 263  However, like the 
Supervisory Commission, the Foreign Office favoured the prioritisation of the I.L.O. 
over the League’s international civil service. Makins wrote that ‘it may well be that 
if further economies are made they should be made in the Secretariat and Princeton 
organisations rather than in the International Labour Office. Such a course of action 
would be justified by the fact that the I.L.O. is able to do more active work in 
wartime than the League itself.’264 The I.L.O. was arguably the largest organ of 
intergovernmental cooperation during the war whose Secretariat was able to directly 
assist and advise national governments. Though the Geneva Secretariat remained an 
important link with continental Europe, with its Rockefeller Library continuing to 
function as a vital channel for social and economic intelligence, it could not match 
the level of publicity and governmental support enjoyed by the League.  
 Jacklin claimed that as the I.L.O. enjoyed such powerful political backing its 
officials felt that ‘they can get anything and do anything.’ 265  This included the 
encroachment of the I.L.O. on the work of Loveday’s group in Princeton. Clavin 
pointed out that while the manifold activities of the League allowed it to pursue a 
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more comprehensive programme of international cooperation, these activities risked 
pulling the organisation in different directions.
266
 In addition, the division of labour 
between the League’s various agencies was often porous and indistinct. This was 
partly due, as Ghébali pointed out, to the fact that the League’s technical 
organisations were allowed to grow for twenty years without any coherent design 
being imposed on them.
267
 The Bruce Committee constituted a belated attempt to 
impose greater definition and cohesion onto the League’s technical work but it was 
too late to influence the wartime relations of the disparate technical organisations. 
While this fluid division of labour could result in collaborative efforts as mentioned 
above, it could also result in tense demarcation disputes. Early on in the war 
Loveday confided his fears to Lester that, as a result of their closer relationship with 
the I.L.O., the Washington and Ottawa governments might conspire to ‘blow out the 
candles’ on the E.F.O. 268 This would allow Phelan to direct studies on economic 
policy that were traditionally the provenance of Loveday’s group and of the League 
Secretariat. Loveday could be assured that the Foreign Office was not anxious to 
engage in a wartime re-structuring of the international civil service. Roger Makins 
was adamant that, while the I.LO. enjoyed a broader base of support,  every effort 
should be made to ensure that the administration of the League’s agencies was 
conducted ‘on prudent and constitutional lines’ and that the pre-war structures were 
preserved and the ‘legality of operation’ observed as long as it remained possible to 
do so.
269
  
To address the mounting tensions, I.L.O. officials were dispatched to the 
1942 London and Princeton meetings of the Economic and Financial Committees of 
the League. An informal agreement was brokered recognising the division of labour 
between the E.F.O. and the I.L.O. in reconstruction studies. The I.L.O. consented to 
limit itself to labour issues and to the social implications of economic reconstruction 
in order to avoid ‘friction or duplication’ with the work of Loveday’s group in both 
Princeton and Geneva.
270
 Whatever the assurances of the British Foreign Office and 
of the I.L.O., it was the attitude of the United States that determined the future role 
of Phelan’s organisation. The U.S. government favoured the extension of the I.L.O.’s 
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mandate in the economic field as it was then the only large organisation through 
which it could develop its ideas on post-war planning.
271
 Clavin recently 
demonstrated how the different priorities and methods of the E.F.O. and the I.L.O. 
reflected the divisions in the United States Congress. The policies of Loveday’s 
group appealed to the advocates of liberal free-market economics while Phelan’s 
group enjoyed stronger ties with the labour union supporting ‘New Dealers.’272 It 
was difficult to predict which group would enjoy the ultimate ascendancy until the 
U.S. government became more explicit in its post-war economic and social policies.  
In conclusion the League retained a significant technical presence in the 
years 1940-3. Geo-political factors played a central role in defining the scope and 
character of the work of both the Geneva and North American branches of the 
international civil service. Throughout its history the League was forced to adapt to 
and reflect the course of international affairs; during the Second World War its 
international civil servants tried to come to terms with the growing international 
influence of the United States. Just as the League of 1939 was not the same League 
as 1920, the League of 1943 was different again. As discussed, internationalism was 
a relative concept; member states and indeed League officials often expected 
different things from the ‘great experiment.’ For some League officials the 
international organisation was an objective data source, an inclusive Society of 
Nations; for others it was a moral and ideological support to a wartime alliance, an 
exclusive League. While the disparate agencies continued to share the same funding 
and liberal democratic identity, the institutional unity of the League of Nation was 
fatally undermined during the period 1940-3. The disagreements over the League’s 
political (or apolitical) role, the location of headquarters and the division of the 
budget demonstrate that there was no such thing as a single, unified League of 
Nations. By 1943 the League was really a collection of increasingly autonomous 
agencies. In the early years of the war, these technical agencies were broadcasting 
their post-war plans within an official vacuum. National governments, particularly 
those of the great powers, would not begin to exchange coherent ideas on post-war 
planning and reconstruction until late 1943 at the earliest. The extent to which the 
technical organisations would succeed in influencing the type of peace destined to 
emerge  depended on the extent to which governments were willing to include them 
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in that process. The technical organisations carried the ideological baggage of their 
parent organisation and were often very happy to do so. This ideological baggage 
assumed a greater complexity within the emerging international order, presaging a 
further assault on the institutional unity of the League of Nations. 
180 
 
Chapter four: The League’s wartime relations with member states and its place 
in a shifting international landscape, 1940-4  
 The League of Nations could not function as an intergovernmental 
organisation during the war. However it did not exist independently of the will or the 
influence of its member states whose aspirations for peaceful internationalism, 
however conservative, continued to be invested in the League’s international civil 
service. The League of Nations was an organisation that insisted upon the inviolable 
sovereignty of its member states. Thus membership remained of significant value 
and constituted a badge of independence to those insecure states and erstwhile 
governments of uncertain legitimacy. This chapter examines the impact of the 
domestic and foreign policies of both member and non-member states on the 
operation of the League of Nations during the years 1940-4. Though sustained 
through the war by the support of its members, a quartet of states would have the 
most profound impact on the League’s wartime experience and post-war prospects: 
the United Kingdom, France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics.  
The United Kingdom and France formed the old guard of the Geneva system, 
determining the policy of the League Council in the inter-war period. After 1940 the 
League relied heavily on the support of the British Empire as it came to grips with 
wartime curtailment of French influence on the world stage. League officials also 
had to contend with the emerging titans of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., as they 
strove to preserve some technocratic continuity between the old international system 
and the new. As discussed, realist accounts of the League’s history tend to depict the 
organisation as hopelessly out of touch with the hard reality of international 
relations.
1
 In fact League officials were very much alive to the complexities of 
international affairs as they sought to influence policies on post-war planning and 
reconstruction. That is not to say that the League’s technical directors were as 
prepared as Avenol to erase the liberal ethos of their work. However they became 
increasingly aware that the new international order that was beginning to emerge 
needed to present a profound break with the League’s ignominious political record. 
The structural weakness and congenital flaws within the Geneva system hung like a 
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millstone around the neck of every League official who sought to influence and 
advise national and international policy. Under these conditions the League’s 
technical organisations were obliged to project an artificial dissonance between their 
work and that of the ‘political’ League. This exercise would prove unsuccessful, 
demonstrating that while the League was presenting the international community 
with many faces by 1943, all of them were infused with the same political identity.  
 
 
League membership as an indicator of the vicissitudes of both the national 
experience and international relations 1940-4. 
As discussed in chapter one, public professions of support for the League, while not 
painless for the neutral member states, allowed governments to project an association 
with peaceful internationalism without having to fulfil the accompanying 
responsibilities. As the League’s diplomatic organs were suspended during the war, 
League membership would require even less political commitment from member 
states. All that was required was the necessary moral and financial support to ensure 
that the international civil service remained an important agent in the social and 
economic spheres. Although the League was never quite as exacting on the treasuries 
of member states as its successor, certain countries, facing wartime occupation or 
austerity, found it difficult to justify continued payment to the League budget.
 2
 
While two thirds of member states kept up their contribution to League income, they 
did not always do so by the deadline of each financial period and this compounded 
the problem of the mounting arrears faced by the League Treasury.
3
 By 1945 the 
total number of arrears had accumulated to 4,241,042 C.H.F.
4
 From 1940-5, as 
contributions steadily dwindled, the Treasury of the League resorted to a greater 
reliance on its working capital fund.
5
 This was money member states invested into 
the League and which the League Treasury held in trust for them. As discussed in 
chapter three, the growing paucity of funds compounded the sense of rivalry between 
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the disparate technical agencies, undermining the institutional unity of the 
international civil service. 
The failure on the part of member states to meet their financial obligations 
cannot be solely attributed to the wartime reductions in national expenditure. 
Member state contributions were by no means set at an exorbitantly high rate and the 
fiscally conservative Supervisory Commission was never eager to increase 
contributions.
6
 In an increasingly polarising wartime climate, it was political 
considerations that determined the relations between the League and its member 
states. As Patricia Clavin argued, because the nation state played a decisive role in 
defining and shaping transnationalism, transnational encounters in the inter-war 
years often reveal much about the domestic contexts and conditions within those 
states themselves.
7
 Within the heightened atmosphere of global war, this maxim 
proved even more compelling. The manner in which states reacted to the League 
during the war serve as a clear reflection of the evolution of world affairs and the 
changing fortunes of the war. In turn, the national experience conditioned the 
wartime experience of the international organisation. Domestic disorder, shifting 
alliances and crises of sovereignty among member states impacted heavily upon the 
League apparatus.  
As discussed in chapter three, membership of a perceived pro-Allied League 
impelled neutral Switzerland to withhold its contribution to the organisation. Sweden 
was also in a precarious situation where the League was concerned, with its foreign 
policy placed under intense scrutiny by the Axis powers.
8
 Sweden had been obliged 
to disassociate itself from the League resolutions of December 1939 to avoid 
increasing tensions with Germany.
9
 In August 1940 Sweden’s minister for foreign 
affairs stated that the government ‘did not feel justified’ in paying a contribution to 
the League budget, as in its eyes, ‘the League of Nations today has ceased to 
function.’10 The political implications of such a move were not lost on the Swedish 
press. The following day the Social-Demokraten, the organ of the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party (the party of Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, then leading a 
broad coalition government) expressed its opposition to the idea of Sweden turning 
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its back on the League and all that it stood for.
11
 According to the newspaper, for 
countries sharing the same democratic traditions as Sweden, voluntary cooperation, 
through the mechanisms of an international organisation, was the most appropriate 
means of promoting peace.
12
 This article further underscores the value of the League 
as a barometer of liberal democracy. The Social-Demokraten stated that it was not 
overly important if Sweden left the League should the country be willing to 
participate in a new system of international cooperation after the war. However ‘after 
the action of Romania and the Baltic states at this time [countries no longer 
associated with the League and which were under the influence of Germany and the 
Soviet Union respectively], Sweden’s resignation might be misinterpreted.’13  
Neutral states such as Sweden and Switzerland were obliged to maintain a 
precarious balance as their appeasement of the Axis powers, from whom the threat of 
invasion loomed prominently, risked the complete alienation of the Allied bloc 
whose war aims shared a clear affinity with the Covenant. As Lester wrote to 
Professor Oaten Unden, a leading Swedish academic and long-term supporter of the 
League: ‘It has seemed very evident to me therefore that the payment of 
contributions would not have been regarded as an un-neutral act; on the contrary it 
might even seem that the refusal to do so took that character.’ 14  The League’s 
relations with the European neutrals was thus complex; the lack of clear consensus 
on whether the League should function as an Allied satellite organisation or an 
objective vehicle for technical cooperation resulted in the increasingly ambivalent 
place of neutrality within the League apparatus. Of the five European countries that 
maintained their neutrality during the Second World War, four retained their 
membership of the League of Nations. Franco’s Spain withdrew in May 1939, but 
out of the remaining European neutrals-Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and the Irish 
Free State-the fulfilment of financial obligations was confined to the last two states, 
who shared closer political, economic and military ties to the United Kingdom.
15
 The 
Irish Free State was not prepared to renounce League membership as Taoiseach 
Éamon de Valera believed that while neutrality had isolated the state, renunciation of 
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League membership would isolate it further.
16
 This is indicative of the inclusive 
internationalism practised in the League Assembly of 1939 that was imperilled by 
the pro-Allied policies of the transferred missions. As a result of their closer trade 
and cultural ties to Germany, Sweden and Switzerland could not afford to offer their 
unreserved support to the League.
17
 Nor, however, as the Social Demokraten and 
Lester observed, could they sever links completely with an organisation whose 
Covenant articulated the cherished democratic traditions of their respective states. As 
Swiss federal papers indicate, the Bern government, while deciding to adopt a certain 
reserve towards the League, recognised that it could not withdraw entirely from the 
organisation if it wished to avoid overt identification with the Axis powers.
18
 Formal 
renunciation of League membership on the part of Sweden and Switzerland never 
transpired as it risked compounding the controversies of an already biased neutrality. 
The League Covenant amounted to an almost religious consecration of national 
sovereignty, a concept of great importance to states with a proud history of 
independence. As a columnist in the Journal de Genève argued, the adoption of 
neutrality by the Swiss Confederation would be meaningless in the absence of full 
and complete sovereignty.
19
 By retaining its membership Switzerland was able to 
demonstrate that its foreign policy was its own to decide.  
The neutral states had to bear in mind the significant pattern of withdrawals 
from the League on the part of governments whose domestic and foreign policies 
were undergoing dramatic evolutions. In the years 1939-40, the following countries 
notified the League of their intention to terminate membership: Albania (April 1939), 
Hungary (April 1939), Peru (April 1939), Spain (May 1939) and Romania (July 
1940).
20
 This spate of withdrawals inspired Time Magazine to dub the League ‘the 
League of leftovers.’21 Apart from Peru, whose withdrawal reflected the inter-war 
disenchantment of Latin Americans states with the Eurocentric League, the above 
countries were either, during this period, moving into the Axis sphere or were 
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transforming into totalitarian states.
22
 Those powers whose foreign policies were 
increasingly orbiting Berlin were eager to publicly disavow their affinity with the 
League. It has already been demonstrated that the 1939 Winter War inspired member 
states, assembled within the walls of the Palais des Nations, to launch passionate 
tirades against the Soviet Union, but failed to extract the necessary military 
intervention to safeguard Finnish territory. In the ultimate indictment of the 
impotence of the League’s political organs and the intransigence of members of the 
Council, Finland was obliged to seek help from one of the traditional antagonists of 
the Covenant. In June 1941 the Finnish army, under General Mannerheim, launched 
the Continuation War against the Soviet Union in cooperation with Hitler’s 
Operation Barbarossa. In the week leading up to mobilisation, the Helsinki 
government released the following statement to parliament:  
 
Finland considerers that the activity of the League had ceased to be 
manifested in the course of the war, apart from some technical sections. In 
1940 neither the Assembly nor Council had met. In the same year the 
secretary-general had abandoned the League at the moment when it was 
giving signs of dissolution. Taking account of these facts the Finnish 
government had decided to suppress the League Section in the Ministry. 
Finland had no further reason to continue to pay its contributions. Relations 
between Finland and the League had thus found their natural end.
23
  
  
Then an erstwhile co-belligerent with Germany, Finnish association with a 
body whose ideals conflicted so dramatically with the tenets of Nazi expansionism 
was no longer possible. As discussed in chapter one, member states were more 
inclined to uphold the League’s political identity than its diplomatic role. This meant 
that vulnerable states such as Finland were forced into an uncomfortable marriage of 
convenience with the power described by the French delegate in the Assembly of 
1939 as the ‘the first and chief author of the present European upheaval.’24 
The outcome of German and Italian offensives in Western and Southern 
Europe also influenced the League’s relationship with member states. Unlike Finland, 
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which voluntarily opted to become a co-belligerent with Germany, for countries 
unwittingly caught in the net of Hitler’s expanding empire, League membership 
constituted an important form of protest; an affirmation, in Eden’s words, ‘of the 
transience of the German “New Order”.’25 The Secretariat established contact with 
the London-based governments-in-exile of Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.
26
 Michael Kennedy 
argued that six years of war ‘effectively destroyed the benefits of League 
membership’ for neutral states such as the Irish Free State.27 Whereas neutrality was 
facilitated within the League framework, even during the war, this would not prove 
the case within post-war internationalism. However, for those small states whose 
neutrality was violently breached by the Axis bloc, wartime membership of the 
League served as an important bridge between pre-war and post-war international 
cooperation.  
Continued association with the League, the mouthpiece of international law, 
was a useful mechanism through which the governments-in-exile could insist that 
their homelands remained legal entities. With the suspension of the Assembly and 
Council there lacked a platform through which the governments-in-exile could 
affirm their loyalties to the Covenant. This was mitigated by an initiative on the part 
of the British government. It became the practise of the Foreign Office to arrange 
meetings between British civil servants and representatives of the governments-in-
exile in advance of the budgetary sessions of the Supervisory Commission.
28
 They 
were presided over by Sir Cecil Kisch, the British member of the Supervisory 
Commission, and Seymour Jacklin, then resident in London. At a 1942 meeting, held 
at the British Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Czechoslovak delegate stated that ‘his 
government was attached to the principles of international co-operation for which the 
League stood.’ 29  The Belgian representative echoed the British and American 
attitude when he declared that ‘the League organisation should be kept going’, 
positing that it would be ‘unwise to let the existing machinery fall until something 
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definitely better had been set up.’30 The Yugoslav representative, reflecting on the 
continued potential of the organisation, declared that he was ‘confident that the 
League would again become an important agency for world cooperation.’ 31  In 
contrast to the cautious and parsimonious attitude of the Swiss and Swedish 
governments, the governments-in-exile were eager to publicise their financial 
contributions to the League budget. Due to the economic hardships incurred by the 
occupied territories and governments-in-exile, the League Treasury reduced the 
contributions payable by these states, sometimes by as much as fifty per cent.
32
 The 
representatives of the Allied governments-in-exile, present at the 1942 meeting, 
stated that although they could not afford to pay the full amount owed to the League 
Treasury, token contributions would be made to the budget.
33
 The Polish and 
Czechoslovak contribution to the budget was cancelled by the League at the 
beginning of the war but both governments undertook to make token payments.
34
   
In his 1975 history of the League of Nations, Elmer Bendiner posited that the 
wartime nucleus of the Secretariat ‘holed up in the empty Palais’ resembled ‘the 
monks who illuminated ancient texts during the dark ages, oblivious to the barbarism 
that raged around them.’ 35  This is an inaccurate representation of the League’s 
wartime history; national and international developments informed, inspired and 
challenged the social and economic programmes of the Geneva Secretariat and 
shaped the working conditions of League officials.
36
 As discussed in chapter two, the 
fall of France sparked an intense internal crisis in the Secretariat. However it did not 
immediately result in French withdrawal from the League. The actual moment of 
withdrawal blind-sided the Secretariat. Until early 1941 the French contribution to 
the League budget was duly paid by the Vichy government. In keeping with the 
fiscal policy devised for invaded territories it was agreed by the Supervisory 
Commission to reduce the set French contribution by fifty per cent in view of the 
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harsh austerity incurred by defeat and occupation.
37
 The Vichy government used 
French funds deposited in the United States to meet their financial obligation to the 
League. For these funds to be de-blocked Vichy needed to secure the permission of 
the United States Treasury Department. In February 1941 Lester undertook to write 
to the U.S. government in order to assure the Americans that the funds were sought 
by the Pétain regime on good faith and for legitimate purposes and would not be 
used for purposes contrary to American polices of neutrality.
38
 The approach to the 
United States was an agreed collaborative effort between the Vichy and the 
Secretariat. At this time there was no indication from Vichy that the government 
would, in less than two months, announce its intention to withdraw from the League. 
While Pétain’s government initially upheld membership of the League and 
the financial responsibilities incurred by it, it was locked in tense negotiations with a 
power that was occupying two thirds of its metropolitan territory.
39
 At the meetings 
of Franco-German Armistice Commission held in Wiesbaden in autumn 1940, 
considerable pressure was applied on the Vichy representatives to interfere in the 
activities of seconded French international civil servants. Winant’s decision to 
transfer I.L.O. officials to Canada, a belligerent country within the British 
Commonwealth, confirmed German prejudices towards the League for its pro-Allied 
sympathies. The president of the French delegation to the Armistice Commission 
wrote to the French minister of national defence on 19 August 1940, outlining the 
German position. According to this communication, the Reich Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs noted that the I.L.O.’s parent organisation observed ‘a hostile attitude 
towards Germany.’40 Indeed Carter Goodrich wrote that one of the motivations for 
Winant’s transfer of the I.L.O. to Canada, a country at war with the fascist powers, 
was to ensure that no one could mistake the ‘democratic orientation’ of the Labour 
Office.
41
 For this reason the German delegation to Wiesbaden advised their French 
counterparts that it would be ‘opportune’ to recall the transferred French officials to 
Geneva.
42
 This communication caused considerable consternation at Vichy and the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not keen to weaken its involvement with the I.L.O. 
A Ministry memorandum on the subject cited the long history of French involvement 
in the formation and development of the I.L.O. and the reluctance on the part of the 
Vichy government, at this stage, to abdicate ‘her place in the concert of nations that 
she has always occupied.’43 Nevertheless the French were not in a position to protest 
too strongly. The need to placate Germany during these years assumed a far greater 
importance than the struggle to preserve France’s international influence; although 
for erstwhile collaborationists such as Pierre Laval, those two objectives were not 
irreconcilable.
44
  
Accordingly, the Vichy government forwarded a communication to Phelan 
protesting against the transfer and demanding the return of all officials of French 
nationality to Geneva.
45
 Adrien Tixier, a French I.L.O. official, wrote to René Cassin, 
the commissioner for public instruction in de Gaulle’s embryonic London-based 
government-in-exile, complaining that the French consulate in Geneva had been 
instructed to deny visas to any French I.L.O. official intending to travel to Canada.
46
 
This development placed Phelan in a dilemma. He was aware that Vichy’s 
prohibition would create a conflict of interest for French members of staff between 
their national and international loyalties. However if the I.L.O. halted the transfer of 
French officials it would constitute a ‘humiliating surrender of its independence and 
authority.’47 Phelan wrote to the French government outlining the right of the I.L.O. 
to send its staff to wherever, in the director’s judgment, they could render the best 
service; however Phelan accepted that French officials could not be sent to Montreal. 
French officials would either remain in Geneva or work in the small I.L.O. branch 
office in Washington, where close links could be maintained with their colleagues in 
Canada.
48
 The Vichy government did not pursue the matter further. Vichy’s anxiety 
to retain its involvement in the I.L.O., during this period at least, jarred with its 
evolving domestic policies. When the Vichy Labour Charter introduced corporatism, 
suppressed trade unions and the right to strike, I.L.O. officials denounced Pétain’s 
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government in the International Labour Review.
49
 Indeed the International Labour 
Review became increasingly preoccupied with describing labour conditions in areas 
of authoritarian and totalitarian rule.
50
 However as the Ministry memorandum 
demonstrated, I.L.O. membership provided a limited means by which France could 
retain its ‘place in the concert of nations’.51 This is indicative of role of international 
organisations as important touchstones for independence and prestige. 
Between the summer of 1940 and the spring of 1941 political infighting and 
intrigue at Vichy would result in the rise to prominence of Pierre Laval only for him 
to be summarily, if temporally, replaced by Admiral François Darlan. On 19 April 
1941 the admiral, in his capacity of minister of foreign affairs, dispatched a curt 
telegram to Geneva announcing that France was invoking its prerogative to ‘retire 
from the League’, and reserved the right to pronounce upon its membership of the 
I.L.O. at a later date.
52
 Lester received this news with some surprise. About six 
weeks prior to the notice of withdrawal, one of Lester’s colleagues in the Secretariat 
made a visit to Vichy and attempted to acquire some clarification on recent rumours 
surrounding French membership. The Secretariat official consulted with Pierre Arnal, 
the acting political director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had previously 
spent many years in charge of League matters at the Quai d’Orsay. Arnal informed 
him that France had no intention of withdrawing from the League. According to 
Arnal such a move would be contrary to the general policy being followed by France 
which was to ‘await developments’ before any action was taken.53  
The records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demonstrate that Arnal had not 
tried to deceive the Secretariat as to French intentions. According to these sources, 
while the decision to withdraw from the League may have been a long term goal, its 
eventual execution was swift and resulted from a personal directive from Admiral 
Darlan. According to Arnal, since the summer of 1940, the prospect of French 
withdrawal from the League was raised twice by the government. The first time was 
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in the aftermath of Avenol’s leaving office; however the government felt that the 
resignation of a French secretary-general made it clear that France did not seek to be 
as active in League affairs as it once had been.
54
 This attitude is emblematic of the 
early stage of the Vichy regime. The original intent of the Vichy government was to 
retain as much of the independence the armistice allowed them and to make tentative 
efforts to salvage some of that which was lost. However with the ascendance of 
Laval and then later of Darlan, the intent, among some, but by no means all, 
members of Pétain’s cabinet, was to secure a prominent place for France and its 
empire in the German ‘New Order’.55 This would entail going above and beyond the 
provisions of the armistice in terms of the concessions offered to the Germans; such 
a policy sealed the fate of French membership of the League.  
According to Arnal, the second time the question of French withdrawal from 
the League was raised was under Laval’s first ministry (1940-1). As Jackson has 
shown, Laval was ‘never idealistic about the League of Nations.’ 56 The controversial 
Hoare-Laval Pact of 1935, which ignored the diplomatic role of the League in the 
Abyssinian crisis, attested to this. Under Laval a text, intended for the Secretariat, 
was prepared in late 1940 informing member states of French intentions. It was 
agreed in principle that France would eventually withdraw from the League but the 
government decided to postpone notification and continue to meet its financial 
obligations.
57
 This decision reflects the heightened predilection for a foreign policy 
more exclusively concerned with Franco-German relations during the Laval era. The 
temporary replacement of Laval with Darlan did nothing to reverse the 
collaborationist course of the Vichy government. Darlan, at this time at least, was 
convinced of an inevitable German victory and ‘shared with his colleagues the 
delusion that Hitler would make France “his leading vassal state”’.58 Barely two 
weeks after Arnal’s note revealed that the government was in no hurry to expedite 
withdrawal, the Secretariat in Geneva received notification that France desired to 
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leave the League. According to one insider at Vichy in touch with his French peers 
in the Palais des Nations, the decision to formally quit the League was not the result 
of an ultimatum from the occupying power but was entirely Darlan’s own 
initiative.
59
 Darlan returned to Vichy from Paris in the middle of April, requested the 
League dossier and gave instructions for a notice of withdrawal, showing ‘personal, 
passionate views on the subject.’ 60  This supposed antipathy for the League on 
Darlan’s part tallies well with his public utterances of the subject. In August 1941, 
on the occasion 650
th
 anniversary of the founding of the Helvetic Confederation, 
Darlan sent his hearty congratulations to the Swiss, informing them that the presence 
of the League of Nations in Geneva was the only fault he could find with their 
country.
61
 Darlan also claimed that when he visited League headquarters in 1930 to 
view the construction of the new Palais des Nations, he prophesised that ‘when this 
palace is finished the League will be dead.’62  
The laissez-faire approach of the French Foreign Ministry to the conundrum 
of League membership, indicates that it was under no pressure from Berlin to quit 
the organisation. Arnal was keen to stress this and affirmed, in his note of the 10 
April that at ‘no time’ did the Germans request the French to retire from the 
League.
63
 It was the French themselves who were determined to sunder a previously 
valued link with a world that lay outside the German sphere. Such developments 
correspond to Paxton’s judgement of those French government officials who 
envisaged France as a potential helpmate of the German ‘New Order’: 
‘Collaboration was not a German demand to which some Frenchmen acceded, 
through sympathy or guile. Collaboration was a French proposal that Hitler 
ultimately rejected.’ 64  Vichy’s renunciation of French liberal internationalist 
traditions was not the result of coercion but rather pure initiative. In 1940 Avenol 
had been astonished to learn that the French government was not interested in his 
vague proposals for the transformation of the League into an instrument of the new 
European order. Darlan however did not fail to recognise the incompatibility of the 
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liberal democratic League with that new order. Indeed, it cannot be incidental that 
the notice of withdrawal was issued against the backdrop of increased Franco-
German cooperation. A few days after Darlan issued the notice of withdrawal from 
the League, Vichy began to support Hitler’s African campaign by agreeing to 
provide Rommel’s army in North Africa with 1,100 lorries and 300 liaison 
vehicles.
65
  
Germany may not have been the instigator of French withdrawal but it was 
the inspiration. As the incident with the I.L.O. transfer to Montreal indicated, 
Germany was not apathetic to the League and took notice of the Frenchmen working 
at the heart of the organisation. Berlin, like certain technical officials, identified the 
League as a satellite agency of the Allies and its international civil servants as an 
intelligence source for the enemies of the Reich. In August 1941, a few months after 
Darlan’s notice of withdrawal, the German ambassador to France, Otto Abetz, wrote 
to Fernand de Brinon, Vichy’s representative in the occupied territory, singling out 
André Ganem of the League’s Information Section and Benoit Marius Viple of the 
I.L.O.’s nucleus which remained in Geneva. According to the German ambassador, 
Ganem was devoted to ‘Gaullist propaganda’.66 Abetz charged Viple with being in 
contact with prominent leaders of the former Popular Front such as Leon Blum and 
accused the I.L.O. official of making frequent trips to non-occupied France so that he 
could pass on information to the British consul in Geneva.
67
 This was in fact true on 
Viple’s part and he provided a useful link between the Secretariat and de Gaulle’s 
‘Free French’ movement in London.68 Abetz identified both Ganem and Viple as 
being Jewish and requested that they be relieved of their functions. Darlan attempted 
to assure the Germans that the matter was not serious, that Ganem had in fact been 
suspended like so many other officials during Avenol’s campaign of partial 
liquidation in the summer of 1940.
69
 Thus Ganem held no official position in Geneva; 
the League was no longer responsible for his political activities.
70
 According to 
Darlan, Viple was not in fact Jewish but from ‘a family of old stock in the 
D’Auvergne’.71 The admiral had no denial for Viple’s obvious sympathies with the 
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Free French but sought to remind the Germans that the personnel of the I.L.O. were 
expected to remain ‘aloof from ideological controversies.’72  In the I.L.O.’s case 
those expectations were far removed from reality. With its social democratic 
orientation, the I.L.O.’s officials and delegates pitted the organisation as the 
ideological antithesis to the authoritarianism and corporatism of Vichy.  
Under the terms of the Covenant, following a notification of withdrawal, two 
years had to elapse for that withdrawal to be given legal effect. This gave member 
states ample time to meet all outstanding financial obligations to the League and 
allowed them to reverse the decision if they so wished. French withdrawal from the 
League was due for legal activation in April 1943. By that time the Allied Operation 
Torch led to the loss of Vichy control of North-West Africa and the occupation of 
France’s entire metropolitan territory by the Wehrmacht. The growing rivalry 
between London-based General Charles de Gaulle and Algiers-based General Henri 
Giraud over leadership of a nascent Free French authority also enacted important 
repercussions for French membership of the League.
73
 From 1942 onwards there was 
a push to reconcile General de Gaulle’s National Committee in London with General 
Giraud’s North African Administration. The League’s involvement in that process 
was indicative of the reality of its wartime experience as an ostensibly functionalist 
organisation prone to arousing political and diplomatic controversy.   
Against the backdrop of the French domestic situation, the acting-general 
recognised an opportunity to secure some positive propaganda for the League. In 
March 1943 Lester wrote that did not want to see the historic link between the 
League and France sundered ‘in the humiliation of to-day.’74 On 13 February 1943 
Lester wrote to William Strang in the British Foreign Office stating that he was 
‘naturally concerned to maintain the League membership as strongly as possible and 
particularly that France should not leave as a result of Darlan’s rather irresponsible 
action.’75 Lester outlined to the Foreign Office several initiatives which he believed 
could rescind Darlan’s notice of withdrawal. Lester argued that a declaration issued 
either jointly or separately by de Gaulle and Giraud renouncing the validity of 
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Darlan’s notification, might have the desired effect.76 According to Lester, a mutual 
declaration on the part of the generals would be beneficial to France and to the 
purpose of creating a recognised provisional government-in-exile. He argued that the 
‘outlook [was] generally sympathetic to any joint action likely to smooth the path for 
fuller co-operation between Giraud and de Gaulle.’77 However this was the difficulty 
in leaving the initiative with the two generals-neither carried any legitimate 
governmental authority and neither could claim to speak for the whole of France.  
In his communication of 13 February Lester also mooted the possibility of 
the United Kingdom and other League governments declaring that ‘until the French 
are in a position to freely decide’ France would ‘have her place in the League.’78 
This scenario would set an unusual precedent as in the past the League permitted 
authoritarian governments to speak as the legal representatives of their respective 
countries. For instance the Secretariat never challenged Francisco Franco when he 
curtailed Spanish membership of the League in 1939 and followed the example of 
Britain and France in treating the new regime as the legal government of Spain.
79
 
According to Lester, the latter approach in regard to the preservation of French 
membership could be approved by de Gaulle and Giraud and ‘would have the 
advantage of another political reassurance to the people of France that free nations 
were acting as a kind of trustee of France’s future international position.’80 The fact 
that Lester was ready to overlook League protocol in order to safeguard French 
membership of the organisation was a reflection of the historic importance of France 
to the creation and development of the League of Nations.  
On 2 March 1943 William Strang wrote to Lester outlining his government’s 
position. According to Strang, as far as the British were concerned, the legal position 
was that ‘Darlan was entitled to speak for the French government’ at the time in 
which notification was given and that ‘no declaration by de Gaulle or Giraud or both 
could legally be held to cancel the French government’s note of 1941.’81 The crucial 
factor determining the British position was that in 1941 the vast majority of member 
states, including the United Kingdom, accorded the Vichy regime recognition as the 
legal government of France, even if they did not retain diplomatic relations with the 
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regime.
82
 There was thus no compelling case for the nullification of Darlan’s note in 
either 1941 or 1943. Furthermore, the League was not in a position to recognise the 
authority of Generals Giraud or de Gaulle whose faltering attempts at forming 
effective government or military command in exile, either jointly or independently, 
failed to inspire confidence in Britain or the United States. Dependent as he was 
upon British support, Lester had no choice but to heed Whitehall’s advice and drop 
the matter. Lester, like Avenol, learned that that there was a crucial limitation to the 
political influence of the office of secretary-general. While the secretary-general 
could advise governments, the League’s lack of supranational function meant that he 
could not achieve his political ends if they were not prepared to listen to him.  
 While the secretary-general could not embark on any attempt to preserve 
French membership, it was clear that some of his French colleagues could not be 
induced to ignore this matter and they found willing collaborators among members 
of de Gaulle and Giraud’s retinues. One such figure was the I.L.O.’s Marius Viple, 
previously under the suspicion of the Reich Foreign Ministry. Viple has been 
characterised in previous historiography as being anxious to accommodate Vichy 
within the I.L.O., despite its controversial labour practices, so as to ensure some 
semblance of French participation in the organisation.
83
 However, by 1943 Viple 
supported the efforts of the Free French.
84
 He was in close contact with René 
Massigli, the one-time head of the League of Nations section at the Quai d’Orsay, 
who went to London in January 1943 to serve de Gaulle, first as commissioner for 
foreign affairs, then as his ambassador to the United Kingdom. According to Viple, 
several suggestions on the subject of French membership of the League had already 
reached ‘our friend Massigli’ by March 1943 who was reportedly ‘anxious’ for 
something to be done on the subject.
85
 Former League officials were prominent in 
the Free French movement. Among de Gaulle’s first followers in London was René 
Cassin, one of the future architects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Cassin served as the French delegate to the League of Nations from 1924-38 and 
strove to transform the Assembly from a forum of world peace to a juridical 
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Assembly.
86
 Cassin was determined that de Gaulle’s Free French movement should 
usurp Vichy as the recognised government of France.
87
 In addition, Avenol’s 
predecessor as deputy secretary-general, Jean Monnet, operated as an advisor to 
President Roosevelt. By 1943 Monnet was trying to entice Giraud away from his 
past loyalties to Pétain and to stir the general into healthier relations with the 
Allies.
88
 The political expediency of retaining a connection between France and the 
League, as a means of challenging Vichy’s authority, could not be lost on those 
figures trying to create a rival government authority.  
Events came to a head with the intensification of efforts on the part of 
Frenchmen, in both London and Algiers, to bring de Gaulle and Giraud into a closer 
working relationship. Robert Murphy, Roosevelt’s representative in North Africa, 
informed General Georges Catroux, De Gaulle’s envoy to Giraud, that the U.S. 
government thought it opportune for France to retain a connection with the League 
and the I.L.O.
 89
 Without recognising any government of France, Murphy predicted 
that continued French commitment to peaceful internationalism would have positive 
implications for the post-war international order.
90
 With American support acting as 
the catalyst, both Generals Giraud and de Gaulle dispatched telegrams to the 
secretary-general on 16 April 1941. In his telegram Giraud informed the secretary-
general that: 
 
Frenchmen at present free to express their will cannot accept as effective the 
notification which was given to you on April 19
th
 1941, without having 
allowed the French people [who were] deprived of the possibility of 
expressing [their] sovereignty through their legitimate representatives, of 
expressing their wishes and opinion about France’s position towards the 
League of Nations. In consequence I beg you to grant your kind 
consideration to the fact that this notification, given under foreign pressure, 
cannot be validated [and] that France continues to be a member of the League 
of Nations.
91
 
 
De Gaulle’s telegram contained the same message and expressed his own 
administration’s practical commitment to League membership. The general 
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reminded Lester that his London-based National Committee had always kept the 
League informed of the measures taken with regard to the territories entrusted to 
France in the Cameroons and the Levant (which fell to Allied and Free French forces 
in 1941) under the Mandates Commission.
92
 Both generals denied the legitimacy of 
Vichy, its right to speak for the French people and claimed that the decision to 
withdraw was made under duress from Berlin. As we have seen this was not the case 
but it was the presence of an occupying power in France and the pressure it was 
exerting on the French government and economy which allowed the Free French to 
deny Vichy’s legitimacy. This was the motivation René Cassin’s 1941 declaration 
that Free France was the ‘true France’: ‘the Vichy government is both illegal and 
illegitimate. The fact is important both from a legal and a moral point of view.’93 
While the generals sent separate communications, in each of the telegrams both men 
acknowledged that they were acting in concert with the other. The British Foreign 
Office learned that the Catroux mission was ‘entirely satisfied with the 
announcement’ which was ‘in exact accordance with the texts agreed between 
Generals Giraud and de Gaulle.’ 94  Lester’s vision of the League acting as the 
medium to bring greater cooperation between de Gaulle and Giraud came to pass. 
The telegrams were issued before de Gaulle’s departure for Algiers to establish, with 
Giraud, the new French Committee of National Liberation (C.F.L.N.) and marks one 
of the first examples of cooperation between the London and Algiers administrations. 
When the C.F.L.N. was formally established in June 1943, the secretary-general 
received a formal communication from the Committee, outlining its political and 
social objectives.
95
 
The League of Nations was an intergovernmental organisation devoid of 
supranational function. As such its international civil service did not have executive 
authority to take important political decisions for its member states. While the 
secretary-general and the Supervisory Commission could act for member states in 
matters of League procedure and administration during the war years, the de Gaulle-
Giraud telegrams raised a delicate political conundrum. Lester and the Supervisory 
Commission could not afford unreserved acceptance of the de Gaulle-Giraud 
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communications lest it alienate the vast majority of member states, who, if they 
recognised any French authority at all at this stage, it was unlikely to be the fledgling 
C.F.L.N.
96
 Thus Lester and the Supervisory Commission were obliged to remain 
discreet and adeptly avoided any pronouncements on the legality of the Free French 
declarations. Rather the text of the telegrams was disseminated on 20 April 1943 for 
the ‘information of member states.’97  In a letter to the generals Hambro simply 
acknowledged receipt of the telegrams. He praised the Free French adherence to the 
terms set by the League’s Mandates Commission (which had been unable to meet in 
the war years) as an example of the ‘spirit of the finest traditions of France’ which 
gave ‘faith in a future of international honour and responsibility.’98 In the aftermath 
of the de Gaulle-Giraud telegrams, the British concluded that there should not be any 
difficulty in agreeing to Free French involvement in League affairs so long as they 
did so as representatives of the territories which were in their control, rather than as 
representatives of the government of France.
99
 In this way, by alluding to those 
territories in the Cameroons and in the Levant which were no longer in the control of 
the Vichy government, the Supervisory Commission was able to acknowledge and 
encourage the Free French commitment to internationalism without recognising its 
right to speak for metropolitan France.  
The problem of the French contribution to the League budget would not be so 
easily parried. Without procuring the express permission from member states to do 
so, accepting contributions from regimes of uncertain legitimacy risked embroiling 
the League in a diplomatic quagmire. Denmark and Latvia caused similar problems 
for the Supervisory Commission. Denmark was unique among the countries 
occupied by Germany, permitted as it was to retain control of its own government 
and police; thus the Secretariat addressed all Danish correspondence to the legal 
government in Copenhagen. On 29 August 1940 Lester received a communication 
from a Danish diplomat, announcing Copenhagen’s decision to ‘recall its 
representation to the League of Nations, close down the office of the delegation in 
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Geneva, and cease to contribute to the League.’100  In the summer of 1943 Carl 
Hambro was approached by Henrik De Kauffmann, Denmark’s former minister to 
Washington, who expressing his conviction that the Danish government would soon 
‘pay all arrears in full.’101 De Kauffmann was dismissed by his government in 1942 
after signing, without permission, an agreement with the United States for the 
military protection of Greenland and amidst worsening U.S.-Danish relations was 
recognised in Washington as a virtual one-man government-in-exile.
102
 As member 
states still recognised the democratically elected Copenhagen government, Hambro 
advised de Kauffmann that ‘the most discreet course would be not to bring the matter 
up’ at that moment in time.103 Similarly, in 1943 the Latvian Minister in Washington 
paid a token contribution to the League budget covering the years 1941-3, as well as 
some of the arrears owed for the 1940 financial period into the League’s account at 
the Banker’s Trust Company of New York.104 Baltic ministers and consuls, while 
still recognised by the United States at this time, were no longer recognised by the 
vast majority of League member states following the Sovietisation of the Baltic 
states in 1940. Hambro consulted with the British Foreign Office to determine the 
appropriate action to take and it was agreed that the League ‘ought to abstain from 
any action which might prejudice future decisions and which might embarrass loyal 
member states.’105 Thus it was decided that the money deposited by the Latvian 
minister should not be touched but rather left in a suspense account and could be 
withdrawn by Minister Bilmanis if he so wished. The intent of renegade diplomats to 
make a contribution to the League was emblematic of the League’s role as a signifier 
of legitimacy and sovereignty.  
At a meeting in New York in June 1943 the Supervisory Commission agreed 
that it could not accept contributions from any source which was not regarded, by a 
consensus of member states, as a legal government authority.
106
 The Supervisory 
Commission decided to obviate any political controversy with the C.F.L.N. and with 
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member states by deciding that while France would still be included within the 
organisation’s official list of member states, no contribution would be shown against 
this state.
107
 In this way the Supervisory Commission could recognise French 
membership without recognising any of the rival government that claimed to speak 
for the French people.
108
 This same measure had been applied to Ethiopian 
membership in the wake of the Italian conquest.  
The dilemma of the French contribution further underlined the difficult 
working relationship between the League and the I.L.O. with Phelan adopting a 
different position to that of the League’s Supervisory Commission. In Darlan’s 1941 
communiqué to the acting secretary-general, the Vichy government reserved the 
right to pronounce upon the fate of French membership of the I.L.O. As no 
subsequent communication was received, Phelan insisted that there was no 
cancellation of French membership, with which the British Foreign Office 
concurred.
109
 In official documents the I.L.O. continued to list the French 
contribution. According to Phelan, ‘very considerable importance was attached in 
Washington to maintaining continuity’ of French membership and actual payment of 
its contribution to the I.L.O.’s budget was considered of secondary importance.110 
Lester confided to Jacklin that he resented Phelan’s tactics, attributing them ‘to 
another stage in their separatist policy-an attempt to establish the membership of 
France of the I.L.O. as something independent and distinct from France’s 
membership of the League.’111 Lester commented that there was ‘a deuce a lot of 
politics about this question’ as Phelan’s decision entailed recognising Darlan’s right 
to make the decision while embarking on a seemingly opposing relationship with the 
Free French.
112
  
In fact the I.L.O., always one step ahead of the League Secretariat, had been 
cooperating with the Free French since the New York Conference of October-
November 1941. With the encouragement of the French I.L.O. official Adrien Tixier 
and with the support of the British Government, the Governing Body permitted 
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Henry Hauck, de Gaulle’s Socialist director of labour, to serve as an unofficial 
observer to the conference.
113
 According to French archival sources, Hauck 
recognised the political significance of the New York Conference and was 
determined that the Free French should participate in such an important 
demonstration for social justice.
114
 France’s official government representative to the 
New York Conference was Vichy’s Francois de Panafieu, an advisor to Pétain’s 
ambassador to the United States, Gaston Henry-Haye. De Panafieu was compelled to 
agree to Hauck’s addressing the conference on the condition that the latter made no 
direct attack on the government of Marshal Pétain.
115
 Hauck, when granted 
permission by Frances Perkins to address the assembled delegates, refrained from a 
direct denunciation of Vichy but  wasted no time in proclaiming de Gaulle’s 
London-based National Committee as the ‘true France.’ 116 Such a declaration was 
already in keeping with the pro-Allied atmosphere of the New York Conference. The 
I.L.O. was never likely to appease the Vichy government when it had already 
publicly attacked it for its prohibition of organised labour.  Regarding the I.L.O.’s 
condemnation of its labour policies as ‘provocation’, Vichy, unlike the Free French, 
did not field a tripartite delegation with no worker or employer representatives 
present in New York.
117
 Hauck reported that delegations, particularly the American 
delegation, were extremely sympathetic to the Free French and expressed their 
admiration for the heroism of French workers engaged in the Resistance.
118
 The Free 
French movement shared an ideological affinity with the I.L.O. which was later 
strengthened by the C.F.L.N. When Adrien Tixier left the Labour Office to become 
the commissioner for social affairs of the C.F.L.N., he requested the assistance of the 
I.L.O. in the framing of social measures for the territory under the Committee’s 
control.
119
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It is important to note that cooperation between France, the League and the 
I.L.O. remained largely informal in the manner of the past participation of the United 
States in many of the League’s technical activities. By July 1944 representatives of 
Free French in North Africa were participating in the meetings of the Economic and 
Finance Committee of the League. Officials under the control of the C.F.L.N. 
provided information to the Health Section. The League’s publications were also 
transmitted, either from Geneva, or from Princeton, to the C.F.L.N. in London.
120
 
Victor Yves Ghébali claimed that by 1943 Free France became the representative of 
France in all existing international organisations, including the League and the I.L.O.: 
Jaci Leigh Eisenberg claimed that it happened much earlier because of the 
ideological rupture between Vichy and the I.L.O.
121
 In reality, Free France, even 
after the formation of the C.F.L.N., was not recognised by the League hierarchy as a 
legitimate governmental authority representing all French citizens. Had recognition 
actually been conferred on the C.F.L.N. it would have constituted a profound break 
in the character and procedures of the League and the I.L.O. The League was not a 
supranational body with the power to speak on behalf of member states: rather 
member states had the right to speak through it. As it transpired the League did not 
treat de Gaulle as the rightful leader of France until the general became the president 
of the internationally recognised Provisional Government of the French Republic in 
August 1944. On 25 October 1944 Jean Paul Boncour, a former French delegate to 
the League Assembly, was dispatched by his minister for foreign affairs to ‘renew 
relations and cooperation with the Secretariat.’122 Boncour informed Lester that he 
was instructed by the new French government to declare to the secretary-general that 
‘France remained loyal to the principles and ideals of the League’ and that, in its 
view, French membership of the League remained ‘unbroken.’123 This had been the 
ultimate goal of the Supervisory Commission-an ‘unbroken’ tradition of French 
cooperation with the League until the moment formal association could be 
resumed.
124
 The Provisional Government made a contribution to the League budget 
in late 1944.  
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As discussed in chapter two, the French national experience enacted deep 
repercussions within the international civil service; repercussions that did not 
immediately fade with Avenol’s departure from Geneva. Lester wrote in November 
1941 that: 
 
the Secretariat and the League still suffer from the moral bankruptcy of the 
Unspeakable Joseph. Not only did he fail us completely in all that is looked 
for in a chief, but he plunged us at a critical time into an internal struggle for 
decency and (forgive me!) honour. For some months there was not one action 
of influence of his that was not undignified, unmoral and destructive.
125
 
 
Indeed Avenol continued to prove a complicating and disruptive influence, making 
an unwelcome return to the pages of Lester’s diaries in May 1942. Lester learned 
from Charron that Avenol had approached him and shown him a letter which he had 
proposed sending to Pétain. According to Charron, the letter argued that the future of 
France lay in collaboration with the Germans whose victory was inevitable.
126
 Yet 
Avenol continued to lack any form of ideological consistency. The previous year he 
attempted to build bridges with the Foreign Office, writing to Anthony Eden in 
January 1941. He expressed his admiration for the ‘endurance, the tenacity and the 
heroism’ of the British fighting spirit and sought  to justify his own attempts to 
ingratiate himself with Vichy to the British Foreign Office, assuring Eden that he 
had simply been led by a desire to be loyal to his country.
127
 This was the closest 
Avenol came, in all of his correspondence, to acknowledging his accountability for 
the summer of 1940.  Eden thanked Avenol for his sentiments and pointedly 
expressed his confidence that France would once more show ‘herself to be worthy of 
her great traditions.’128 
Avenol returned to the environs of Geneva on the last day of 1943. He wrote 
to the American legation claiming that he was compelled to leave France after 
having incurred a private warning from the French police upon their discovery of 
clandestine pro-Resistance literature in his house; the former secretary-general was 
consequently worried that the Germans might deport him.
129
  Lester subsequently 
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heard that Avenol had in fact been threatened by local members of the Resistance.
130
 
He conceded that with Avenol anything might be true. Edouard de Haller of the 
Swiss Political Department informed Lester that Avenol was granted permission by 
the federal government to reside in Switzerland on the condition that he abstained 
from all political activity.
131
 That would be no easy request of such a politically-
minded figure as Avenol.  
The legacy of Avenol’s actions bred divisions within the Secretariat. As de 
Gaulle’s Free French movement gained greater prominence, accusations of betrayal 
were slung at colleagues who had previously sympathised with the architects of 
Vichy. In May 1944 René Charron, Avenol’s former confidante, was charged by Dr. 
Yves Biraud of the Health Section of having ‘been ready to in 1940 to join with 
Avenol in selling the League to the Boches.’132 Loveday also refused to trust Charron 
and warned Lester that he was ‘walking into a trap’ where the Frenchman was 
concerned.
133
 Charron reacted vehemently to these accusations pointing out that 
Biraud himself had actually offered his services to the Vichy government in the 
aftermath of the armistice.
134
 Lester sought to do what he could to ‘soften the bitter 
feelings between French members of staff’ in the hope that the ‘whole thing could be 
worked out and forgotten.’135 Lester was personally completely antipathetic to Vichy 
but reserved his ire for those who went above and beyond the terms of the armistice 
to become ‘vehement collaborationists.’136 The acting secretary-general would not 
condemn those League officials who continued to be loyal to what was, technically, 
the legal government of France. As Jackson has argued, in the early days of Vichy 
‘disobeying the regime caused a greater crisis than obeying it.’137 Lester informed 
the two warring Frenchmen that firstly, he did not believe Charron to be pro-German 
and that secondly, it was perfectly understandable of a doctor of Biraud’s standing to 
want to assist his country in its hour of need. Lester was aware that René Charron, 
despite his past loyalty to the former secretary-general, had broken off entirely with 
Avenol upon the latter’s return to Geneva and that Charron, because of his useful 
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contacts in France, had been passing on information and intelligence to American 
diplomats in Geneva.
138
 Lester’s Geneva Secretariat was an international civil 
service that was arguably badly scarred from divided national loyalties.  
 
 
The League and the internationalist debate 1940-4 
With France too engrossed in the crisis of its own sovereignty to fulfil its 
traditionally dominant role in League affairs, it fell to the other half of the inter-war 
double-act, the United Kingdom, to champion the organisation through the war years. 
In his report to member states on the work of the League during the period 1940-1, 
Lester paid tribute ‘to those states which, although directly affected by the war, have 
not failed to carry out their financial obligations.’ 139  Britain and its Dominions 
provided the bulk of financial support to the League during its final years and the 
British government largely covered the immediate costs of transferring the League’s 
technical missions to the United States.
140
 Despite the pressures of wartime 
economies, the financial contribution from Britain soon represented almost thirty per 
cent of League income and the combined contributions of the Empire and 
Commonwealth represented over sixty per cent of the total amount extracted from 
member states.
141
 At Geneva, up until the suspension of the Assembly, Britain and 
its Dominions worked together to present a united front within the League apparatus; 
at the same time membership of the League allowed the Dominion governments to 
project their growing independence.
142
 This tradition was upheld during the war 
years with regular meetings taking place between the representatives of the 
Dominion states and the British Government on League matters. During these 
meetings the work of the League’s technical organisations were spoken of 
approvingly.
143
 The League’s budget was routinely discussed but there was no need 
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to raise the subject of arrears since it was the Dominion states that proved the most 
steadfast in their financial support for the organisation.  
There was some parliamentary opposition in Britain to the government’s 
commitment to the League and its role as one of its main sources of capital in 
straitened times. This disapproval was augmented by the failure of other member 
states to meet their obligations. In a session of the House of Commons in November 
1943 one M.P. rejected the notion that a defaulting member state should still be 
allowed to remain in the League and argued that an Imperial Conference would serve 
a more useful purpose than continued membership of moribund organisation.
144
 
Facing the enormity of years of conflict and the massive breakdown in international 
relations, London might have been forgiven for jettisoning its connections with 
Geneva in order to employ the Commonwealth as its sole vehicle for multilateral 
cooperation. After all the British war effort depended on the pooling of imperial 
resources, the combined might of all the armed forces, as well as cooperation in 
industry, trade and food production.
145
 However Richard Law, the parliamentary 
under secretary of state for foreign affairs, dismissed such an idea and any other 
which might be seen to ‘weaken an institution to which it is obvious His Majesty’s 
Governments in all the Dominions attach so much importance.’ 146  The British 
Commonwealth was predicated on a shared imperial history and operated on the 
assumption of common legal and political traditions. The League, while certainly not 
culturally relativist, was a less exclusive club that could facilitate transnational 
encounters of a more varied kind.  
Without British financial and moral support the League’s wartime mission 
would have foundered and there would be no prospect of preserving a technocratic 
continuity between pre-war and post-war international cooperation. The two most 
prominent figures in government, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden, were eager to engage in a public defence of the League’s 
reputation. In a national broadcast on 21 March 1943, Churchill made the following 
declaration:   
 
I hope we shall not lightly cast aside all the immense work which was 
accomplished by the League of Nations. Certainly we must take as our 
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foundation the lofty conception of freedom law and morality which was the 
spirit of the League.
147
 
 
Eden too hoped that the experience of the League would provide some foundation 
for any new experiment in international organisation. The foreign secretary was 
always ready, in the House of Commons, to praise the vitality and usefulness of the 
technical services and cited their relevance for the future project of reconstruction.
148
 
Such public declarations were firmly in step with the long-term aspirations of 
League apologists.
149
 While such signs were encouraging for the acting secretary-
general, the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the organisation’s future as well 
as the career prospects of his staff were a constant source of anxiety, with the 
Secretariat ‘living from week to month’ when the future was ‘dark and unknown.’150 
Lester did not even know for what purpose he was keeping the League intact. In 
1939 member states had suspended the Assembly and Council and as the war wore 
on the reconstitution of the League of Nations, in its pre-war form, became an 
increasingly unlikely prospect. 1n 1942 an article in The Observer opined: ‘no one 
expects the League of Nations to resume its larger activities after the war with its 
constitution and general organisation unchanged. But to keep the League alive as the 
basis on which the international structure of the future may be based is elementary 
wisdom.’ 151  In 1942 Sir Cecil Kisch, the British member of the Supervisory 
Commission and the assistant under secretary of state for India, conceded in a letter 
to Lester that his task was not an enviable one and that no one yet knew the precise 
form internationalism would take at the war’s end: 
 
It is not an easy thing to keep the League in being during this period of crisis, 
and what you are doing by remaining in Geneva and by directing the 
operations outside is an essential factor in the matter and must make in the 
end a powerful contribution to the eventual revival of international co-
operation in whatever form this may come about.
152
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Roger Makins informed Lester in 1942 that the post-war reconstitution of the League 
was unlikely; rather ‘an international administration not differing in essentials from 
the League’ would be created, ‘dressed up in a new form.’153 Makins outlined what 
return he thought member states expected of the wartime preservation of the 
international civil service: ‘With the increasing scale and momentum of the conflict, 
neither the Labour Office, nor the Secretariat, can do much more than safeguard their 
institutions and traditions, carry on their limited resources and prepare, as far as they 
are able to prepare, to assist in the solution of immediate post-war problems.’154 
While the League was not destined to serve as the vehicle for post-war international 
cooperation, its wartime activities could still provide inspiration for governments and 
serve as an important bridge between the old international order and the new.  
From 1942 onwards, in the aftermath of the United Nations Declaration, it 
was clear that the new international order would, in the event of an Allied victory, be 
determined by the three great powers of the United States, the U.S.S.R. (which 
became an Allied power upon the breach of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when 
German forces invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941) and the United Kingdom 
through the framework of the ‘United Nations’ alliance. 155  The United Nations 
powers identified themselves as ‘engaged in a common struggle against savage and 
brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world.’156 By April 1942 the Foreign Office 
had an established goal ‘to substitute the more organic conception of the United 
Nations for the old political structure of the League, but to work into this new 
organism the I.L.O. and the tried technical services of the League.’ 157  With the 
Moscow Declaration of October 1943 the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Soviet Union and China affirmed that they recognised ‘the necessity of establishing, 
at the earliest possible date, a general international organisation, based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to 
membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international 
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peace and security.’158 The intent of Washington, London and (later and to a lesser 
extent) Moscow was to construct a new international organisation. Pressed with the 
more immediate object of winning the war, this project was not initially invested 
with the same degree of urgency and clarity.
159
 This lack of clarity among the United 
Nations powers was another compelling factor that sustained the wartime 
preservation of the League. Winston Churchill told his cabinet colleagues that it ‘was 
important not to make any public statements underrating the conception or the 
achievements of the League of Nations’ until the British government was ‘in a 
position to make positive suggestions for something to put in its place.’ 160  The 
Foreign Office was also at pains to assure League supporters that there would be no 
attempt to dissolve the organisation until an adequate replacement emerged.
161
 
Premature dissolution of the League of Nations was regarded as an unwelcome 
prospect in Washington for the same reason.
162
 
While some League officials, national civil servants, public figures and 
intellectuals were eager for the League to retain a relevance to a post-war 
international order, others were anxious to see a profound break with the 
assumptions and principles that had underpinned the internationalism of the past. In 
the aftermath of the previous cataclysmic war, ardent internationalists hoped that the 
moral obligations of the Covenant constituted sufficient encouragement for the 
maintenance of peace and security.
163
 Other more realistic observers were impressed 
with the need to reform the League apparatus, almost from the moment of its birth.
164
 
The totality of the war demonstrated that a new system of international cooperation 
would simply have to accommodate modern realities. E.H. Carr’s seminal 
Conditions of Peace (1944) notably attacked the idealist paradigm of the League of 
Nations as being insufficient to deal with inter-state tensions, particularly between 
those countries possessing different systems of government.
165
 According to Carr: 
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the tradition of the League of Nations is one of frustration and-more fatally 
still-of association with the interests of a particular group of powers; and 
its ideology was also derived from nineteenth century political traditions 
which have already proved inadequate to solve our modern problems.
166
  
 
Cohesion between the great powers on security matters was more important 
than achieving ideological conformity. Upon his award of the Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation medal in December 1943, Field Marshal Smuts shared his views on the 
organisation he helped to create in 1919, in a broadcast to the United States. He did 
‘not agree that the League went too far or attempted too much, but it was perhaps 
true that its founders were dominated by idealistic expectations sadly out of tune 
with the hard realism of the times, and it was this hard won realism which finally 
exploded the idealism.’167 In his 1942 report to member states, Lester conceded that 
security should be the prime focus of post-war internationalism: ‘Between nations 
there must be law, there must be justice; but there must be force, economic and 
military, behind that law and justice.’ 168  John A. Thompson noted that while 
Wilsonianism remained a feature of American foreign policy in the war years, 
commitment to the principles of equality between states, self-determination and the 
extension of democracy was less wholehearted.
169
 A war-weary world could not be 
asked to accept an international organisation that was better at projecting liberal 
democracy than maintaining peace and security. Leo Amery, the British secretary of 
state for India, offered the following words of caution to his cabinet colleagues in 
January 1943, following the United Nations Declaration:  
 
What I do regard as dangerous and likely to lead to disaster, for ourselves and 
for the world, is to delude ourselves once again by publicly proclaimed 
announcements of a new world structure of permanent peace based on 
ignoring all the stubborn realities in the varying outlook and behaviour of 
those intensely individualistic entities which we call nations, and in doing so 
neglect the more practical measures for promoting peace and prosperity of 
the world which can be achieved by recognising those realities.
170
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Cordell Hull echoed these sentiments in a note for Roosevelt when he asserted that 
technical organisations, such as those organised under the League umbrella, were 
‘unlikely to survive as effective instruments in a world from which reasonable 
security is absent.’171 Hull, like Eden, was anxious for the experience of the League 
to be utilised.
172
 However as the League never functioned as an effective security 
organisation, a different model was clearly needed.  
 The problem was the lack of consensus on what that model should look like. 
The United States was the first of the Big Three to devote serious study to a new 
international organisation. The State Department began contemplating a new 
organisation as early as 1941, before the United States had even entered the war and 
was circulating internal proposals by 1943; this as Mazower pointed out, ensured 
that the United States played the leading role in the eventual construction of the 
United Nations Organisation.
173
 Roosevelt came to advocate a new international 
organisation based on the reality of great power politics. The president pressed for 
the continuation of the wartime alliance of the United Nations, a system in which the 
great powers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China 
would act as the ‘four policemen’ in enforcing the peace.174 In Britain, Conservative 
members of the government began to favour strong regional organisations. Churchill 
favoured a ‘Council of the World’ dominated by the great powers, with the smaller 
states represented by a number of regional councils.
175
 Churchill was particularly 
anxious to create a west-European alliance to balance the growing power of the 
Soviet Union. As Meisler demonstrated, Stalin’s post-war vision was actually closer 
to that of Churchill’s than to Roosevelt’s. 176  Stalin intended to create an East-
European buffer belt that would stave off any future attack on the U.S.S.R. The 
federalist argument that powerful regional councils should replace the League model 
of a universal world organisation was also championed by Sumner Welles, 
Roosevelt’s energetic under-secretary of state. However this initiative died when 
Welles’ dismissal was engineered by the more conservative Cordell Hull. Hull and 
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his protégé, Leo Pasvolsky, wanted a global organisation in reach and power; a 
League of Nations with stronger security machinery.
177
  
Seventeen of the twenty-six signatories of the original Declaration by the 
United Nations (January 1942) were League member states and before the end of the 
war ten more members would join them. However the new international order would 
be determined by the Big Three. The United Kingdom, as part of the old guard of the 
League, had to adapt to an evolving balance of power dynamic. There was a very 
real possibility that the British government would be compelled to sacrifice its 
aspirations for securing the long-term legacy of League so as not to alienate the two 
emerging superpowers of the United States and the U.S.S.R., neither of whom 
enjoyed a straightforward history with the League of Nations. It cannot be denied 
that the realist tradition of League historiography was correct to assert that states 
were guided by self-interest and jealously guarded their sovereignty within the 
international framework.
178
 Yet while the British government was certainly guided 
by its own foreign policy constraints, it continued to recognise the value of League 
membership, both for its own reputation and the future of international cooperation. 
Within the wider political system and within influential pockets of society there 
remained a genuine commitment to the preservation of the League and a near-
religious attachment to the articles of the Covenant. A number of well placed League 
devotees marshalled support through participation in an organisation which, for more 
than twenty years, invested a great deal in the education of the public on League 
affairs-the League of Nations Union (L.N.U.).
179
 Founded in 1918 the L.N.U. 
became the largest society in the British peace movement and played an important 
role in inter-war politics and education. The man most responsible for shaping the 
Union into an effective pressure group, which lobbied for a greater British 
commitment to the League of Nations, was Britain’s most famous League apologist: 
Viscount Robert Cecil. The Executive Committee of the L.N.U. comprised of other 
figures who devoted a great deal of their professional lives to the League, including 
the O.I.C.’s Gilbert Murray and the former secretary-general Eric Drummond (1920-
32) who had since inherited the earldom of Perth.  
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In the early days of the war, the leadership of the L.N.U. remained 
remarkably optimistic about the viability of the League and continued to inform the 
public about the activities of the Geneva based organisation. Its journal, Headway, 
publicised the achievements of the League’s technical services and documented their 
cooperation with United Nations bodies in the field of post-war reconstruction. The 
L.N.U. also persevered in its interaction with education in both schools and colleges 
throughout the war. In 1939 the Union established the Council for Education in 
World Citizenship which sought to prepare ‘the hearts and minds’ of those who 
would ‘have to carry out the work of transition from war to peace and operate the 
new international system.’180 Both Viscount Cecil and the Earl of Perth used their 
seats in the House of Lords to stage a defence of the League. As establishment 
figures (Perth was serving as chief adviser to the Ministry of Information) and men 
of considerable international standing, their defence of the League, from within the 
Palace of Westminster itself, helped to copperfasten Britain’s role as wartime 
champion of the organisation. In addition, the L.N.U. could count members of the 
House of Commons among its membership. Churchill served as honorary president 
during the war years while Eden was president of the Warwickshire and Birmingham 
Federal Council of the L.N.U.
181
 The speeches that Cecil and Perth made to their 
fellow peers in the House of Lords, were very much in the ‘idealist’ tradition, 
roundly rejecting the idea that fundamental flaws in the spirit and principles of the 
Covenant paralysed the League’s diplomatic machinery. In an address in June 1942 
Perth shared his conviction that had ‘the League as originally conceived, come into 
being, it would have fulfilled all the hopes and all the aspirations of its founders’.182 
Cecil too used the sessions of the Lords to express his unshakable conviction in the 
valuable lessons learned from the League and argued that the new international 
organisation should be founded on the same principles of ‘freedom, law and 
morality.’183  
The L.N.U. also rejected the notion that an international organisation could 
not successfully create both a liberal world order and a stable system of international 
security. One of its most prominent members of the L.N.U., Gilbert Murray, 
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specifically condemned E.H. Carr for his attempts to infect ‘those sections of British 
opinion, on the extreme left and extreme right, who hate the whole liberal tradition 
which is the result of our long security and peace.’184 For Murray, peace could not 
exist in the absence of liberal democratic principles. Carr on the other hand believed 
that the liberal spirit of the League Covenant ignored irreconcilable political 
differences between potentially warring states. He derided the notion that ‘the 
problem of the government of mankind, which has defied human wit and human 
experience for centuries, can be solved out of hand by some paper construction of a 
few simple-minded enthusiasts.’185  For Lucian Ashworth the arbitrariness of the 
‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ classification rests on the fact that so called idealists were very 
much aware of the realities of international relations when trying to address the 
failings of the world as it was.
186
 Ashworth also observed that the political beliefs of 
so-called realists such as E.H. Carr were more idealistic than those of their 
opponents.
187
 League supporters were correct to recognise the League’s liberal 
democratic identity as a vital aspect of its appeal. The wartime experience of the 
League, beset as it was by financial difficulties and political controversies, also 
demonstrates that League officials were extremely conscious of and had to contend 
with the constraints of international cooperation.
188
 However, as discussed in chapter 
one, the League’s political identity impeded its diplomatic role, with states 
possessing contrasting systems of government, such as the Soviet Union, unable to 
overcome anti-communist prejudice in order to stir collective action to maintain 
international security. Carr was wrong to dismiss League supporters as narrow-
minded thinkers incapable of forming a sophisticated and complex understanding of 
international relations. In turn, Murray failed to recognise that a liberal democratic 
ethos was an inadequate and antagonistic foundation for a universal security 
organisation.  
While the L.N.U. may have eventually found itself swimming against the 
current of nascent post-war internationalism, it is through the actions and 
interventions of such well-connected figures as Cecil and Perth that we can glean the 
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long-term intentions of the British and Allied government towards the League of 
Nations. In May 1941 Cecil tried to persuade Anthony Eden into committing to the 
use of the League of Nations in the post-war settlement. Eden, at this time of 
uncertainty, could not be induced to make such pledge as, according to the foreign 
secretary, while sentiment among the Allies for a system of international 
collaboration was still strong, there was ‘little enthusiasm’ for the re-constitution of 
the League of Nations ‘as it was.’189  While having to concede, by 1943, that a 
complete revival of the League was no longer possible, the leadership of the L.N.U. 
vigorously promoted the absorption of the League’s traditions and machinery into a 
new system of international cooperation. The executive of the L.N.U. produced a 
‘draft pact’ in 1943 for public perusal. The pact was steeped in the traditions of 
liberal internationalism, with its opening preamble declaring that ‘the welfare of the 
whole community of nations is the concern of all of them’ and that ‘the territorial 
integrity and political independence of all nations should be respected.’190 The pact 
closely followed the League model, with an Assembly where each member would 
exercise a single vote and a Council in which the United Kingdom, the United States, 
the U.S.S.R. and China would enjoy permanent seats.
191
 The draft pact even 
proposed the preservation of the League’s unanimity rule so that any member of the 
Council and Assembly could prevent a League resolution by voting against it. In an 
attempt to address the critical question of security the pact proposed the creation of a 
defence committee, to be composed of the permanent members of the council, but 
did not specify what measures they could employ to enforce the peace.
192
 
According to one Foreign Office official, the immediate reaction of his 
colleagues to the draft pact was that it ‘seemed to try to recreate too closely the form 
and phraseology of the Covenant. But this act was partly due to the necessity of 
keeping in good heart the supporters of the League of Nations Union, still a 
numerous and influential body.’193 Other high profile members of the L.N.U. became 
increasingly disenchanted with the movement’s refusal to adapt to new political 
realties or to engage with the fundamental problems that resulted in the inertia of the 
League’s security machinery in the first place. Alfred Duff Cooper, the Conservative 
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M.P. and former secretary of state for war, resigned as vice-president of the 
Westminster branch of the L.N.U. in June 1943 because he had come to recognise 
that the League proved a ‘complete failure.’194 Duff Cooper informed the L.N.U. that 
while he was still an internationalist he was ‘opposed to any revival of the League as 
such or as a similar body based on the same principles’ as those principles were 
‘fundamentally wrong.’195 The Executive Council of the L.N.U. furnished Eden with 
a copy of the draft pact and the foreign secretary invited influential members of that 
body, including Lord Lytton (a high-ranking former colonial civil servant and 
chairman of the League commission that investigated the 1931 war between Japan 
and China), Viscount Cecil and Lord Perth to a meeting in Whitehall on 13 January 
1944. Eden informed the representatives of the LN.U. that while the League would 
not be reconstituted at the end of the war, the government’s view was that 
‘something like the machinery of the old League of Nations would be required’ with 
a greater emphasis placed, within the new organisation, on the predominant role of 
the great powers and the need for greater coordination in security measures.
196
 This 
amounted to an acknowledgment on Eden’s part, that the language of security and 
not of morality would drive the next international project.  
Eden’s exchanges with the L.N.U. also provide an insight into the evolving 
landscape of international affairs and the League’s precarious place in it. The 
members of the L.N.U. sought to impress upon Eden that the European countries 
were looking towards Britain to take the lead in determining the future of 
international collaboration.
197
 In the January meeting, Eden argued that while Europe 
may have been looking to London, London now had to look to Washington, such 
was the reality of the new world order. Eden confided to the L.N.U. leaders that, in 
light of Anglo-American talks on the subject, he was convinced that the United 
States would not accept Geneva as the headquarters of an international organisation 
to which it belonged and that the Americans wanted the new organisation to be 
presented as something ‘quite new.’198 This meeting was intended to impress upon 
the Executive Council of the L.N.U. the absolute necessity of  U.S. support for the 
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success of a new international organisation; a truth that the League’s technical 
organisations had already recognised. 
The Foreign Office suffered diplomatic complications in the past due to the 
determination of the L.N.U.’s leadership to vigorously defend the reputation of the 
League of Nations. Lord Perth, driven by loyalty to an organisation he himself led 
for more than ten years, wrote an article in 1941 which he intended to publish in the 
United States. In this document Perth placed a great deal of blame on American 
reluctance to join the League for that organisation’s failure.199 Eden wrote to Perth in 
May of that year asking him not to air his censure of the Americans. According to 
Eden while this blame might partly have been deserved, it was ‘hardly timely to rub 
it in’ and he asked Perth to refrain from publishing his article to which the former 
secretary-general reluctantly agreed.
200
 Without the support of the United States the 
post-war international system would suffer from the same artificiality as Hobsbawm 
ascribed to the League system.
 201
 As Eden reminded the former secretary-general,  
‘rightly or wrongly, Americans in general intensely dislike the League of Nations 
and this has become a traditional national sentiment which will never be dispelled by 
arguments.’ 202  Roosevelt shared his views on the League with the British 
ambassador, Lord Halifax, during an informal audience in 1941. Halifax informed 
Alexander Cadogan that when the president referred to Viscount Cecil’s 
autobiography he said ‘we mustn’t have the League of Nations again, at least in any 
form like that.’ 203  Halifax informed the Foreign Office of his certainly that the 
British government should allow American opinion to ‘form itself’ on the subject of 
a new international organisation.
204
 
Even if the political organs of the League were not reconstituted at the end of 
the war, there was no reason to expect that the technical organs would not survive. 
As discussed in chapter one, the technical organisations sought to embrace the 
growing Atlanticism of international cooperation. By 1943 Loveday and Phelan 
believed that they stood in high favour with the U.S. government. Loveday thought 
that Sumner Welles appreciated the work of the Economic Section of the Secretariat 
and claimed to be ‘on excellent terms’ with Leo Pasvolsky, Hull’s trusted and 
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influential aide.
205
 Phelan assured William Strang in the Foreign Office that he was 
confident that the I.L.O. ‘enjoyed the support and good opinion of Secretary Hull.’206 
Despite the predilection in the United States towards the creation of a new 
international organisation, the L.N.U.’s draft pact was circulated among influential 
figures in the State Department. In the summer of 1942 Arthur Sweetser, the 
League’s director of publicity, left his post to serve in the United States Office of 
War Information. Sweetser wrote to Lester that he was able to do more for the 
‘common interests’ of League supporters ‘on the outside’ than he could possibly 
have achieved ‘in the somewhat isolated position’ he occupied on the ‘inside.’207 
Sweetser consequently placed the draft pact at the disposal of those State Department 
officials who were working on proposals for a new international organisation.
208
 
Mazower also documented State Department officials finding Jan Smuts’ 1918 
pamphlet on the League as ‘surprisingly apt.’209 In 1943 Secretary of State Hull 
drafted a memorandum for President Roosevelt on the establishment of a new 
international organisation, advising that the experience of the League should be 
utilised and its functions transferred to the new organisation.
210
 These developments 
created the impression among League officials and supporters that the organisation 
was being used, both in Washington and in London, as a blueprint for the future 
international organisation. As Sweetser wrote to Cecil: ‘It makes one feel how 
invaluable has been the experience at Geneva and how great a part it can play in the 
future.’211  
While the League may have provided some inspiration to preparations for a 
new international organisation, Eden’s observation to the L.N.U. that the Americans 
wanted the new organisation to be presented as something ‘quite new’ was a 
prescient remark. As Gary Ostrower argued, while both Roosevelt and Hull have 
long been considered internationalists, their foreign policy in respect of Geneva was 
characterised by inconsistency.
212
  The Roosevelt administration was quite happy to 
draw from the League’s experience but overt association with the League needed to 
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be avoided if the new project, yet to be unveiled, was to avoid the tinge of past 
failures. As discussed in chapter two, it was the League’s transferred technical 
missions, rather than Lester’s Geneva-based Secretariat, that acted as the wartime 
embodiment of the League’s political identity. The League’s liberal democratic 
identity served as one of the most compelling justifications for its wartime 
preservation. However it became problematic in a world more alive to the adverse 
impact of this identity on the League’s diplomatic role. This impelled the technical 
organisations, much to the growing annoyance of Lester, to emphasise their 
separation from Geneva and to contrast the vitality of their technical work with the 
supposed inertia of the ‘political’ Secretariat. Lester resented Phelan’s assertion, in 
the latter’s director’s reports, that by its transfer to North America the I.L.O. 
‘escaped death by paralyses’ as, according to the acting secretary-general, ‘one can 
draw an inference’ from this statement.213 Lester was frustrated by the attitude of the 
Supervisory Commission which continued, despite all evidence to the contrary, to 
treat the technical organs as apolitical bodies and used that as a pretext to impose 
greater economies on the Geneva Secretariat. At a 1941 meeting of the E.F.O. and 
the L.N.A. in Princeton, Hambro articulated his understanding of the differences 
between the ‘political’ and ‘technical’ League: 
 
A careful distinction must be made between the League as a passive 
international clearing-house for the dissemination of information though the 
International Labour Office, or the economic department, or the Health 
Section, and the League as a football game of power politics ensuring the 
status quo, snubbing Russia and working to keep Europe divided.
214
 
 
The acting secretary-general, like Loveday and Winant, did not believe that the 
League’s technical work could be separated from its political work.215 He completely 
rejected Hambro’s distinction arguing the following in a letter to Makins in 1941: 
 
the fact is that the I.L.O., particularly in its staff and some of their activities, 
can be described as much more political and definitely non-technical than our 
present organisation here. Although we of course still present the political 
idea that is not reflected in our present organisation and expenditure in the 
same way as it is with the other institution.
216
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Indeed the Geneva office tended to concentrate more on statistical work, 
publishing and data collection with little scope to make the same political impact as 
the I.L.O.’s ambitious New York resolutions. The acting secretary-general duly 
noted the efforts undertaken at the New York Conference to avoid mention of the 
words ‘League of Nations.’217 According to Gladwyn Jebb of the British Foreign 
Office, the I.L.O. was ‘conducting a pretty vigorous intrigue against the League’ as it 
attempted to ingratiate itself among the Allied powers at the expense of the parent 
organisation.
218
 The Geneva suffered in the publicity stakes as a result. Following the 
New York Conference of the I.L.O., the American civil servant Smith Simpson 
wrote in The American Political Science Review that the I.L.O. was the only general 
international institution which was continuing to function during the war.
219
   
Lester was also disappointed at Phelan’s failure to keep in contact as his 
compatriot appeared to be doing all he could to avoid association with the League of 
Nations. Though they had disagreed profoundly upon the question of headquarters, 
Loveday’s relationship with Lester was considerably more amiable and both tried to 
maintain correspondence even when their letters touched upon points in which they 
disagreed. Lester wrote to Loveday towards the end of the war expressing his 
gratitude for the latter’s efforts to keep in contact and praising the quality of the 
Princeton mission’s work: ‘You have been doing a hell of a job and doing it well and 
I keep being amazed at the creative and imaginative creativity of your stuff, even 
though I should probably want to argue with you about some things.’220 The E.F.O. 
was far more integrated with the League Secretariat than the I.L.O.; however it too 
pulled away from Geneva when it could. The Geneva Secretariat became anxious 
that the Princeton mission was beginning to assume the authority of League 
headquarters. The League librarian, Arthur de Brechya Vauthier, protested at the use 
of Loveday’s library in the Institute of Advanced Study of the title ‘League of 
Nations Library, Princeton.’221 According to de Brechya Vauthier such usage risked 
creating the false impression that the Rockefeller Library was no longer working at 
Geneva. This hampered the efforts made on the Library’s part to maintain all 
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possible connection with academic intuitions and repositories in foreign countries, 
especially among those located in the western hemisphere.
222
 De Brechya Vauthier 
already noticed a creeping tendency among governments to dispatch official 
publications to Princeton, rather than to Geneva. In interviews with the American 
press and in their writings, Loveday’s staff also gave the impression that they were 
collecting all the statistical information for Europe and were simply sending the 
information via telegraph to Geneva, which was depicted as a mere centre for 
publishing, which was not the case.
223
  
The ambitious and high profile work of the transferred missions risked 
effacing the important (and non-political) work of the Geneva Secretariat. As Frank 
Boudreau wrote to Lester, ‘what we have to combat is the feeling that the League is 
dead; many of my friends who know something of Europe express great surprise 
when I tell them how many League officials are still employed and how much work 
is still going on.’ 224  As Rasmus Skylstad (a former League official then in the 
employment of the Norwegian government-in-exile) wrote to Lester in May 1941; ‘I 
tell everybody that the work is still going on in Geneva and they all seem 
surprised.’225 Even when the League’s one man publicity machine was still seconded 
to the organisation he risked tarnishing the overall image of the organisation.  
Sweetser delighted in contrasting the vitality of the technical work with the torpor of 
the League’s political mission. As a result he created the impression of an indolent 
Geneva-based Secretariat earning a rebuke from the acting secretary-general:  
 
I know that mental picture is a very great temptation: I doubt if it is entirely 
sound. I would see no objection to quote “the deserted Council chamber”, but 
it should be offset by a picture of quiet steady work, actual services 
maintained and being rendered, readiness for future, fate [of which] not yet 
decided-and also for the United States not so much emphasis on the 
reductions and economies enforced, as on what is still maintained. Reflect 
upon this angle and I think you may agree with me that we should avoid 
anything smacking of sentiment over the sepulchre.
226
  
 
The push to disassociate the technical agencies with the politics of Geneva 
resulted in an internal conflict in the League’s various drug bodies. Differences arose 
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between the Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body, staffed 
by various experts, and the League-centred Opium Advisory Committee (O.A.C.) 
which was led by Bertil Renborg and directly staffed from the League Secretariat.
227
 
Renborg was intent on promoting the interests of the League, which figures such as 
Leon Steinig, de facto head of the Drug Supervisory Body and chairman of the 
Permanent Central Opium Board, viewed as damaging to the potential of the drug 
bodies, particularly to its relationship with the United States.
228
 Renborg was also apt 
to take the political role of his office seriously, pushing for direct intervention in the 
domestic affairs of opium producing states which flew in the face of the cautious 
diplomatic environment of Washington. According to another member of the 
Secretariat, Renborg had thought only of personal interests in departing Geneva for 
the safety of the United States and had failed to prepare a plan for the work of his 
group once they arrived.
229
 Lester wrote to Arthur Felkin, the secretary of the 
P.C.O.B., in 1944, reminding him that as the representatives of the three drug bodies 
were unable to meet it was important to ‘avoid any misunderstandings and 
discrepancies in the preparatory work pursued in connection with reconstruction 
problems.’230 A projection of disharmony within the technical organisations risked 
further damage to the League. Steinig and Felkin managed to marginalise Renborg 
whom Lester recognised as a disturbing presence and recalled to Europe, assigning 
him administration work in London.
231
 Like Phelan, Steinig and Felkin perceived the 
futility of clinging to the old structures and practices of the League as they strove to 
prove the potential of their agencies to the task in hand.  
The attitude of the United States government vindicates the judgement of 
those officials who viewed association with the ‘political’ League as a disadvantage 
to the post-war prospects of the technical organisations. In 1943 the Foreign Office 
attempted to sound out the American State Department on its willingness to include 
the League in the process of post-war reconstruction. The British were informed that 
while the State Department had not developed, by 1943, any clear ideas on this 
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problem, it was certain that it ‘would be easier to use the I.L.O. than the League 
Secretariat in view of the fact that the United States was a member of the I.L.O. 
whereas the League of Nations still aroused a certain amount of political feeling.’232 
As a result of the New York Conference a greater deal of promise was 
invested in the I.L.O. than in the other technical organisations. As the I.L.O. was 
held, largely because of its own grandstanding, to a higher standard, it had farther to 
fall. Despite the support that the United States was willing to accord the Labour 
Office, there were many who, in the aftermath of the New York Conference, 
believed the I.L.O. to have been overtaken by its own momentum. At the New York 
Conference delegates confidently proclaimed the organisation’s right to a voice in 
matters of post-war reconstruction but by 1943 very little effect had been given to 
this resolution. The committee established to consider measures to make possible the 
social objectives of the Atlantic Charter had not made any progress and Phelan, in 
particular, was blamed for this lethargy.
233
 Jef Rens, a member of the Governing 
Body and the secretary of the Belgian Commission for the study of post-war 
problems, criticised the failure of the I.L.O. to establish such a working committee 
and characterised this failure as indicative of the ‘slow and difficult’ 
communications between the Montreal office, Washington and London.’ 234  As 
Carter Goodrich (the American chairman of the Governing Body) recollected in 
1946: ‘No one who has lived intimately with the work of the I.L.O. can fail to 
recognise that there have been opportunities missed as well as opportunities 
taken.’ 235  In the House of Commons Richard Law was compelled, in 1943, to 
counter criticisms that the I.L.O. was becoming too ‘sidetracked.’236 Law gave an 
emphatic assurance that it was the British government’s desire to associate the I.L.O., 
in every practical way, with the work of post-war reconstruction.
237
 In December of 
1943 Eden further stressed to his fellow parliamentary members that he wanted to 
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see the I.L.O. ‘become the main instrument for implementing article five of the 
Atlantic Charter.’238 
Despite its failure to live up to the aspirations of the New York Conference 
the I.L.O.’s future appeared more assured because of the strong governmental 
support it enjoyed. The British government made allowances for the fact that the 
fortunes of the Allies had undergone a dramatic transformation since the New York 
Conference. Ernest Bevin, speaking to a meeting of the Governing Body in London 
in 1943, pointed out the fundamental shift in the position of the Allied powers since 
the Body’s last meeting two years previously: ‘Then, we were struggling for 
existence. Today, the military position is very different, so that without letting up in 
the fight for complete victory over the enemies of democracy, we can find some 
moments to look ahead to reconstruction and the course which humanity must 
follow.’239 According to Clavin, in the aftermath of the New York Conference the 
I.L.O.’s position became more precarious with U.S. congressional elections in 1942 
resulting in stronger representation from Republicans and conservative Democrats 
who rejected the New Deal; the policy with which the I.L.O. shared a considerable 
affinity. 
240
 Phelan sought to remind member states that at the New York Conference 
the United States was a non-belligerent power that could afford to invest greater 
priority to international social reform through the I.L.O. The acting director offered 
the following defence in his director’s report of 1944:  
 
In assessing the progress achieved thus far, it should be borne in mind that 
the setback of Pearl Harbor and of all that followed prior to the entry of 
United Nations forces in North Africa completely altered the political 
conditions under which the New York resolution was adopted, and that 
reconstruction, like peace itself, of which it is the first place, is a continuous 
process.
241
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According to a 1944 report, the Governing Body, having met in Montreal, 
regarded itself as entirely satisfied that the Labour Office was already associated 
with the work of several bodies engaged in question of post-war reconstruction, 
through which the organisation could work towards its social objectives.
242
 What the 
report failed to mention was that these achievements were shared by the League’s 
other technical agencies who did not enjoy the lion share of funding accorded to the 
I.L.O. by the Supervisory Commission. Van Goethem characterised Phelan, during 
this period, as nothing more than ‘a pawn on the chessboard of world politics.’243 
This judgement is rather harsh ignoring the reality that international organisations 
such as the I.L.O. were predicated on volunteerism. Their strength always depended 
on the degree to which the great powers were prepared to use them. The same 
limitations were faced by the successive secretaries-general of the League. Under 
Phelan the I.L.O. managed to maintain a significant presence and profile on the 
international scene and was an unrelenting advertiser of its own potential. However 
the I.L.O.’s eventual post-war survival could be less attributed to the value of its 
work programme than to the support of its powerful friends. As a favoured 
international vehicle for American social and democratic values, it enjoyed a 
permanent safety net.  
During this period the United States began taking a more direct role in trying 
to determine the policy and procedures of the I.L.O. A frequent expression that was 
bandied about during the Second World War was that America had ‘come of age.’244 
The idea that the United States had reached a climactic point in its history grew more 
prevalent, with the dawning realisation that the seat of power had finally transferred 
from the old world to the new.
245
 According to this theory, the United States 
inherited the supreme position, previously occupied by earlier civilisations such as 
the Romans, the Spanish and most recently by the British Empire. With this privilege  
came the responsibility of spreading good government across the globe and 
Americans were able to contrast their supposedly non-imperialist credentials against 
those of their successors and against the regressive old world governments fallen to 
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communism and fascism.
246
 Clavin argued that critiques of American 
‘irresponsibility’ in the inter-war period, articulated by bodies such as the League, 
helped to reshape American foreign policy after the war’s end.247 During the war 
itself, the platform provided by League agencies such as the I.L.O. allowed the 
United States to become more confident in its leading international role.  By 1943 
the State Department was most anxious for the convocation of a formal session of 
the International Labour Conference in order to provide an international forum for 
the formulation of post-war labour and social policy on the part of the United 
Nations powers.
248
 The U.S. government proceeded to invite Phelan to hold the 
I.L.O. Conference in the United States and suggested Philadelphia as an appropriate 
destination.
249
 
The increasingly bold internationalism of the United States was tempered by 
conservatism of the United Kingdom, the veteran pacesetter of international 
cooperation. The British government remained committed to existing procedures in 
international organisation and to keeping structures and practises intact. Within the 
League’s wartime experience it had been an American envoy that provided the bold 
encouragement for the de Gaulle-Giraud declarations while the more cautious British 
Foreign Office demurred from any aberration in protocol. As preparations for the 
new I.L.O. Conference were underway, the British government sought to remind the 
United States that the time and place of the conference was for the Governing Body, 
and not for individual governments to decide. While it was the wish of most 
delegates, especially the workers and employers, to hold the session in June 1944, 
the U.S. government decided instead that the conference should convene in April so 
that it would not clash with the American presidential election.
250
 The Foreign Office, 
speaking to Hull through Ambassador Winant, the former director of the I.L.O.,  
stressed that the worker and employer groups within the tripartite structure were very 
jealous of their rights in such matters and would greatly resent any action by the 
governments which tended to suggest their willingness to dominate the worker’s 
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groups.’251 Such was the emboldened international impulse of the U.S. government 
that this advice went unheeded.  
The preparations for the Labour Conference demonstrated the differing 
approaches of the administrations of the ‘Big Three’ to international organisations. If 
it was Britain that ensured the wartime survival of the League, it was the United 
States that determined its functions and traditions would be transposed to a new 
organisation at the war’s end. In turn, it was another emerging great power that 
ensured once and for all that the United Nations Organisation could not be 
characterised as a resurrected League. The I.L.O.’s fractious relations with the Soviet 
Union came back to haunt it in the later stages of the war. By 1943 the U.S.S.R. 
enjoyed considerably more political and military leverage than in 1939 when League 
member states, as well as the Governing Body of the I.L.O., contrived to banish it 
from the established international framework. The Soviet Union, through enormous 
human sacrifice, was making the largest contribution to the liberation of Europe. 
After the Battle of Stalingrad (1942-3) the Soviet Union became more confident, 
secure in the knowledge that it was the Red Army that was doing the most to push 
the Wehrmacht back to Berlin.
 252
   
With the obvious necessity of establishing a new system of international 
organisation, the cooperation of the most powerful United Nations power on the 
continent of Europe was required to ensure its success. Roosevelt wanted Stalin to 
work with him ‘for a world of democracy and peace.’ 253  As the Philadelphia 
conference loomed, the United States, in a pre-Cold War burst of good feeling 
towards the U.S.S.R, invited the Soviet government to field a delegation so that that 
it could avail of an unrivalled opportunity to discuss the problems of post-war 
planning and reconstruction.
254
 The Governing Body of the I.L.O., at the suggestion 
of the worker’s group, agreed that the Soviet Union should be invited to participate 
in the conference and that it should be allotted a seat among the eight states of chief 
industrial importance.
255
 The Governing Body also agreed that should the Soviet 
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Union take its place at the conference, the question as to whether its membership of 
the I.L.O. had ever lapsed would not be raised.
256
  
In the event of the Soviet Union’s acceptance of this invitation, the 
attendance of Finland would become a thorny issue. Finland never formally 
withdrew from League or, by extension, from the I.L.O. In 1943, with the 
diminished likelihood of a German victory on the Eastern Front, the Finns sought to 
re-establish relations with the League Secretariat. Despite the liquidation of the 
League diplomatic corps by the Swiss federal government in 1940, Lester often had 
the opportunity of informal meetings with government representatives passing 
through Geneva.
 257
 Two such visits were paid by the Finnish minister to Switzerland 
who was both times accompanied by the former Finnish minister to Paris and one-
time foreign minister, Oscar P. Enckell, a personal friend of General Mannerheim, 
the commander in chief of Finnish defence force. Enckell was a member of a 
committee in Finland which was interesting itself in post-war arrangements and 
foreign policy, including Finnish relations with the League. On the first visit in April 
1943 Enckell admitted to the acting secretary-general that there was a great deal of 
anxiety in his country about Finland’s position if it was still a co-belligerent in 
German eastern offensive at the end of the war; his government was aware that 
Finland’s ‘big capital of sympathy’ with western countries would soon be spent.258 
Lester came to the conclusion that one of the reasons for their calling on him was to 
stimulate ‘sympathy and appreciation’ for the difficult political situation in which 
Finland had found itself.
259
  
On their second visit in October 1943 the Finns addressed the awkward 
subject of Finnish membership of the League. The Finns indicated to Lester that 
while an official declaration of support for the League was not possible at that 
present juncture, as Finnish military supplies were heavily reliant upon Germany, the 
government was interested in improving its relations with the League in the near 
future.
260
 This softening of Finland’s policy towards the League culminated in 1944 
with the re-establishment of official relations with the League. The government 
informed Lester in January of that year of its intention to pay its contribution to the 
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League budget for a period covering all years until 1943. This was a sizeable sum, 
amounting to 423,000 C.H.F. Lester informed Jacklin that this initiative was 
‘entirely Finnish’ and that the government asked for the matter to be treated as 
confidential.
261
 At this moment in time Finland was still fighting on the eastern front 
and the issue of membership of the League was a sensitive topic. The League’s 
liberal democratic identity became attractive and expedient once more to Finland at a 
time when it was anxious to gravitate away from the German sphere; this further 
demonstrates the political significance of League membership during the war years.  
As it remained an official member of both the League and the I.L.O., Finland 
was automatically issued an invitation to the Philadelphia Conference. The U.S. 
State Department, realising that the presence of Finland at the conference would be 
deeply unpopular not just with the Soviet Union, but with the rest of the Allied 
powers, took it upon itself to request the Finnish government to abstain from the 
conference.
262
 Finland, a member of the I.L.O. for a considerably longer period than 
the United States, took to this suggestion with ill-grace. Responding to the State 
Department’s request, the Finnish government expressed the following sentiments: 
 
Finland had received invitation to I.L.O. Conference with great satisfaction 
because it has always been considered in this country that international 
collaboration, both political and economic, is the best means to secure 
permanent peace and justice. Furthermore, this country has been particularly 
interested in I.L.O. work and has been a member of Organisation since 1919. 
In the future it intends to continue its participation.
263
 
 
While clearly offended, the Finnish government relented to American pressure and 
abstained from the Philadelphia Conference. American efforts to keep Finland away 
from Philadelphia indicate that the U.S. government was treating the International 
Labour Conference as an extension of its own foreign policy. This presaged what 
Rietzler described as the post-war tendency of the State Department to transform 
‘international organisations like UNESCO into a mouthpiece for American 
policies.’264 In the aftermath of the American rebuff of Finland Anthony Eden was 
                                                          
261
 Telegram from Lester to Jacklin, 20 Jan. 1944 (L.N.A., O.S.G., S553/2).  
262
 The secretary of state to the minister in Finland, 7 Feb. 1944 (FRUS, diplomatic papers: general 
economic and social matters 1944, p. 1016).  
263
 The chargé in Finland to the secretary of state, 11 Feb. 1944 (FRUS, diplomatic papers: general 
economic and social matters 1944, p. 1016).  
264
 Katharina Rietzler, ‘Before the cold wars: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the 
inter-war years’ in Historical Research, lxxxiv (2011), p. 150.  
231 
 
reminded in the House of Commons that the I.L.O. was ‘not an American institution 
but an international institution.’265 Eden intimated to his parliamentary colleagues 
that the action of the United States government was not taken in cooperation with his 
own.
266
 While opinion, even among the British trade unions, concurred that Finland 
could not take its appointed place in Philadelphia, the idea that an international 
organisation could be commandeered to express the foreign policy of an individual 
government was not a popular one.
267
 This attitude was somewhat hypocritical given 
the British intention, in the winter of 1939-40, to exploit the terms of an Assembly 
resolution (in respect of the very country excluded from the I.L.O. Conference of 
1944) in order fulfil its own war aims. However in this respect at least, Britain better 
understood that a certain level of etiquette needed to be maintained. When a great 
power wanted to exploit an international organisation to achieve a purpose for which 
it was not designed, greater discretion was required.  
Ultimately the Soviet Union had no intention of attending the Philadelphia 
Conference, declaring that it had no further association with any agency of the 
League and that it did not regard the I.L.O. as endowed with the sufficient authority 
to coordinate international cooperation in labour matters.
268
 Even a personal 
intercession from Roosevelt to Stalin did not result in a Soviet delegation to 
Philadelphia.
269
 Stalin wrote that participation with the I.L.O., under League 
auspices, was impossible. However, he did declare the Soviet Union open to future 
participation with the I.L.O. should that agency enter into a formal relationship with 
the United Nations powers.
270
  Roosevelt’s response imparted to Stalin the following 
expectations he had for the future of the I.L.O.: ‘I hope that the coming meeting of 
the International Labour Organisation will make it clear that it is no longer an organ 
of the League of Nations and that it will become affiliated with the United 
Nations.’ 271  Eden, speaking through Ambassador Winant, counselled the United 
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States government not to pursue the matter with the Soviet Union any further as it 
has always seemed to the British ‘that in view of past events the Soviet government 
would prefer not to return to the existing bodies but, as a matter of self respect, 
[would] resume their connection with these international activities as a founder 
member of a reconstituted organisation.’272 This episode demonstrated that there was 
a definite limit to the I.L.O.’s ability to escape association with its parent 
organisation. Its own political identity, as an alternative to international communism, 
also proved problematic to an international system anxious to accommodate the 
U.S.S.R. 
In the pages of its magazine, Headway, the L.N.U. attacked the Soviet refusal 
to attend the Philadelphia Conference and referenced the ‘savage denunciation’ of 
the I.L.O. in Izvestia, the official Soviet journal.
273
 The article in Izvetsia dismissed 
the I.L.O. as a bankrupt organisation, a charge that was repudiated by Frances 
Perkins who led the American delegation to the Philadelphia Conference. Perkins 
reminded other delegates assembled in Philadelphia that the I.L.O. was already 
associated with the United Nations powers and quoted Roosevelt’s hope that it 
would eventually become part of a permanent U.N. organisation.
274
 The Daily 
Worker, (later to be re-named the Morning Star) the organ of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain, defended the Soviet Union’s stance on the I.L.O. The newspaper 
heavily criticised the organisation for issuing an invitation to the ‘Hitlerite satellites, 
Finland, Romania and Hungary.’275 According to the article the I.L.O. had proven its 
irrelevancy by operating as an international organisation which offered a certain 
refuge to the countries 'seeking a common language with the fascist countries’ rather 
than as an organ of the United Nations alliance. 
The depiction of the I.L.O. as a protector of Axis sympathisers was ironic, 
considering the organisation’s tradition of outspoken support for the Allied cause. 
This tradition was upheld at the Philadelphia Conference when delegates expressed 
‘the conviction that the heroic resistance of the occupied countries is one of the 
essential factors in the struggle of the United Nations against the common enemy.’276 
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In the lead up to the conference the American chairman of the Governing Body, 
Carter Goodrich, expressed his desire for the I.L.O.’s pre-Conference proposals to be 
described as the ‘present and post-war policy of the United Nations’ but the British 
representative succeeded in getting it amended.
277
 While the British were eager to 
present the results of the Conference as ‘a manifestation of their [United Nations 
powers] clear desire to apply the principles of democracy to the future ordering of 
the world’ it did not want to appear to be excluding non-United Nations members of 
the I.L.O.
278
 However, the amended text continued to heavily reference the United 
Nations with the resulting alienation of the Portuguese government which declared 
its intention to abstain from Philadelphia, despite a direct appeal from Frances 
Perkins.
279
 Apart from the Portuguese objection, the British effort to present the 
I.L.O. as less of an Allied satellite agency helped ensure more universal 
representation at Philadelphia. The so called ‘Hitlerite’ countries, while they may 
have been invited, did not attend but unlike in 1941 Sweden and Switzerland joined 
the Irish Free State as European neutrals prepared to send a delegation to the Labour 
Conference.
280
  
The twenty-sixth session of International Labour Conference opened on 20 
April 1944 at Temple University, Philadelphia. The resulting Declaration of 
Philadelphia (1944) laid the foundation for a new constitution (adopted in 1946) and 
the ideals of social justice articulated in its pages became a model for the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration called on all 
governments to strive to achieve conditions in which all men and all women could 
pursue their material well-being and spiritual development in freedom and dignity.
281
 
Delegates in attendance at Philadelphia approved several resolutions directly urging 
the United Nations powers to safeguard the well-being and development of peoples 
within the dependent (colonial) territories, to apply various international labour 
conventions to these territories and even to make a periodical report to the I.L.O. on 
                                                          
277
 Memorandum of minister for labour and national service giving instructions to British delegates to 
the I.L.O. Conference, 13 Apr. 1944 (T.N.A., CAB 66/48/47, f. 266, p. 5).  
278
 Ibid., f. 265, p. 4.  
279
 Ibid., f. 266, p. 5.  
280
 International Labour Conference twenty-sixth session, Philadelphia 1944: record of proceedings 
(Montreal, 1944), pp xv-xxiv, available from (I.L.O.A., I.L.O.C.P., official documents).  
281
 Declarations concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation 
(Philadelphia Declaration), International Labour Conference, record of proceedings, twenty-sixth 
session, Philadelphia, 10 May 1944 available from  (I.L.O.A, I.L.O.C.P., official documents).  
234 
 
social policy within these areas.
282
 The conference also recommended the use of 
Spanish and Portuguese as official languages of the I.L.O. ‘largely because of the 
longstanding support of Central and South America for the organisation.’283 By 1944 
the I.L.O. Conference was not tainted by any awkward standoffs between the Free 
French and Vichy. The former I.L.O. official Adrien Tixier was invited by Phelan 
and the Governing Body to lead a tripartite delegation to the conference.
284
 This 
invitation did not mean the I.L.O. was conferring official recognition on the C.F.L.N; 
rather Phelan made it clear to Tixier that he was welcomed as a representative of 
Free France and that the I.L.O. was mindful of the fact that ‘a great majority of the 
French people were still in a position which prevented them from exercising their 
free will in the choice of their government.’ 285  The conference showcased the 
expanding ambitions of the I.L.O. when, through the medium of a resolution, 
delegates attributed to the organisation the responsibility to ‘examine and consider 
all international economic and financial policies and measures’ likely to have a 
bearing on labour matters.
 286
 The I.L.O.’s special Advisory Committee on the 
Economic Conditions of Post-War Reconstruction was also established which 
expressed its openness to collaborating with the United Nations powers in the 
construction of a new organisation. By the close of the Philadelphia Conference the 
inclusion of the I.L.O. into the new international framework, yet to emerge, was a 
foregone conclusion.  
The emergence of that new system of international cooperation was a 
painstakingly slow process. Roosevelt did not want to make the same mistake as 
Wilson in committing the United States to too much too fast, resulting in the 
alienation of Congress. He believed that the best course of action was to adopt a 
gradualist approach to greater international cooperation.
287
 The first step in this 
process was the Hot Springs Conference of May 1943 which established the basis for 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (F.A.O). The League furnished the 
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representatives of the United Nations powers, assembled in Hot Springs, with the 
pertinent information and statistics on world nutrition; information which formed 
‘the documentary backbone of the conference.’288 The director of the E.F.O. was 
subsequently invited to participate in the deliberations of the F.A.O.’s Interim 
Commission and to nominate experts to assist in devising a programme of statistical 
investigation and research into the challenges facing the new organisation.
289
 It is 
important to note that the League was never an official observer to the conference. 
Rather it served in an advisory capacity in a reflection of the inclination of the 
United States to retain a political distance from the League while benefiting from the 
fruits of its technical work.  
The question of how great a role the League should play in post-war planning 
and reconstruction absorbed the Secretariat, its supporters and national civil servants. 
Arthur Sweetser conceded that the changing political situation would complicate the 
League’s ability to participate in wartime relief and post-war planning, but remained 
convinced that its officials were the best suited to these crucial activities: 
 
It is going to be a tough job to hold the lines when the present emergencies 
pass, new allegiances develop, and people slip back into the inevitable 
exhaustion. We certainly have the very best of claims for a front line position, 
claims which are justified by a very long and successful experience, but we 
are going to find that many new people and new methods will have come into 
the picture, and that we can get a seat only if we stake out a claim 
considerably in advance and arrive at the right moment with invaluable 
material.
290
  
  
Others were less convinced that the League should occupy a ‘front line position.’ 
The Foreign Office was initially reluctant to recognise the League as the most 
appropriate body to tackle such a complex and delicate questions. Roger Makins 
wrote in 1941 that the League had neither the ‘funds of the staff to make any serious 
impression in this field. There is already too much cerebration on insufficient 
data.’ 291  Makins was not convinced by the bold resolutions of the New York 
Conference, demanding a role for the organisation in post-war planning. Rather he 
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believed that the problem of post-war reconstruction should be best left to an inter-
Allied organisation and that I.L.O. officials should not overextend themselves by 
doing more than collecting such data as was available to them.
292
 Within the League 
apparatus itself there was an awareness that the international civil service would not 
be in a position to direct reconstruction projects when the time came but rather 
should confine itself to offering information and guidance to the relevant Allied 
authorities. Leon Steinig believed that the League’s drug control service was 
‘numerically unable to face the task of helping to re-establish promptly any controls 
in liberated countries.’293 According to Steinig it was  
 
important that, while responsible control be squarely placed on occupying 
power to whom it belongs, the League Secretariat should, in replying to the 
[requests of the] United States, express willingness to send suitable officials 
to help with advice as and when occupying powers became responsible for 
handing over control to adequate re-established national administrations.
294
  
 
Thus the directors of the League’s technical organisations could not be overly 
ambitious in pushing their agencies forward as the most competent body to directly 
address the manifold problems engendered by the sudden cessation of hostilities. 
However, as the experience of the technical organisations attested, the Allied powers 
were eager to derive the benefits of the extensive intelligence and statistical data 
gathered by the League. League officials did not ignore the scruples of governments 
where the League was concerned, but rather sought to achieve as much as they could 
within the confines of the wider political climate.  
During this period the E.F.O. continued to make a significant contribution to 
the preparations for post-war economic reconstruction.  A special delegation was 
formed in 1943 on economic depressions and the fruit of the group’s labours was a 
study published under the title; The Transition from War to the Peace Economy 
which discussed the need to provide universal employment to prevent post-war 
unrest.
295
 Various government bodies including the White House and the State 
Department drew on this E.F.O. publication in their own studies of post-war 
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reconstruction.
296
An E.F.O. official also produced The League of Nations 
reconstruction schemes in the inter-war period which reminded the world of the 
financial and economic advice and assistance the League had given individual 
governments in the aftermath of the previous war. Before this study was officially 
published by the League it was made available to the U.S. and British 
governments.
297
 Loveday attended the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944, accompanied by his colleague Ragnar 
Nurkse who authored the study International Currency Experience which was 
distributed at the conference.
298
 In her recent work Clavin demonstrated how that the 
inter-war League loan system, offered to countries facing a banking crisis, and the 
financial missions the League dispatched to the less developed economies of Austria, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece set a precedent for the agencies which emerged from 
Bretton Woods-the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). 
299
  
At the request of the American government a special study was prepared in 
1942, by the League’s drug experts, on the narcotic situation in the part of 
continental Europe under Axis occupation. In 1943 the League’s drug control service 
drew up various monographs on the drug situation in twenty-seven different 
European and Far-Eastern countries with a view to providing information and 
assistance to the United Nations forces that would likely occupy those countries 
upon the cessation of hostilities.
300
 The London branch office of the League was 
used to forward important League statistics on drug stocks and estimated 
requirements for Sicily and Southern Italy in the wake of the Allied landings there in 
the summer and autumn of 1943.
301
 In the spring of 1944 a series of meetings were 
held between representatives of the United Nations powers and with the chairman 
and vice-chairman of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory 
Body. As a result of these meetings the League’s drug bodies were able to 
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recommend an appropriate policy on drug control during periods of Allied military 
occupation.
302
 
Despite the reluctance of the British and the American governments to create 
the impression that they were about to embrace a revived League of Nations, the 
technical organisations were able to establish a steady working relationship with 
various Allied organisations and agencies. In doing so, the technical organisations 
not only underscored the value of their work and combined experience but also 
vindicated the wartime preservation of the League’s social and economic agencies. 
One of the most pivotal moments of inter-Allied cooperation in the war period was 
the foundation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) in 1943. Jessica Reinisch argued that UNRRA’s relief work provided the 
testing ground for renewed international cooperation following the demise of the 
League.
303
 In reality UNRRA was able to function partly because of the continued 
existence of the League’s technical organisation, upon whom it relied significantly. 
At the first meeting of UNRRA in Atlantic City in November 1943 the Council of 
that body agreed to invite the League and the I.L.O. to send observers to participate 
in its future meetings and committee sessions. The E.F.O. of the League was 
subsequently represented at all session of the UNRRA Council.
304
 UNRRA also 
benefited from the expertise of former League officials. Arthur Salter, a former head 
of the Economic and Financial Section of the League Secretariat, was appointed 
assistant director of UNRRA. Ludwik Rajchman, the former director of the Health 
Organisation, served as the Polish representative to UNRRA and helped draft its 
medical programme. Royall Tyler, another former official of the E.F.O., was 
appointed to serve as an UNRRA representative in Europe. He was accorded special 
facilities in the Palais des Nations by Lester so that he could avail of the extensive 
information services the League could place at his disposal.
305
 From 1944 onwards 
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League officials also provided UNRRA with information on the consumption of 
narcotic drugs in German-occupied Europe.
306
 
The Health Organisation enjoyed a particularly close working relationship 
with UNRRA. In March 1944 when the health division of U.N.N.R.A was under 
development the Administration’s director general, Henry H. Lehman (a former 
governor of New York), formally requested of Lester the co-operation of the 
League’s Health Organisation. Lehman wanted to capitalise on the experience of the 
League’s health and medical experts without incurring the risk of duplication of 
effort.
307
 The acting secretary-general duly obliged and the League’s Health 
Organisation began its work as a research unit in Washington in May 1944. This 
research unit included the former head of the Epidemiological Intelligence Service as 
well as the former statistician of the Singapore Bureau. The Health Organisation’s 
technical unit in Washington served as an official link between the League and 
UNRRA.
308
 It provided the health division of UNRRA with a weekly survey of the 
health situation in Europe, in parts of Africa and in Indo-China. In December 1944 
Lehman, impressed by the work of the League’s Health Organisation, wrote once 
again to Lester citing the need of UNRRA to form an Epidemiological Intelligence 
Service of its own. In view of the ‘excellent work’ carried out by the League’s 
research unit in Washington, Lehman requested that its staff be placed at the direct 
disposal of the health division of UNRRA so that it could ‘form the nucleus of such 
a service.’309 Lester assented and the transfer of those officials from the League to 
UNRRA took effect on 1 January 1945.  
While League assistance and League personnel provided an invaluable 
foundation for UNRRA, the older organisation had to be careful to ensure its own 
influence was not effaced by the high profile work of the new body. Dr. Raymond 
Guatier of the Health Section was opposed to the complete absorption of the League 
body by UNRRA. Gautier argued that the autonomy of the Health Organisation 
should be safeguarded until it could form part of the new international organisation, 
rather than used for the exclusive benefit of UNRRA, itself operating on a temporary 
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basis.
310
 When UNRRA was first established it was predicted that many of the 
League’s technical functions would be assumed by that body.311 By 1944 the idea 
that UNRRA should form the basis of new world health organisation had already 
been abandoned.
312
 In addition, given the nature of its composition and foundation, 
UNRRA could not hope to maintain an intelligence network with non-belligerent 
and non-Allied powers as practised by the Health Organisation. For this reason the 
League’s Health officials, as the tide of war turned in the Allies favour, were 
reluctant to relocate to where they could embark on a closer working relationship 
with the United Nations powers. Guatier counselled against the transfer of the entire 
Health Organisation of the League to London. Guatier argued that while the Health 
Organisation was eager to collaborate with Allied services, if it abandoned its 
Geneva base the principle of reciprocity of information with Axis and neutral 
countries would have to be abandoned.
313
 Throughout the war maintenance of 
headquarters in Geneva had allowed the Health Organisation to gain a more 
complete picture of the European health situation than would have been possible 
from an Allied country or from a base in the western hemisphere. The maintenance 
of a League nucleus in Europe imbued the preservation of headquarters on the shores 
of Lake Geneva with a practical advantage that complemented its symbolic 
importance.  
In conclusion, the League’s wartime experience serves as a clear reflection of 
an evolving world order. Far from being irrelevant, membership of the League of 
Nations retained a political significance for many states. Member states maintained 
their membership to affirm their sovereignty or courted it to prove their legitimacy. 
Others renounced it when their national policies became incompatible with the ethos 
of the Covenant. The efforts of the League’s technical agencies to participate in post-
war planning and the responses such activities also demonstrated the delicate 
position of the League in the evolving international landscape. Every member of the 
alliance of the Big Three ultimately recognised the imperative of a new organisation 
that eschewed the pitfalls of the League. For Britain and even for the United States, 
tradition remained just as important as innovation; even if those states were not quite 
transparent about the huge debt new U.N. agencies such as the F.A.O. and UNRRA 
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owed to the League. For the Soviet Union, eager to brush off the indignity of the past, 
a clean break was crucial. The organic relationship between the ‘political’ and the 
‘technical’ League became an impediment to the League’s social and economic work 
when the great powers began to contemplate a stronger security organisation more 
attuned to realpolitik than to the rhetoric of liberal democracy. The League’s 
haunting past placed its post-war legacy in jeopardy; the structural weakness and 
congenital flaws within the Geneva system proved a compelling obstacle to League 
officials as they strove to make a contribution to the construction of a new 
international system. As a result, the League underwent another identify crisis, with 
the transferred missions seeking to artificially differentiate between their work and 
that of a supposedly moribund relic of the political League; the Geneva Secretariat. 
However, as the Soviet Union’s refusal to attend the Philadelphia Conference 
demonstrated, the technical organisations, having served as the most forceful 
expression of the League’s liberal democratic identify during the Second World War, 
could not escape the ideological underpinnings of the Geneva system. The course of 
international affairs ultimately determined the League’s post-war dissolution but the 
ever-growing dissonance between the various branches of the international civil 
service meant that by 1944 the League was already undergoing a process of self-
dismantlement. 
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Chapter five: The dissolution of the League of Nations and the transfer of assets 
and functions to the United Nations Organisation, 1945-7  
 In the summer and autumn of 1944 concrete plans for a new world 
organisation eventually began to materialise. The establishment of the United 
Nations Organisation (U.N.O.) prompted increased contemporary debate on the 
experience of the League and its lessons for post-war internationalism. This debate 
has never ceased and has proven a fertile discussion ground for historians and 
scholars of international relations as they strive to explain the League’s failure to 
function as an effective security agent and to attribute to it a legacy within the 
overall narrative of international cooperation. This final chapter draws on the 
writings and correspondence of Secretariat officials, of League supporters and critics, 
of politicians and of civil servant during the period leading up to and immediately 
following the organisation’s dissolution in order to make a contribution to this 
worthwhile debate. This chapter asserts that the transition from the League to the 
U.N.O. was not an organic process; nor was it a clean break with the internationalist 
traditions of the past. The League and the U.N.O. were the products of a shared 
international heritage as well as differing political climates. The contemporary 
reactions to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, to the San Francisco Conference and to 
the final Assembly of the League of Nations demonstrate that internationalism 
remained a ubiquitous but divisive subject. This chapter chronicles the political 
obstacles and controversies faced by League officials and supporters as they 
endeavoured to preserve some semblance of technocratic continuity between the old 
and the new international civil service. It was indicative of the League’s tendency to 
reflect the current of international affairs that the dissolution of the Eurocentric 
League presaged the post-war eclipse of Europe in the United Nations Organisation.   
 
 
The League of Nations and Dumbarton Oaks 
In a note Lester prepared for the League’s Supervisory Commission in May 1944 he 
outlined what he perceived as the significance and value of the wartime preservation 
of the League: 
 
In spite of unparalleled preoccupations with the terrific tasks imposed on 
them by the world war, [member states] have looked beyond their turmoil: 
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they have not only assessed the real value of substantial immediate services 
being rendered but have made it materially possible for the three organs of 
the League of Nations-the Secretariat, the International Labour Organisation, 
and the International Court-to remain as a beacon and as a guide until the 
peoples of the world had again found faith in a future of ordered peace and 
justice [and] had the opportunity to consider the best means of reorganising 
international cooperation for these objects.
1
  
 
In a letter to the secretary-general in June 1944 Alexander Cadogan asserted that the 
time was clearly approaching when the League would be substituted for a new world 
organisation.
2
 He reminded Lester that the Soviet Union would not forget its 
expulsion from the League as its refusal to even participate in the I.L.O. Conference 
indicated. While this was a complicating factor, Cadogan relayed his government’s 
confidence that the preparatory work for ‘the new world order’ would ‘draw on the 
immense and valuable experience of the League of Nations’ with the new 
organisation eventually assuming the functions of the old, especially its technical 
activities.
3
 It is easy to validate Stedman’s assertion that the British government was 
inclined to exploit the rhetoric of the League and to ignore its obligations to the 
League’s diplomatic machinery in order to pursue its own diplomatic ends. 4 
However when the moment of crisis came for the League, it was British moral and 
financial support that largely carried the organisation through the war years. The 
establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 marked the culmination of the liberal 
internationalist traditions of its member states. Mazower argued that British 
influence on the League Covenant is often unfairly overshadowed by Woodrow 
Wilson’s more public championship of the document.5 It was Robert Cecil who 
produced the most comprehensive proposals for a world organisation in the lead up 
to the Paris Peace Conference; these proposals were then supported and enlarged by 
South Africa’s General Smuts.6 The League Covenant was arguably a derivative of 
British internationalist and peace movements, owing much to the early studies of 
groups such as the Fabian Society and was as much the product of British history as 
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its inter-war governments.
7
 Due to its close connections to establishment figures 
such as Cecil, the League was an intrinsic feature of the British political landscape at 
a time when the British position in the wider international landscape was shifting. 
Kenneth Morgan posits that it would be premature to depict the immediate post-war 
years as the period in which Britain lost its world power status.
8
 Until the Suez Crisis 
of 1956 many British politicians, particularly Churchill and Eden, believed that the 
country could still recover its antebellum position once its economy had recovered 
from the devastating effects of total war.
9
 However in the immediate post-war period 
it was the United States which emerged with its economy booming and with its 
global power enhanced rather than diminished.
10
 As the junior partner in the alliance 
of the ‘Big-Three’, the United Kingdom could not hope to enjoy the same dominance 
at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference as it had in Paris in 1919 with Churchill often 
sidelined by Roosevelt in the president’s negotiations with Stalin.11 A commitment 
to securing continuity between the League and the new international system arguably 
provided the means of sustaining the British internationalist tradition.  
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference (August-October 1944) prefigured the 
establishment of an international organisation devoted to the maintenance of peace 
and security. The negotiations of the Big Four (the United States, the U.S.S.R., the 
United Kingdom and China) conducted in the historic Georgetown estate outside 
Washington D.C., presaged the creation of a General Assembly, a Security Council 
and an International Court of Justice. An Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
was to be created to direct international cooperation in the economic, humanitarian 
and social fields.
12
  While the publication of the proposals indicated that the new 
organisation would retain some of the features and functions of the old, they also 
signalled a new departure in the measures employed to maintain security, to avert 
war and to contain and punish illegal acts of aggression. The most crucial of these 
measures was the Security Council through which the Big Four and France would 
oversee matters which threatened the peace of the world. A subsidiary body of the 
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Security Council, the Military Staff Committee, would plan U.N. military action and 
assist in the regulation of armaments. The proposals echoed the earlier 
pronouncements of the British and U.S. governments; the new organisation was to 
function first and foremost as a security organisation. Brought into being in a world 
still at war, the purpose of the new organisation was to ensure that when peace was 
declared the United Nations possessed the appropriate machinery by which to keep it.  
The publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in autumn 1944 inevitably 
inspired contemporary comparisons to be made between the new world organisation 
and the League. Comparing and contrasting the League and the United Nations 
Organisation has proven a popular pursuit of both historians and scholars of 
international relations over the past seventy years. It is essential however that 
international historians do not become over-zealous in providing an overly simplified 
grand narrative for internationalism. The political scientist Lucian Ashworth recently 
argued that international relations as a discipline often fell prey to ‘Whiggish’ 
practises in that the past was interpreted only as it related to the present.
13
  The 
League and the United Nations are often depicted as chapters of the same story and 
League officials were among the first erstwhile historians to impose this ‘Whiggish’ 
interpretation of the League experience. Writing in 1952, Arthur Sweetser insisted 
that the U.N. was what the League would have been had it been given a normal 
chance of development.
14
 Sweetser’s assertion oversimplified the important 
differences in the political landscape between 1919 and 1945. Writing in the 1970s, 
Paul Raffo asserted that the transition from the League to the United Nations 
Organisation was not the neat narrative that figures such as Sweetser sought to 
present.
15
 This chapter does not seek to simplify the transition from the League to the 
U.N. It demonstrates that this transition was a complex process, riddled with 
complexity and inconsistency.  
Some liberal internationalists welcomed the creation of the new organisation 
by falling into a teleological trap. After pursuing the details of the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals, Sweetser, ever the Wilsonian idealist, expected the new organisation to 
build upon the old as proof of the progress of civilisation. He observed that ‘it would 
be an affront to human intelligence to think that mankind, in a second effort, after a 
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quarter century of experience, and a second world war, could make no improvements 
upon a document drafted without experience in a little over a dozen evening sessions 
totalling over fifty hours.’16 Sweetser’s progressive reading of history was the natural 
accompaniment to his liberalism. It is important for League scholars to identify this 
optimism among League officials and apologists as an essential driver of the 
League’s history; however it is also essential to heed Mazower’s warning to fellow 
historians not to confuse the Utopianism of their subject with that of their object and 
to avoid the presentation of internationalism and globalisation as the current of 
modern history.
17
 The chapter records the optimism that remained prevalent within 
the League’s international civil service but also documents the opposition League 
officials and apologists incurred as they struggled to find a place for the League 
tradition in the apparatus of the U.N.O. Furthermore, the new international 
organisation was not universally regarded as an improvement upon the old. Just as 
the League was riven by the lack of consensus on what is could be and do, the great 
and small states, as well as members of the old international civil service, entertained 
different expectations of its successor.  
The United Nations Organisation is often portrayed as the maturation of 
inter-war internationalism with the impotence of the League’s political organs 
juxtaposed against the political and military authority of the Security Council.
18
 
Scholars have observed that the League Covenant did nothing more than simply 
establish the illegality of unprovoked acts of aggression, while the organisation 
proposed under Dumbarton Oaks was specifically designed to possess the authority 
and the means to enforce peace through diplomatic, economic and if necessary, 
military action.
19
 However a study of the Covenant demonstrates that member states 
did have the necessary authority and machinery at their disposal to enforce the peace. 
Article sixteen of the League Covenant called for the immediate suspension of all 
diplomatic and economic relations with an offending state, the imposition of 
economic sanctions and authorised the Council to recommend the provision of 
military assistance to the afflicted state. 
20
 Robert Cecil wrote that ‘the want of 
‘teeth’ with which [the League]was reproached was not so serious a defect as is 
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sometimes alleged, since such “teeth” as it had were never fully used. From its birth 
it even had to fight against the indifference or hostility of the official 
bureaucracies.’21 Thus it would be incorrect to assert that the League did not have 
the means to function as a security organisation. The fact that it did not can be less 
attributed to congenital weaknesses in the League apparatus than in the dearth of 
motivation for doing so. 
As discussed in chapter one, the great powers showed little inclination to 
allow the League to function as an effective security agent. In 1946 the Harvard 
Crimson identified the ‘inability to understand that an assembly of states is only a 
tool which must be used by its members’ as ‘the flaw which destroyed Wilson’s 
dream.’22  The Dumbarton Oaks proposals did not differ from the League system 
because they advocated security machinery. What distinguished the proposals from 
the Covenant was that they sought to directly tackle the problem of great power 
intransigence. The 1944 proposals laid the groundwork for more exclusive 
leadership from the great powers, a feature that was so seriously lacking in the 
League. Under the Dumbarton Oaks plan all decisions on matters of peace and 
security were to be the preserve of the Security Council and any initiative could be 
swiftly halted by the execution of the veto by any one of the five permanent 
members.
23
 Drawing on the irrefutable failings of the League system, the Big Four 
sought, through the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, to enshrine the hegemony of the 
great powers into the very heart of the new organisation. The new organisation was 
not predicated on liberal internationalism but on realpolitik; the proposed Security 
Council recognised that it was the dynamics of great power politics that largely 
determined international security. Within existing scholarship, supposed ‘realist’ and 
‘idealist’ interpretations are presented as diametrically opposed to one another.24 In 
fact, instead of binary opposition among two schools of international thought, there 
is a common strand of agreement among historians and scholars of I.R. that the 
League’s diplomatic role foundered because the great powers failed to make use of it. 
The difference lies instead in the various explanations offered for such neglect with 
disagreement over whether it was great power arrogance or congenital weakness in 
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the League’s diplomatic machinery which lead to the League’s peripheral role in the 
conduct of international relations.
25
 The design of the Security Council was arguably 
a response to both these critiques with the Big Four seeking to reconcile the 
operation of realpolitik with the goals of peaceful internationalism. As the veto 
system obviated the risk that the political organs of the new organisation could 
threaten the interests of the great powers, it followed that they were less likely to 
discard it. The machinery of the League was designed to prevent hasty over-reaction 
such as that which had spawned the First World War.
26
 The machinery of the 
Security Council, especially the Military Staff Committee, was designed to prevent 
the great power inaction that led to the Second World War. 
This innovation did not meet with universal approval and threatened to breed 
resentment among those powers accustomed to the greater equality of the League 
voting system where every member of the Assembly and Council ostensibly 
possessed the power of veto.
27
 While the new organisation was designed to be a 
vehicle for security, there was to be nothing ‘collective’ about that security. This led 
to accusations of regression from prominent figures such as the jurist Edwin 
Borchard who asserted that the proposed new organisation ‘hardly seems to enhance 
the protection of the weak.’ 28  Thanassis Aghnides, then Greek ambassador to 
London, also bemoaned the fact that the League principle of juridical equality of all 
member states was virtually ignored by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.
29
 Gilbert 
Murray argued that the price of the admittance of the two ‘recalcitrant powers’, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, into a system of international cooperation was 
considerable. Murray pointed out that the veto accorded the great powers ‘full 
privilege of isolation for themselves and secondly a power of coercion over’ the 
smaller states.
30
 However as argued in chapter one, the League’s semblance of 
‘juridical equality’ allowed the great powers to abdicate their responsibilities turning 
the Assembly and Council into a reflection of collective weakness rather than 
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collective strength. Sweetser disagreed with the pessimistic reading of Dumbarton 
Oaks, reflecting the traditional lack of consensus among liberal internationalists. 
Sweetser asserted that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee 
‘sharpened’ the ability of the new organisation to enforce the peace. 31  The 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals acknowledged the determining role of great power 
relations in international affairs. They also acknowledged the reality of geo-politics 
in recommending a role for regional organisations in the mediation of disputes under 
the overall authority of the world organisation.
32
 The Assembly of December 1939 
failed to take geo-political factors into account when the Latin American motion for 
Soviet expulsion placed the Scandinavian states in a diplomatic quandary.  
While the measures proposed in the field of security constituted an important 
departure from the League experience, there was no revolutionary overhaul in the 
guiding principles of international cooperation. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
reflected the conservative internationalism of the inter-war and wartime periods as 
the new organisation was to be predicated on the ‘sovereign equality of all peace-
loving states.’33 In this instance the League had clearly served as a benchmark for the 
new world organisation. There would be no immediate post-war introduction of the 
radically different systems of international cooperation mooted during the war such 
as federalism or the regional security arrangements initially favoured by Churchill.
34
 
Defending the decision, on the part of the great powers, not to employ a different 
foundation for international cooperation, Sweetser conceded that the new 
organisation would not constitute ‘the dawn of a wholly new experiment in human 
affairs, but rather the assimilation into an already tried system of organised 
international cooperation of the two great isolationist states of the inter-war period, 
the United States and the Soviet Union.’35 Sweetser justified the retention of the 
older model by arguing that the incorporation of the United States and the Soviet 
Union into a new system of international organisation constituted a ‘big enough 
hurdle without attempting any great innovation in principle as well’, tactfully 
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ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union was actually a veteran of the pre-war 
experiment.
36
  
This outcome reinforced the idea among League officials, observers and later 
scholars that the development of the new organisation was the product of evolution, 
not revolution.
37
 As its structure was broadly similar to that of the League, there 
were questions raised as to why the Big Four were so anxious to create a new 
organisation with a new name, rather than simply reform the League. Cecil still 
maintained, by 1949, that it would have been more prudent ‘to have amended and 
confirmed the Covenant rather than start a new document.’38 In his report to member 
states in 1943 Lester considered what reforms of the League system would be 
necessary to ensure its place in the post-war landscape: ‘It may be that a change of 
name would facilitate the adhesion of certain powers to the post-war institution. No 
person could question any such proposal if it is needed to widen membership and 
authority.’39  In a letter to the acting-secretary general J.V. Wilson, the assistant 
director of research of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) 
and a former senior official in the League Secretariat, shared Cecil and Lester’s 
viewpoint but offered his understanding of why a new organisation was ultimately 
necessary: 
 
If this were a world without passions and prejudice I suppose we should 
agree that we should not change the name unless we very radically changed 
the thing. But is it not the case that so rational a world would probably be a 
world which would not have again become embroiled in war? The ordinary 
vulgar feeling against having too much to do with what has been classed a 
‘failure’ is strong, and I suppose it is these political feelings and prejudices 
which will decide things in the long run, though those who have to think out 
these problems concretely and consider various alternatives naturally take a 
more conservative view. 
40
 
 
This ‘conservative view’ manifested itself in the continued deference to the 
sovereignty of member states exhibited in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Despite 
the innovation of the Security Council, reservations about a giant world bureaucracy, 
interfering in matters of domestic concern persisted. As Benn Bongang argued, the 
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Roosevelt and Truman administrations had to be careful to craft a new instrument of 
world politics consistent with both the conservatism of its own Congress as well as 
the conservatism of the other big powers in matters of security.
41
 The Soviet 
diplomat and future statesman Andrei Gromyko wrote in his memoirs that the Soviet 
Union was prepared to resist any attack, through the new international organisation, 
on national sovereignty so as to prevent other states or even the organisation itself 
from meddling in the domestic affairs of other member states.
42
 David Mitrany later 
reflected on the apparent contradictory insistence of the Soviet Union on the sanctity 
of state sovereignty. Mitrany conceded that many contemporaries found it ‘puzzling’ 
that the ‘most revolutionary of all governments, which ideologically believes in 
world unity and in the proscription of the state, at the United Nations, and on every 
possible occasion, insists on a strict observance of national sovereignty.’43 However 
as Alexander Dallin argued, Soviet policy did not remain static, with state interest 
often having to supersede communist ideology as the Soviet Union tried to enhance 
its great power status.
44
 As the U.N.O. was intended to reflect great power hegemony 
it followed that those powers would be unlikely to accord the organisation 
supranational functions.  
League officials had long encountered such scruples during the inter-war 
period as they sought to promote international economic and social reform. National 
obduracy persisted in the war years with the League’s technical officials 
experiencing a deliberate limitation to their autonomy in wartime relief and post-war 
planning. Even when internationalism experienced an upsurge in the latter days of 
the war, the British government was eager to remind the League not to exceed its 
functions. When Alexander Loveday wrote to the British Foreign Office in February 
1944 outlining his suggestions on the structure of a new international organisation, 
he met with a cool response. Though the title of Loveday’s report suggested that he 
was modestly limiting himself to making proposals on the establishment of a 
specialised United Nations economic agency to follow the F.A.O., he also offered 
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various suggestions on the structure and procedures of a new general organisation.
45
 
Loveday’s proposal that all member states be accorded equal voting rights did not 
impress the Foreign Office. According to its officials it was preposterous to suggest 
that small countries such as El Salvador or Liberia should carry the same influence 
as the great powers.
46
 In fact the Foreign Office regarded Loveday’s ideas as 
dangerous; ‘dangerous because they are the type of idea which would appeal to the 
small nations and encourage in them the delusion that they may be in a position to 
control the big international economic bodies [i.e. agencies such as the I.M.F.] 
whose regulation if they are to function, must be the primary concern of the big 
powers.’47 Loveday had previously expressed his disappointment that representation 
on the Central Committee of UNRRA was confined to the Big Four, believing that 
the relief agency would have incurred greater public support if ‘some democratic 
principle had been employed.’48 The Foreign Office, while noting certain points of 
similarity between their ideas and Loveday’s proposals for a new organisation, wrote 
to the director of the E.F.O. to remind him that such ambitious proposals could not 
be presented prematurely and resolved to keep in contact with the him so that his 
views would be ‘kept on the right lines.’49 Although Loveday was permitted little 
direct influence in the creation of the new organisation, E.F.O. policies enjoyed 
significant currency in post-war Europe. According to a recent study by Clavin, 
E.F.O.’s ideas on how to moderate and shape trends in the open market to prevent 
severe fluctuation in price and demand resonated in the E.E.C.’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP).
50
 These developments demonstrate that while League 
officials were not permitted to operate as direct agents, their work still found a way 
to profoundly influence national and international policy.  
The I.L.O. also faced opposition when it sought to expand its work 
programmes into the sensitive economic sphere, rather than limiting itself to making 
recommendations on the social consequences of labour practices. Though the high 
words of the Declaration of Philadelphia ambitiously proclaimed the right of the 
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I.L.O. to examine all matters of economic policy likely to influence labour matters, 
in practise member states were not prepared to accord it greater authority. In 
December 1944 an article appeared in The Economist attacking the I.L.O.’s 
ambitious attempt to regard the entire international system of economic relations as 
its province.
51
 The article rejected the notion that the I.L.O. should have participated 
in the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods. 
According to the Economist it would have constituted a ‘serious mistake’ to allow 
the I.L.O. a role in matters of ‘highest policy’:  
 
It is unlikely in the extreme that governments will be content to deal with 
[economic issues] through the mechanism of the I.L.O. And if they did, the 
I.L.O. would immediately become what, to its great advantage, it had hitherto 
avoided being-a political organisation. The I.L.O. will be well advised to 
leave the high politics of economic affairs to other agencies. Its particular 
function is to see that labour in each country gets its fair share of national 
income of that country.
52
 
 
Despite the assertion of the article, the I.L.O.’s work and its pronouncements 
were incredibly political, especially during the war. Philip Noel-Baker, the minister 
of state for foreign affairs in the post-war Labour government, argued that any 
division between politics and diplomacy on the one hand and social, cultural and 
economic welfare on the other was, by 1945 ‘unreal and out-of-date.’53 Speaking at a 
London meeting of the Governing Body in January 1945, Ernest Bevin posited that 
the technical work of the I.L.O., with governments, employers and workers 
collaborating to remove social and economic evils could very well prove ‘the road 
towards an international parliament in the wider field.’54 Bevin’s words are reflected 
in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor’s arguments on functionalism; they, like Bevin, 
expected intergovernmental cooperation to procure greater welfare benefits for 
individuals and to provide the means to ‘undermine popular loyalties to the state 
through the creation of a working peace system and the satisfaction of felt needs on a 
non-national basis.’55 Bevin’s observation on technical cooperation is noteworthy 
considering the later evolution of the European Coal and Steel Community into the 
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political and economic integration embodied by the European Union. Jean Monnet 
wrote in his memoirs: 
 
Looking back I can see more clearly how the League of Nations prefigured 
supranationality-through underlying agreements among men who enjoyed 
widespread influence in their own countries, so that awareness of the general 
interest was communicated to the places where national decisions were 
reached.
56
  
 
In this way the League set an important and influential precedent. However 
while Bevin’s statement was prophetic, he was speaking of the future and regarded 
the conferral of supranational function on technical organisations as overly ambitious 
and premature. At the January 1945 meeting of the Governing Body, Bevin, echoed 
the opinion of The Economist article. He emphasised that the I.L.O. would ‘stand or 
fall by what it does in its own proper sphere.’57 The Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
failed to make any specific allusion to the I.L.O., much to the disappointment of the 
Governing Body.
58
 The British government wanted to ensure that the I.L.O.’s 
supremacy in labour was not corroded. However it did not want to grant the Labour 
Office the emancipation from an overall umbrella organisation it had craved. Bevin 
informed the Governing Body that it was ‘important, both in its own interest and in 
the interest of the new world organisation, that it should not be completely 
independent of that organisation’ but rather that it should form ‘a definite part of the 
organisation in its constructive work for peace.’59 That did not mean that Bevin was 
anxious for the I.L.O. to ‘make itself too cheap’ by surrendering its acquired 
autonomy and traditions. Rather, according to Bevin, the organisation ought to work 
in parallel to the proposed Economic and Social Council.
60
 This became one of the 
chief concerns of the I.L.O. in this period-to secure and maintain a degree of 
elasticity and independence within the framework of the new organisation. 
As the terms of Dumbarton Oaks were digested and debated League officials 
eagerly anticipated the opportunity to collaborate with the new organisation and 
pushed for their technical activities to be assumed by the proposed Economic and 
Social Council. The ECOSOC eventually consisted of eighteen states elected 
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annually in groups of six for staggered three year terms. It was to have the power to 
initiate studies and reports on international social and economic matters and to make 
recommendations to the General Assembly as well as to the specialised agencies. It 
could also call international conferences when it saw fit to do so. The ECOSOC has 
often been cited by historians as the realisation of the Bruce proposals of the 
League.
61
 The League’s wartime experience served as a stark illustration of the need 
for a sophisticated system for regulating the relations between the various technical 
organisations as well as the need for a clear definition of the relationship between the 
parent organisation and the disparate agencies. Lester wrote in January 1945 that he 
had noticed ‘again and again a strong desire for autonomy in every section and 
organisation inside the Secretariat or associated with it even in staff and 
administrative questions.’62 He quoted a letter he received from Felkin where the 
latter cited the strong desire within the opium bodies that their work ‘should not be 
classed internationally or administratively integrated under the Dumbarton plan in 
social, or least of all, health work; but, having many aspects, be treated separately as 
in the past and linked directly with the Economic and Social Council.’63  
In the dying days of the war there was some awareness that the autonomy 
sought by the various technical organisations, rather than enhancing their respective 
work programmes, actually impaired them. As Lester wrote to Loveday in early 
1945: ‘a lot of trouble has arisen from the diverse points of view which have grown 
up in the different branches of the disparate Secretariat, not unmingled I fear with a 
good deal of envy the feeling that everyone else has had advantages or has not had 
intelligent and friendly consideration.’ 64  At the January 1945 meeting of the 
Governing Body of the I.L.O. the Belgian member criticised the isolation the I.L.O. 
traditionally imposed on itself in relation to the work of the League’s E.F.O.65 He 
advocated greater efforts to ensure collaboration with other bodies operating in the 
economic and financial fields. Consequently, at the next session of the Governing 
Body, the government, employer and workers representatives heard from Loveday 
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himself on the subject of economic depressions.
66
 In his February1944 proposals for 
a new world organisation Loveday echoed the Bruce proposals, emphasising the 
need for the economic and social agencies of the new international body to function 
as a coherent whole. According to Loveday:  
 
If the special organs [were to be] projected into a world without any 
machinery for the coordination of their policies, confusion will result. But 
more is required than the prevention of inter-organisational rivalries or 
contradictory policies. It is necessary to assure that all organs work toward a 
common objective or common objectives, and have a sense of unity of 
purpose. That unity of purpose postulates some constitutional unity and some 
common form of discussion.
67
  
 
Loveday anticipated the terms of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals by suggesting that a 
special council or commission should be formed from the assembly of the new 
organisation to coordinate and initiate policy.
68
 The lack of institutional cohesion in 
the League apparatus during the Second World War justified the creation of the 
Economic and Social Council.  
 In late 1944 Lester was finally able to leave Geneva, travelling to London to 
meet Foreign Office officials and to attend a meeting of the Supervisory 
Commission. The acting secretary-general was given the good news that the British 
government was fully committed to transferring as much of the assets and ‘non-
political’ activities of the League to the new organisation as was practical. 69 
According to Foreign Office records, during informal discussions with American and 
Chinese officials at Dumbarton Oaks ‘there was a broad measure of agreement on 
the desirability of taking over these [technical] activities.’ 70  The Foreign Office 
stressed that the value of League records and archives for the new organisation 
‘needed no emphasis’ and that it was ‘desirable that the transfer of both staff and 
records should be arranged so that there is no break in the continuity of the work.’71 
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Even one of the League’s sternest critics, E.H. Carr, allowed that there was 
considerable support for the survival of its technical organisations.
72
  
When Hitler’s Fortress Europe began crumbling in the summer and autumn 
of 1944 the League’s technical programmes were invested with a new urgency. 
Many of the practical and political obstacles to the realisation of their wartime goals 
began to recede. With the restoration of normal postal communications in certain 
areas the League’s Epidemiological Intelligence Service gradually re-established 
contact with the countries from whom it had been cut off, such as the Balkan 
countries of Albania, Yugoslavia and Greece. It also collaborated with the Allied 
military authorities in the provision of information concerning typhus fever among 
prisoners in the occupied areas of Germany.
73
 During the process of liberation an 
American military official, experienced in matters of drug control, was attached to 
Allied Supreme Headquarters in Europe to coordinate measures for the re-
establishment of such control in liberated areas. The secretariat of the League’s drug 
bodies remained in close contact with that officer.
74
  
The decision to preserve a League nucleus in the heart of Europe was 
vindicated in the aftermath of the Allied landings as it served as an important 
intelligence source for those engaged in immediate relief work. The Geneva branch 
of the Secretariat accumulated important data on the narcotic situation in Europe. In 
March 1944 the American State Department expressed disappointment that the 
information passed onto UNRRA from the missions of the P.C.O.B. and the Drug 
Supervisory Body, established in Washington, was incomplete in terms of statistical 
information on the European situation. Lester reminded the American minister to 
Switzerland, Leland Harrison, that American censorship controls prevented the 
Geneva Secretariat from transmitting information to Washington concerning 
conditions in European countries with which the United States was at war or which 
were under Axis occupation.
75
 To circumvent this problem the State Department 
permitted the Geneva branch of the Secretariat to forward important statistical 
information to Washington in the diplomatic post-bag of the American consulate.
76
 
This episode further underlines the Allied reliance on the League’s ability to amass 
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and disseminate crucial statistical data, highlighting the practical working 
relationship between the State Department and the League Secretariat. 
It was during this time that the League’s high commissioner for refugees was 
finally able to fulfil his traditional role. Following the liberation of France and 
Belgium Sir Herbert Emerson and his deputy high commissioner visited these 
countries, helping to re-establish the legal protection and status of refugees.
77
 The 
office of the League’s high commissioner of refugees had enjoyed a close working 
relationship with the French Third Republic. France was one of the League member 
states that traditionally sold the ‘Nansen stamp’, the proceeds of which were 
allocated to the high commissioner for refugee relief. During occupation the stamp 
was replaced by another bearing a different name and the revenue was no longer 
forwarded to Emerson’s office. With the establishment of a new provisional 
government in France in August 1944 the stamp was restored and the funds that were 
withheld during occupation were allocated to the high commissioner, a sum 
amounting to two million francs.
78
 During the war the Vichy government also 
annulled a 1928 agreement in which the French state agreed to recognise the role and 
duties of high commissioner as well as the various conventions relating to the 
international status of refugees. The Provisional Government of the French Republic 
subsequently cancelled the Vichy decisions.
79
 A pre-war arrangement was 
reactivated in both France and Belgium which allowed quasi-consular authority to be 
accorded to any appointed representative of the League’s high commissioner.  
Emerson was also to re-establish contact with the Nansen refugees. In the 
aftermath of Franco-Belgian liberation the Central Offices for Russian and Armenian 
refugees was reconstituted under the joint control of the League High Commission 
and the French Foreign Ministry. The high commissioner devoted himself in 1944-5 
to the repatriation of French and Belgian Nansen refugees who experienced forced 
labour and depredation during the war.
80
 Many of these came from central Europe 
and those who were hidden by the Resistance also needed fresh papers. Emerson was 
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aware that the eventual collapse of Germany itself and the subsequent Allied 
occupation of the country would throw the refugee crisis into even sharper relief. He 
insisted that any new refugee authority should continue the League’s legacy of 
providing legal status and protection for refugees and that the High Commission 
should not be dissolved until a competent body was ready to take its place.
81
   
 
 
 
The League and the San Francisco Conference 
Such a competent body could not be created until the formal establishment of the 
proposed new international organisation. An international conference was convoked 
for that purpose and was due to convene in San Francisco from April-June 1945. 
Two weeks before the opening of the conference its host country was plunged into 
mourning upon the death of President Roosevelt. Harry S. Truman cited his 
affirmative answer to the White House press secretary’s question as to whether the 
conference would go ahead as planned as the first decision he made as president of 
the United States.
82
 In preparation for the conference the British Foreign Office 
sought to secure some commitment to the transfer of the technical functions of the 
League to the new organisation. The British favoured the passing of a suitable 
resolution at the conference indicating a willingness, on the part of the United 
Nations, to assume these functions as well as certain assets and liabilities.
83
 The 
Foreign Office confided to the State Department its fears that if the League was kept 
in ‘an ignominious state of uncertainty’ it might result in the ‘disintegration of the 
Secretariat and the breakdown of the useful work which it is now doing.’84 Before 
the establishment of the specialised agencies of the new organisation certain number 
technical organisations of the League retained a monopoly in their field of work. 
Unless an agreement was reached between the old and the new organisations on the 
assumption of functions, the dissolution of the League would result in an 
interregnum for international cooperation in vital areas of social and economic 
concern.  
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While later Cold War tensions would eventually render the Truman 
administration less equivocal in its support for the U.N.O., the late wartime and early 
post-war period was marked by Washington’s determined leadership of the new 
international system.
85
 Within this political climate the U.S. government was 
prepared to spare some kind words for the League and to offer a mea culpa for the 
country’s failure to join the organisation. In January 1945, on the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the first session of the League Assembly, Sumner Welles issued the 
following statement: 
 
We will not fail to admit that the greatest obstacle in the way of its success 
was the failure of the people of the United States to take part in it. And yet as 
we look back, the Covenant of the League of Nations remains, and will 
remain, a high water-mark of constructive human endeavour.
86
  
 
The idea that it was the United States’ refusal to join the League which doomed the 
organisation’s political mission to failure proved enduring and was echoed in the 
subsequent historical scholarship. 
87
 Cecil lamented in 1949: ‘If only the United 
States had been willing to join the League, how much suffering and destruction 
might have been saved.’88 J.P. Dunbabin dismissed the idea that the League would 
have been more of an effective organisation if it enjoyed the membership of the 
United States. According to Dunbabin that would only have proven the case if the 
United States had been willing to serve as an activist member; if it had joined the 
U.S. would have proven just as prone to Britain ‘to restrict and play down the 
League’s coercive aspects.’ 89  The United States certainly demonstrated the 
conservative internationalism of League member states during the Second World 
War when it refused to accord the transferred missions officials status and when it 
played down the political nature of the I.L.O.’s work.  
While the League’s experience helped shape the post-war internationalism of 
the United Nations, the influence of current and former international civil servants 
was not overtly publicised. As Patricia Clavin argued, the American inclination to 
limit the League’s role to that of an ‘observer’ at the various conferences for post-
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war planning, with League officials being obliged to ‘use the tradesmen’s entrance at 
large  public events’, should not be over-exaggerated, considering the League 
Secretariat always lived  in the ‘shadows of international relations.’90 By allowing 
the United States to participate in the warmly received technical activities, while it 
abstained from the League’s political debacles, the League had afforded American 
diplomats and officials a risk-free experience of international cooperation. The 
United States was able to embark on the United Nations project untainted by the 
futile efforts of the League Assembly and Council to maintain peace. Huntington 
Gilchirst, a former American member of the League Secretariat, wrote in 1945 that 
American membership of the League would provide the opportunity, denied to the 
League, for the new organisation to function effectively.
91
 Other long-term 
supporters of the League such as James T. Shotwell, a member of Wilson’s foreign 
policy advisory group and future president of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, wrote that the revival of popular internationalism through the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals and American support of it was almost ‘too good to be 
true.’92 The absence of the United States from the League of Nations also provided 
League apologists with their strongest weapon with which to defend the League’s 
legacy. In a wartime address to the House of Lords the League’s first secretary-
general reminded his fellow peers to:  
 
remember that the League which failed was not the League envisaged by 
President Wilson, by General Smuts, by the noble Viscount himself, and by 
other statesmen. That League was based on the intimate participation in its 
inner councils of the United States of America. That League has never been 
tried, and has never failed.
93
 
 
The new organisation was to be the first of its kind to secure American 
political commitment and as a result it was imbued with a sense of progress and 
optimism. The idea pervaded that the United Nations was breaking new ground and 
this was an asset that the State Department was reluctant to dilute. Leo Pasvolsky 
informed British Foreign Office official Gladwyn Jebb that while he agreed that 
certain steps should be taken in the future to ensure the transfer of activities from the 
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League to the new organisation, he feared that a formal resolution, at San Francisco, 
would ‘open the flood-gates.’ 94  Other British diplomats received the same 
noncommittal response. Orie Gerig, a State Department official and past employee 
of the League Secretariat, informed his British counterparts that while there was 
general support for the winding up of the League and the assumption of any useful 
functions, in the build up to the conference it had not been possible to ‘give this 
subject much attention at a high level.’95 The new organisation, not the old, was to be 
the natural priority of the United States government at San Francisco. 
That being the case the League’s position vis-à-vis the San Francisco 
Conference was an awkward one. On 4 March 1945 Lester informed Hambro that he 
did not believe the United Nations powers would want the League to dispatch 
official representation to San Francisco. If the Secretariat should receive an 
invitation to attend the conference, Lester thought it would likely be in the capacity 
of observer with League officials simply being asked to look over certain drafts and 
to offer informal advice to delegations, as it had done in the past with organisations 
such as UNRRA and the F.A.O.
96
 With the conference looming there was little sign 
of such an invitation, much to the consternation of Lester who doubted his ability to 
prepare an appropriate delegation in time for proceedings. On 12 April 1945, twelve 
days before the conference was due to convene, the acting secretary-general reflected 
that he found the entire situation ‘extremely unsatisfactory.’97 Lester stated that, in 
the event of the arrival of an invitation he was  
 
torn between a strong personal disinclination to go and a feeling that for any 
subsequent developments and negotiations, it may be very useful, especially 
when the conference comes to the point of inviting the old League to dissolve 
and negotiate the transfer of activities.
98
 
 
The next day, 13 April, Lester received a letter from his former colleague 
Ambassador Winant, who requested, on behalf of his government, the presence of 
the secretary-general and two or three other League officials at San Francisco. 
According to Winant, the U.S. government, as the host of the conference, believed it 
would be ‘useful and helpful’ if the League was ‘unofficially’ represented at the 
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conference so that it would be available for consultation on matters which would ‘be 
of particular concern to the League.’99 This equivocal invitation confirmed Lester’s 
expectations of what would be asked of League officials at the conference and he 
reflected that the invitation was ‘somewhat back-handed.’100  Despite the fact that 
the Supervisory Commission was ‘not very pleased’ with the manner in which the 
League was asked to participate, it was agreed that Lester should field an unofficial 
delegation to San Francisco.
101
  
In 1944 former League official J.V. Wilson was commissioned by the Royal 
Institute of International affairs at Chatham House to compose a report on a 
prospective ‘international secretariat of the future.’ He perfectly captured the 
tensions that would exist between the old and new organisation during the 
transitional period when the United Nations Organisation remained under 
construction. Wilson wrote that ‘politically a balance must be stuck’ between the 
disadvantages ‘associated in the public mind with efforts that were not always either 
popular or successful’ and the possible advantages of working with those who still 
believed that the ‘resolute application of the Covenant might have established the 
peace of the world on a firm basis.’102 As Sweetser observed to Lester in November 
1944 ‘what seems like new ground to many is old and familiar ground indeed to a 
handful of us.’103 In a letter to Hambro (then working in the United States) Sir Cecil 
Kisch, the British member of the Supervisory Commission, wrote: ‘When I see the 
messages that come along from your side of the Atlantic I cannot resist a smile at the 
efforts to construct the same thing under another name and to conceal the fact at the 
same time.’ 104  During this transitional period between the publication of the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the dissolution and liquidation of the League of 
Nations there existed a curious tension between the need of the United Nations 
powers to glean as much information and assistance from the League’s international 
civil service as was possible and the inclination to banish the old embattled 
organisation to the periphery. 
Upon their arrival in San Francisco the League delegation found that no 
arrangements had been made for them to obtain credentials for the conference or 
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even to obtain admission to the buildings. They were obliged to lodge in a third class 
hotel. It was not until three days after their arrival that they were able to obtain the 
necessary credentials. Just one ticket for the opening ceremony of the conference 
arrived a half an hour before it was due to begin and this was for the upper gallery.
105
 
Their very presence of the League’s unofficial delegation was objected to by the 
Soviet Union. In a pointed allusion to Lester, Molotov claimed that it ‘should have 
been clearly understood that only citizens of one of the United Nations could be 
invited to the conference.’ 106  The composition of the San Francisco Conference 
demonstrated that the new organisation was destined to be more of a ‘League’ than 
its predecessor ever was. Dunbabin observed that it was not commonly noted in 
historiography that the United Nations Organisation was originally a wartime 
coalition.
107
 Sweetser argued, with justification, that the United Nations Organisation 
was ‘more reflective of the atmosphere of war’ in which it was inaugurated, than the 
League had been.
108
 Alger Hiss, the American secretary-general of the conference 
(who three years later would be accused of being a Soviet spy), was anxious to 
diffuse tensions and advocated the reform of the League delegation so as to only 
include nationals of United Nations powers.
109
 Lester did receive this suggestion as a 
personal slight but he was determined to stand his ground. As Lester put it: 
 
In view of the principle involved, the international character of League 
officials, for which we had fought for many years and firmly established, and 
secondly and less [importantly], the right of the organisation to choose its 
representatives, I could not and would not take any initiative unless I knew 
this was the wish of the sponsoring governments, and even then [after] 
having sought the authority of the Supervisory Commission which had 
authorised our delegation and its presence in ‘Frisco.110  
 
The fixation of Molotov on the nationality of the League delegation 
demonstrated the different internationalist impulses at work in the old organisation 
and the new. The new organisation was less the embodiment of liberal 
internationalism than it was, in Mazower’s words, the ‘return to principles of 
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Concert diplomacy.’ 111  Hambro, as chairman of the Supervisory Commission, 
reacted vehemently to this regressive attitude to an international civil service. 
Hambro emphatically declared that an ‘international official was international’ and 
advised Lester that in absolutely no circumstances should he contemplate giving way 
on the matter.
112
 The League and I.L.O. contingent were the only groups to be 
comprised of nationals of non-United Nations countries. Molotov’s protestation at 
the presence of non-United Nations nationals in the League delegation can be 
interpreted as an attempt to highlight the League’s growing irrelevancy to an 
international order that practised a different kind of exclusivity than its post-war 
variant.  
Never failing to assume its position as champion of League interests it was 
the United Kingdom which rose to the defence of Lester’s delegation. In reacting to 
Molotov’s protestations, Eden stressed that the League officials were not attending 
the conference as nationals of their own countries but as unofficial representatives of 
their organisation.
113
 While informing the acting secretary-general that they would 
never contemplate telling him what to do in this situation, the British delegation 
expressed the hope that Lester would not withdraw his name from the delegation. 
114
 
According to Eden, the British deliberately chose not to adopt as prominent a role in 
the San Francisco Conference, believing that the United States should take the lead 
in its own country. The British foreign secretary, bearing in mind the ultimate fate of 
the League Covenant, regarded the United Nations charter as having the best chance 
of success if embraced and championed by the United States.
115
 As Armstrong, 
Lloyd and Redmond observed, ‘whereas the Covenant was more British than 
American, the Charter was the reverse.’116 J.V. Wilson mused in 1944: ‘I expect that 
Great Britain will be less at ease in the new than in the old Zion: it will be less her 
show.’117 Thanassis Aghnides was present in San Francisco, as a member of the 
Greek delegation. Aghnides noted the strong shift in power and influence to the 
United States and its implications for the small European states. In a lecture he gave 
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in London in October 1945, Aghnides shared the impressions of the delegates of the 
smaller European nations on what he described as the ‘eclipse of Europe’: ‘How 
deeply we felt it. The only Western European voice which had vigour and warmth 
was the voice of England. These islands thus appeared to us as the last repository of 
European civilisation.’ 118  Britain and France’s permanent seats on the Security 
Council meant that Europe still had a role to play in high politics at the United 
Nations but it would clearly not enjoy the same global ascendancy. Marks argued 
that by 1945 ‘the surviving former European great nations became greybeards, elder 
statesmen full of advice and possessing some influence but not much far ranging 
authority.’119 The San Francisco Conference revealed to the world that the United 
Nations organisation, responding to the reality of a changed world order, would 
reflect the dominance of the United States. As the League was shaped by a political 
order that no longer existed, its role in the San Francisco Conference was destined to 
be minimal.  
While Lester could not take an active part in proceedings that did not mean 
that the League was irrelevant to the San Francisco Conference. As he followed the 
proceedings of the conference, Sweetser noted that League experience and precedent 
were cited continuously during the various meetings, not least by the United States 
delegation.
120
 An invitation was dispatched for a League official to attend, in an 
advisory capacity, a sub-commission of the steering committee of the conference and 
Lester, erring on the safe side, nominated the British national Alexander Loveday.
121
  
Loveday was called upon to speak several times at the meetings of the commission 
and Lester wrote that the director was able to have an indirect influence on 
proceedings through his behind-the-scenes consultation with several national 
delegations. 
122
 As Clavin argued, this was what League officials did best; they 
operated in the shadows, using indirect means to influence national and international 
policy. The experience of League officials at San Francisco was indicative of the 
League’s entire wartime experience. Technical directors such as Loveday could 
enjoy less complicated interaction with delegates; the acting secretary-general and 
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the treasurer, Seymour Jacklin, as representatives of the supposedly ‘political’ 
Secretariat, could not. Jacklin produced a draft report on methods of financing the 
Interim Commission and Secretariat of U.N.O so that the ‘odium’ of making 
proposals on the question of finance could be avoided by delegations.
123
 However 
Jacklin, as well as representatives of the I.L.O., were neglected by the financial 
committee of the conference, being obliged to wait several hours in the lobby outside 
the meeting room until the session was almost complete.
124
 Jacklin regarded his 
treatment as a politically charged ‘studied insult.’125  
Proceedings at San Francisco were marred by a lack of leadership and 
administrative expertise with inexperienced and ill-informed chairmen often allowed 
to conduct committees. 
126
 As Jacklin commented drily to Lester, some of those he 
encountered in San Francisco used to hand his papers to him in Geneva.
127
 The 
conference secretariat was primarily recruited from the civil service in Washington 
and locally in San Francisco. Until a few weeks before the conference the secretariat 
remained under-subscribed and so the International Labour Office responded 
generously to requests for temporary staff.
128
 However the staff of the I.L.O. 
represented only a small fraction of the overall conference secretariat. Of the 
hundreds of staff employed less than half a dozen had served in the League and only 
two had enjoyed permanent employment in the old international civil service.
129
 
Contemporary observers concluded that the absence of a recruitment drive for 
former staff of the League Secretariat constituted a failure to ‘to capitalise upon this 
rich experience in international administration.’130  
It would be remiss in pointing out the shortcomings of San Francisco not to 
concede that the conference itself was a highly ambitious and challenging project. 
The organisational difficulty in managing such a huge conference was reflected in 
the fact that its closing ceremony, during which almost two hundred delegates 
affixed their signatures to the draft charter, would take an estimated eight hours to 
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reach its conclusion.
131
 The Charter of the United Nations was first activated on 24 
October 1945 and by the following December it had been ratified by all of its fifty-
one member states. Arthur Sweetser, a member of that generation of American 
internationalists who had been bitterly disappointed by U.S. abstention from the 
League, was fittingly present in the Senate gallery when Senators voted 
overwhelmingly to ratify the U.N. Charter by eighty-nine votes to two. Sweetser 
wrote to Lester, articulating the optimism and determination characteristic of the 
most idealistic of League officials, who believed that the survival and expansion of 
international organisations was the current of world history: ‘I thought of you several 
times that day and since, feeling that the objective to which we both of us have given 
so much of our lives has now been brought increasingly nearer.’132 Amidst all the 
drama of San Francisco, measures were adopted to begin the process of transferring 
the functions and activities from the League to the United Nations Organisation 
(U.N.O.). Before the close of the conference, the United Nations powers agreed to 
enact a steering committee to negotiate, with League representatives, the transfer of 
the assets and functions of the old organisation to the new. Lester was also able to 
make use of his transatlantic crossing to pay a visit to the League missions in 
Princeton and Montreal. The fate of the League was sealed but despite the ignominy 
of the San Francisco Conference its influence was not effaced. As the British Foreign 
Office official Hugh McKinnon Wood wrote in a report on ‘The dissolution of the 
League of Nations’:  
 
When the fifty-one original members of the United Nations, including the 
great majority of the League’s own members, signed the charter of the United 
Nations on 26 June 1945, they rendered the early dissolution of the League 
inevitable. At the same time they reaped the benefits of the wise policy which 
had refused to allow it to collapse and had on the contrary maintained its 
structure, equipment and finances intact and continued its non political 
activities.
133
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The League’s ongoing technical programmes 1944-5 
Even in the wake of the San Francisco Conference the technical work of the League 
did not come to a halt and continued to adapt to new political and military realities. 
During the final months of war Lester reported that the American diplomats and 
officials stationed in Switzerland were ‘getting a good deal of value’ out of the 
Rockefeller Library.
134
 In the summer of 1945 the work the E.F.O.’s Committee of 
Statistical Experts, disrupted by the war, resumed. Its work, particularly on the 
international balance of payments, was considered to be of particular pertinence to 
the proposed International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.)
135
 The League’s health and 
opium bodies continued to produce surveys and to collaborate with UNRRA.  
Following V.E. day, the work of the League’s high commissioner for 
refugees gained a new momentum. With the Allied occupation of Germany Nansen 
was able to focus on procuring papers and assistance for the Nansen refugees among 
the displaced persons of the former Greater Reich. Emerson secured the services of 
Captain Yves le Vernoy, who had enjoyed distinguished service in the French 
Resistance, to liaise, on behalf of the high commissioner, with the Allied military 
authorities and with UNRRA from his headquarters in Munich.
136
 By March 1946 
almost 25,000 Nansen refugees were found within those parts of Germany occupied 
by the western Allies and of Austria, having being transported from central and 
southern Europe as well as from their former residences within the borders of 
Greater Germany. The office of the high commissioner began the process of 
registering the Nansen refugees and Captain le Vernoy secured the permission of the 
French government for the admission of a small number of ‘detached’ children and a 
few adults.
137
 Otherwise, by March 1946, the problem of the resettlement of the 
Nansen refugees had barely begun. Emerson regarded it as his particular duty to 
ensure that responsibilities to the League’s Nansen refugees were assumed by the 
new organisation.
138
 As regards the wider refugee crisis, Emerson gave evidence to 
the Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and suggested measures for the 
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repatriation, absorption and settlement of displaced persons within various 
countries.
139
  
The latter period of the war constituted a rude awakening for the I.L.O. as 
there appeared a marked disparity between its ambition and its achievement. In his 
1945 director’s report Phelan wrote that those ‘who were familiar with the I.L.O.’s 
record of achievement and, in consequence, convinced of its potentialities for the 
future, not unnaturally experienced some disappointment at the failure to associate 
the I.L.O. more fully with the discussions at San Francisco concerning the new 
economic and social machinery.’140 Phelan attributed this omission on the part of the 
United Nations powers to the necessity of concentrating, at the conference, on the 
most crucial issue of security and to the unpredictability of political and military 
developments leading up to and during the conference.
141
 According to State 
Department records, the U.S. government’s representative to the ninety-fifth session 
of the Governing Body, held in Quebec in June 1945, noticed that ‘the experience of 
the I.L.O. representatives in San Francisco appears to have had a chastening effect. 
Numerous statements were made to the effect that the I.L.O. must stick more strictly 
to its own affairs and do a good job in this field.’142 While the British proposed that 
immediate action concerning the I.L.O. should be taken in the aftermath of the 
conference, the organisation remained in a certain limbo.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, before the Philadelphia Conference the 
I.L.O. was criticised for becoming complacent in its work programmes and for 
losing its momentum after the high point of the New York Conference. By 1945 the 
I.L.O. could not afford its past complacency as increasingly, in the aftermath of the 
San Francisco Conference, it was no longer the largest international organisation to 
boast the membership of the United States.  In his 1945 report Phelan denied that the 
I.L.O. felt in any way threatened by the new World Federation of Trade Unions 
(W.F.T.U.) established in October 1945, which united trade unions under the 
umbrella of one organisation and replaced the International Federation of Trade 
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Unions. According to the acting director, the W.F.T.U. was not in any sense a rival 
to the I.L.O., as the tripartite I.L.O. possessed a different function. Rather the I.L.O. 
had a complementary function to the W.F.T.U. ‘as an instrumentality through which 
trade unionism cooperating with governments and employers, exercises official 
responsibility for an important sector of international policy [and] has valuable 
opportunities for influencing policy in a wider field of action.’143 While its own 
position may not have been implicitly threatened, the I.L.O. would have to prove it 
could hold its own within a climate of increased international cooperation. From 
January to October 1945 its specialised committees and commission on maritime 
affairs, on employment, on work safety, on the protection of children and young 
workers in the workplace and on social insurance met with increasing regularity.
144
 
The I.L.O. also re-introduced its Committee of Experts to examine the annual reports 
submitted by member states outlining their adherence to ratified labour conventions. 
The Committee found that while the machinery of reports never ceased to function 
during the war, such literature could not adequately depict ‘the dislocating effect of 
the abnormal conditions created for all countries at war upon their ability to carry out 
their obligations under labour conventions.’145 The I.L.O. hoped to advocate the re-
introduction of approved labour practises under the umbrella of the United Nations 
Organisation.  
During the war years it became the practise of the transferred technical 
missions to prioritise North and South America in their studies and surveys, leaving 
the Lester’s Geneva-based nucleus to look after Europe. With the liberation of 
Europe this was partly remedied by the I.L.O. The Labour Office sought to resume 
the closest contact with continental Europe, dispatching emissaries to Paris, Brussels, 
Bern, Lisbon, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Amsterdam and Luxembourg.
146
 In 
October 1945 the I.L.O. Conference made a symbolic return to Europe, convening in 
the French capital. Phelan declared it fitting that Paris should be the site for the first 
post-war conference of the I.L.O. as the city had ‘served as cradle for the I.L.O. and 
the liberties of Europe alike.’147 At this sitting the I.L.O. adopted an instrument of 
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amendment the object of which was to sever all constitutional ties of the League of 
Nations. This instrument came into effect when it received ratification by three-
fourths of its membership and by the members of the I.L.O. who were also members 
of the League Council.
148
 Phelan partly attributed the sluggishness of the United 
Nations powers to incorporate the I.L.O. into the framework of the new organisation 
to the historic antipathy of the Soviet Union towards the League of Nations. Phelan 
believed that jettisoning the League connection would enable closer relations with 
the Soviet Union thus paving the way for formal relations with the United 
Nations.
149
 At Paris the International Labour Conference admitted two new members 
to the organisation: Guatemala and Iceland. The new democratic republic of Italy 
was re-admitted to the I.L.O. ‘not only because of pre-fascist Italy’s wholehearted 
collaboration with the Organisation, but also as an earnest of the interest of the 
organisation in the reconstruction problems of Europe.’150 As was the case with the 
League and Finland, the I.L.O. played an important role in the international 
rehabilitation of a state that had previously orbited the Third Reich. 
 
 
Negotiations with the U.N. Preparatory Commission 
Meanwhile in late 1945-early 1946 the United Nations Preparatory Commission, 
working from its London base, deliberated the transfer of the assets and functions of 
the League to the new organisation. There is general agreement, within the 
historiography devoted to this period of Soviet history, that the U.S.S.R. resented 
any initiatives for the new international organisation that deflected attention from its 
primary security function.
151
 During the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations the Soviet 
representative argued that one of the reasons for the failure of the League was the 
multiplicity of its tasks.
152
 Alexander Dallin asserted that the Soviet delegation made 
a paltry contribution to the work of the Preparatory Commission and seemed to 
attribute little importance to its work.
153
 Despite the assertion that the U.S.S.R. was 
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apathetic to the cause of international social, economic and cultural cooperation, 
records illustrate that the Soviets were not eager to allow the western powers, 
operating within the Preparatory Commission, a free hand to mould the Economic 
and Social Council of the U.N. in the image of the League’s technical services. After 
all, it had been the League’s technical agencies that had proved the most enduring 
embodiment of its liberal democratic ethos.  
The British government was of the position, supported by other government 
representatives of the U.N. Preparatory Commission, that given the recognised 
necessity of avoiding any disruption to the useful work of the League’s technical 
services, a general transfer, on terms to be agreed between the two organisations, 
was the most logical step.
154
 The Soviets rejected this proposal. The American 
delegate confided to the secretary of state that the Soviet view on the liquidation of 
the League was that the League should remain in existence until the U.N. finished 
picking and choosing which of its services it wanted to retain.
155
 Soviet 
representatives dismissed any inference that the United Nations Organisation was the 
successor of the League of Nations. In order to avoid giving this impression, the 
Soviet representatives insisted that the Preparatory Commission of the U.N.O. 
should avoid the implication that these activities would be ‘transferred’ to the new 
organisation. The Soviets reasoned that the term ‘transfer’ connoted the complete 
preservation of League agencies under the direction of the United Nations. Rather, 
according to the Soviets, it should be stated that those League activities would be 
‘assumed’ by the Economic and Social Council of U.N.O. which would then proceed 
to organise, re-shape or even discontinue those activities as it saw fit.
156
 A sub-
committee was formed to study the problem. As no suitable compromise could be 
found by the sub-committee between the Soviet proposal and the previously 
accepted course of a general transfer, the motion was put to a vote. The proposal of a 
general transfer of assets and functions was accepted by a majority of the committee 
with the Soviet Union rejecting the motion and Czechoslovakia abstaining.
157
  
Notwithstanding the approval of the majority of the sub-committee for a 
general transfer, the Soviet objection, considering its power of veto on the Security 
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Council, proved too great an obstacle to overcome. Consequently the original plan of 
the Preparatory Commission was altered. The Preparatory Commission would only 
enter into negotiations with the League on the subject of the transfer of assets. The 
ECOSOC would be asked to survey the League’s technical activities and determine 
which of those should be assumed by the new organisation. If the dissolution of the 
League was effected before that process was completed then the ECOSOC would be 
empowered to continue, provisionally, the work being carried out by all League 
agencies. Once the ongoing programmes of the League’s technical agencies were 
completed the ECOSOC would then determine what technical activities would be 
continued and what direction they would take.
158
 The wartime projects of the 
technical services would be completed and their recommendations for post-war 
reconstruction would be disseminated to governments. The U.N.O. had already 
expressed interest in the statistical work of the Economic and Finance Organisation 
as well as in the work of Health section, the Social section and that of the 
P.C.O.B.
159
  
Once the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations clarified its position 
on the transfer of assets and functions, it was able to enter into negotiations with the 
League of Nations. Lester sought and received the approval of member states for the 
Supervisory Commission to be invested with the necessary authority to negotiate on 
behalf of all member states.
160
 During the last months of the League’s existence, 
when Lester left Geneva, he was able to provide a degree of leadership denied to him 
during the war years. Rather than each individual technical agency entering into 
separate negotiations with members of the U.N.O., Lester and the Supervisory 
Commission were able to reassert some kind of administrative control over the entire 
League apparatus and negotiated on behalf of all the League’s technical 
organisations, except for the semi-autonomous I.L.O.  
League representatives entered negotiations with their U.N. counterparts with 
certain objectives. One of those objectives was to try and secure some kind of an 
assurance that the staff of the Secretariat would, upon dissolution of the League, be 
able to secure opportunities of employment with the new, as yet unformed, 
permanent Secretariat of the U.N.O. Between 1939 and 1943 the number of League 
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staff had fallen from 650 to 100 individuals. After 1943 when the technical activities 
escalated their efforts in post-war planning, certain staff were re-engaged and by the 
time of the final Assembly the number had risen to 130.
161
 Lester was reluctant to 
pare down the Secretariat until orderly dissolution and liquidation of the organisation 
was effected. However Hambro was anxious to dispel the ‘unpleasant gossip’ 
amongst government officials that League officials were simply trying to hold on to 
their jobs.
162
 Lester informed his staff that their contracts would be terminated on 31 
July 1946 but that those officials whose services would be required for the process of 
liquidation would be retained on temporary short-term contacts.
163
 The Preparatory 
Commission of the U.N.O. emphasised that it could not undertake to agree to an en-
bloc transfer of League officials to the U.N. Secretariat. The recruitment of officials 
to the new international civil service was to be entirely the prerogative of the U.N. 
secretary-general but as the intention was to create the most professional and capable 
international civil service, applications from League personnel would be most 
welcome.
164
 As the Preparatory Commission, due to Soviet scruples, was denied the 
authority to negotiate the transfer of League activities to the U.N.O., the Supervisory 
Commission secured a commitment from that body that it would press the Economic 
and Social Council to make a formal pronouncement on the matter.
165
  
The League had accrued significant liquid assets over the course of its history 
with over 561 million C.H.F. contributed to the League budget by member states. By 
1945 the total liquid assets of the League amounted to 15,238,792.32 C.H.F.
166
 
During negotiating proceedings the Supervisory Commission pointed out to the U.N. 
Preparatory Commission that the League had remained solvent throughout its history, 
even during the war years, and that no serious obstacle should hamper the 
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procurement of ‘an equitable and businesslike solution satisfactorily to all parties.’167 
In briefly alluding to the League’s wartime experience David L. Bosco wrote that 
most of the League’s member states stopped their payments to the League budget.168 
In reality thirty-seven out of the total forty-four member states of the League 
continued to make contributions to the budget.
169
 By December 1945 League 
accounts could testify that since the organisation’s creation over ninety per cent of 
contributions had been received, 4.5 per cent cancelled and about 1.5 per cent 
consolidated into payments over a period of years (to asset defaulting member states). 
This left only four per cent of contributions outstanding.
170
 While the League 
Treasury was in regular receipt of contributions, by the time of the final League 
Assembly in April 1946 only thirteen member states were completely up to date on 
their payments.
171
 The Supervisory Commission allowed that the United Nations 
should not be obliged to assume the liabilities of the League as well as its assets.
172
 
To this end it would be the responsibility of the League to resolve the issue of arrears 
in member state contributions during dissolution and liquidation proceedings. The 
liquid assets of the League would not be gifted to the U.N.O. but rather divided 
among member states, with each state receiving a sum proportionate to the amount it 
had contributed.  
From the birth to the dissolution of the League approximately fifty million 
C.H.F. (derived from member state contributions) was converted into tangible 
material assets, such as the sprawling Palais des Nations.
173
 The total value of 
League buildings, fixtures and fittings was estimated at 2,750,000 G.B.P.
174
 The 
League and the United Nations authorities agreed that a full indiscriminate transfer 
of material assets was the best course of action. Although the material assets of the 
League were to be transferred to the U.N.O., they were strictly speaking the property 
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of member states. As a result it was agreed that credits would be granted in the books 
of the U.N.O. to those powers who were members of the League upon its dissolution. 
However upon the final moment of dissolution there would be four such countries 
who were not yet members of the U.N.O; Switzerland, Portugal, Ireland and Finland. 
Rather than depriving them of their rightful share in the material assets it was found 
that there would be sufficient funds left over from the divided liquid assets of the 
League to apportion an additional cash payment to those states to cover their share in 
the material assets.
175
 It was agreed that the deadline for the transfer of all material 
assets of the League should be 1 August 1946 but that it was necessary to provide 
some ‘degree of elasticity’ in the event of a delay to prevent ‘embarrassment for the 
administrations concerned.’176 As it was likely that the ECOSOC would only be 
ready to assume the non political functions of the League in various stages, the 
Supervisory Commission agreed to provide full use of League buildings to the 
U.N.O. before legal transfer was effected in order to ensure a smooth transition 
without any break in the continuity of the technical work.
177
 The U.N.O. likewise 
agreed to extend the same rights to League officials, after the buildings of the old 
organisation became the property of the new, until liquidation proceedings, likely to 
take some months, were completed. 
The eventual fate of League headquarters was of great interest to the old 
international civil service. Over the course of the League’s history and especially 
during the war years, its officials and supporters were always anxious to encourage 
greater participation of the United States in the activities of the organisation. That 
did not mean that they were anxious to oversee, what Aghnides referred to as the 
‘eclipse of Europe.’178 By 1945 the question of where to locate the headquarters of 
the U.N.O. had not been resolved; the decision would have a massive impact on 
operation and influence of the new international civil service. The Swiss federal 
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government hoped that Geneva would remain an important seat for international 
institutions.
179
 According to the Gazette de Lausanne Geneva was one of the likely 
locations alongside other European cities such as London, Brussels, Luxembourg 
and Vienna with the Soviets favouring Prague.
180
 At a Commonwealth meeting in 
April 1945 the British coalition government recommended that the best location for 
the new U.N.O. would be in Europe, outside the territory of a great power, ideally 
retaining the old League headquarters in Geneva.
181
  
The transfer of power in Britain from the Conservative led coalition to the 
Labour government of Clement Atlee in July 1945 did not undermine the League’s 
currency with the British government; as discussed in chapter two support for the 
League was traditionally strong among the British left.
182
 During the deliberations of 
the United Nations Preparatory Commission the minister of state for foreign affairs 
of the new Labour government, Philip Noel-Baker, continued to advocate Geneva as 
the potential headquarters of the new organisation. Noel-Baker had served as Cecil’s 
assistant when the League Covenant was first drafted in Paris. He was seconded to 
the League Secretariat in 1920, serving as an assistant to Drummond. In 1945 Noel-
Baker emphasised the advantages of Geneva as the location for an international 
organisation; it possessed purpose-built amenities and accommodation while the 
neutrality of Switzerland which would obviate the risk of any undue opportunities or 
influence being accorded to a great power.
183
 He argued that Soviet scruples against 
both the League and Swiss neutrality would likely be removed by the liquidation of 
the League as well as the full internationalisation of the territory on which 
headquarters stood so that it fell outside Swiss jurisdiction.
184
 Noel-Baker 
acknowledged that Geneva was associated with the failure of the League, but 
asserted that the location of U.N. headquarters on the site of past ignominy would 
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demonstrate how the United Nations powers were ‘facing the challenges of this 
failure.’185  
This view, though not without support, was not shared by all members of 
Atlee’s government who recognised the need to place some political and even 
geographical distance between the old organisation and the new.
186
 In his 1941 
publication Robert Dell had argued that Geneva was an unsuitable location for an 
international organisation. According to Dell the League should have been located 
‘in an important city where the members of the staff would have a large and varied 
society outside the League to mix with and would not be obliged, so to speak, to take 
in one another’s washing.’ 187  J.V. Wilson also observed that ‘it was sometimes 
argued against Geneva that it was removed from the mainstream of affairs, not being 
in itself an active centre of political life. Perhaps it was somewhat too idyllic a place 
to be fully suited to its purpose.’188 Geneva was certainly isolated from mainstream 
events during the war and was exposed as a poor choice of headquarters for any 
international organisation aspiring to a political role. The retention of headquarters in 
Geneva would also be incompatible with the Soviet determination for a clean break 
with the past. During the debates of the first General Assembly in January 1946 
Gromyko firmly expressed the view of the Soviet Union on the permanent location 
of U.N. headquarters: 
 
I wish to say that the Soviet government has a definite negative attitude 
towards Geneva as a possible place for the United Nations Organisation. The 
Soviet Government considers that the United States would be the proper 
place for the United Nations Organisation. The United States is located 
conveniently between Asia and Europe. The old world has had it once, and it 
is time for the new world to have it.
189
 
 
The ultimate selection, by the 1946 General Assembly, of New York as the 
headquarters of the U.N.O. served as a backdrop for the substitution, within 
international organisations, of the worn out hegemonies of western Europe for the 
post-war predominance of the United States. The idea that the stately Palais des 
Nations could be forsaken and the attempt of the Soviets and other hardened critics 
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of the inter-war system to consign the League to the dustbin of history appalled its 
supporters and officials. The League’s dying days were marked by the determination 
of League officials and supporters to fight for their own history. Those who had 
devoted a great deal of their life to the service of the League believed that the 
Secretariat of the League was an institution which deserved ‘to leave some 
permanent trace behind it’.190 Figures such as Frank Walters, the former deputy 
secretary-general, were convinced of the historical value of League records which 
documented major political, economic and social development over the previous 
twenty-five years. Walters was adamant that the League’s archives should become a 
permanent institution and vehemently opposed the indiscriminate transfer of files to 
the new (as yet un-built) headquarters of the U.N.O. Reflecting on the intentions of 
the U.N. to assume full ownership and right of disposal of all League archival 
material he concluded that such a move would be; 
 
profoundly wrong, short-sighted, un-generous, destructive and an offence 
against history. If anything of this sort is carried out, it will mean that all 
visible and material records of the League of Nations will, for practical 
purposes, be wiped out-scattered, merged into a mass of material in which 
they lose all separate identity, removed from the place and setting in which 
they properly and historically belong.
191
 
 
Loveday also believed that the transfer of the League’s Rockefeller Library 
to New York would be ‘a tragic error’ and a ‘serious loss to the cause of 
international understanding’.192 Loveday argued that everything should be done to 
‘maintain some centre of international work in Europe.’193 Despite the assertion of 
Walters that the archives of the League should serve as a kind of memorial to the old 
international civil service, the organisation’s complete collection of files and 
publications were too valuable to the U.N. Secretariat to be preserved in a kind of 
mausoleum. During negotiations with League representatives in January 1946, the 
U.N. Preparatory Commission emphasised the importance it attached to the League 
Library and to the transfer of its archives to the new organisation.
194
 The Preparatory 
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Commission asserted that the U.N.O. would need to have full right of disposal of the 
archival material but assured the League representatives that they regarded those 
archives as a most valuable material asset.
195
 
 During the final months of the League’s existence its officials were obliged 
to come to terms with the fact they were no longer in the vanguard of peaceful 
internationalism; rather they were increasingly regarded as relics of times passed. 
The League’s liberal democratic ethos was relevant during the war as a counterpoint 
to totalitarianism and fascism. However in a post-war world of greater political 
realism, the League was beginning to lose the relevance it fought so hard to keep. In 
November 1945 at a meeting of the U.N. Preparatory Commission a correspondent 
of the Manchester Guardian observed an incident that perfectly encapsulated the 
difficult position in which League officials and supporters found themselves at the 
end of the war: 
 
Our attention was attracted by Mr. Noel-Baker suddenly leaving his place 
and greeting a stranger in the gangway. It was Viscount Cecil, a little more 
bowed and frail than Geneva knew him but with fire still in his eye. He came 
in, just at the moment when the words ‘seat of the U.N.O.’ were being 
frequently heard in a committee in which the name ‘Geneva’ apparently must 
not be pronounced. Across the passage the League of Nations Committee was 
engaged in winding up that first world organisation with which he was so 
completely identified. It was only a step or two to go in, but he did not take 
them.
196
 
 
 
 
History closing in: the final Assembly of the League of Nations 
When the ‘common plan’ for the transfer of asserts and functions, brokered by the 
U.N. Supervisory Commission and the U.N. Preparatory Commission, secured the 
necessary approval from the U.N. General Assembly, Lester could return to the 
Palais des Nations to make the necessary preparations for the dissolution of the 
League of Nations. The acting secretary-general, about to embark on his final duties, 
received some recognition in late 1945. Arthur Sweetser, then president of the 
Woodrow Wilson Foundation, wrote to Lester informing him that the directors of the 
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foundation wished to confer upon him the Woodrow Wilson award for 
‘distinguished service in maintaining throughout World War II the traditions and the 
organisation of the League of Nations.’197  In an official letter to the foundation 
Lester accepted the award ‘on behalf of all my colleagues wherever they served, as a 
recognition of the steadfastness of those who, when the cause of free cooperation 
between free nations seemed almost a forlorn hope, would not yield their integrity 
nor allow force or the threat of force to mould their conduct.’198 Lester informed his 
old colleague Sweetser that he was touched that the Foundation chose ‘to honour a 
bit of wartime service, obscurely performed and by no means in the public eye.’199 
Lester confided to Eden that what sustained him ‘in his personal disinclination to 
quit’ just because things ‘were difficult’ was the conviction that the preservation of 
the League would prove to ‘have been worthwhile.’200 Unlike his successor, Lester 
was an ardent internationalist. His idealism sustained him in his pragmatic 
preservation of a nucleus of international cooperation in the heart of continental 
Europe.  
While Lester was receiving a Woodrow Wilson award, Joseph Avenol was 
trying to exculpate himself from accusations of wrong-doing. Like many of those 
associated with the League experiment Avenol disseminated his views on the post-
war international situation. In his 1944 publication L’Europe Silencieuse he 
suggested the creation of a Council of Europe type organisation.
201
 In this book all 
vestiges of his pro-Axis sympathies were effaced by his admiration for the Allied 
war aims and for the Resistance efforts of the occupied countries.
202
 In terms of the 
wider historiography of Vichy, Avenol can be recognised as one of the many Vichy-
résitants, men who had been early adherents to Vichy only to switch allegiance in 
response to the reversal in fortunes of the Axis bloc.
203
 Avenol was an opportunist 
who would not concede that he had failed in his duties as secretary-general. He 
dispatched a vehement letter to the editor of the Tribune de Genève in April 1946 
refuting an assertion that Lester was compelled to assume leadership of the 
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Secretariat when it was left in the lurch.
204
 He wrote beseeching letters to Hambro 
wanting to know the exact nature of the charges his colleagues laid against him.
205
 
As the last Assembly approached Avenol made it known to Hambro that he would 
be prepared to justify himself to the Supervisory Commission and to pass onto that 
organ whatever information, explanations or opinions it required of him.
206
 Hambro, 
extremely preoccupied with the task at hand, neatly side-stepped any unnecessary 
digression into the events of 1940 and politely reminded Avenol that he had, 
whatever the circumstances surrounding it, left the Secretariat in ‘very difficult 
conditions’.207  
Avenol lacked both an idealistic attachment to the Covenant and a realistic 
understanding of the political landscape. Lester was both a disciple of the Covenant 
and, having in his own worlds, ‘received more kicks than halfpence’ during his 
wartime stewardship of the Secretariat, acquired a shrewd understanding of the 
realities and limitations of international cooperation.
208
 In 1944 Anthony Eden 
discussed with Lord Lytton the prospect of conferring upon the secretary-general of 
the new organisation the power to call the attention of the Council to matters which 
threatened the peace of the world. Eden observed that ‘in such a case much would 
depend on the personality of the secretary-general [........] we cannot be certain that 
he will always be the man to be entrusted with those powers.’209 Avenol’s tenure as 
secretary-general served as a significant warning against placing at the head of an 
international secretariat a figure so lacking in political prudence and circumspection.  
Lester was, even before the San Francisco Conference, adamant that the 
League should not be pressurised into dissolution and liquidation on anything other 
than its own terms.
210
 He came under increased pressure to call the League’s 
suspended political organs into session to obviate the inconvenience of the 
simultaneous existence of two international organisations. In August 1945 he 
rejected the proposal for the convening of an Assembly as early as November 
1945.
211
 This risked the possibility of effecting the League’s dissolution before 
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member states had been given the opportunity to agree to the transfer of assets and 
functions to the U.N.O. In a letter to the Foreign Office Gladwyn Jebb, then the 
acting secretary-general of the United Nations, expressed his frustration with 
Lester’s insistence that the League Assembly should be held in Geneva, as per 
tradition, rather than in London.
212
 London was a more convenient location for the 
U.N.O. (than operating in that city) which was expected to send observers to the 
final League Assembly. He also indicated his preferment that the last Assembly of 
the League should be a ‘quiet affair’ but that Lester was insisting that the occasion 
be marked by an ‘enterrement de premiere classe complete with funeral speeches’ 
and the establishment of various committees to study the proposals of the common 
plan.
213
 
Lester’s desire for dissolution with dignity was an objective supported by 
Ernest Bevin, then foreign secretary. Bevin stressed that while the League should not 
try to compete with the United Nations in any way, the last Assembly should not 
constitute ‘an undignified shovelling away of a corpse into a pauper’s grave, such as 
the Russian’s may desire us to give it.’214  Consequently the British government 
fielded an impressive delegation to the Assembly. Viscount Cecil, whose attempts to 
galvanise public opinion in defence of the League Covenant never flagged, even 
during the war years, was accorded his place in the delegation and the final 
Assembly fittingly marked the end of Cecil’s active public life.215 The delegation 
was led by another League enthusiast, Philip Noel-Baker.  The French too sent their 
seasoned diplomats and statesmen to dissolve the League. The aged Joseph Paul-
Boncour once more led the French delegation to Geneva, serving as a reminder of 
the prominent role of Third Republic in the formation and development of the 
League. The staff of the Geneva Secretariat, unlike their counterparts in the 
transferred technical services, had spent almost six years in relative obscurity as they 
persevered with their wartime work programmes. In April 1946 the eyes of the world 
would turn once more to Geneva as the League Assembly emerged from self-
imposed hibernation.  
The Supervisory Commission asked the British Foreign Office to take the 
initiative at the Assembly in advancing the motion for dissolution, a responsibility 
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which was accepted.
216
 In preparing for the Assembly Lester was faced with the 
diplomatic conundrum of who exactly to invite to participate. While the League 
functioned as an anti-communist coalition, the U.N.O. practised a more tangible 
form of exclusivity it being composed of the members of the wartime alliance. The 
Assembly Hall of the League of Nations would not only be populated by delegations 
from neutral member states but also by those powers which had fought alongside 
Germany, Italy and Japan.  Finland, Bulgaria and Thailand fell into this bracket and 
the situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Assembly convened before formal 
peace treaties were signed between those powers and the representatives of the 
Allied governments. The British Foreign Office reflected that the prospect of sitting 
down at the same table with countries with which the United Kingdom was still 
technically at war was not desirable but it conceded that it could not stop Lester 
issuing invitations to those powers.
217
 As it transpired, neither Bulgaria nor Thailand 
attended the Assembly. Finland, which had already begun its rehabilitation with the 
League through the payment of its contribution, did send delegates. While the 
Assembly of April 1946 might have been the last session in the history of the League 
of Nations, it provided one of the first opportunities of international collaboration, 
between ex-enemy states. Finnish, British and French delegates served together on 
important sub-committees at the April Assembly.  
By 1946 official League documentation listed forty-four states as members of 
the League of Nations.
218
 However the massive political upheavals engendered by 
war meant that in reality a handful of those states had completely lost their 
sovereignty or were bereft of a legitimate, internationally recognised government. 
Lester could not contemplate issuing a formal invitation to the Baltic states as the 
majority of member states no longer recognised their independence.
219
 Another state 
whose status was considered uncertain was Albania. As discussed in chapter one, 
Avenol ignored the Albanian appeal to the League in April 1939. In the wake of the 
complete Italian conquest of Albania the same month the newly installed puppet 
government of Shefqet Vërlaci telegrammed the secretary-general of the League 
notifying him as to the immediate withdrawal of Albania.
220
 As this government had 
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not yet secured the recognition of member states, the notification was considered 
invalid and Albania continued to be listed on League documentation.
221
 Likewise in 
1946, the uncertain and largely unrecognised status of the new People’s Socialist 
Republic of Albania, led by the former partisan Enver Hoxha, impelled Lester to 
withhold an invitation to an Albanian government.
222
 As was customary, the 
Assembly inaugurated specialised committees to investigate the matters which 
would come before it. The League’s Credentials Committee was appointed the task 
of approving and sanctioning the presence of member state delegations. Even as 
proceedings were ongoing the diplomatic problems posed by those states whose 
membership of the League was regarded as having lapsed or whose legitimacy was 
considered dubious, did not disappear. A representative of the former Latvian 
republic tried to obtain admission to the Assembly on the grounds of his credentials 
from the 1939 session.
223
 He was refused by the Credentials Committee.  
The status of Austria also presented an original problem for the high direction 
of the League. Prior to a session of the Assembly in 1938 a formal communication 
was received from Germany informing the League of Austria’s union with the Third 
Reich. The League’s Committee on Contributions insisted that this communication 
constituted a formal notice of withdrawal and the Legal Committee upheld this view 
as, in the aftermath of the Anschluss, Austria could no longer be regarded as an 
independent state.
224
 With the collapse of the Third Reich a representative of the new 
provisional Austrian government approached Lester to express an interest in 
participating in the final Assembly.
225
 Ultimately it was considered ‘legally 
incorrect’ to allow Austria a seat in the Assembly, especially as that right was being 
denied to the Baltic states whose membership was also deemed as to having lapsed 
due to a loss of sovereignty.
226
 The British Foreign Office, in particular, did not want 
to raise complicated questions in view of the complete authority the Allied Control 
Council was exercising over Austrian foreign relations at that moment in time.
227
 
However an Austrian representative presented himself at the Assembly in the 
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manner, according to Time Magazine, of a ‘poor, estranged relative.’228 Robert Cecil 
argued that it would be an injustice for the Assembly to fail to recognise a newly 
independent Austria and suggested its re-admittance as a new country.
229
 Hambro, as 
president of the League Assembly, announced that Austria would be admitted to the 
Assembly as an official observer in recognition that the country had been the ‘first 
victim of Nazi aggression’ which once again desired to ‘collaborate with the free 
peoples of the world.’230 Denmark too was quick, during this period, to discharge all 
its outstanding financial obligations to the League before the organisation’s formal 
dissolution. In this way Austria and Denmark followed in the footsteps of France and 
Finland in using the League as the means to re-establish relations with members of 
the international community from whom they were estranged.  
In December 1939 the League Assembly decided not to close its twentieth 
ordinary session but to adjourn it. Lester believed, with the approbation of member 
states, that the best course of action would be for the Assembly to resolve itself into 
a new session.
231
 It was agreed by member states that the Council would not be 
convoked but that the League Assembly carried the necessary executive authority to 
dissolve the organisation. The twentieth Assembly was formally opened by its 
president, Hambro, on 8 April 1946 in order to formally close it and announce the 
opening of the twenty-first session. The last time member states convened in a 
League Assembly they confined themselves to condemning Soviet aggression in 
Finland while abdicating their responsibility to denounce German aggression 
elsewhere on the continent. With the war at an end Hambro declared that delegates 
could not meet once more in the Palais des Nations without dwelling: 
 
for one solemn second on the untold suffering and sacrifice of millions, on 
the furious fighting, on the resolute and resourceful resistance, on the 
determination of nations, great and small, to die rather than to see prostituted 
and destroyed every idea for which they have been striving, in human frailty 
and futility, and every principle that makes life worth living trampled 
underfoot.
232
  
 
                                                          
228
 Time Magazine, 22 Apr. 1946.  
229
 Conclusion of a British delegation meeting, 9 Apr. 1946 (T.N.A., FO 371/57003).  
230
 Record of the fifth meeting of the twenty first ordinary session of the Assembly, 12 Apr. 1946 
(T.N.A., FO 371/57006, p. 4).  
231
 Annotated provisional agenda for the Assembly convened to meet in Geneva on 8 April 1946, 2 
Mar. 1946 (T.N.A., FO 371/57002).  
232
 Provisional record of the twentieth Assembly: sixth meeting, 8 Apr. 1946 (T.N.A., FO 371/57005, 
p. 1).   
288 
 
In recognition of his commitment to the League during the war years, 
Hambro was unanimously re-elected president of the Assembly. Lester too was 
recognised for his efforts. Humphrey Hume Wrong of Canada was one of many 
delegates to pay a warm tribute to Lester. According to Wrong, Lester assumed 
leadership of the Secretariat ‘in the darkest hours of modern history’ but persevered 
‘in the midst of discouragement which would have made a lesser man resign in 
despair.’233 The name of Lester’s predecessor was never invoked. The Czechoslovak 
delegate was the only speaker who made a veiled allusion to Avenol and his actions 
in 1940. Dr. Jaromir Kopecky argued that ‘had not a change occurred in 1940 in the 
person at the head of the Secretariat’ his country and the other occupied member 
states would not have been permitted to further associate themselves with the League 
of Nations.
234
 The Journal de Genève also paid tribute to the League’s international 
civil service as a ‘model of efficiency and order’ and celebrated the League tradition 
of gathering competent and distinguished experts under one roof to work for social 
and economic progress.
235
 On 26 March 1946 Lester had announced his intention to 
place his position as acting secretary-general at the disposal of the forthcoming 
Assembly.
236
 On 18 April, the final day of proceedings, member states voted to 
formally confer upon Lester the full rights and responsibilities of secretary-general. 
The Assembly conferred the title retroactively so that Lester’s tenure as secretary-
general was deemed to have begun in September 1940. Jacklin was also retroactively 
confirmed as under secretary-general.
237
 Raymond Fosdick’s asserted that Lester’s 
appointment as secretary-general constituted nothing more than the conferral of a 
type of ‘honorary degree’; however this risks slighting Lester’s pivotal role in 
preserving a League nucleus in the heart of continental Europe and overlooks the 
esteem in which he was held by member states and by his colleagues.
238
 
The League’s sobering experience of the San Francisco Conference created 
the impression that its political identity was no longer valued by the international 
community. However even when the League’s identity was no longer relevant to 
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member states they were not prepared, on the eve of dissolution, to treat their 
membership of the organisation as politically insignificant. The final Assembly 
continued to reflect the League’s role as a badge of sovereignty and its value as a 
shared accord on international standards of behaviour. The refusal of member states 
to depoliticise the League, even on its deathbed, and their reluctance to summarily 
dissolve the organisation with little fanfare was demonstrated by the controversies 
generated within the special committees of the Assembly. The first day of Assembly 
proceedings was marred when the Argentinean candidacy for the vice-presidency of 
the Assembly was soundly beaten with most delegations preferring Mexico for the 
role.
239
 This provoked an angry outburst from the Argentinean delegation which 
temporarily withdrew from all Assembly and committee meetings. A representative 
of the British delegation assumed the role of peace-broker and called upon his 
Argentinean counterparts. Argentina protested at the manner in which it was treated 
by the Assembly, viewing it as an affront to its ‘national prestige’ precisely at the 
time when it had just conducted ‘genuine democratic elections.’240Argentina was 
pushing for an increase in the number of vice-presidencies and so the British 
delegation sounded out the attitude of their Dominion counterparts. Disapproval of 
the right-wing policies of the Argentinean government was running high and some 
of the dominion delegates, the Australians in particular, informed the British that if a 
move to increase the number of vice-presidencies was proposed on the floor of the 
Assembly they would move to oppose it.
241
 The British then informed the 
Argentinean delegation that there was no hope for such a proposal, warning them 
that if they attempted any further initiative in this matter it would ‘certainly produce 
a first class battle in the Assembly which would discredit both them and the 
League.’242 The Argentinean delegation had no choice but to agree drop the matter 
and re-assumed its participation in the Assembly. 
Crucially, one of the factors which rendered the prospect of an Argentinean 
vice-presidency of the Assembly so unattractive to other delegations was that 
country’s bold stance on the Soviet Union in December 1939. Of all the member 
states that had supported the condemnation of the U.S.S.R. in December 1939, 
Argentina was the only one anxious to remind everyone of its previous anti-Soviet 
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pronouncements. Its delegation claimed ‘a clear right’ to a vice-presidency in 
recognition of its prominent role in the Assembly of 1939.
243
 A member of the 
British delegation informed his Argentinean counterparts that allusions to the 1939 
Assembly ‘was exactly the kind of thing’ on which they ‘did not wish bitter remarks 
to be made in the Assembly.’244  The legacy of the 1939 resolution haunted the 
special Assembly committees tasked with considering the League’s dissolution and 
liquidation.  
The two most important of these committees were the General Committee 
and the Finance Committee. The General Committee studied the questions of 
transfer and dissolution. Lester pointed out to its members that the General 
Committee could not, in any way, consider how the League’s technical activities 
should be conducted within the umbrella of the new organisation.
245
 All the member 
states of the Assembly could do was register their approval of the continuation of the 
social and economic activities of the League within the new organisation. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice was also to be dissolved in favour of the 
new International Court of Justice. The Permanent Court maintained its nominal 
existence but by early 1945 its judiciary had resigned their posts, most being offered 
positions within the new Court. José Gustavo Guerrero, the El Salvadorian president 
of the Permanent Court, who alongside Lester had been denied passage into Spain in 
1940, was elected the first president of the International Court of Justice.  
While the proposal for dissolution was relatively straightforward the 
liquidation of the League’s assets became a politically charged issue. In March 1946, 
with the Assembly looming, the Sovietised Baltic states officially requested Lester to 
add their share of the League’s assets to that of the U.S.S.R’s. At the same time he 
was approached by figures claiming to separately represent the old republics who 
invoked the individual financial rights of those countries vis-à-vis liquidation.
246
 The 
U.K. delegation supported the inclusion of the Baltic republics in the list of member 
states entitled to a share in the League’s assets, mindful of the fact that the extent of 
arrears owed to the League Treasury by those three states would likely extinguish 
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their claims.
247
 This was indeed the case. However the British Foreign Office 
resisted the suggestion that any state which had withdrawn from the League of its 
own volition should be entitled to a share in the organisation’s assets. The Foreign 
Office felt that the remaining member states who had preserved the League 
machinery during the war years as an ‘act of faith in international organisation’ 
should not have to lose a portion of their shares in the assets to accommodate those 
countries which had discarded it.
248
  
A country whose history had pitted it as an enemy of the Covenant tried to 
re-establish relations with the dying League of Nations. The new democratic republic 
of Italy sought to distance itself from the belligerent dictatorship of Mussolini, a 
dictatorship that sought to obliterate other League member states such as Ethiopia, 
Albania and Greece from the map. Hugh McKinnon Wood of the British Foreign 
Office was approached by an Italian diplomat who expressed his intention to write to 
Hambro claiming a share for Italy in the League’s assets. The Foreign Office 
regarded such a claim as the ‘height of impertinence.’249 McKinnon Wood dissuaded 
the Italian diplomat from pressing his claim, advising him that such an application 
would be ‘hopeless.’250 However the new Italian republic remained keen to make 
some gesture to the League of Nations. On 8 April President Hambro read a message 
to the assembled delegations from the Italian government. The message expressed 
the hope that the ideals of the League would find in the United Nations ‘a fertile soil 
for their development and their application’ and reminded the Assembly of the role 
Italian nationals had played in the social and economic activities of the old 
organisation.
251
 In return Hambro relayed the following carefully worded message to 
the young Italian republic: ‘The Assembly hails the birth of a new democratic Italy, 
freed of that fascism which has done so much harm to the interests of all Italians and 
all mankind.
252
  
The issue of former member states staking a claim in the League’s assets 
continued to complicate dissolution proceedings. The U.S.S.R., as the only state to 
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have been expelled from the League, was in a unique position. A member of the 
Soviet delegation to the U.N. Assembly made a private approach to Hambro 
suggesting that the U.S.S.R. was entitled to a share in the League’s assets.253 The 
British Foreign Office refused to countenance such a proposal as it felt that any 
weakening on the issue would ‘cast a shadow of appeasement over the League’s 
final meeting’ and ‘would also gain no good-will from the Soviet Union, who would 
only despise the League for having way.’ 254  The Polish and Czechoslovak 
delegations forwarded a motion in the meeting of the Second Committee of the 
Assembly (devoted to financial questions) that the Soviet Union should be accorded 
a share in the League’s assets. The motion was predicated on the fact that the Soviet 
Union did not withdraw from the League of its own free will. The Poles and 
Czechoslovaks, then falling within the Soviet sphere of influence, argued that it 
would be ‘equitable to associate with the final settlement, a nation whose 
contribution to the victory of free countries and the contribution of the world order 
has been outstanding.’255 This motion was supported by the delegates of Finland, 
France and Yugoslavia. A sub-committee composed of delegates from Canada, 
Finland, France, the United Kingdom and Uruguay was formed to study the matter. 
While the majority of the sub-committee favoured the inclusion of the Soviet Union 
in the list of member states entitled to a share in the League’s assets, it was agreed 
that such a move would ‘create technical difficulties of so serious a character as to be 
practically insurmountable.’ 256  At the suggestion of the Second Committee the 
Assembly approved the following resolution as a gesture to the U.S.S.R: 
 
The Assembly desires to place on record its recognition of the fundamental 
contribution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the overthrow of 
the fascist enemies of civilisation and to the triumph of freedom, and to 
welcome the collaboration of the Soviet Union in building, on the 
foundations so successfully laid, the new edifice if international solidarity.
257
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The period under review by the thesis is bookended by two important 
Assemblies. Both of these Assemblies featured Soviet inspired resolutions and the 
stark difference in the tone and spirit of these resolutions serve as a dramatic 
reflection of an unprecedented shift in the international landscape. The words of 
gratitude and approbation sounding in the Assembly did not induce the Soviet press 
to construct flattering obituaries for the League of Nations. Trud, the organ of the 
Soviet labour unions, commented upon dissolution proceedings by dismissing the 
League as a ‘centre of Soviet intrigue.’258 With the U.N.O. the Soviet Union had 
come once again to participate in an international organisation; but on its own terms. 
Trud expressed its hope that the ‘ignominious legacy’ of the League would be an 
adequate warning for ‘all who intend to follow the bankrupt policy of Geneva’.259 
The sense of continuity between the League and the U.N. while feted by League 
supporters was denied and dismissed by Moscow, despite the shared technocratic 
traditions of the two organisations.  
It was this sense of continuity and optimism that characterised the final 
Assembly of the League of Nations. League officials and supporters were very 
possessive about the League’s history and tried to manage the organisation’s epitaph. 
The speeches of the final Assembly were characterised by the self-consciousness that 
this was a historic occasion and the final opportunity, on home ground, to justify the 
League’s existence and its wartime preservation. Lester articulated the traditional 
apologia of League supporters when he delivered his final report to the assembled 
delegates: ‘The League of Nations as an organisation no doubt had its faults, but it is 
dangerous nonsense to say that war came because of those faults. The League did not 
fail; it was nations which failed to use it.’260  The survival and influence of the 
technical services contributed to a self-congratulatory atmosphere in Geneva. Robert 
Cecil proudly asserted that ‘the work of the League is purely and unmistakably 
printed on the social, economic and humanitarian life of the world.’ 261   South 
Africa’s Leif Egeland criticised  
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the fashion to belittle the League of Nations, and to seek to make the League 
the scapegoat for the myopia of statesman or the apathy of peoples. In this 
Assembly, however, here in Geneva where through the years a vast and 
efficient international civil service was built up, it is fitting that tribute should 
be paid to a great experiment, which despite its failure to avert Armageddon, 
did achieve many positive successes and solid contributions to human 
progress, particularly in the less spectacular field of its work.
262
  
 
The League’s traditional critics in the press dismissed what they regarded as 
mawkish and inaccurate recollections of the Geneva experience. Time Magazine 
dubbed figures such as Robert Cecil ‘sentimental old-timers.’263 Pravda sought to 
downplay the grandiosity of the final Assembly by claiming that the League was 
buried in an ‘unattended last-rite at which its last president Doctor Hambro read the 
funeral service and [Joseph] Paul Boncour in the role of deacon pronounced the 
Amen, and said a few words for decency’s sake.’264  Rather than defending the 
League’s legacy, in the tradition of Cecil and Lester, Pravda  accused the League of 
being ‘chatterly like a magpie and cowardly like a hare’, being presided over by the 
‘high-priests of imperialism’, who transformed the organisation into an ‘arena for 
international intrigue and back-stage diplomacy.’265 This debate, which resonated 
within subsequent scholarship, demonstrates that internationalism, a movement 
intended to foster peace, prosperity and solidarity, more often than not inspired bitter 
and entrenched political and ideological division.  
  The type of history League officials and supporters were engaged in was of 
the ‘Whiggish’ variety described by Ashworth.266 What sustained those gathered at 
Geneva was the belief that the United Nations represented not the end of the League 
but a continuation of its ideals within a stronger framework. Nothing embodied that 
sense of continuity more than the presence, within the new U.N. Secretariat, of 
former League officials. During the first session of the Assembly, Hambro, in 
welcoming the official United Nations delegation, pointed out the presence of 
Adriannus Pelt, the personal representative of the U.N. secretary-general. Hambro 
was eager to allude to the fact that in December 1939 Pelt had sat in the Assembly as 
the director of the League Secretariat. Thus the Dutchman, according to Hambro, 
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embodied ‘that continuity which must be preserved.’267 Hambro also argued that 
League headquarters should not become ‘an impressive grave for mourned and 
regretted ideas.’ Rather League member states hoped that it would ‘soon team with 
life, as a centre of fruitful and creative activity.’268 He told the correspondent of the 
local Journal de Genève that the spirit of the League of Nations was not dead and 
that those assembled for the last time in the Palais des Nations were not ghosts.
269
 
The President of the Council, Adolfo Costa du Rels, spoke of the ‘sacred trust’ being 
passed from the League to the United Nations.
270
 Robert Cecil was also keen to 
emphasise the continuity and tradition that existed between the League and the 
United Nations: 
 
Shorn of its imperfections and transplanted under better conditions, the 
League Experiment will start a new lease of life in a new human endeavour 
to achieve peace and security through the United Nations [.............] The 
League is dead: Long live the United Nations!
271
   
  
As can be concluded from the negotiations between the League and the U.N. 
Preparatory Commission and even from the often frustrating experience of the 
League’s technical organisation as they sought to influence post-war planning, the 
United Nations Organisation, though not a clean break with the past, certainly did 
not constitute the second attempt at the Geneva experiment. While the goals and 
some of the equipment remained the same, the world had been too badly burned by 
the frustration of the League’s collective security potential not to employ new 
methods and ideas. The United Nations Organisation would be called on to preside 
over an era of rapid decolonisation and its General Assembly would provide the 
forum for an ideological clash between east and west as Cold War Tensions 
escalated. Such divisions enabled a resurgence of a liberal internationalist approach 
on the part of the United States and its allies when they engaged in cultural warfare 
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with the communist bloc.
272
 These tensions and the inability to juggle different 
political systems would subject U.N. machinery to the same crippling inertia as 
experienced by the League, demonstrating the enduring challenges of international 
and intergovernmental cooperation. However, while the western powers may have 
already come to suspect and resent Stalin’s intentions in Eastern Europe,  the 
immediate post-war era, the period with which this thesis is concerned, was marked 
by the aspiration that the Big Five could work together to effectively police the 
world; this would require the toleration of the radically different political, cultural 
and economic structures of the U.S.S.R.
273
 After 1945 international cooperation 
could no longer be predicated on the maxim that the principles of liberal democracy, 
still being espoused within the walls of the last Assembly, would soon become a 
universal political reality.  
In the closing session of the Assembly on 18 April the reports of the 
committees and their recommendations were presented to member states. The terms 
of the common plan for the transfer of assets from the League to the United Nations 
were unanimously approved. League member states directed Lester to ‘afford every 
facility for the assumption by the United Nations of such non-political activities, 
hitherto performed by the League, as the United Nations may decide to assume.’274 
The terms proposed for the liquidation of the League, its dissolution and the 
dissolution of the Permanent Court of Justice were formally approved by Assembly 
resolutions. Thus on the afternoon of 18 April 1946 the League of Nations ceased to 
exist. All that remained was a small band of officials to liquidate its assets and 
oversee the assumption of its functions by the United Nations Organisation.  
 
 
The transfer of functions to the U.N.O. and the liquidation of the League  
Once all the grandiose ceremonies had been completed and delegates scattered for 
the last time, Lester and his remaining staff could concentrate on their relations with 
the U.N.O. and the process of liquidation. In May 1946 a negotiating committee 
from the United Nations arrived in Geneva to discuss the transfer of property with 
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the high direction of the League. During their stay they were given the opportunity 
of touring the facilities offered by the Palais des Nations and of assessing the 
potential of the buildings in relation to conference services and as potential office 
space for the U.N.’s technical agencies. The aspirations of the final Assembly 
appeared likely to be realised as the U.N. committee came to the conclusion that in 
the Palais des Nations the United Nations Organisation had ‘acquired a valuable 
asset which could play an important role in facilitating future international meetings 
of every description.’275  
The U.N. delegation also busied themselves in negotiations with the Swiss 
authorities. The U.N. confirmed certain rights of usage the city of Geneva enjoyed 
on the former League site in the Ariana Park. They also negotiated the diplomatic 
immunities and privileges which their staff were to enjoy in Switzerland. The new 
‘Interim arrangement for the privileges and immunities of the United Nations in 
Switzerland’ explicitly formalised the international status of all its officials and 
delegates leaving no room for the manipulation and interference which had been 
endemic during the war.
276
 At the final Assembly Max Petitpierre, head of the Swiss 
Political Department, expressed his government’s satisfaction that the relations with 
the League ‘have been so pleasant and so cordial.’ 277 In reality the difficult attitude 
of the Federal Council undermined the potential of the wartime nucleus of the 
Geneva Secretariat. In a communication to Swiss diplomats in April 1945 Petitpierre 
had stated that while Switzerland would not seek an invitation to the San Francisco 
Conference, the Swiss people, in adhering to the League Covenant, had given clear 
proof of their understanding of international solidarity, both before and during the 
war.
278
 Lester recognised that there was less inclination to accommodate the scruples 
of neutral powers in the new international system as there had been during the 
League’s time and believed that Switzerland had been over-hasty in disassociating 
itself from the old organisation at different times during its wartime history.
279
 At a 
luncheon hosted by the Geneva municipal authorities to welcome the United Nations 
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delegation to the city, Lester could not resist the temptation, on this occasion, to say 
to an old Swiss acquaintances ‘that it was rather a pity Geneva seemed to have 
entirely forgotten what the League of Nations meant to the city during the last 
twenty-five years.’280 The League’s wartime experience of Swiss neutrality served as 
a useful lesson for the development and organisation of the United Nations with U.N. 
headquarters and its future European headquarters of the Palais des Nations enjoying 
formal extra-territorial privileges.  
On 1 August 1946 Lester and Wlodzimierz Moderow, the European director 
of the U.N.O., carried out the formal signature for the legal transfer of League 
buildings and other material assets to the United Nations. This entailed signing three 
documents, two of them bilateral with the United Nations and one which registered 
the new ownership in the records of the Genevese cantonal and municipal authorities. 
From this day the remnants of the League Secretariat were no longer the hosts of the 
United Nations but their guests. Lester was disappointed by Moderow’s insistence 
that they carry out the formalities on 1 August 1946 when the new secretary-general 
of the U.N.O. was due to arrive in Geneva the following morning and whose 
signature would surely prove more significant than that of his representative.
281
 
Lester learned from members of the United Nations delegation that Moderow, a 
former advisor to the Polish government on the Danzig question, had not made the 
best impression on his chief as the Pole was deemed ‘a trifle fussy and a trifle over-
anxious to expand and develop his personal position.’282 As the League experience 
demonstrated, the management of a large international civil service was fraught with 
many tensions and professional in-fighting; such problems were clearly not dispelled 
with the creation of the new U.N. Secretariat.  
U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie arrived in Geneva on 2 August. Moderow 
originally arranged for the secretary-general’s first official call in Switzerland to be 
made to the Swiss authorities but Lie’s political advisers thought it more fitting for 
Lie to go straight to the what was, since the previous day, the former headquarters of 
the League of Nations.
283
 Lester greeted Lie on the steps of the Palais des Nations 
and the two secretaries-general enjoyed a brief conversation and photo opportunity. 
Lie then left for Bern to conduct talks with the Swiss federal authorities. A few days 
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later Lie returned to Geneva and was given on a tour of League buildings by 
Moderow. Moderow was keen to exclude all League officials from the tour of the 
Palais des Nations which was reserved for United Nations officials only. However, 
Moderow’s attempt to belittle the League was undermined by the presence of at least 
four former League officials in the U.N. delegation.
284
  
 As the League was in the process of liquidation it was remarkable that 
Moderow bothered to project a sense of rivalry between the old international civil 
service and the new. He continued to behave with hostility to League staff at a dinner 
in Geneva that same week. At this rather exclusive event the only non United 
Nations officials present were Lester and Valentin Stencek, the director of personnel 
and internal administration of the League Secretariat.  In proposing a toast to Lie's 
health Moderow claimed that this was a ‘family party’ and with the ‘exception of 
two’ present, everyone wished Lie well in his work.285 Such discourtesy did not 
recommend itself to the U.N. secretary-general. Lie regarded Moderow’s speech as 
‘provocation’ while Lester merely regarded it as ‘some kind of jealousy'  and an 
apparent need to emphasise the ‘outsider position’ of League officials on Moderow’s 
part.
286
 As the U.N. Secretariat was still cutting its teeth, contact with such veterans 
of international cooperation, who had, in Philip-Noel Baker’s words, shown the 
word during the last Assembly ‘how well the job of an international secretariat can 
be done’, ought to have been encouraged. 287  League officials were however 
accustomed to being on the outside and to having their work eclipsed by those 
enjoying stronger governmental support. The work of the League in the technical 
sphere tended to be overlooked when the ECOSOC continued to find its feet. Carl 
Hambro wrote to Lester in August 1946, reflecting on how much the League was 
failing at publicity during this time:  
 
We were doing work-and nobody commented on it. The U.N.O. people don’t 
do any work. And nobody comments upon it, because they are giving press 
conferences every day.
288
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In cooperating with UNRRA during this period, Guatier felt that that the 
Administration was benefitting from a one-sided flow of information from the 
remnants of the League’s Health Organisation while UNRRA excluded Gautier from 
crucial meetings and placed him in charge of topics no one else wanted.
289
 In the 
period immediately preceding the transfer of League assets to the U.N., the League 
Secretariat played host to UNRRA which held a Council session in the Palais des 
Nations in August 1946. In what seemed like a repeat of San Francisco Lester was 
issued an invitation to sit in the hall with representatives of other international 
organisations during the opening session of UNRRA’s 1946 conference. Lester, in 
one last burst of professional pride, declined the invitation as he ‘was not entirely 
satisfied with the arrangement made. The place of one of the six Swiss officials on 
the platform (representing a non-member state) might better have been left to us who 
had been hosts of UNRRA for three weeks and been responsible for an absolutely 
invaluable assistance.’290 In making a speech to the assembled delegates gathered in 
the old League Assembly hall, UNRRA’s director-general Fiorello LaGuardia (the 
former mayor of New York) remarked ‘how pleased he was that the United Nations 
had taken over the buildings to wipe away the cobwebs.’291 Such a remark could be 
considered ill judged considering how indebted UNRRA was to the work of the 
Geneva branches of the League’s Secretariat and technical services. The short-lived 
experience of UNRRA itself reflected the various pitfalls of international 
cooperation. Resentment at the American dominance of UNRRA and a split between 
western European member countries and those of central and Eastern Europe caused 
the decision to be taken at the Geneva meeting to terminate UNRRA upon the 
realisation that the budget for 1947 would not be forthcoming.
292
 Ultimately, 
UNRRA did not long out-live the League with its relief operation wound down 
towards the end of 1946 and its last staff appointment terminating in 1949. 
The assumption of the U.N.O. of the activities of the League of Nations was 
a painstaking affair. The U.N.O., like the League before it, was initially intended as a 
security organisation first and foremost. Mitrany observed in 1948 that it was 
unfortunate that political schemes had been paramount to the creation of the new 
international organisation, rather than a promotion of economic and social 
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cooperation as a means of promoting peace and prosperity.
293
 As a result of its 
preoccupation with security matters, most the League’s technical agencies outlived 
the political organs by many months.  In December 1945 the U.N. Preparatory 
Commission established a Commission on Narcotic Drugs (C.N.D.) which League 
opium officials such as Steinig and Felkin came to lead.
294
 The Interim Commission 
of the new World Health Organisation (WHO) established an office in the Palais des 
Nations in 1946 and former officials of the League’s Health Organisation were 
among the first members of its administrative and technical staff.
295
 Dr Yves Biraud 
was appointed executive secretary of the Interim Commission providing continuity 
and contacts between the new health organisation and the old.
296
 The opium and 
health functions of the League’s technical services were transferred to the U.N.O. on 
1 September 1946 and the library services were handed over the following month. 
The activities of the League’s Social Section, its reports into the traffic of women 
and children, the prevention of obscene publications and child welfare were also 
assumed by the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. in autumn 1946.  
As many of the League’s technical services were transferred to the U.N. 
while certain work programmes were still being pursued, their resulting studies were 
published by the League under its name though paid for by the United Nations 
Organisation.
297
 Sir Hugh Emerson devoted a great deal of time to advising the 
ECOSOC on the creation of a new refugee organisation to replace that of his office. 
Emerson helped draft a budget for the first year of the new international refugee 
organisation, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(U.N.H.C.R.).
298
 This body assumed responsibility for the League’s Nansen 
refugees.
299
 Claudena Skraan argued that the U.N.H.C.R’s politically neutral 
approach and its emphasis on the authority of the high commissioner bear the 
imprint of the League’s first high commissioner and one of its most influential 
international civil servants, Fridtjof Nansen.
300
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Following the legal transfer of the material asserts of the League to the 
U.N.O., the fate of the League archives still weighed heavily upon Lester’s mind. In 
February 1947 Lester wrote to Moderow expressing the hope that at an appropriate 
time in the future, the authorities of the United Nations might consider ways and 
means of arranging the League archives to be so disposed so that serious students of 
international affairs would be permitted, with all proper precautions, to make use of 
them.
301
 The permanent Secretariat of the U.N. was still being constructed at this 
time and Moderow stressed that the priority was to maintain open access to files 
which assisted it in its work.
302
 A former League official, Bertil Renborg, then in the 
employ of the U.N., was eager to assure Lester that the records of the old 
organisation would be looked after. According to Renborg, the U.N.O. was 
extremely mindful of the fact that the records of the League constituted an 
‘irreplaceable and invaluable record of the history of international co-operation 
between the two world wars’ as well as being of great use to the specialised technical 
agencies of the U.N.
303
 As the Palais des Nations became the headquarters for most 
of the successors of the League’s technical agencies it became easier to ensure the 
integrity of League archives. Arthur de Brechya-Vauthier retained his position in the 
Rockefeller Library and by 1959, as U.N. librarian, received full custody, for the 
Library, of all League archives.
304
 The establishment of the United Nations Office at 
Geneva (UNOG) and the survival of the Rockefeller Library demonstrated that while 
Europe had lost its geo-political supremacy, it remained an important location for 
international endeavours.  
Ultimately the I.L.O., having severed its connection with the League, was not 
adopted by a new parent organisation until the winter of 1946. In Phelan’s 1946 
report, submitted to the Montreal meeting of International Labour Conference, he 
reminded delegates that the League had largely ‘acted as the I.L.O.’s banker’ from 
whom overdrafts were available when necessary; when the relationship between the 
I.L.O. and its parent organisation was ended the I.L.O. was obliged to devise new 
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means to manage its own finances.
305
 During the process of the dissolution and the 
liquidation of the League, Jacklin provided assistance to the new finance committee 
of the I.L.O. as it came to grips with its new level of financial autonomy. The I.L.O. 
had continuously acted out against the authority of its parent organisation throughout 
its history, especially during the war years. However in his 1946 report Phelan took 
the time to thank the League, especially its Supervisory Commission, for its role in 
the post-war survival of the I.L.O. and in protecting the assets of the organisation 
during negotiations with the U.N. Preparatory Commission: 
 
As the I.L.O. takes over many new financial responsibilities, it does so with a 
sincere sense of gratitude to those who for many years carried these burdens 
with courage and efficiency on its behalf, and in particular to Mr. Carl 
Hambro, the Chairman of the SC, to Sir Cecil Kisch, its vice-chairman and 
Reporter, and to the secretary-general of the League, Mr. Seán Lester, and the 
Treasurer, Mr. Seymour Jacklin.
306
 
 
In his 1946 director’s report, Phelan also offered a retrospective on the often 
commentated rivalry between his office and the League. Phelan owned friction 
between the League and the I.L.O. was sometimes prevalent but claimed that such 
stories ‘had their origin perhaps in echoes of the liveliness of the discussions which 
ignored the mutually satisfactory results to which those discussions led.’ 307 Lester’s 
wartime exasperation with the preferential treatment accorded to the I.L.O. by the 
Supervisory Commission and the tensions between Loveday’s Princeton office and 
Phelan’s Montreal branch was completely devoid of any semblance of ‘mutual 
satisfaction.’ The League asked too much of the U.N. Preparatory Commission in the 
winter of 1945-6 by requesting an en-bloc transfer of functions and staff when its 
technical organisations showed no inclination to be treated as such a bloc. In his 
1946 report Phelan lamented the lack of an international organisation competent to 
take decisions in the economic sphere that would complement the I.L.O.’s actions in 
the social sphere.
308
 By failing to allude to Loveday’s E.F.O. in his 1946 report, 
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Phelan demonstrated the complete lack of organisational unity which facilitated the 
piecemeal transfer of the technical functions of the League to the U.N.O.  
 Ultimately Phelan was appointed director-general of the I.L.O. in September 
1946 and the title was conferred upon him retroactively, from the moment he 
assumed the duties of acting director. In this way Phelan provided continuity for the 
I.L.O. between the League of Nations era and that of the United Nations. At the 1945 
session of the International Labour Conference delegates had approved a draft 
agreement drawn up by a negotiating committee of the I.L.O. and its counterparts in 
the ECOSOC of the U.N.
309
 In May 1946 the agreement was endorsed by the 
leadership of the United Nations and of the I.L.O. in which the two organisations 
agreed to collaborate in the fullest extent in matters of finance and administration 
with steps taken to incorporate the budget of the I.L.O. into the general budget of the 
U.N. Phelan insisted in his 1946 report that the agreement prefigured a relationship 
of partnership, but not of subordination.
310
 This agreement was submitted to the 
General Assembly of the U.N. in December 1946 where it was approved. The I.L.O. 
thus became the first specialised agency of the U.N. under article fifty-seven of the 
Charter. Trygve Lie informed the delegates of the International Labour Conference, 
assembled in Montreal in 1946 that the ‘successful experience of the International 
Labour Organisation was the most important single factor in developing the new idea 
of specialised agencies.’311 Despite its wartime promise the I.L.O. found it difficult 
to adjust to the post-war climate; much to its disappointment the language of social 
justice as articulated by the Philadelphia Declaration was eclipsed by ‘a more 
constrained approach to social rights in an international order that privileged the 
rights of the market.’312 As it transpired the Soviet Union did not return to the I.L.O. 
until 1954.
313
 Unlike with the League system, membership of the I.L.O. was no 
longer automatic upon entry into the U.N.O. In some respects this distinction 
conferred a greater sense of autonomy on the I.L.O. but also risked its ability to work 
as a universal and extensive network for international labour reform.  
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Once the material assets of the League had been disposed Lester then 
oversaw the financial liquidation of the League in 1946-7. Defaulting member states 
such as Mexico, Panama, Cuba, Ecuador, Argentina, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, 
Thailand, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Luxembourg, Ireland, Sweden and Portugal cleared their 
arrears before formal liquidation.
314
 The United Kingdom, in reflection of the role it 
played in bearing a great deal of the financial burden of keeping the League alive 
during the war years received the largest share in League assets. The U.K's share 
amounted to seventeen per cent of the whole, followed by France with almost twelve 
percent.
315
 Ultimately the only states whose arrears proved too great to allow for a 
share in assets were the following: Albania, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Liberia, Paraguay 
and Spain.
316
  Lester wound up the activities of the League’s Board of Liquidation in 
August 1947. 
In December 1945 Lester had written to Frank Walters complaining that ‘a 
few ill-bred bounders have not been lacking who may think I am hanging around 
with my eye on a job.’317  However Lester clearly did not entertain any serious 
ambitions for further international and diplomatic service. Once Lester’s tenure as 
secretary-general had successfully been completed he was offered diplomatic posts 
in New York, Brussels, Stockholm and Pretoria by the Irish Department of External 
Affairs but none of these positions excited his interest.
318
 Trygve Lie continued to 
correspond with Lester and expressed his gratitude for ‘the helpfulness and patience’ 
the latter exhibited during transfer and liquidation proceedings. Lie identified 
himself as Lester’s successor and promised the former League chief that he would do 
his utmost to ‘carry on the task of secretary-general to the best of his ability.319 
Demonstrating the esteem and respect in which he was held by his peers, in 1948 Lie 
personally requested Lester to act as his representative as head of a commission 
established by the Security Council to deal with the India-Pakistan border dispute in 
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Kashmir. Lester declined this position due to personal reasons.
320
 Lester would later 
decline another United Nations post with the Palestine Conciliation Commission. 
Upon the liquidation of the League, Lester was approaching his sixtieth birthday and 
was worn out by the exertion and exile of the previous few years.
321
 He retired to 
Ireland to indulge his passion for trout fishing. He died in Connemara in 1959.  
While it is important to take account of the important political and 
organisational difficulties between the League and the U.N.O. it is also worth 
emphasising that the secondment of former League officials into the U.N. Secretariat 
provided the new organisation with a tradition of international civil service dating 
back to 1919. The experience and perspective former League officials could bring to 
the new organisation was unique, helping to build upon what was useful and discard 
what was outmoded. Arthur Sweetser was personally asked by Trygve Lie to come 
to New York to assist with the construction of a permanent secretariat. Sweetser 
wrote that, due to his past League experience, five members of the Security Council 
called him by his first name and stressed that the whole ‘web and network of 
experience’ accrued during the twenty-six years of the ‘first experiment’ could not 
be discarded.
322
 In a speech about the transition from the League to the United 
Nations, Sweetser claimed that ‘he felt like man on his second honeymoon who is 
asked to speak about his first wife.’ 323  The professional jealousies and rivalries 
between the former League officials and their colleagues began to disappear when 
the U.N. Secretariat became more comfortable in its own skin and more receptive to 
the voice of experience. As Sweetser wrote to Lester in 1949 ‘the U.N. boys are 
beginning to realise they have not got all the answers and that others have done good 
work in this field before.’324  
Within this promising new international civil service Sweetser was not the 
only high profile former League official to make an invaluable contribution; there 
are many notable examples. Alexander Loveday assisted in the construction of the 
ECOSOC of the U.N. and by 1946 was advising the U.N. economic and employment 
department. Loveday was never seconded to the U.N. Like Lester he was 
overworked and decided instead to go into academia becoming a fellow of Oxford’s 
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Nuffield College in 1946 and then warden in 1950.
325
 He was replaced as head of 
League mission in the United States by Angsar Rosenberg who wound up the 
Princeton Office of the E.F.O.
326
 Adrianus Pelt, the former officer of the League 
Secretariat who represented the U.N. at the League’s final Assembly, rose to succeed 
Moderow as director of the European office of the United Nations in Geneva. The 
former director of the League’s Health Organisation, Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, became 
the first chairman of UNICEF. Alfred Zimmern, a former contributor to the League’s 
work in international cooperation, played a role in formation of UNESCO.
327
 
Valentin Stencek was also seconded to the World Health Organisation. Frank 
Walters spent several months in New York in 1952 as an independent chairman of 
the commission inaugurated to determine which members of the U.N. Secretariat 
should be granted permanent contracts. Veterans of the League’s international civil 
service, Thanasiss Aghnides, Irishman Martin Hill and Frenchman Henri Vigier held 
the distinction of having served under the authority of six secretaries-general, from 
Sir Eric Drummond of the League to U-Thant of the United Nations. 
In conclusion, the transition from the League to the United Nations cannot be 
characterised as either a clean break or as the direct transplanting of the liberal 
internationalist tradition from the old organisation to the new. The abandonment of 
juridical equality among all member states and the moves to limit overt League 
influence on the creation of the new organisation reflected the different political 
landscapes that shaped the two international institutions. The League experience was 
shaped by Eurocentrism; the United Nations experience would be characterised by 
the rivalry of the two superpowers. The continued predication on state sovereignty 
and the transfer of personnel from the League to the U.N.O. demonstrated that the 
same national anxieties persisted as well as the same international aspirations. 
Though the end of the League was in sight by late 1944, member states refused to 
de-politicise it and its last Assembly was the scene for traditional diplomatic 
controversies and in-fighting among member states of an organisation that struggled 
to reconcile national ambitions with international cooperation. Despite the various 
obstacles Lester and his staff achieved an orderly dissolution and liquidation. The 
I.L.O. and the other technical organisations, with much difficulty, ensured arguably 
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the most tangible post-war legacy for the first experiment in international 
cooperation. Though the U.N. was not the natural child of the League it was its 
technocratic heir, expanding the old organisation’s tradition of international civil 
service.  
309 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Considerable progress has been made in recent years in shattering both the 
narrow dismissal of the League of Nations as a failure in security and rejecting the 
‘popular caricature of its farcical disarmament programme.’ 1  However historical 
understanding of the League will remain incomplete as long as insufficient credit is 
accorded to its wartime record. The wartime preservation of the League of Nations 
was not a hollow or perfunctory act. This thesis documents the political value and 
technical potential member states continued to invest in the League as a vehicle for 
liberal internationalism in a time of war. It particularly illuminates the challenges 
confronted by a pioneering international civil service engaged in international 
diplomacy. Though certain events and episodes within the League’s wartime 
experience were unique to this particular period, the vast majority reflected or were 
indicative of the historic challenges it faced as an organisation predicated on national 
sovereignty, trying to facilitate international cooperation. This thesis demonstrates 
that the period 1939-47, traditionally accorded little priority in League 
historiography, must now begin to be integrated within historical accounts of the 
organisation itself as well as within the wider narrative of international cooperation. 
As this thesis attests, such an approach allows the historian to appreciate the residual 
problems of inter-war international cooperation and to anticipate the mounting 
challenges of post-war internationalism. 
The League of Nations maintained a political presence to complement its 
technical role during the Second World War. Previous historians have shown a 
marked indifference to the last years of the League on the grounds that its collective 
security potential had foundered by the mid-1930s; thus the League’s wartime 
experience has been ignored by general histories of the organisation and of 
international relations.
2
 However as the League never functioned convincingly as a 
security organisation this constitutes an inadequate justification for the neglect of the 
League’s wartime history. The significance of the sessions of the League Assembly 
and Council in December 1939 underline the prematurity of presenting the League as 
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politically irrelevant. That is not to say that the significance of this episode is 
predicated on its diplomatic outcome. Bearing in mind the wise words of caution 
offered by Susan Pedersen on the difficulty in offering a revisionist reading of the 
League’s security record, it was not the intention of this project to serve as an 
apologia for the League’s failure in the diplomatic sphere.3 Few historians, apprised 
of the reality of the League’s experience, could endorse Robert Cecil’s often-quoted 
defence of the organisation: ‘The League of Nations has not been tried and found 
wanting; it has been found inconvenient and not tried.’4 The problematic decision, on 
the part of League member states, to expel the Soviet Union demonstrated that 
League machinery when tried, could be found wanting. The resulting League 
resolutions were more an exercise in collective anti-communism than collective 
security; it did little to help Finland, ignored the reality of geo-politics, risked 
compounding the vulnerability of the small states and was later hijacked by Britain 
and France for their own war aims. Yet while the Assembly and Council resolutions 
were an incomplete exercise it does not follow that this exercise was politically 
insignificant. This thesis demonstrated that historians do not have to prioritise the 
technical League over its political counterpart to obtain a fresh perspective of its 
history. However the approach of the new wave of technical histories provided the 
inspiration for a more nuanced reading of the League’s political record so that the 
thesis could determine what the League ‘meant’ to member states on a political 
level.
5
  
Within this paradigm this thesis has determined that the League Assembly 
and Council sessions of 1939 are significant for their articulation of what member 
states hoped to derive from continued association with the organisation. This thesis 
endorses Steiner’s assertions that the League’s political organs never really 
functioned as executive agents in their own right.
6
 The League was not a 
supranational organ but a reflection of the international aspirations of its member 
states. As a result the organisation underwent several transformations in 
correspondence to the wider changes in the international landscape. By 1939, 
following years of appeasement and the practise of exclusive diplomatic conferences 
                                                          
3
 Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’, p. 1092.   
4
 Raffo, The League of Nations, p. 8.  
5
 Pedersen discussed the need to focus not on what the League failed to do but on what it ‘did and 
meant’ in the article ‘Back to the League of Nations’, p. 1092.  
6
 Steiner, The lights that failed, p. 299.  
311 
 
on the part of the great powers, the League was not expected to function as a 
decisive instrument in international affairs. It was valued less by member states for 
what it could do than for its symbolism as an international organisation predicated on 
sovereign equality and peaceful cooperation. The League’s political identity 
superseded its political role and, in consequence, fatally undermined the League’s 
ability to operate as an objective diplomatic agent. This process was inevitable and 
deliberate in an organisation so imbued with the liberal democratic ethos of its 
founders that was born, as Henig argued, into a world not really prepared for its 
security potential.
7
 It functioned less as a collective alliance than as what Mazower 
described as a ‘coalition of like-minded states.’8 It was not a collective military 
alliance but a shared accord on international standards of behaviour. During 
expulsion proceedings the League was presented by sympathetic elements as a 
‘forum of world opinion’ but this opinion was confined to those who shared the 
same cultural conceptions of government.
9
 As Kitchen argued, the League was 
powerless to deal with states who despised the principles of liberal democracy.
10
 The 
Soviet Union had ignored the League’s liberal ethos in 1934 on the grounds of its 
security potential but by 1939 that potential was spent. League member states could 
not agree to collective action to save Finland in the Assembly of 1939 but could 
agree on at least one central element of the League’s political identity: a shared 
distrust of communism. 
The League sought to universalise liberal democracy but it certainly did not 
create a framework for universal membership. The League’s political identity helped 
secure the organisation’s wartime preservation but when the Soviet Union emerged 
as a key player in the international landscape that same political identity determined 
the organisation’s post-war dissolution. The Soviet experience of the League of 
Nations foreshadowed the ideological showdown between east and west in the 
United Nations General Assembly. While the United Nations Organisation was 
predicated more on realpolitk than the rhetoric of liberal democracy, the growing 
bipolarity of the General Assembly by the 1950s further demonstrated that 
international cooperation was a relative and ideologically driven concept.  
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 Within the League apparatus member states and League officials did not 
always entertain the same expectations of and aspirations for the organisation. As 
long as member states were comfortable within the liberal atmosphere of Geneva, 
the League offered a remarkably malleable and protean form of internationalism; the 
League could be many things to many people. The League’s predication on liberal 
democracy ensured that it could never be apolitical; however during the war there 
was considerable debate as to whether or not the organisation should take sides in the 
fray or remain neutral. The European neutrals were not excluded from the League 
system despite their refusal to participate in the Assembly resolutions of 1939. 
Though they declined to engage with the League’s political activities they did not 
absent themselves from the proceedings of the League’s political organs or renounce 
their membership. This was indicative of the League’s role as an important 
barometer of independence and sovereignty. Whereas Wylie asserted that the League 
had a ‘corrosive’ effect upon neutrality, this thesis demonstrates that the League’s 
accommodation of neutrality corroded the League’s ability to serve as a mouthpiece 
in international law, prevented as it was, from denouncing ‘the chief author’ of the 
wider European crisis.
11
 Lester’s Secretariat was held ransom by the scruples of the 
Swiss Federal Council, unable to denounce the repressive excess of the Axis 
occupation of Europe or to speak out against the violent appropriation of the 
sovereign territory of League member states.
12
 It is ironic but perhaps ultimately 
fitting that the League’s wartime history should be shaped more by the principles of 
neutrality than the tenets of collective security. The growing ambivalence of the 
neutrals towards League membership, as the disparate technical organisations 
became increasingly aligned with the Allied bloc, foreshadowed the eventual 
incongruity of neutrality within the post-war international system; an international 
system that was less ‘a coalition of like-minded states’ than the continuation of the 
wartime alliance.   
As the wartime activities of the international civil service were largely 
confined to the technical sphere, it is significant that membership continued to pose 
problems for the neutral member states. Whereas the Geneva-based nucleus of the 
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League was deprived of a political voice, the transferred technical organisations were 
vocal supporters of the Allied war effort. As the League’s wartime history 
demonstrated, the acceptance of a division between the League’s technical work and 
its political agenda must surely be regarded as a redundant concept by historians and 
scholars of international organisations.
13
 Member states certainly made no distinction 
with most of the European neutrals failing to dispatch delegates to the New York 
Conference of the I.L.O. in 1941. The refusal of the United States to accord the 
transferred missions official status further demonstrated the symbiosis of the 
‘political’ and ‘technical’ League. The successive conferences of the I.L.O. as well 
as the writings and public speeches by other League officials such as Alexander 
Loveday and Arthur Sweetser, invoked the moral judgment of the Covenant at a time 
when the League’s political organs could not. The organic relationship between the 
League’s political foundations and the activities of its technical agencies 
demonstrated that while Lester’s Geneva-based nucleus may have striven for 
objectivity, it was ultimately an elusive goal, within an organisation encumbered 
with considerable ideological baggage.  
It was remarkable that the League did not become an inter-Allied 
organisation considering its parentage and raison d’être. The League functioned as 
an expression of liberal internationalism against the backdrop of a war that was 
characterised, by Allied propaganda, as a showdown between the forces of 
totalitarianism and democracy. The fact that the League did not become an inter-
Allied agency cannot solely be attributed to the scruples of its host country and to 
those of the other European neutrals. The neutrals were, after all, small states 
dependent upon the whims of the great powers. Their continued membership of the 
League was certainly not a painless exercise from a diplomatic point of view with 
the Reich Foreign Ministry subjecting the Swiss, Swedish and Finnish governments 
to awkward questions on their respective League policies. The Geneva-based 
nucleus of the Secretariat and technical organisations was, in turn, reluctant to sever 
useful links within the countries of occupied and neutral Europe so as not to 
diminish the League’s role as the source and disseminator of crucial social and 
economic data. Furthermore the British government was actually reluctant to 
undermine the League’s role as a vehicle for international cooperation between the 
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Allies and the neutral powers. Thus continued British membership and championship 
of the League was designed to demonstrate to the world that the United Kingdom 
was not simply driven by its own commercial and colonial interests. The language of 
the Covenant proved useful to all those states that sought association with a liberal 
democratic system and the peaceful ordering of international affairs. In this way, 
states whose national sovereignties were under threat, or who sought to distance 
themselves from expansionist regimes, ascribed a particular importance to wartime 
membership of the League of Nations. Retaining headquarters in Geneva and 
providing information services to neutral and belligerent alike, afforded the League a 
special distinction in the polarised atmosphere of war and stood in stark contrast to 
the early exclusivity of the United Nations Organisation.  
The League’s Eurocentrism was challenged during the war but was not 
defeated. Initially, the transfer of its technical agencies to the United States reflected 
and foreshadowed the diminishing geo-political importance of Europe. The transfer 
led the directors of the technical organisations to concentrate their work programmes 
more on American issues, with the League’s technical agencies operating as vehicles 
for pan-American cooperation. The opposition provoked by such a development 
from the secretary-general and the British government, ostensibly on the basis that 
the League should not renounce its intercontinental ambitions, betrayed the real 
anxiety that its European parentage and practices would be effaced; for in reality, 
despite its globalist aspirations, the League had always functioned as a regionalist 
organisation. The League’s Eurocentrism was not regarded as a fault; rather the 
maintenance of League headquarters in Geneva served a symbolic purpose as a 
repudiation of the permanence of Hitler’s European empire. The technical officials 
courted the United States and were gratified by its attentions. However the dismay of 
League officials upon their realisation that the New World was not simply going to 
be incorporated into the new international framework, but was likely to eclipse the 
Old World within it, demonstrated that they deemed the internationalist tradition to 
be firmly welded to European political and cultural traditions. Identifying the 
processes that lead to the distillation of the European influence on the United 
Nations Organisation and chronicling the evolution of a more internationally 
representative Secretariat, while beyond the scope of this thesis, would add a 
fascinating dimension to the history of international cooperation. Clavin’s recent 
investigation of the similarities between the economic policies of the E.F.O. and 
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CAP opens up an exciting and original avenue of research; it raises an interesting 
question as to whether League historians should consider the Eurocentric League, 
despite its notable lack of supranational function, as having a greater affinity with the 
E.E.C. and E.U., than with the globalist U.N.O.
14
  
This thesis has found that the League’s wartime experience reflected (though, 
as discussed above, it did not always emulate) the growing Atlanticism of 
international affairs. The wartime history of the League of Nations permitted a 
further insight into the relationship between the United States and the League of 
Nations. Before the outbreak of war, American foreign policy was certainly not 
untouched by the League or the League by American interests.
15
 The transfer of the 
technical agencies of the League to American soil marked the culmination of a long 
and often overlooked record of informal collaboration between the organisation and 
elements in the United States. This working relationship intensified as the war wore 
on with former and current League officials making a significant contribution to 
post-war planning; influencing the development of Allied agencies such as the F.A.O. 
and UNRRA as well as the State Department’s plans for a new world organisation. 
The I.L.O. enjoyed a special distinction because of U.S. membership of the 
organisation. During the war years the United States used the platform of the 
International Labour Conference to pledge its commitment to post-war 
reconstruction and to signal its willingness to take a leading role in international 
affairs; so much so that the U.S. government, by the time of the Philadelphia 
Conference, was treating the I.L.O. as an extension of American foreign policy.  
Indeed, this thesis endorses Dunbabin’s rejection of the argument that 
American membership of the League would have resulted in a more proactive 
organisation, with the United States less likely to pursue a self-interested foreign 
policy outside the bounds of the Covenant or to manipulate the League to achieve its 
own ends.
16
  The United States, as a non-member state, proved just as willing as the 
European great powers, to exploit the machinery of the League. The Roosevelt 
administration presented a bogus and self-serving dissonance between the League’s 
technical activities and the political ethos of the Covenant. It reaped the benefit of 
the various studies of the technical organisations while denying the transferred 
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missions official status. Its officials and diplomats availed of the resources of the 
League’s Rockefeller Library and of the expertise of its former and current officials 
in the preparations for a new world organisation, but failed to accord the old 
organisation a prominent position at the San Francisco Conference. American 
engagement with the League’s technical mission allowed the U.S. government to 
serve an informal apprenticeship in international cooperation before it spearheaded 
plans for a new organisation; in doing so it enjoyed the special distinction as the only 
member of the Big Four untainted by the past ignominies of the League’s diplomatic 
mission. The United States government drew on the twenty-six year experience of 
the League of Nations in order to present the United Nations organisation as a new 
and groundbreaking project.  
This thesis cannot posit that American influence on the United Nations 
Organisation forms part of a neat narrative where the ambitions of Woodrow Wilson 
are finally brought to realisation by the U.S congressional approval of the United 
Nations Charter.
17
 While historians of U.S. foreign policy should continue their 
efforts to chronicle American engagement with the League it would be unwise to 
exaggerate the Wilsonian tradition within the Roosevelt administration or over-
emphasise the League’s influence on American foreign policy. Roosevelt’s earlier 
statement that the League of Nations, by the 1930s, ‘was not the League conceived 
by Woodrow Wilson’ was a telling insight into his administration’s complex attitude 
towards the organisation.
18
 Despite the nature of its conception, the League was 
never really the embodiment of Woodrow Wilson’s particular branch of 
internationalism. The absence of the United States from the League meant that the 
organisation could not be used, as Wilson hoped, as the means to bring the vibrant 
ideals of the new world to improve upon the stale standards of the old.
19
 The refusal 
of the United States to participate in a formal system of international cooperation 
meant that Britain and France were able to artificially prolong the Eurocentrism of 
international affairs. The profound repercussions of the fall of France and Vichy’s 
withdrawal from the League demonstrated how intrinsic French foreign and 
domestic policy was to the League experience. The reliance of the League on the 
wartime support of the British Empire and Commonwealth pointed to the important, 
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even pre-eminent, position of Britain within the liberal internationalist tradition. 
After twenty-six years of Anglo-French dominance the League could not be 
resurrected to preside over the era of European political decline. By 1945 the United 
States was no longer willing to engage in internationalism as a leader among equals, 
but as a superpower was poised to act as the driving force of international affairs. 
Instead of congressional intransigence, this time round it was the presence of the 
Soviet Union that prevented the new world organisation becoming a vehicle for 
American exceptionalism.  
The discord between the various technical organisations and their isolation 
from Lester’s Geneva nucleus cannot be blamed entirely on the attitude of the 
Roosevelt administration. The ambiguity of American foreign policy towards the 
League facilitated and compounded the dissonance between the disparate elements 
of the international civil service, but it was not the initial cause of that disharmony. 
Upon the eve of war the proposals of the Bruce Committee demonstrated that 
institutional incoherence was already a problem within the League apparatus, a 
problem that was exacerbated by the practical pressures of separation during the war 
years. There can be nothing but agreement with the various scholars who cited the 
League’s technical organisations as the most successful features of its existence.20 
However just as the flaws of the League’s security credentials have been laid bare by 
generations of historians, the faults within the League’s technical agencies also need 
to be understood. Centripetal forces were as important a factor in the dissolution of 
the League as centrifugal pressure with the secretary-general unable to preserve the 
institutional integrity of the League apparatus. The dissonance wilfully imposed 
between the technical agencies and the Geneva Secretariat meant that the League’s  
international civil service was taking itself apart before the process of dissolution and 
the transfer of functions had even begun.  
The League’s wartime experience also permits additional insights into the 
character of its international civil service. League officials were not the ‘civic 
monks’ as depicted by de Madariaga but a collection of political animals.21 In a time 
of extreme politics the League’s Secretariat was subject to extreme pressure. The 
impact of the fall of France on the League’s administrative and technical organs 
during the summer of 1940 demonstrate the fallacy of depicting the organisation as 
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being untouched by the reality of the conflict.
22
 The position of secretary-general 
required a combination of skills rarely united in the one person; that of a politician 
and a technocrat. While League member states may not have traditionally desired the 
secretary-general to assume a political role within the Assembly and Council, that 
did not mean that he lacked political influence or that his personal politics would 
have no bearing on relations with member states or on the activities of the 
international civil service. In the summer of 1940 the controversial actions of Joseph 
Avenol illustrated the political sensitivity of the office of the secretary-general. It 
underscored the need to ensure that the secretary-general, no matter how able an 
administrator or technocrat, displayed sound political judgement. Joseph Avenol’s 
dramatic fall from grace also demonstrated the centrality of liberal idealism to the 
esprit de corps of the Secretariat; Avenol was certainly one of the ‘opportunistic 
time-servers’ of Pedersen’s description.23 As a result of the growing isolation of 
Geneva and because of the delicate relations between the League and the Swiss 
Confederation, Avenol’s pro-Allied successor, Seán Lester, experienced a curb to 
both the administrative functions and political influence of the office of secretary-
general. However through his participation in negotiations with the U.N. Preparatory 
Commission and by his dignified and orderly handling of dissolution, despite many 
obstacles and potential controversies, Lester settled the question as to whether a 
small-state national could meet the responsibilities of secretary-general. The 
League’s wartime experience also demonstrated the need for the secretary-general 
and for the directors of the technical organisation to operate as pragmatic optimists, 
within a political climate not always amenable to the survival or the expansion of 
international cooperation.  
The League’s wartime experience demonstrated that it was not just the 
position of secretary-general that could have a determining impact on the fate of the 
international civil service. Lester’s isolation allowed the other personalities within 
the League umbrella to assume a more prominent place. Carl Hambro the chairman 
of the Supervisory Commission was instrumental in securing the necessary 
budgetary arrangements to ensure the League’s wartime survival. The League’s 
treasurer Seymour Jacklin ensured the League’s continued solvency, facilitating a 
straightforward transfer of assets from the League to the U.N. Alexander Loveday’s 
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proactive leadership of the E.F.O. allowed it to fulfil its potential and to make an 
invaluable contribution to U.N. agencies. Through their wartime collaboration with 
United Nations agencies, figures such as Hugh Emerson and Raymond Guatier 
ensured a technocratic continuity between the League’s technical organisations and 
bodies such as the U.N.H.C.R. and WHO. While the post-war survival of the I.L.O. 
within the U.N. umbrella can be attributed to the significant governmental support 
the organisation enjoyed, Edward Phelan’s often combative directorship ensured that 
the I.L.O. retained the sufficient funds and presence to make a post-war impact.  
Within the League apparatus sovereignty was regarded by national politicians 
as the basis, rather than as the obstacle, for international cooperation. There was no 
question of conferring upon the League supranational functions with the 
organisation’s ambitions for international social and economic reform often road-
blocked by nervous member states.
24
 Though internationalism experienced a 
renaissance during the latter period of the war, the same apprehension about a world 
government persisted and undermined the ability of the League’s technical 
organisations to make a domestic impact on post-war planning. Many League 
officials were aware that national ambitions and the goals of international 
cooperation could never be reconciled as long as sovereignty remained a sacred cow. 
On the other hand, the technical organisations made the greatest inroads into the 
domestic affairs of member states than the political organs could ever hope to.
25
 
During the war national parliaments and governments continued to request statistical 
information and assistance from the League’s ‘clearing house of ideas.’ Despite the 
scruples of national governments towards endowing the League with executive 
authority in political matters, the technical organisations were thus able to achieve a 
domestic and international impact by the back door. While the technical officials 
could not operate as direct agents in wartime relief and post-war reconstruction 
measures, their work influenced that of national governments and resonated within 
the new Economic and Social Council of the U.N. 
Ashworth’s assertion that historians and scholars of international relations 
should avoid interpreting the past only as it related to the present and should not 
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succumb to Whig histories of progress, has been a guiding principle of the work.
26
 
As the episodes and developments within the period 1939-47 illustrated, it would be 
an overly problematic exercise to engage in a narrative on the ‘progression’ from the 
League to the present day United Nations. Indeed many contemporaries regarded it 
as a regression, a betrayal of liberal internationalism in favour of nineteenth century-
style diplomacy dominated by the chancelleries of the great powers. The new 
organisation was, in Mazower’s words, the ‘return to principles of Concert 
diplomacy.’27 In fact, as the diplomatic sidelining of the League in the 1930s attests, 
the great powers had never truly abandoned concert diplomacy; the United Nations 
Organisation constituted a more honest attempt to reconcile international cooperation 
with the reality of great power relations. However, due to the residual influence of 
liberal internationalism, the establishment of the U.N.O. was not universally 
regarded as a maturation of the practise of international cooperation. It aroused 
significant criticism for its veto and exclusivity and retained the trappings of 
sovereignty as the foundation of international cooperation. However the United 
Nations was a product of the evolution of international affairs, when the political and 
military cooperation of the great powers, rather than shared moral values and cultural 
codes, was considered the essential precondition for international security. In this 
way the United Nations was a product of both the ‘idealist’ and the bourgeoning 
‘realist’ interpretations of international relations. The creation of the Security 
Council constituted an effort to tackle the type of great power intransigence criticised 
by Cecil and Walters while the exclusivity of that organ was a clear, if not 
universally popular, reflection of the reality of international affairs. The transition 
from the old organisation to the new was marked by continuities in tradition as well 
departures in practice. While internationalism was still a divisive subject, there 
remained an enduring acceptance that the goals of peace, security and social justice 
should be pursued through the mechanisms of international organisations. The 
transfer of functions from the U.N.O. to the League was not an organic process but 
the significant number of League personnel within the U.N. Secretariat ensured that 
a level of technocratic continuity was maintained between the old organisation and 
the new. The transition from the League to the U.N.O. demonstrated that this 
tradition of international civil service, characterised and sustained by its remarkable 
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optimism and idealism, was sobered but not beaten by its greatest challenge; the 
Second World War. 
In conclusion, this thesis sought to avoid the bipolarity of the traditional 
narratives of the League’s history. As Lucian Ashworth argued, the terms realist and 
idealist are misnomers when applied to complex and varied attitudes of League 
apologists and critics.
28
 The abandonment of the realist and idealist epithets allows 
the history of the League to open a multiplicity of interpretations. The flawed logic 
of League officials as they defended the Eurocentric and universalist tradition of the 
old organisation when faced with the innovation of the new, coupled with their 
pragmatic approach to the League’s preservation, demonstrate that the history of the 
League contains more nuance than can be explained within the realist/idealist debate. 
The lack of unity within the League’s international civil service and the dearth of 
consensus within the wider internationalist debate illustrate the intricate and 
chimerical qualities of international organisations. The abandonment of the 
traditional approach to League historiography permitted this thesis to become less 
focused on whether the organisation was a positive or negative force so that its 
complexities and impact are studied for their own significance. At the same time this 
thesis is more overtly concerned with the political aspects of the League’s existence 
than the new wave of technical-focused histories usually allow. By reconciling 
aspects of these disparate historiographical traditions, this thesis has been able to 
present a more holistic study of the League’s wartime experience by examining the 
political motivations and impact of the League’s wartime technical programmes. The 
wartime experience of the League of Nations allows a bridge to be made between the 
pre-war traditions of internationalism, dominated by the chancelleries of Europe and 
its post-war evolution, determined by the emergence of two global superpowers. The 
primary sources attest that, due to the wartime preservation of the League, liberal 
internationalism was not a spectre of the interwar years; neither was there any 
interregnum in international organisation between 1939 and 1945. It is now time for 
historians to cease imposing such an artificial interlude within the narrative of 
international cooperation.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
 
List of material assets of the League (in Swiss francs, C.H.F.).
 
 
 
 
 
Source: General report of the finance committee to the assembly, 17 Apr. 1946 
(T.N.A., FO 371/57007, p. 17).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 According to the exchange rate set by the Bretton Woods agreements the equivalent in U.S. dollars 
was approximately $8,960,528.75. According to ‘Measuring worth.com’ a website established by 
Laurence H. Officer, professor of economics at the University of Illinois and Samuel H. Williamson, 
Emeritus professor of economics from Miami University, the relative value of that amount today 
ranges from $72.9-92.1 million. (http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/relativevalue.php) (1 
Aug. 2013).  
Property, League headquarters       38, 576, 958.78
29
  
League library   Donated by John D. Rockefeller jnr.  
(cost of building 5,564,206.22) 
Real estate belonging to the League                   2,889, 453.45  
 
Furniture, fittings, typewriters, etc., in 
League headquarters and in branches 
offices    
1, 886, 522.81 
Furniture, fittings, typewriters, etc. in the 
buildings of the Permanent Court in the 
Hague.  
199,900.20 
Stocks of stationary, office supplies, 
printing paper and equipment in League 
headquarters and branch offices.  
132, 831.17 
Publications: stocks at headquarters and 
in hands of agents (estimated market 
value).  
50,000.00 
Books, stocks of stationary, printing 
paper, publications, office supplies and 
equipment at the Permanent Court in the 
Hague. 
55, 562.35 
Gifts  Donated by member states 
(estimated value 1,234,640.00) 
Library (value of books according  
to inventory) 
1,913, 404.10 
Total material assets  45,704,632.80 
Not including gifts and donations.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Final assembly of the League of Nations: list of present members of the   
League, March 1946.  
1. Afghanistan               23. Iraq 
2. Albania                24. Iran 
3. Argentinean Republic              25. Ireland 
4. Australia                26. Latvia 
5. Belgium                                                               27. Liberia 
6. Bolivia                                                                 28. Lithuania 
7. Bulgaria                                 29. Luxembourg 
8. Canada                30. Mexico  
9. China                                         31. Norway 
10. Colombia                           32. Netherlands 
11. Cuba                33. New Zealand 
12. Czechoslovakia                                                   34. Panama 
13. Denmark                                                             35. Poland 
14. Dominican Republic                                           36. Portugal 
15. Egypt                                                                   37. Siam (Thailand) 
16. Ecuador                                                               38. Sweden 
17. Estonia                                                                39. Switzerland 
18. Ethiopia                                                               40. Turkey 
19. Finland                                                                41. Union of South Africa 
20. France                                                                 42. United Kingdom 
21. Greece                                                                 43. Uruguay 
22. India                                                                     44. Yugoslavia 
United Nations Department 23 March 1946 
Foreign Office S.W.1.  
 
Source: Foreign office memorandum, 23 Mar. 1946 (T.N.A., FO 371/57003 
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Appendix 3 
 
Final share of member states of the U.N.O. in material and liquid assets of 
the League. 
State Share in 
material 
assets (Swiss 
francs) 
Share in 
liquid 
assets 
(Swiss 
francs) 
Total share Percen
tage of 
total 
assets 
1. Afghanistan 35,170.80 8,408.06 43,578.86 0.07 % 
2.  Union of 
South Africa 
1.471, 978. 
70 
351,895.49 1,823,874.19 2.96% 
2. Argentinean 
Republic 
1,789,895. 426,702.04 2,211,597.04 3.59 % 
3. Australia 2,364,469. 47 565,256.72 2,929,726.19 3.76 % 
4. Belgium  1,315,141. 43 314,401.41 1,629,542.84 2.65% 
5. Bolivia 137,395. 71 32,846.22 170,241.93 0.27% 
6. United 
Kingdom 
8,601,392. 44 2,056, 273. 
13 
 10,657, 665. 
57 
17.34
% 
7. Canada 3,116,503. 54 745,040.10 3,861,543. 64 6.28% 
8. China.  1,984,442. 59 474,406.43 2,458,849. 02 4% 
9. Cuba 441,453. 72 105,535.17 546,988.89 0.89% 
10. Denmark  911,603. 17 217,951.97 1,129,645. 14 1.83% 
11. Dominican 
Republic 
54,143.51 12,943.71 67,087.22 0.10% 
12. Egypt  314,004. 77 75,066. 87 389, 071.64 0.63% 
13. Ecuador 15, 971. 41 3,818.19 19,789,60 0.03% 
14. France 5,827,834. 75 1,393,218. 
63 
7,221,053.38 11.75
% 
15. Greece 504,225. 36 71,276. 55 575,501.91 0.93% 
16. India 4,633,454.36 1,107,686. 
67 
5,741,141. 03 9.34% 
17. Iraq 131,081.64 31,336.72 162,418.36 0.26% 
18. Iran 286,583,09 - 286,583.09 0.46% 
19. Luxembour 95,000.16 22,711.01 117,711.17 0.19% 
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g 
20. Mexico 317,348.46 - 317,348.46 0.51% 
21. Norway 742,162.87 177,423. 54 919,586.41 1.49% 
22. New 
Zealand 
778,800.16 186,182. 15 964,982.31 1.57% 
23. Panama 103,022.39 24,628.80 127,651.19 0.2% 
24. Netherlands 1,707,428. 33 408,182. 64 2,115,610. 97 3.44% 
25. Poland 1,166,876. 26 518,019. 55 2,684,895. 81 4.37% 
26. Siam 
(Thailand) 
612,129.94 146,339. 90 758,479. 84 1.23% 
27. Sweden 1,659,574. 77 396,742. 61 2,056,317. 38 3.34% 
28. Czechoslova
kia 
1,910,650. 75 456,765. 56 2,367,416. 31 3.85% 
29. Turkey 436,938.72 104,455. 80  541,394. 52 0.88% 
30. Uruguay 367,005.31 87,737. 30 454,742. 61 0.74% 
31. Yugoslavia 1,365,785. 71 89,359.10 1,455,144. 81 2.36% 
 
 
States not members of the U.N.O. at the moment of liquidation.  
State Share in 
material 
assets 
(Swiss 
francs) 
Share in liquid 
assets (Swiss 
francs) 
Total share Percentage 
of total 
share 
33. Finland - 926,184.20 926,184.20 1.50% 
34. Ireland - 940,118.84 940,118.84 1.53% 
35. Portugal - 859,204.66 859,204.66 1.39% 
36. Switzerland - 1,900,674.58 1,900,674.58 3% 
 
 
Source: Report of the liquidation committee of the League of Nations, 4 Aug. 1947 
(T.N.A., FO 371/67575). 
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